

**e-Szignó Certificate Authority**

**eIDAS conform  
Qualified Certificate for Electronic Signature  
Certification Practice Statement**

**ver. 2.21**

**Date of effect: 2021-03-19**



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Microsec Micro Software Engineering & Consulting Private Company Limited by Shares  
Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13.

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Version	Effect date	Description
2.19	2020-12-15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Introduction of video-based natural person identification in Section 3.2.3.</li><li>- More detailed rules for the Certificate renewal initiated by the Service Provider.</li><li>- Smaller improvements.</li></ul>
2.21	2021-03-19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Upgrading the rules for the generation of service provider's key pairs in the section 6.1.1.</li><li>- Upgrading the description of the CRL profile in the section 7.2.</li><li>- Adding MD 940 to QSCD list.</li><li>- Smaller improvements.</li></ul>

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## 1 Introduction

This document is the *Certification Practice Statement* concerning the issuance of qualified certificate for electronic signature service of e-Szignó Certificate Authority operated by Microsec Ltd. (hereinafter: Microsec or *Provider*).

The *Provider* provides its services for its *Clients* with whom it has contractual relationship.

The present *Certification Practice Statement* describes the framework of the provision of the aforementioned services and includes the detailed procedures and miscellaneous operating rules. It makes recommendations for the *Relying Parties* for the verification of the electronic signatures and *Certificates* created by using the services.

The *Certification Practice Statement* complies with the requirements set by the eIDAS Regulation [1], the service provided according to these regulations is an EU qualified Trust Service.

The *Provider* announced the provision of the trust service to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority on the 1st of July 2016.

The conformity assessment audit of the qualified trust services was carried out by the independent auditor TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (hereinafter: TÜViT).

Based on the successful audit the National Media and Infocommunications Authority registered the qualified trust service and published it in the Hungarian Trust List [44] on the 20th of December 2016.

The conformity assessment of the qualified trust service will be performed by Hunguard Kft (hereinafter Hunguard) as an independent auditor from October 2020.

The *Provider* provides the most important information to the *Clients* also in the form of a Disclosure Statement. The Disclosure Statement will be published as described in Section 2.1.

### 1.1 Overview

The aim of the present *Certification Practice Statement* is to summarize all the information that the *Clients* coming into contact with the *Provider* should know. This aims to foster that its *Clients* and future *Clients*:

- get better acquainted with the details and requirements of the services provided by the *Provider*, and the practical background of the service provision;
- be able to see through the operation of the *Provider*, and thus more easily decide whether the services comply or which type of services meet their individual needs and expectations.

Furthermore the aim of this document is to support the users and relying parties of *Certificates*, *Certificate Revocation Lists* and online Certificate Status Responses issued by the *Provider* to understand unambiguously the ways of their management, the level of security guaranteed by them as well as the relevant technical, commercial and financial guarantees with legal responsibility related to them.

The content and format of the present document complies with the requirements of the IETF RFC 3647 [30] framework. It consists of 9 sections that contain the security requirements, processes defined by the *Provider* and the practices to be followed during the provision of services. To strictly preserve the outline specified by IETF RFC 3647, section headings where the document does not impose a requirement have the statement "No stipulation".

Considering the end user activity related to the services used, besides the present *Certification Practice Statement* further requirements may be found in the *Time-Stamping Policy* [46], the General Terms and Conditions and the service agreement concluded with the provider, the *Certificate Policies* applied by the *Provider* (see section 1.2.1 ) and other regulation or document independent from the *Provider* as well.

Section 1.6 of this document specifies several terms which are not or not fully used in this sense in other areas. The terms to be used in this sense are indicated by capitalization and italicization throughout this document.

## 1.2 Document Name and Identification

Issuer	e-Szignó Certificate Authority
Document name	eIDAS conform Qualified Certificate for Electronic Signature Certification Practice Statement
Document version	2.21
Date of effect	2021-03-19

The list and identification information of the *Certificate Policies* that can be used according to the present *Certification Practice Statement* can be found in section 1.2.1.

### 1.2.1 Certificate Policies

All *Certificates* issued by the *Provider* refer to that *Certificate Policy* on the basis of which they were issued.

The first seven numbers of the OID identifying the *Certificate Policys* is the unique identifier of Microsec as follows:

(1)	International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
(3)	Organization identification schemes registered according to ISO/IEC 6523-2
(6)	United States Department of Defense (DoD)
(1)	Internet
(4)	Private projects
(1)	Private enterprises
(21528)	MICROSEC Ltd.

The system of the further numbers was allocated within Microsec's own scope of authority, the interpretation of it is as follows:

(1.3.6.1.4.1.21528)	MICROSEC Ltd.
(2)	e-Szignó Certificate Authority
(1)	documents
(1)	public documents
(x)	unique identifier number of the document
(y)	document version

(z)	document subversion
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In accordance with this *Certification Practice Statement* the *Provider* issues *Certificates* based on the following *Certificate Policies*:

OID	DENOMINATION	SHORT NAME
1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.142.2.21	Qualified, for the generation and verification of electronic signatures, for natural persons issued on <i>Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device</i> , Certificate Policy prohibiting the use of pseudonyms.	MATBN
1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.143.2.21	Qualified, for the generation and verification of electronic signatures, for natural persons issued on <i>Cryptographic Hardware Device</i> , Certificate Policy prohibiting the use of pseudonyms.	MATHN
1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.144.2.21	Qualified, for the generation and verification of electronic signatures, for natural persons issued as a software token , Certificate Policy prohibiting the use of pseudonyms.	MATSN

The rules of the formation and interpretation of the *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* short names can be found in the Appendix of this document.

The *Provider* doesn't issue *Certificates* with pseudonym.

The detailed requirements of the listed *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy(s)* can be found in " e-Szignó Certificate Authority – eIDAS conform Qualified Electronic Signature Certificate Policies ver.2.21." [45]

In case of *Certificate Policies* concerning *Certificates* issued to natural persons, the *Subject* is always a natural person.

The denomination of the IT systems, applications and automatism by the help of the *Certificate* can be used, can be indicated within the *Certificates* (*Certificate for Automatism*).

In case of *Certificate Policies* ([xxxBx]) requiring the usage of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*, the *Provider* shall make sure that the private key associated with the *Certificate* is located in a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*, verified by a certification body registered in a member state of the European Union.

In case of a *Certificate Policy* ([xxxHx]) that requires the usage of *Cryptographic Hardware Device*, the *Provider* guarantees that the private key belonging to the *Certificate* is stored only on such *Cryptographic Hardware Device* that has at least one of the following certifications:

- Certificate issued in any of the member states of the European Union certifying that the equipment is a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*;
- Common Criteria [40] certification according to CEN SSCP PP [42], at least at level EAL-4;

- legalább EAL-4 szintű Common Criteria [40] tanúsítás a CEN 419 221-5 [26] szerint;
- FIPS 140-2, Level 2 (or higher) certification [39].

Qualified *Certificate* based advanced electronic signatures can be created automatically, and without direct supervision with an IT equipment specified in the legislation.

*Certificates* that comply with *Certificate Policies* that require the usage of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* or *Cryptographic Hardware Device* may be issued for usage in a remote key management service, if

- the remote key management service is provided by a Qualified Trust Service Provider,
- the private keys of the users are managed in *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* or *Cryptographic Hardware Device* devices having the proper certificates,
- a conformity assessment report, created by an independent accredited auditor, proves that the remote key management service fulfils the relevant requirements,
- the Qualified Trust Service Provider declares in writing that it manages the private key belonging to the public key to be indicated in the *Certificate* in *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* or *Cryptographic Hardware Device*, respectively, in accordance with the device certification.

The private key belonging to a *Certificate* issued based on *Certificate Policies* ([xxxBx]) that require the usage of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*, is protected by a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*. Qualified electronic signature can be created only on the basis of such *Certificate*.

If a qualified *Certificate Policy* doesn't require the usage of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*, an advanced electronic signature can be created based on that qualified *Certificate* issued according to that policy.

A document, with a qualified electronic signature or with advanced electronic signature based on a qualified *Certificate* under paragraph 196 Act III of 1952 on Civil Procedure [3] is representing conclusive evidence (in Hungary).

The qualified signing *Certificates* issued in accordance with the [MATBN], [MATHN], [MATSN] *Certificate Policies* fully comply with the requirements of the related legislation, like the (Hungarian) Government Decree 137/2016. (VI. 13.) on the requirements for the use of electronic signatures and stamps related to the provision of electronic administration services (later E-Signature Government Decree) [12] and the private keys belonging to them can be used for creating electronic signatures for public administration use.

Among the present *Certificate Policies*:

- each *Certificate Policy* complies with the [QCP-n] *Certificate Policy* defined in the ETSI EN 319 411-2 [19] standard;
- the [MATBN] *Certificate Policy* complies with the [QCP-n-qscd] *Certificate Policy*.
- the [MATHN] *Certificate Policy* complies with the [NCP+] *Certificate Policy* defined in the ETSI EN 319 411-1 [18] standard.



### Compliance with the ETSI Certificate Policies

In cases when an ETSI Certificate Policy is based on another ETSI Certificate Policy and this way contains all the requirements of it, only the Identifier of the Higher Level Certificate Policy is referenced in the issued *Certificates*.

	[QCP-n]	[QCP-n-qscd]	[NCP+]
MATBN	(x)	X	
MATHN	X		X
MATSN	X		

#### 1.2.2 Effect

##### Subject Scope

The *Certification Practice Statement* is related to the provision and usage of the services described in section 1.3.1.

##### Temporal Scope

The present version of the *Certification Practice Statement* is effective from the 2021-03-19 date of effect, until withdrawal. The effect automatically terminates at the cessation of the services or at the issuance of the newer version of the *Certification Practice Statement*.

##### Personal Scope

The effect of the *Certification Practice Statement* extends each of the participants mentioned in section 1.3.

The *Provider* provides trust services primarily to citizens of the European Union and organizations registered in the European Union, but does not exclude natural or legal persons from other countries as long as they accept the system of rules followed by the *Provider* and the controls necessary to provide the services can be done safely and economically.

##### People with disabilities

The *Provider* strives to ensure equal opportunity access to the services provided by the company to the highest possible standards.

In order to establish equal opportunities regarding the service, the *Provider* applies every possible and reasonable measure to make its services available without obstructions to disabled people as well. It is especially important them to ensure that the disabled clients receive services, which are adapted to their special needs, of the same quality as those for the other clients.

The *Provider* cooperates with clients in order to guarantee them an administrative process which is the most suitable for their personal needs within the framework determined by the *Certification Practice Statement*.

## Geographical Scope

The present *Certification Practice Statement* based on the European Union requirements includes Hungarian specific requirements for services operating under the Hungarian law in Hungary.

The *Provider* can extend the geographical scope of the service, in this case it shall use not less stringent requirements than those applicable in the *Certification Practice Statement*. At services provided to foreign *Clients*, detailed conditions that differ from the *Certification Practice Statement* may be regulated in a specific service agreement.

The service provided according to the present *Certification Practice Statement* is available world-wide. The validity of the *Certificates*, Certificate Revocation Status Lists and OCSP responses issued according to the present *Certification Practice Statement* is independent of the geographical location where they were requested from, and where they will be used.

The service provided according to the present *Certification Practice Statement* can be only used as described in the present document and in the *Certificate Policy*.

### 1.2.3 Security Levels

The *Provider* defined security levels by taking into account the relevant requirements as follows.

The authentication strength of the *Certificate Subject* in descending order:

- qualified *Certificates* [M\*\*\*\*];
- non-qualified III. certification class *Certificates* [H\*\*\*\*] issued by e-Szignó Certificate Authority;
- non-qualified II. certification class *Certificates* [K\*\*\*\*] issued by e-Szignó Certificate Authority;
- non-qualified *Certificates* issued not by the e-Szignó Certificate Authority.

Based on the used container in descending order by security:

- *Certificates* issued on *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* [\*\*\*B\*];
- *Certificates* issued on *Cryptographic Hardware Device* [\*\*\*H\*];
- otherwise, for example *Certificates* issued by software [\*\*\*S\*].

By taking into account the two points of view the *Provider* established the following aggregated order in descending order of security:

- qualified *Certificates* issued on *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* [M\*\*B\*];
- qualified *Certificates* issued on *Cryptographic Hardware Device* [M\*\*H\*];
- qualified otherwise, for example *Certificates* issued by software [M\*\*S\*];
- non-qualified, III. certification class *Certificates* issued by e-Szignó Certificate Authority [H\*\*S\*];

- non-qualified, II. certification class *Certificates* issued by e-Szignó Certificate Authority [K\*\*S\*];
- non-qualified *Certificates* issued by other CA than e-Szignó Certificate Authority

During the communication with the *Clients* the *Provider* supports the use of electronic channels and enables the use of electronic signature during the administration in most cases possible.

It is a general rule, that during the administration related to the *Certificates*, the *Client* can use its own signing *Certificate* to verify the electronic documents, if its level of security according to the aforementioned list is not lower than the relevant *Certificate*.

On an individual basis in special cases, the *Provider* can deviate from the strict application of the above list with regard to particular tasks (for example the personal identification for III. certification class *Certificates* in case of new qualified *Certificate Application* or the modification of an existing one as a result of the same procedural identification rules it accepts the identification required for qualified *Certificate*).

### 1.3 PKI Participants

The participants applying the services provided within the framework of present *Certification Practice Statement* consist of the following:

- the Microsec e-Szignó Certificate Authority,
- the *Clients* of Microsec e-Szignó Certificate Authority (*Subscribers* and *Subjects*),
- *Relying Parties*,
- other participants.

#### 1.3.1 Certification Authorities

##### Data of the *Provider*

Name:	MICROSEC Micro Software Engineering & Consulting Private Limited Company by Shares
Company registry number:	01-10-047218 Company Registry Court of Budapest
Head office:	Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13.
Telephone number:	(+36-1) 505-4444
Fax number:	(+36-1) 505-4445
Internet address:	<a href="https://www.microsec.hu">https://www.microsec.hu</a> , <a href="https://www.e-szigno.hu">https://www.e-szigno.hu</a>

### Customer Service Office

The name of the provider unit:	e-Szignó Certificate Authority
Customer service:	Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13., Graphisoft Park South Area, Building C
Office hours of the customer service:	on workdays between 8:30-16:30 by prior arrangement
Telephone number of the customer service:	(+36-1) 505-4444
Email address of the customer service:	info@e-szigno.hu
Send revocation request to:	revocation@e-szigno.hu
Service related information access:	<a href="https://www.e-szigno.hu">https://www.e-szigno.hu</a>
Place for registering complaints:	Microsec Ltd. Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13., Graphisoft Park South Area, Building C
Relevant Consumer Protection Inspectorate:	Budapest Capital Authority for Consumer Protection 1052 Budapest, Városház str. 7. 1364 Budapest, Pf. 144.
Relevant Arbitration Board:	Arbitration Board of Budapest 1016 Budapest, Krisztina krt. 99. III. em. 310. Mailing address: 1253 Budapest, Pf.: 10.

### Introduction of the *Provider*

Microsec Ltd. is an EU qualified trust service provider according to the 910/2014/EU Regulation [1] (hereinafter: eIDAS).

Microsec Ltd. (its predecessor) started the provision of its services related to electronic signatures under the effect of Act XXXV. of 2001. [5] (hereinafter: Eat.):

- provides non-qualified electronic signature certification services, time stamping, and placement of signature-creation data on signature creation devices services according to Eat. since May 30, 2002 (registration number: MH 6834 1/2002.);
- provides qualified electronic signature certification services, time stamping, and device services according to Eat. since May 15, 2005;
- provides qualified long term preservation service according to Eat. since February 1, 2007. (reference number of the decision on the registration: HL-3549-2/2007).

On the 1st of July, 2016. the whole system of services related to electronic signatures changed uniformly on a European basis with eIDAS and its complement Act CCXXII of 2015. [9] coming into force.

Microsec provides its non-qualified trust services conformant to eIDAS furthermore started the issuance of eIDAS qualified signing certificates for natural persons from the 1st of July 2016.

Microsec provides the following qualified trust services conformant to eIDAS form the 20th of December 2016:

- qualified certificates for electronic seals
- qualified time stamping
- qualified archiving (preservation of electronic signatures and seals).

Microsec provides the following qualified trust service conformant to eIDAS form the 2nd of January 2019:

- qualified certificates for website authentication.

Microsec provides the following qualified trust service component conformant to eIDAS form the 29th of May 2020:

- remote key management service suitable for creating qualified electronic signatures and seals.

### **Quality and Information Security**

Microsec highlights the importance of *Client* experience. In order to maintain a high level of services, the *Provider* has been operating a quality control system compliant with the ISO 9001 standard since January 23, 2002. Compliance with the standard has been verified by Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance.

Microsec assigns high priority to the security of the systems it operates, and has therefore been operating an information security management system that is compliant with ISO/IEC 27001 (formerly known as BS 7799) in its main areas of activity since May 19, 2003. Compliance with the standard has been verified by Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance.

The scope of both the quality control system and the information security management system cover the trust services provided by Microsec.

Microsec has two level risk assessment which covers beyond the information technology risks the whole organization including also the business risks. The risk assessment is updated at least yearly. Based on the results of the risk assessment the *Provider*

- sets up new measures to eliminate the vulnerabilities, or/and
- accepts the identified residual risks by stating the reason of the decision.

The *Provider* makes available for all interested parties its Information Security Policy on its web page on the following link:

<https://www.microsec.hu/en/quality-assurance-and-audit>

Any change to the Information Security Policy is communicated to third parties through this web page.

Changes to the information security policy is communicated to third parties, where applicable. This includes subscribers, relying parties, assessment bodies, supervisory or other regulatory bodies.

Due to their confidential nature the *Provider* doesn't disclose its internal Security Rules. The *Provider* informs its subcontractors, contractors and other interested parties concerned of the security rules applicable to them when concluding the contract.

### **Business Providing Certification Services**

Operating as an independent business unit within the organization of Microsec, e-Szignó Certificate Authority is responsible for creation and management of *Certificates*, publication of *Certificate* repository and *Certificate* revocation status information, management and delivery of *Electronic Signature Creation Devices* and provision of the online certificate status service.

Tasks related to the management of policies and practices is also provided by this unit. The e-Szignó Certificate Authority has its own *Registration Authority*.

### **Services**

The *Provider* provides the following trust services defined by the eIDAS Regulation [1] to the *Subscriber* within the framework of the present *Certification Practice Statement*:

- Issuance of Qualified Certificates for Electronic Signatures

The *Provider* provides its services within the framework of the present *Certification Practice Statement* as a qualified trust service provider.

### **The Issuance of Qualified Certificates for Electronic Signatures Service**

The *Provider* to provide the Issuance of Qualified Certificates for Electronic Signatures service signs a service agreement with the *Subscriber*, within the confines of it issues qualified *Certificate(s)* to the *Subjects* specified by the *Subscriber*. The *Certificate* provides a certified connection between the data of the identified *Subject* and the public key belonging to the private key that the *Subject* holds. Within the framework of a service agreement, multiple *Certificates* can be issued to multiple *Subjects*.

In case of using a qualified *Certificate* issued based on present *Certification Practice Statement*, if the electronic signature was created by a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*, the electronic signature is a qualified electronic signature. If the electronic signature was not created by a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* then the electronic signature is an advanced electronic signature based on qualified certificate. A document verified by a qualified electronic signature or an advanced electronic signature based on a qualified certificate under the 196. § of the Act 1952 - III on Civil Procedure [3] considered as a private document providing a full probative value.

In case of a valid a subscription, the *Subject* may initiate the following actions:

- *Subject* may apply for a *Certificate* (and a *Electronic Signature Creation Device* in addition) from the *Provider*, the *Certificate* issuance is performed according to a *Certificate Policy* or policies;

- the *Subject* may request the revocation of its *Certificate*;
- the *Subject* may request the suspension and reinstatement of its *Certificate*.

The *Subscriber* may also request the revocation, suspension or reinstatement of the belonging *Subject's Certificate*. These actions may also be requested by the *Organizational Administrator* authorized by the *Subscriber* and registered by the *Provider*.

The *Provider* makes the *Certificate Revocation Lists* publicly available, containing the revocation status of the issued *Certificates*. The *Provider* also makes the *Certificate* public, based on the *Subject's* consent. The suspended, revoked or expired *Certificate* is invalid. Signatures created with an invalid *Certificates* do not have any legal effect.

The *Provider* also issues test certificates with the purpose of testing its system. The test certificates do not have any legal effect.

Upon requests the *Provider* may issue free *Certificates* for testing purposes on an individual bases. The *Certificates* issued this way need to be managed prudently because they have the same legal effect as the normal *Certificates*.

### Certificate Types

The *Certificate Policies* supported by the present *Certification Practice Statement* are presented in section 1.2.1 . The ID of the applied *Certificate Policy* is always indicated in the "Certificate Policies" field of the *Certificate*.

The e-Szignó Certificate Authority provides various certificate types for its *Clients*, which mainly differ concerning their properties and data authentically bound to the *Subject*.

- *Organizational Certificate* means a *Certificate* wherein the *Subject* is an *Organization*, a device under the control of the *Organization* or the *Certificate* attests the relationship of a natural person *Subject* with the *Organization*. In this case, the name of the *Organization* is indicated in the "O" field of the *Certificate*. This type of a *Certificate* can only be used as specified by the *Organization*.  
In case of an *Organizational Certificate* issued to a natural person, further restrictions can be indicated in the "Title" field, related to the usage of the *Certificate*.
- *Certificate for Profession* means a *Certificate* issued to a natural person which is not an *Organizational Certificate* and which contains the title or profession of the *Subject* in the "Title" field.
- *Certificate for Automatism* means a *Certificate* wherein the denomination of the IT device (application, system) is indicated amongst the *Subject* data in the *Certificate*, by the help of the *Subject* uses the *Certificate*.
- Pseudonymous *Certificate* means a *Certificate* wherein not the official – verified by the *Provider* – denomination of the *Subject* is in the *Certificate*. In the pseudonymous *Certificates* the requested name is indicated in the "Pseudonym" field, and it is stated in the "CN" field that the *Certificate* contains a pseudonym.

- *Certificates* requiring *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* usage: In that case the *Certificate* was issued to a public key for which the corresponding private key was generated on a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* – so it is guaranteed that the private key can not be extracted and copied –, then that information is indicated on the *Certificate* in the "QCStatements" field. Qualified electronic signature can be created only based on a *Certificate* this type.
- Personal *Certificate* means a *Certificate* that does not contain either an "O" or a "Title" field. This type can only be issued to natural persons.

The e-Szignó Certificate Authority issues *Certificates* for natural persons and legal persons. In case of *Certificates* issued to legal persons the authorized representative natural person or a trustee authorized by the representative need to act on behalf of the legal person.

### Test Certificates

The *Provider* issues test certificates – firstly to test their system, on the other hand, to third parties in order to test the services. No legal effect belongs to the certificates, and the *Provider* does not take any responsibility for their issuance, usage and service availability.

The *Provider* does not issue test certificates under the top level service provider (root) *Certification Unit*.

The issuance of the test certificates is done under the "Microsec e-Szigno Test Root CA 2008" root exclusively created and operating for this task.

The *Provider* indicates the test certificates in the "Certificate Policies" field according to the following (see section 7.1.2 ):

- the 1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.9 OID is indicated as a *Certificate Policy* in the *Certificate*, or
- the 1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.100 OID is indicated as a *Certificate Policy* in the *Certificate*, or
- no *Certificate Policy* is indicated in the *Certificate*.

### Device Service

Within the confines of the device service *Provider* puts the *Certificate* related signature-creation data of the *Subject* on an *Electronic Signature Creation Device* which complies with the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* requirements defined in eIDAS Regulation [1]. The usage of these *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* is prerequisite for the creation of qualified electronic signatures.

### Certification Units

In the following those *Certification Units* will be described, that appear in the system of the e-Szignó Certificate Authority and stay under the effect of this *Certification Practice Statement*. Further information can be found in the the certificate hierarchy of the *Provider* at the following address:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/pki-services/ca-certificates.html>



**Active, SHA-256 based RSA hierarchy**

- "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" – Root certification unit  
Issues SHA-256 based *Certificates* for the *Certification Units* of the *Provider*. This *Certification Unit* has a self certified (SHA-256 based) certificate.
- "Qualified e-Szigno CA 2009"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009". This *Certification Unit* issues *Certificates* for natural persons according to pseudonym excluding qualified ([MATB] OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.142.2.21) *Certificate Policy*.
- "Qualified e-Szigno QCP CA 2012"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009". This *Certification Unit* issues qualified *Certificates* according to certificate policies that do not require that the private key belonging to the *Certificate* shall reside inside of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*.
  - OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.143.2.21 [MATHN];
  - OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.144.2.21 [MATSN];This *Certification Unit* issues non-pseudonymous *Certificates* for natural and legal persons. This *Certification Unit* may issue special time stamping *Certificates* for the *Time-Stamping Units* of the Time Stamping service Providers.
- "Qualified Pseudonymous e-Szigno CA 2009"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009". This *Certification Unit* issues *Certificates* according to the pseudonymous qualified ([MATxA] OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.148.2.21) certificate policy.  
Presently it is not used.
- OCSP responders;  
every *Certification Unit* with SHA-256 based *Certificate* certifies dedicated OCSP responder unit, which gives responses regarding the revocation status of the *Certificates* issued by the given certification unit. The OCSP responder unit's name contains the "OCSP Responder" text besides the given certification unit name. The "OCSPSigning" extended key usage is present in the OCSP responder *Certificates*.

The following *Certification Units* of the *Provider* issue *Certificates* for the public administration:

- "Qualified KET e-Szigno CA 2009"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by KGYHSZ and issues qualified *Certificates* for public administration usage.
- "Qualified KET e-Szigno CA 2018"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by KGYHSZ and "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" and issues qualified *Certificates* for public administration usage.

The aforementioned units have SHA-256 based Certificates, and issue SHA-256 based *Certificates*, and OCSP responses.

In this hierarchy, all provider certificates use RSA keys with a key length of at least 2048 bits.

In this hierarchy all the issued end-user *Certificates* use at least 2048-bit RSA keys or at least 256-bit ECC keys.

### Latest, ECC based hierarchy

- "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" – Root certification unit, that issues ECC based *Certificates* for the *Certification Units* of the *Provider*. This *Certification Unit* has a self certified (ECC based) certificate.
- "e-Szigno TSA CA 2017"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, issues *Certificates* for Time Stamping Authorities, that are certified by the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" and the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009".
- "e-Szigno TSA CA 2020"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, issues *Certificates* for Time Stamping Authorities, that are certified by the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" and the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009".
- "e-Szigno Qualified CA 2017"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017". This *Certification Unit* issues *Certificates* according to pseudonym excluding qualified ([MATBN] OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.142.2.21) for natural persons on *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*.
- "e-Szigno Qualified QCP CA 2017"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017". This *Certification Unit* issues *Certificates* according to certificate policies that do not require that the private key belonging to the *Certificate* shall reside inside of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*.
  - OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.143.2.21 [MATHN];
  - OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.144.2.21 [MATSN];This *Certification Unit* issues non-pseudonymous *Certificates* for natural and legal persons. This *Certification Unit* may issue special time stamping *Certificates* for the *Time-Stamping Units* of the Time Stamping service Providers.
- "e-Szigno Qualified Pseudonymous CA 2017"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017". This *Certification Unit* issues *Certificates* according to the pseudonymous qualified ([MATxA] OID:1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.148.2.21) certificate policy.  
Presently it is not used.

- OCSF responders;  
every *Certification Unit* with ECC based *Certificate* certifies dedicated OCSF responder unit, which gives responses regarding the revocation status of the Certificates issued by the given certification unit. The OCSF responder unit's name contains the "OCSF Responder" text besides the given certification unit name. The "OCSFSigning" extended key usage is present in the OCSF responder *Certificates*.

The aforementioned units have 256-bit ECC based Certificates.

In this hierarchy, all the issued end-user *Certificates* use at least 2048-bit RSA keys or at least 256-bit ECC keys.

### Retired, SHA-1 based RSA hierarchy

The *Provider* issued SHA-1 *Certificates* based "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" *Certification Unit* beforehand. The *Provider* does not issue *Certificates* according to this hierarchy. The *Provider* keeps the SHA-1 based hierarchy for the verifiability of the previously created signatures and *Time Stamps*. The following *Certification Units* are in the hierarchy:

- "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA"  
Root certification unit, which issued SHA-1 based *Certificates* to the *Certification Units* of the *Provider*. This *Certification Unit* has a self-certified certificate.
- "Qualified e-Szigno CA"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" root certification unit. This *Certification Unit* issued certificates according to the pseudonym excluding qualified certificate policy.
- "Qualified e-Szigno PCA"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" root *Certification Unit*. This *Certification Unit* issued certificates according to the pseudonymous qualified certificate policy.
- "Qualified e-Szigno CA7"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit* certified by the Public Administration Root CA. With this *Certification Unit* the *Provider* issued qualified certificates exclusively according to administrative certificate policies with this certification unit.
- "Microsec e-Szigno Server CA"  
The "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" root *Certification Unit*, and the KGYHSZ certified it. This *Certification Unit* certified the SHA-1 based time stamp issuer time stamp units.
- "e-Szigno OCSF CA" (self-certified)  
The OCSF responder certificate issuer *Certification Unit*.

- "e-Szigno OCSP Responder"  
OCSP responder – certified by "e-Szigno OCSP CA".

Intermediate *Certification Units* in the SHA-1 based hierarchy issued "closing CRLs".

The *Provider* terminated the OCSP services serving the SHA-1-based hierarchy in April 2017. The validity of the old electronic signatures can be verified by using the closing CRL-s.

After the 1st of January, 2012 there is no valid certificate used for end-user electronic signing in the *Provider's* SHA-1 based system. Since that date, SHA-1 based time stamps are not issued by the *Provider*.

### Publication of the *Root Certificates*

The *Provider* published the hash of the *Root Certificates* belonging to "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" and "e-Szigno OCSP CA" in the July 21, 2005 edition of Magyar Nemzet (a Hungarian daily newspaper), the hash of the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" *Root Certificate* in the June 17 2010 issue of Expressz (a Hungarian daily newspaper).

All the *Root Certificates* are available through the webpage of the e-Szignó Certificate Authority.

- The SHA-1 fingerprint of the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" *Root Certificate*:  
23 88 c9 d3 71 cc 9e 96 3d ff 7d 3c a7 ce fc d6 25 ec 19 0d,  
the SHA-256 fingerprint of the same *Root Certificate*:  
32 7a 3d 76 1a ba de a0 34 eb 99 84 06 27 5c b1 a4 77 6e fd ae 2f df 6d  
01 68 ea 1c 4f 55 67 d0
- The "e-Szigno OCSP CA" *Root Certificate* SHA-1 fingerprint:  
56 2c 85 5b 9c d9 be 0e 64 e6 f7 95 86 24 95 a1 09 3e f1 68,  
the SHA-1 fingerprint of the same *Root Certificate*:  
15 a9 45 a5 e4 92 c8 6c 3e 4e 0e a5 81 4c 9c 43 b0 4f 2e a6 83 1a 64 6c  
37 8c d2 b1 82 05 aa 89
- The "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" *Root Certificate* SHA-1 fingerprint <sup>1</sup> :  
89 df 74 fe 5c f4 0f 4a 80 f9 e3 37 7d 54 da 91 e1 01 31 8e,

<sup>1</sup>The same root (trust anchor) formerly operated with a different *Root Certificate*. The SHA-1 fingerprint of the former *Root Certificate* is :

a6 5c b4 73 3d 94 a5 c8 65 a8 64 64 7c 2c 01 27 2c 89 b1 43,

and the SHA-256 fingerprint is:

8e 8c 6e bf 77 dc 73 db 3e 38 e9 3f 48 03 e6 2b 6b 59 33 be b5 1e e4 15 2f 68 d7 aa 14 42 6b  
31.

the *Provider* published this fingerprint in the 22 June 2009 issue of Magyar Hírlap (a Hungarian daily newspaper).

The same root also had an even earlier *Root Certificate* that has been never published in the printed media, but has been published in early versions of the Microsec e-Szignó Signature Creation and Verification Program. The SHA-1 fingerprint of this first *Root Certificate* is:

59 32 E2 00 30 0B AE 8D D7 9D 28 E5 AE 9D B0 05 50 3E 3B 8F,

and the SHA-256 fingerprint is:

72 F9 AF 21 58 18 1B AF 16 D6 0C 9B 4E 6F 4B D7 CA 8D 23 41 AD 48 AF DB 67 CB 4C 83 32 D5 46  
F6.

Signatures and *Certificates* which were verified with the usage of the former *Root Certificate* can also be considered valid.

the SHA-256 fingerprint of the same *Root Certificate*:

```
3c 5f 81 fe a5 fa b8 2c 64 bf a2 ea ec af cd e8 e0 77 fc 86 20 a7 ca e5
37 16 3d f3 6e db f3 78
```

- The "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" *Root Certificate* SHA-1 fingerprint:  
89 d4 83 03 4f 9e 9a 48 80 5f 72 37 d4 a9 a6 ef cb 7c 1f d1,  
The "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" *Root Certificate* SHA-256 fingerprint:  
be b0 0b 30 83 9b 9b c3 2c 32 e4 44 79 05 95 06 41 f2 64 21 b1 5e d0 89  
19 8b 51 8a e2 ea 1b 99

The following trusted certificate stores contain and distribute the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" *Root Certificate*:

- Microsoft Windows certificate store,
- Network Security Services (NSS) certificate store,
- Google Android from the v2.3 (Gingerbread) version,

The expired *Root Certificate* will be phased out from these trusted certificate stores.

The following trusted certificate stores contain and distribute the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" *Root Certificate*:

- Microsoft Windows certificate store,
- Network Security Services (NSS) certificate store,
- Google Android from the v2.3 (Gingerbread) version,
- Apple iOS from the 7.1.2 version.
- Apple Mac OS X from the 10.9.4 version.

The inclusion of the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" *Root Certificate* into the trusted certificate stores is in process.

The following trusted certificate stores contain and distribute the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" *Root Certificate*:

- Network Security Services (NSS) certificate store from version 3.54.

The

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/pki-services/browser-compatibility.html>

webpage contains more information on other browsers and certificate stores that contain the root certificates of the *Provider* by default.

The other *Certificates* of the *Provider* can be verified based on the self certified *Root Certificates*, so these *Certificates* are only published by the *Provider* on its webpage. If – law or in the framework of a contract or agreement between *Providers* – other *Provider* issues certificates for the *Certification Units* of the *Provider*, the *Provider* can publish the *Certificates* on its webpage.

The *Provider* undertakes that in case of *Certificates* issued for the *Provider* in this manner, it complies with the cross certifying *Provider's Certificate Policy* and considers the included information binding. According to this rule in case of *Certificates* issued for the public administration the *Provider* follows the *Certificate Policy* of the Public Administration Root CA (KGYHSZ) [15] and – as a first level CA – considers the included requirements binding.

Before the expiration date of the provider *Certificates*, the *Provider* generates new provider keys and starts new *Certification Units*, and takes all the necessary steps, so that the change of the provider *Certificates* does not endanger the continuity of the services.

### Chained Certification Service

The *Provider* has the right to offer a chained certification service, where a *Certification Unit* of the *Provider* issues a certificate to a *Certification Unit* controlled by another certification authority (hereinafter: cross-certified CA).

This cross-certification is arranged according to the following requirements:

- The *Provider* and the cross-certified CA conclude a contract, the contract contains the exact conditions of the cross-certification. The cross-certified CA contracts the belonging *Clients* by itself, within this contract, the cross-certified CA is appointed as the certification authority.
- The *Provider* takes full responsibility for the activities of the chained Certification Authority.
- The cross-certified certification authority can only issue *Certificates* for a well defined scope of users.
- The cross-certified certification authority shall publish its *Certificate Policy*, and it shall operate according to it.
- The *Provider* is entitled to verify the operation of the cross-certified provider.
- The *Provider* revokes the *Certificate* issued during the cross certification if the cross-certified certification authority does not comply with its own *Certificate Policy*, or if the cross-certified certification authority indicates that its cross certified provider key is compromised.
- If the *Provider* issues provider *Certificate* for another Certification Authority, it announces the fact to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority. If the cross-certified CA issues *Certificates* that can be used natively and publicly, the cross-certified CA is bound to announce the cross-certification to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, and ask for registration (except it is already registered at the National Media and Infocommunications Authority). These rules apply to other services related to electronic signatures as subordinate services (e.g. time stamp).

#### 1.3.2 Registration Authorities

The *Provider* implements registration and other tasks related to the issuing of *Certificates*, as well as further certificate management tasks centrally, within the framework of a customer service operating within its own organization.

Tasks of the office:

- registration of the *Subject* indicated on end user *Certificates*,
- administration and registration activity related to the issuing of *Certificates* and *Electronic Signature Creation Devices*
- maintaining contact with *Clients* (reception of questions, announcements, requests and complaints, and the initiation of their processing),
- performance of certificate actions (revocation, suspension, reinstatement, certificate renewal, certificate modification and re-key).

The customer service operated by the *Provider* receives requests pertaining to various certificate actions, and initiates their processing.

The *Registration Authority* may perform registration activities at the following locations:

- in the customer service office of the *Provider*;
- the associate of the *Registration Authority* may visit *Clients* and perform mobile registration activities on the site according to the internal statements of the *Provider*.

### 1.3.3 Subscribers

The *Clients* of the services provided by the *Provider*:

- *Subscriber*
  - signs the service agreement with the *Provider*,
  - accepts the General Terms and Conditions,
  - defines the scope of the *Subjects*,
  - may appoint *Organizational Administrators*,
  - responsible for the payment of the fees arising from the usage of the service.
- *Subject*
  - the *Provider* issues the *Certificate* for the *Subject*.
- *Signatory*
  - the electronic signature certification service user party, who can create electronic signature with the help of the issued *Certificate*.

The *Subject* is the *Signatory*.

### 1.3.4 Relying Parties

The *Relying Party* is not necessarily in a contractual relationship with the *Provider*. The *Certification Practice Statement* sections 4.5.2, 4.9.6, 9.6.4 and 9.9.3 and the other policies mentioned in it contain the recommendations related to its operation.

The *Provider* maintains its contacts with the *Relying Parties* mainly through its website.

### 1.3.5 Other Participants

The independent auditor who makes the conformity assessment audit.

The supervisory authority.

If a *Certificate* has been issued to the *Subject* in order to be used representing an *Organization* (*Organizational Certificate* issued to natural person) for signing or for its activity, the *Represented Organization* is the actual *Organization* also indicated within the *Certificate*. The *Provider* does not necessarily have a contractual relationship with the *Represented Organization*, but the *Provider* shall not issue an *Organizational Certificate* without the approval of that *Organization*. The *Provider* can suspend or revoke the *Certificate* at the request of the *Represented Organization*.

## 1.4 Certificate Usage

### 1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses

The private keys belonging to the end-user *Certificates* issued by the *Provider* based on the present *Certification Practice Statement* can be only used for electronic signature creation, with the *Certificates* the *Signatory* can verify the authenticity of the documents signed by him.

The public key in the *Certificate*, the *Certificate* itself, the *Certificate Revocation Lists*, the *Time Stamps* and the online revocation status responses can be used for the electronic signature.

### 1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses

#### Provider Certificates

The provider root and intermediate *Certificates*, and the associated private keys shall not be used for *Certificate* issuance prior to the disclosure of the provider *Certificates*.

#### End-User Certificates

*Certificates* issued in accordance with the present *Certificate Policies*, and the private keys belonging to them using for other purposes than the generation and verification of electronic signature is prohibited.

## 1.5 Policy Administration

### 1.5.1 Organization Administering the Document

The data of the organization administering the present *Certification Practice Statement* can be found in the following table:

Organization name	Microsec e-Szignó Certificate Authority
Organization address	Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Angel Sanz Briz str. 13.
Telephone number	+36 1 505-4444
Fax number	+36 1 505-4445
Email address	info@e-szigno.hu



### 1.5.2 Contact Person

Questions related to the present *Certification Practice Statement* can be directly put to the following person:

Contact person	Head of Process Management Department
Organization name	Microsec Ltd.
Organization address	Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13.
Telephone number	+36 1 505-4444
Fax number	+36 1 505-4445
Email address	info@e-szigno.hu

### 1.5.3 Person or Organization Responsible for the Suitability of the Practice Statement for the *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*

Person responsible for compliance with the present *Certification Practice Statement* and the *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* referenced therein is:

Responsible person	Head of Process Management Department
Organization name	Microsec Ltd.
Organization address	Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13.
Telephone number	+36 1 505-4444
Fax number	+36 1 505-4445
Email address	info@e-szigno.hu

The *Certification Practice Statements* and the provision of the services are supervised by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority. The National Media and Infocommunications Authority maintains a register on the *Certificate Policies* and on the *Providers* applying these policies.

The register of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority on trust services is available on the following link:

<http://webpub-ext.nmhh.hu/esign2016/>

### 1.5.4 Practice Statement Approval Procedures

Preparing, modifying, acceptance and issuance of a new version of the *Certification Practice Statement* is implemented according to unified processes as described in detail in section 9.12.1.

## 1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

### 1.6.1 Definitions

II. certification class	A group of non-qualified <i>Certificate Policies</i> , that make possible the <i>Certificate</i> issuance based on the <i>Applicant's</i> remote registration.
III. certification class	A group of non-qualified <i>Certificate Policies</i> , that bound the <i>Certificate</i> issuance to the <i>Applicant's</i> personal registration.

Data Centre	A facility designed for the placement and operation of computer systems and associated components. These components typically include telecommunications systems and communication connections, redundant power supply, data storage, air conditioning, fire protection and security systems.
Subject	A natural person with an identity or attribute verified by the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> with the <i>Certificate</i> , so the signatory especially in case of an electronic signature certificate.
Subject Unique Identifier	The globally unique identifier of the <i>Subject</i> , given by the <i>Provider</i> . The identifier is in the "Subject DN Serial Number" field of the <i>Certificate</i> , according to the requirements of section 3.1.1.
Signatory	"A natural person who creates an electronic signature." ( <i>eIDAS [1] article 3. point 9.</i> ) " A person with an identity or attribute verified by the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> with the certificate of the electronic signature. " ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [9] 1. § point 43. )</i>
<i>Certificate for Automatism</i>	A <i>Certificate</i> in which the name of the IT device (application, system) that is applied by the <i>Subject</i> to use the <i>Certificate</i> is to be recorded among the <i>Subject's</i> data.
Trusted List)	For the Member States of the European Union, a list issued by a Member State in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council containing information on trust service providers under the responsibility of that Member State. It can be validated on the basis of a list of central trust lists issued by the Commission in accordance with Official Journal of the European Union 2019 / C 276/01.
Trust Service Supervisory Body	"The National Media and Infocommunications Authority, the supervising authority monitoring the <i>Trust Services</i> ." ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [9] 91.§ 1. paragraph</i> )

Trust Service	<p>"Means an electronic service normally provided for remuneration which consists of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the creation, verification, and validation of electronic signatures, electronic seals or electronic time stamps, electronic registered delivery services and certificates related to those services, or</li> <li>• the creation, verification and validation of <i>Website Authentication Certificate</i>; or</li> <li>• the preservation of electronic signatures, seals or certificates related to those services;</li> </ul>
Trust Service Policy	<p>" (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 16. point</i>)</p> <p>"A set of rules in which a <i>Trust Service Provider</i>, relying party or other person requires conditions for the usage of the <i>Trust Service</i> for a community of the relying parties and/or a class of applications with common security requirements." (<i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [9] 1. § 8. point</i>)</p>
Trust Service Provider	<p>"A natural or a legal person who provides one or more <i>Trust Services</i> either as a qualified or as a non-qualified <i>Trust Service Provider</i>." (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 19. point</i>)</p>
Electronic Signature	<p>Data in electronic form which is attached to or logically associated with other data in electronic form and which is used by the signatory to sign (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 10. point</i>)</p>
Certificate for Electronic Signature	<p>"Means an electronic attestation which links electronic signature validation data to a natural person and confirms at least the name or the pseudonym of that person." (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 14. point</i>)</p> <p>In case of <i>Certificates</i> issued by the <i>Provider</i>, it can be clearly concluded from the <i>Certificate Policy</i> related to the <i>Certificates</i>, whether the given <i>Certificate</i> is pseudonymous or not. The reference of the <i>Certificate Policy</i> is in the <i>Certificate</i>.</p>
Qualified Certificate for Electronic Signature	<p>A <i>Certificate</i> for electronic signatures issued by a <i>Qualified Trust Service Provider</i> and meets the requirements laid down in Annex I of eIDAS [1]. (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 15. point</i>)</p>
Electronic Signature Creation Data	<p>"Means unique data which is used by the signatory to create an electronic signature." (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 13. point</i>)</p> <p>Typically, cryptographic private key, formerly known as the signature creation data.</p>

Electronic Signature Creation Device	"Means configured software or hardware used to create an electronic signature." ( <i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 22. point</i> ) Formerly known as signature-creation device (ALE).
Electronic Document	"Means any content stored in electronic form, in particular text or sound, visual or audiovisual recording" ( <i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 35. point</i> )
Electronic Time Stamp	"Means data in electronic form which binds other data in electronic form to a particular time establishing evidence that the latter data existed at that time." ( <i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 33. point</i> )
Electronic signature for electronic administration	At least advanced level electronic signature can be used by bodies providing electronic administration services, which fulfils the requirements of the E-Signature Government Decree [12] 7. § b) and c) point.
Subscriber	A person or organization signing the service agreement with the <i>Provider</i> in order to use some of its services.
Relying Party	Recipient of the electronic document, who acts relying on the electronic signature based on a given certificate.
Validation	"Means the process of verifying and confirming that an electronic signature or a seal is valid." ( <i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 41. point</i> )
Validation Chain	The electronic document or its hash, and the series of information assigned to one another (especially those certificates, information related to certificates, data used for signature or seal creation, the current status of the certificate, information on the withdrawal, as well as information on the validity data of the certificate issuer provider and its revocation information), with the help of which it can be established that the advanced or qualified electronic signature, seal or time-stamp placed on the electronic document was valid at the time of the signature, seal or time-stamp placement. ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [9] 1. § point 21. )</i>
Validation Data	"Means data that is used to validate an electronic signature or an electronic seal." ( <i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 40. point</i> )

Suspension	A temporary pause of the <i>Certificate's</i> validity before the end of the validity period indicated on the <i>Certificate</i> . The <i>Certificate</i> suspension is not definitive; the suspended <i>Certificate's</i> validity can be restored.
Advanced Electronic Signature	"Means an electronic signature which meets the following requirements: a/ it is uniquely linked to the signatory; b/ it is capable of identifying the signatory; c/ it is created using electronic signature creation data that the signatory can, with a high level of confidence, use under his sole control; and d/ it is linked to the data signed therewith in such a way that any subsequent change in the data is detectable. " ( <i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 11. point</i> )
Root Certificate	Also known as top level certificate. Self-signed <i>Certificate</i> , which is issued by a specific <i>Certification Unit</i> for itself, which is signed with its own private key, so it can be verified with its own public key – indicated on the certificate.
HSM: Hardware Security Module	A hardware-based secure device that generates, stores and protects cryptographic keys and provides a secure environment for the implementation of cryptographic functions.
Certification Authority	A <i>Trust Service Provider</i> , who/which identifies the requester within the confines of the certification service, issues <i>Certificates</i> , keeps a record, receives the <i>Certificate</i> related data changes, and publishes the regulations belonging to the <i>Certificate</i> , the Certificate-Verifier Data and the information on the current state (especially on possible revocation) of the <i>Certificate</i> .
Certification Unit	A unit of the <i>Provider's</i> system that signs the <i>Certificates</i> . Always just one Certificate-Creation Data (signing key, signature-creation data) belongs to a <i>Certification Unit</i> . It is possible that a Certification Authority simultaneously operate several <i>Certification Units</i> .
Certificate Policy	"A <i>Trust Service Policy</i> which concerns the <i>Certificate</i> issued within the framework of the <i>Trust Service</i> ." ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [9] 1. § 24. point</i> )
Applicant	That natural person who acts during the application for the given <i>Certificate</i> .

Represented Organization	The <i>Organization</i> , which is represented by the <i>Organizational Administrator</i> during the actions related to the <i>Certificates</i> issued to the given <i>Organization</i> .
Compromise	A cryptographic key is considered as compromised, when it can be assumed, that unauthorized person has access to it.
Public Administration Root CA	Organization unit defined in the E-Signature Government Decree [12] in section 3. § (2).
Electronic signature for public administration	At least advanced level electronic signature can be used by government bodies providing electronic administration services, which fulfils the requirements of the E-Signature Government Decree [12] 7. § a), b) and c) point.
Intermediate Certification Unit	A <i>Certification Unit</i> whose <i>Certificate</i> was issued by another <i>Certification Unit</i> .
Cryptographic Key	A unique digital data string controlling a cryptographic transformation, the knowledge of which is required for encryption, decryption and the creation and verification of electronic signatures and seals.
Key Management	The production of cryptographic keys, their delivery to users or its algorithmic implementation, as well as the registration, storage, archival, revocation and termination of keys which are closely linked to the used security method.
Hash	"A specific length bit string assigned to the electronic document, during the creation of which the used procedure (hashing procedure) fulfils the requirements defined in Act CCXXII. of 2015. [9] at the time of the creation." ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [9] 1. § 34. point</i> ) The hash in practice a fixed-length bit string that is clearly dependent on the electronic document, from which it is derived from, with a very small probability that two different documents would have the same hash, and it is practically impossible given the hash prepare a document, which has the same hash.

Private Key	<p>In the public key infrastructure, the element of an asymmetric cryptographic key pair belonging to the key-pair owner that the <i>Subject</i> shall keep strictly secret.</p> <p>In case of electronic signatures the <i>Signatory</i> generates the signature with the help of the private key.</p> <p>During the issuance of <i>Certificates</i>, the <i>Certification Authority</i> uses the private keys of the <i>Certification Unit</i> for placing an electronic signature or seal on the <i>Certificate</i> to protect it.</p>
Qualified Trust Service	<p>"A <i>Trust Service</i> that meets the applicable requirements laid down in the eIDAS Regulation." (eIDAS [1] article 3. point 17.)</p>
Qualified Trust Service Provider	<p>"A <i>Trust Service Provider</i> who provides one or more <i>Qualified Trust Services</i> and is granted the qualified status by the supervisory body." (eIDAS [1] article 3. point 20. )</p>
Qualified Electronic Signature	<p>An advanced electronic signature that is created by a qualified electronic signature creation device, and which is based on a qualified certificate for electronic signatures. (eIDAS [1] article 3. point 12.)</p>
Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device	<p>"Means an electronic signature creation device that meets the requirements laid down in Annex II of eIDAS [1]." (eIDAS [1] article 3. point 23.)</p> <p>Previously known as Secure Signature Creation Device (BALE).</p>
Qualified Electronic Time Stamp	<p>An electronic Time-Stamp which meets the requirements laid down in Article 42 of the eIDAS Regulation [1]. (eIDAS [1] article 3. point 34.)</p>
Public Key	<p>In the public key infrastructure, the element of an asymmetric cryptographic key pair belonging to key-pair owner, which should be made public. The disclosure is typically in the form of a <i>Certificate</i>, which links the name of the actor with its public key. In case of an electronic signature, the public key of the signature creator party is needed to verify the signature authenticity (this is the Certificate-Verifier Data).</p> <p>The authenticity of the <i>Certificates</i> can be verified with the public key of the <i>Certification Unit</i>.</p>
Public Key Infrastructure, PKI	<p>An infrastructure based on asymmetric cryptography, including the cryptographic algorithms, keys, certificates, the related standards and legislation, the underlying institutional system, a variety of providers and devices.</p>

Registration Claim	The data and statement given beforehand for the preparation of the <i>Certificate Application</i> and the service agreement to the <i>Provider</i> by the <i>Client</i> in which the <i>Client</i> authorizes the <i>Provider</i> for data management.
Registration Authority	Organization that checks the authenticity of the <i>Certificate</i> holder's data and verifies that the <i>Certificate Application</i> is authentic, and it has been submitted by an authorized person.
Extraordinary Operational Situation	An extraordinary situation causing disturbance in the course of the operation of the <i>Provider</i> , when the continuation of the normal operation of the <i>Provider</i> is not possible either temporarily or permanently.
Organization	Legal person.
Organizational Certificate	A <i>Certificate</i> , the <i>Subject</i> of which is the <i>Organization</i> , or which presents that the natural person <i>Subject</i> belongs to an <i>Organization</i> . In this case the name of the <i>Organization</i> is indicated in the "O" field of the <i>Certificate</i> .
Organizational Administrator	The natural person who is acting in the name of the <i>Subscriber</i> , and is eligible to issue the <i>Certificate Application</i> , to grant the issuance of the <i>Certificate</i> , to act during the application, replacement, suspension, reinstatement and revocation of the <i>Certificates</i> issued to the <i>Subscriber</i> .
Trust Service Practice Statement	"The statement of the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> of the detailed procedures or other operational requirements used in connection with the provision of particular <i>Trust Services</i> ." (Act CCXXII. of 2015. [9] 1. § point 41.)
Service Agreement	"The contract between the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> and the <i>Trust Service</i> client, which includes the conditions for the provision of the <i>Trust Service</i> and for using the services." (Act CCXXII. of 2015. [9] 1. § point 42.)
Certificate	"The electronic signature certificate, the electronic seal certificate and the <i>Website Authentication Certificate</i> , and all those electronic verifications issued within the framework of the <i>Trust Service</i> by the service provider, which includes the certificate related verification data and the certificate usage related information, and which as an electronic document is reliably protected against the available counterfeiting technologies at the time of the issuance and during its validity period." (Act CCXXII. of 2015. [9] 1. § point 44.)



Certificate Application	The data and statements given by the <i>Applicant</i> to the <i>Provider</i> for <i>Certificate</i> issuance, in which the <i>Applicant</i> reaffirms the authenticity of data to be indicated on the <i>Certificate</i> .
Certificate Repository	Data repository containing various <i>Certificates</i> . A Certification Authority has a Certificate Repository in which the issued <i>Certificates</i> are disclosed, but the system containing <i>Certificates</i> available to the application (certificate manager system) on the computer of the <i>Subject</i> and the <i>Relying Party</i> is also called Certificate Repository.
Remote Key Management Service	A Trust Service in which a service provider manages Customers' private keys under secure conditions, ensures the necessary technical and procedural conditions in order that the Customers could carry out remote key operations with their private keys stored at the service provider, such as creating electronic signatures or electronic seals.
Client	The collective term for the <i>Subscriber</i> and every related <i>Subject</i> denomination.
Revocation	The termination of the <i>Certificate's</i> validity before the end of the validity period indicated on the <i>Certificate</i> too. The <i>Certificate</i> revocation is permanent, the revoked <i>Certificate</i> cannot be reinstated any more.
Revocation Status Records	The internal records of the suspended and revoked <i>Certificates</i> which includes the fact of the suspension or revocation and the time of the suspension or revocation given in seconds maintained by the <i>Certification Authority</i> .

### 1.6.2 Acronyms

CA	Certification Authority	
CP	Certificate Policy	
CPS	Certification Practice Statement	
CRL	Certificate Revocation List	
eIDAS	electronic Identification, Authentication and Signature	
KGYSZ	Public Administration Root CA	Kormányzati Gyökér Hitelesítés Szolgáltató
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol	
NMHH	National Media and Infocommunications Authority	
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol	
OID	Object Identifier	

PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
QCP	Qualified Certificate Policy
RA	Registration Authority
TSP	Trust Service Provider

## 2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

### 2.1 Repositories

The *Provider* discloses the contractual conditions and policies electronically on its website on the following link:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/terms-and-information>

The draft version of the new documents to be introduced are disclosed on the website 30 days before coming into force.

The documents in force are available on the site in addition to all previous versions of all documents.

The actual version of policies and contractual conditions is readable at the customer service of the *Provider*.

After concluding the contract, the *Provider* makes the General Terms and Conditions, the *Disclosure Statement*, the *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* and the *Certification Practice Statement* available to the *Client* in the form of an electronically signed pdf file that can be downloaded from its website. The *Provider* makes the individual Service Agreement available to the *Client* on paper, authenticated with a handwritten signature and seal, or in the form of an electronic document in PDF format with a qualified electronic signature.

The *Provider* notifies its *Clients* about the change of the General Terms and Conditions.

### 2.2 Publication of Certification Information

The *Provider* publishes on its webpage (<https://www.e-szigno.hu>) and through LDAP protocol (<ldap://ldap.e-szigno.hu>)

- its provider *Certificates*;
- the end user *Certificates*.

#### Service Provider Certificates

With the following methods the *Certification Authority* discloses the *Certificates* of the time-stamping units, certification units and the online certificate status service units it operates:

- The denomination of the root certification units, and the hash of its root certificates in the *Certification Practice Statement*. (see section: 1.3.1.) The information related to their change of status are available at the website of the *Certification Authority*.

- The status change of *Certificates* of intermediate (non-root) certification units and the *Time-Stamping Units* is disclosed on the *Certificate Revocation Lists*, its website and within the confines of the online certificate status response services.
- For the signers of the online certificate status responses the *Provider* – compliant with the best international practice – issues a *Certificate* with extremely short period of validity (for 10 minutes ) thereby eliminating the need for *Certificate* revocation status verification.  
Each OCSP responder *Certificate* contains an indication ("nocheck"), that its revocation status doesn't need to be checked.

### End-User Certificates

With the following methods the *Provider* discloses status information related to the end-user *Certificates* which it had issued:

- on *Certificate Revocation Lists*,
- within the confines of the online certification status response service.

The end-user *Certificate* revocation status information is disclosed by the *Provider*, and the *Subject's* consent is not required for it. For status information disclosing methods, see Section 4.10.

The *Provider* guarantees, that the availability of its system publishing its service *Certificates*, the *Certificate Repository* and the revocation status information on an annual basis will be at least at least 99.9% per year, while service downtimes may not exceed at most 3 hours in each case.

## 2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication

### 2.3.1 Frequency of the Publication of Terms and Conditions

The most important terms and conditions for the service are contained in the service contract to be signed by the *Client* during the conclusion of the contract, or in the General Terms and Conditions [47] document referenced therein.

The *Provider* reviews the General Terms and Conditions annually or in case of exceptional request for change with priority and performs the necessary changes. The document will receive a new version number even after the smallest change and by taking into account the time required by the endorsement process, the planned date of coming into effect will be determined too.

The accepted document will be published on the webpage of the *Provider* and it will be sent for review to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority 30 days prior to the planned entry into force date.

The *Provider* will accept comments connected to the General Terms and Conditions published for 14 days prior to their becoming effective, at the following email address:

info@e-szigno.hu

In case of observations that require substantive changes, the document will be amended.

The *Provider* will close and publish the version of the General Terms and Conditions as amended with remarks on the 7th day prior to its becoming effective.

### 2.3.2 Frequency of the Certificates Disclosure

The *Provider*, regarding the disclosure of *Certificates*, follows the practices below:

- the *Certificates* of the root certification units operated by it are disclosed before commencing the service;
- the *Certificates* of the intermediate certification units operated by it are disclosed within 5 workdays after issuance;
- the *Provider* discloses the end-user *Certificates* in its *Certificate Repository* after issuance without delay.

### 2.3.3 The Changed Revocation Status Publication Frequency

The status information related to the end-user *Certificates* issued by the *Provider* and the provider *Certificates* are available immediately within the confines of the online certificate status service. The information related to the status of the *Certificates* are disclosed in the *Certificate Repository* and on the *Certificate Revocation Lists*. The practices related to the issuance of the *Certificate Revocation Lists* are discussed in Section 4.10.

## 2.4 Access Controls on Repositories

The provided information is freely available for anybody for reading purposes according to the specifics of the publication method.

The information disclosed by the *Provider* shall only be amended, deleted or modified by the *Provider*. The *Provider* prevents the unauthorized changes to the information with various protection mechanisms.

## 3 Identification and Authentication

### 3.1 Naming

The section contains requirements for the data indicated in the *Certificates* issued to end-users in accordance with the applied *Certificate Policies*.

The indicated Issuer ID and the Subject ID amongst the basic fields of the *Certificate* comply with the RCF 5280 [33] and IETF RFC 6818 [35] recommendations name-specific format requirements, in addition the *Provider* supports the Subject Alternative Names and Issuer Alternative Names fields located amongst the extensions.

The *Provider* may shorten the content of the *Certificate* fields in the frame of the name-specific format requirements or may indicate certain types of names in multiple instances.

#### 3.1.1 Types of Names

##### Denomination of the *Subject*

The denomination of the *Certificate* Subject (content of the Subject field) consists of:

- **commonName (CN) – OID: 2.5.4.3** The name of the *Subject*

The name of the natural person *Subject* is in this field in the same form as verified by the *Provider* according to the section 3.2.3.

The name of the automatism by the help of the *Certificate* is used can be indicated in this field for the *Applicant's* request (*Certificate for Automatism*).

Always filled out.
- **Surname – OID: 2.5.4.4** – Surname of the natural person

The surname of the *Subject* is in this field, where the *Provider* generates the surname from the full name in the CN field.

The *Provider* always fills it.
- **Given Name – OID: 2.5.4.42** – The given name of the natural person.

The given name of the *Subject* is in this field, where the *Provider* generates the given name from the full name in the CN field.

The *Provider* always fills it.
- **Pseudonym (PSEUDO) – OID: 2.5.4.65** Pseudonym of the *Subject*

The *Provider* doesn't fill this field.
- **Serial Number – OID: 2.5.4.5** Unique identifier of the *Subject*.

The indication of at least one filled out "Serial Number" field is in the *Certificate* which complies with the following requirements, so that it is able to form a part of the *Subject* permanent unique identifier in case of the usage of "Permanent Identifier" extension according to the IETF RFC 4043 [32] recommendation:

  - the identifier value belongs to the *Subject* named in the *Certificate*, identified by the *Provider*, and it is unique within the system of the *Provider*;
  - the *Provider* guarantees that the identifier value of any two *Certificates* it issued only matches with each other, if both of the *Certificates* belong to the same *Subject*.

This field is part of the *Subject* denomination, and is not the same as the *Certificate* serial number defined by IETF RFC 5280.

  - The unique identifier issued by the *Provider* to the *Subject* is OID formatted: "1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.x.y.z".
    - \* In it, the first numbers are fixed (1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2: is the unique identifier of the *Provider*),
    - \* "x" is the inner identifier used by the *Provider*,
    - \* "y" is the inner identifier used by the *Provider*,
    - \* "z" is an automatically issued, a unique identifier within a specific "x.y" value pair.

So the "x.y.z" value set is the unique identifier of the *Subject* within the system of the *Provider*.

Because the first part of the identifier identifies the *Provider* globally, and the rest of the identifier specifies the *Subject* within the system of the *Provider*, so the full identifier identifies the *Subject* in a unique way globally by itself.

This identifier is part of the "Permanent Identifier" according to IETF RFC 4043 [32] recommendation if the *Certificate* "Subject Alternative Names" field contains the "as-signer" but not the "identifierValue" according to IETF RFC 4043 recommendation.

There may be multiple OIDs belonging to the same *Subject*, but only one *Subject* may belong to an OID. The *Subject* is always entitled to request a new (unassigned) OID.

The *Provider* only issues the same OID for two *Certificates* if it made sure that the *Subject* belonging to the two *Certificate* is the same.

- The *Certificate* may contain further Serial Number fields.

The identifier may be given in a format

- \* specified in the ETSI EN 319 412-1 section 5.1.3 (for example: "TINHU-8123456790"),
- \* in (Name:Value) format (for example: "ID card number:AAAAAA" ), or
- \* in other format requested by the *Clients*.

In the "Serial Number" field the *Provider* – compliant with the standards – does not indicate accents.

- Organization (O) – OID: 2.5.4.10 The name of the *Organization*

In case of an *Organizational Certificate* the full or shortened name of the *Organization* is indicated in the "O" field according to the name verified by the *Provider* according to the section 3.2.2.

In case of an *Organizational Certificate* the field is always filled out.

In case of personal – not related to any organization – *Certificates* this field is not filled out.

In case of a provider *Certificate* issued for a *Trust Service Provider*, the "O" field is always filled, and the real name of the organization providing the service is indicated in it.

- Organization Identifier (OrgId) – OID: 2.5.4.97 – Identifier of the organization

In case of an *Organizational Certificate* the identifier of the *Organization* indicated in the "O" field is in this field.

Only such data may be indicated, which was verified by the *Provider*.

In case of an *Organizational Certificate* filling out the field is optional.

In case of personal – not related to any organization – *Certificates* this field is not filled out.

- Organizational Unit (OU) – OID: 2.5.4.11 – The name of the organizational unit

In case of an *Organizational Certificate* the name of the organizational unit related to the organization named in the "O" field, or the trademark, or other information may be in this field.

Only that data may be indicated here that the *Provider* verified and that the *Organization* has the right to use.

The "OU" field may be filled only if the "O", "L" and "C" fields are filled.

Optional field.

In case of personal – not related to any organization – *Certificates* this field is not filled out.

- CountryName (C) – OID: 2.5.4.6 – Identifier of the country.

In case of an *Organizational Certificate* the two-letter country code - according to ISO 3166-1 [27] - of the place of incorporation of the *Organization* indicated in the "O" field.

In case of a natural person *Subject* not related to an *Organization* the two-letter country code - according to ISO 3166-1 [27] - of the country which issued the document used for the identification of the *Subject*.

Always filled out.

In case of Hungary the value of the "C" field is: "HU".

- Street Address (SA) – OID: 2.5.4.9 – Address data

Not filled.

- Locality Name(L) – OID: 2.5.4.7 – Name of settlement

In case of an *Organizational Certificate* the locality name of the *Organization's* place of incorporation.

In case of a *Certificate* not related to an *Organization*, it is not filled.

- State or Province Name – OID: 2.5.4.8 – Member state, province name

In case of *Organizational Certificate* the state, province or county name of the *Organization's* place of incorporation.

In case of a *Certificate* not related to an *Organization*, it is not filled.

- Postal Code – OID: 2.5.4.17 – Zip code

In case of *Organizational Certificate*, the postal code of the *Organization's* place of incorporation. If filled, only verified information can be indicated.

In case of a *Certificate* not related to an *Organization*, it is not filled.

- Title (T) – OID: 2.5.4.12 – Title of the subject

The natural person *Subject's* role, title or job.

In case of *Organizational Certificate* it is filled out based on the official document presented by the Represented Organization indicated in the "O" field.

In case of *Certificate for Profession* it is filled out based on the official document presented by an Organization independent of the *Subject*.

Since the "Title" field contains the title of the *Subject*, it may contain further restrictions on the *Certificate* usage.

In special cases the *Provider* may include more "Title" fields in the *Certificate*.

- Email Address (EMAIL) – OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1 – The email address of the *Subject*. Filling is optional.

If filled, it is the same as the email address indicated in the "RFC822name" field of the *Subject* alternative names field.

The *Certificates* issued in accordance with the present *Certification Practice Statement* might contain further – in accordance with the referenced *Certificate Policies* – "Subject DN" fields. Only verified text values may be indicated on these fields (they shall not contain values indicating lack of data for example: ".", "-" or " ").

### Extensions

- Subject Alternative Names - "Subject Alternative Names"

A "Subject Alternative Names" field is not listed as a critical extension in the *Certificate*. The content will be filled as follows.

- In case of natural person *Subjects*, for the *Subject's* request, his name written in different notation than in the field "Subject DN / commonName" can be indicated here (typically in the "CN" field of the "Subject Alternative Names"). That name can be written with or without accent marks. The *Provider* is entitled to denote the nature of the name indicated.

The *Provider* verifies the names to be indicated on "Subject Alternative Names" field. It takes a decision based on whether the name requested by the *Client* is indeed the name of the *Subject*, and that it does not mislead others. If the *Subject* in the exercise of its profession does not use its name indicated on its document used for identification, then it can request the *Provider* to use that alternative name in the Subject Alternative Names field.

- The *Subject's* email address can be given in the subject alternative names "rfc822Name" field. If there's an email address indicated on the *Certificate*, then this field is definitely filled out. The same email address might be displayed in the "EMAIL" field of the *Certificate*.
- Furthermore the IETF RFC 4043 [32] "Permanent Identifier" can be included in the subject alternative names field. This is a different name forms that only contains the "assigner" field, in this the unique OID of the *Provider* is indicated. Then according to the IETF RFC 4043 recommendation, this "assigner" OID together with the first "Serial Number" value – containing the OID allocated by the *Provider*– of the "Subject" field makes up the *Subject* permanent identifier.

### The Denomination of the Certificate Issuer Certification Unit

The identifier of the *Certificate* issuer (Issuer field) is made up as follows:

- commonName (CN) – OID: 2.5.4.3  
The name of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit in English (see section: 1.3.1.).



- Organization (O) – OID: 2.5.4.10  
"Microsec Ltd."  
The name of the *Provider* in English without accents.
- Organization Identifier (OrgId) – OID: 2.5.4.97  
Filling out is optional.
- Organizational Unit (OU) – OID: 2.5.4.11  
"e-Szigno CA"  
The name of the *Provider* organization unit's name without accents.  
It was filled in the SHA-1 based provider *Certificates*, but it is not filled in the SHA-256 based provider *Certificates*.
- Locality (L) – OID: 2.5.4.7  
"Budapest"  
City of the seat of the *Provider* without accents.
- CountryName (C) – OID: 2.5.4.6  
"HU"  
Two letter code of the country of the seat of the *Provider* according to ISO 3166-1 [27].
- Email address (EMAIL) – OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1  
"info@e-szigno.hu"  
Filling out is optional.

The same data is indicated in the provider *Certificate* of the *Certificate* issuer, in the subject identifier field.

### **The Alternate Names of the Certificate Issuer Certification Unit**

The Issuer Alternative Names field is not filled in the end user *Certificates*.

Denominations indicated in the end user *Certificate* issuer's provider *Certificate*:

- In case of provider *Certificates* based on SHA-256 only the email address is indicated in the alternate names field (rfc822Name).

### **3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful**

The following rules are applied to the "SubjectDN" field:

- the identifier shall be meaningful;
- the personal name in the *Certificate* shall be indicated the same way as verified by the *Provider* according to the section 3.2.3.
- the name of the *Organization* in the *Certificate* shall be indicated the same way as verified by the *Provider* according to the section 3.2.2.

### 3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

The *Provider* doesn't issue *Certificate* with pseudonym.

### 3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

In order to interpret the identifiers it is recommended for the *Relying Parties* to act as described in this document. If the *Relying Party* is in need for help related to the interpretation of the identifier or any other data indicated in the *Certificate*, it can contact directly the *Provider*. In such case, the *Provider* shall not give any further information on the *Client* than indicated in the *Certificate*, – provided that the law does not require it – only provides the information to help interpret the indicated data.

### 3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

The *Subject* has a unique name in the *Certificate Repository* of the *Provider*. In order to ensure the uniqueness, the *Provider* gives each *Subject* an identifier (OID), – unique in the *Provider's* register – , which is indicated on the *Subject's* unique identifier "Subject DN Serial Number" field. The *Subjects'* unique identifiers (OID) are distributed in accordance with the order of processing the received *Certificate Applications*, ensuring the uniqueness of the "Subject" field in the *Certificate*.

The *Provider* can indicate other unique identifier (for example, identity card number, tax number, and identification within the organization) on request.

### Procedures to Resolve Disputes Relating the Names

The *Provider* ensures that the *Client* is entitled to use the indicated names. The *Provider* is entitled to revoke the *Certificate* in question for the illegal use of the name or data.

### 3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

In the fields of the end-user *Certificate* required by the *Subscriber* trade marks may occur. The *Provider* makes sure of their legitimate use, and in case of a complaint it is entitled to revoke the *Certificate*.

If the *Client* requests a *Certificate*, and asks for brand name or trade mark indication, then the *Client* shall provide evidence of the legitimacy of its use. The *Provider* verifies the provided evidences before the issuance of the *Certificate* based on the following web page operated by the European Union Intellectual Property Office:

<https://www.tmdn.org/tmview/welcome>

The trade mark or brand name may be included in the *Certificate* only if:

- the trade mark or brand name is registered by the organization of the *Applicant*;
- the *Applicant* has the consent to use the trade mark or brand name issued by the registrant.

The trade mark or brand name may be included in the *Certificate* the following ways:

- in the field "O", in this case the trade mark or brand name is followed by the official - shortened as appropriate - name of the organization in parenthesis. In this case the *Applicant* may request the indication of the proper (C), (R) or (TM) mark in the *Certificate* after the trade mark or brand name;
- in the field "OU", in this case the trade mark or brand name is always followed by the proper (C), (R) or (TM) mark.

Any of the (C), (R) or (TM) marks may only be included in the *Certificate* in case of proper use of the trade mark or business name immediately following it.

The *Provider* uses the e-Szignó trademark during its service provision. The trademark is the property of E-Szignó LP., for the usage of the trademark, the consent is given by the holder.

### 3.2 Initial Identity Validation

The *Provider* can use any communication channel within the limits provided by law, for the verification of the identity of the person or organization requesting the *Certificate*, and for checking the authenticity of the data provided.

The *Provider* may, in its sole discretion, refuse the issuance of the requested *Certificate* without any specific justification.

#### 3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

Prior to the issuance of a *Certificate* the *Provider* ensures and makes sure that the *Applicant* actually owns or manages the private key belonging to the public key of the *Certificate*.

If the *Provider* generates within its organization the private key belonging to the qualified *Certificate* of the *Subject* – typically on *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* or on *Cryptographic Hardware Device* in case of *Certificate Policies* requiring such – , then it does not have to specially verify that the *Applicant* owns the private pair of the public key to be verified.

If the *Applicant* requests the *Certificate* issuance for a key provided by it – typically in case of software certificates –, then the *Provider* accepts the *Certificate Application* in PKCS#10 format, which at the same time verifies, that the holder of the private key did indeed request the *Certificate*.

The *Provider* considers equivalent evidence that the *Subject* submits the *Certificate Application* with the public key to be included in the requested *Certificate* signed with the use of a valid qualified *Certificate* based electronic signature.

If the *Subject* private key is generated and managed by another *Trust Service Provider*, then the *Trust Service Provider* verifies that, the referred *Trust Service Provider* owns the private key, and it is under the sole control of the *Subject*. The *Provider* may accept the authentic statement of the referred *Trust Service Provider* about this. The format of the statement may be electronic. The *Provider* verifies the authenticity of the statement. The verification of the ownership happens with the acceptance of a PKCS#10 formatted *Certificate Application*.

#### 3.2.2 Authentication of an Organization Identity

The identity of the *Organization* is verified in the following cases:

- if the *Subject* of the *Certificate* to be issued is the *Organization*;
- if the *Subject* of the *Certificate* to be issued is the device or system operated by the *Organization*;
- if the *Certificate* is issued to a natural person, but the name of the *Organization* is indicated on the *Certificate* as well.

Prior to the issuance of an *Organizational Certificate* the *Provider* verifies the organizational data authenticity to be included on the *Certificate* based on authentic public registers.

Furthermore it is verified in these cases, that:

- whether the natural person acting on behalf of the *Organization* is entitled to act on behalf of the *Organization*;
- whether the *Organization* consented to the issuance of the *Certificate*.

For performing the verification, the *Client* shall give the following data:

- the official denomination, registered office and legal status of the *Organization*,
- official registration number of the *Organization* (e.g. company registration number, tax identification number), if applicable;
- the name of the organization unit within the *Organization*, if its indication in the *Certificate* is requested,
- in case of an *Organizational Certificate* issuance to a natural person, the role of the *Subject* within the *Organization*, if its indication in the *Certificate* is requested.

The following certificates and evidences have to be attached to the *Certificate Application*:

- the statement with the application submitter's manual signature on that, justifying that the data given for the *Organization* identification is correct and comply with reality;
- a declaration of the the applicant with his signature that there is no trademark amongst the data to be indicated in the *Organization Certificate*, or if included, proof that the *Organization* is entitled to use the trademark;
- a certificate regarding that on behalf of the organization the *Certificate Application* submitter natural person is entitled to submit the application <sup>2</sup>;
- in case of an *Organizational Certificate* issuance to a natural person, the certificate regarding that the organization consents to that the name of the organization is indicated on the certificate issued to the natural person <sup>3</sup>;
- the specimen signature of the person entitled to represent the *Organization* or other, official document equal to the specimen signature, which contains the name and signature of the persons entitled to represent the *Organization* <sup>4</sup>;

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<sup>2</sup>Section 3.2.5. contains the details regarding the verification of the authorizations and privileges.

<sup>3</sup>Section 3.2.5. contains the details regarding the verification of the authorizations and privileges.

<sup>4</sup>In case of Court of Registration registered firms the above documents can be acquired by the *Provider*.

- the *Organization* existence, name and the legal status verification document <sup>5</sup>.

The *Provider* is bound to verify the validity and authenticity of the presented documents.

### Identity validation of foreign Organizations

The *Provider* does not exclude the verification of *Organizations* registered abroad, as far as the data verification with adequate records of the country or obtaining a certificate issued by a trusted third party is feasible.

In respect of data verification, the *Provider* accepts:

- information obtained directly from the government register of the foreign country by the *Provider* or queried by a third party but authenticated by the primary data provider;
- certificate issued by the embassy or consulate of the foreign country in Hungary, that the organization exists and the given information is correct;
- certificate issued by a Hungarian embassy or consulate in a foreign country, that the organization exists and the given information is correct.

The *Provider* may accept other documents and evidences too, if it makes sure that the level of security is the same as of the above. Obtaining such evidence and submitting it to the *Provider* is the *Client's* responsibility.

The *Provider* only accepts valid documents, and evidences not older than 3 months.

The *Provider* does not issue the *Certificate* if it considers that based on its internal rules it can not verify with corresponding confidence a certificate issued abroad, a document or the data of the foreign organization.

The *Provider* guarantees by the proper usage of the trusted roles and the internal administrative processes that during the registration and verification process of the personal data at least two employees needed by the proper trusted roles.

### 3.2.3 Authentication of an Individual Identity

The natural person's identity shall be verified:

- if the *Subject* of the *Certificate* to be issued is a natural person;
- if a natural person is acting on behalf of an *Organization* for *Organizational Certificate* application.

When issuing a qualified *Certificate*, the identity of the natural person shall be verified according to (1) paragraph of Article 24 of the eIDAS regulation [1] by the physical presence or by a method providing equivalent security. The *Provider* uses the identification methods described in the (1) paragraph of article 24. as follows.

The *Provider* verifies the identity of the natural person applying one of the following methods.

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<sup>5</sup>In case of Court of Registration registered firms the above documents can be acquired by the *Provider*.

### 1. During face to face identity validation.

- the natural person shall appear in person before the person performing the identity validation, who may be one of the following:
  - officier of the *Registration Authority*,
  - state notary, as a third party in accordance with the Hungarian legislation.

- the identity of the natural person is verified during personal identification based on a suitable official proof of identity card;

The identification can be based on the following official documents:

- in case of natural persons within the scope of Act LXVI. of 1992. (henceforth: Nytv. [4]) official cards appropriate for verifying identity defined in Nytv. in accordance with Eüt. 82.§ (3) [9];
- in case of natural persons outside the scope of Nytv. [4] on the basis of a travel document defined in the Act on the entry and residence of persons enjoying the right of free movement and residence or the law on entry and residence of third-country nationals [6] in accordance with Eüt. 82.§ (4) [9];
- in case of identification of natural persons who have none of the documents mentioned above the *Provider* applies personal identity validation in accordance with Eüt. 82.§ (5) [9] only in the case of identifying European citizens. In such case a personal identity card with a photo issued by the European country of natural person's nationality is accepted as a trusted document for identity validation.
- the natural person shall declare the correctness of the personal identification data used for the identity validation with a written statement signed with a handwritten signature in the presence of the identification person; ;
- In case of natural persons within the scope of Nytv. [4] the validity of the data on the identity card used for personal identification and the validity of the identity card is validated by the *Registration Authority* by using an authentic public register. In case of any other natural persons the *Provider* doesn't validate the validity of the data on the identity card used for personal identification and the validity of the identity card by using an authentic public register, if such register is not available, it is not accessible to the *Provider* or the costs of access and control are disproportionately high.
- The person performing the identity validation verifies, whether any alteration or counterfeiting happened to the presented identity cards.

During the initial identity validation the *Provider* may accept the identification of a natural person carried out by a state notary as equivalent to the identity validation made by its own *Registration Authority*, if it can be stated on the basis of the notarial certification clause attached to the *Certificate Application* signed before the notary that the state notary had compared the personal data of the *Applicant* having appeared before the notary with the content of an authentic public registry or other central database.

#### Further rules for the identity validation of foreign citizens

The *Provider* may accept the identification carried out by a public notary as equivalent to the identity validation made by its own *Registration Authority*, if the public notary registered

in such foreign country,

- which concluded an international bilateral treaty with Hungary on the mutual recognition of public deeds or
- which country ratified the "Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents" of 5th October 1961. (Apostille)

The document issued by the public notary shall follow the requirements specified in the given agreement.

The *Provider* may accept the *Certificate Application* signed before the notary public if the notarial certification clause shows that

- the notary public has verified the identity of the *Applicant* based on a suitable official document for identity validation (ID card, passport etc.);
- the *Applicant* has signed the *Certificate Application* in the presence of the notary public.

The *Provider* always accepts the original documents when issued in Hungarian or English language. In case of documents issued on any other language the *Provider* may request the official Hungarian translation of the documents translated by the OFFI (Hungarian Office for Translation and Attestation).

The *Provider* may also accept other documents and evidences, if it makes sure that the level of security is the same as of the above. Obtaining such evidence and submitting it to the *Provider* is the *Client's* responsibility.

The *Provider* only accepts valid documents and evidences not older than 3 months.

The *Provider* does not issue the *Certificate* if it considers that based on its internal rules, that it can not verify with corresponding confidence the certificate, document or the data of the foreign organization.

## 2. By identification traced back to a certificate of an electronic signature.

In this case:

- The *Applicant* submits the *Certificate Application* in electronic format with a qualified electronic signature based on a non-pseudonymous qualified *Certificate*.
- The electronically signed *Certificate Application* shall contain the data needed for the unambiguous identification of the natural person.
- The authenticity and confidentiality of the *Certificate Application* shall be verified on the entire certification chain.
- The *Provider* accepts only those electronic signatures which are based on a *Certificate* issued by a Trust Service Provider according to a Trust Service, which is listed on a national Trusted List published on the EU List of Lists and was valid at the time of the signature creation.
- The *Provider* may accept only those electronic signatures which are based on such a *Certificate* which was issued in compliance with the paragraph (1) point (a) or (b) of Article 24 of the eIDAS regulation [1].

### 3. Using another method of identification approved on national level

Based on the 541/2020. (XII. 2.) Government Decree [14], the *Provider* may also verify the identity of the natural person using identification by means of an electronic communication device providing video technology (hereinafter: video technology identification), which is recognized as equivalent to the face to face validation.

In this case, the *Provider* shall act as prescribed during the personal identification, with the difference that the personal meeting shall be replaced by a video technology based remote identification procedure in which:

- (a) In the case of video technology identification, the *Provider* takes a video image of the *Client* during a live telecommunication connection, then compares the image taken of the *Client* with the photograph in the document used for identification (hereinafter: ID document). Identification is appropriate if it can be clearly established by the *Provider* that the person in the ID document is the same as the *Client* in the video.
- (b) The *Provider* sets out in detail in the "Information on online video identification terms" [48] document the conditions for the use of video technology identification, in particular the minimum requirements for the quality of the video connection. The document will be published on the *Provider's* website in accordance with the public regulations.

In order to perform a successful video technology identification, it is advisable to provide the following conditions:

- ID document in good condition
  - properly lit environment
  - quiet, undisturbed environment
  - exclusion of the presence of other persons
  - IT device with two-way audio and video capability
  - camera with min. 2 megapixel video resolution
  - stable internet connection at a speed of min 1.5Mbps.
- (c) By presenting the *Certification Practice Statement* and the "Information on online video identification terms" [48] document and during the video recording, the *Provider* ensures that the *Client* can get to know the conditions of the video technology identification in detail, and has expressly agreed to comply with them, and acts accordingly.
  - (d) The *Provider* records and keeps for at least 10 years from the date of recording the entire communication established between the *Provider* and the *Client* during the video technology identification, the detailed information of the *Client* related to video technology identification, and the *Client's* express consent to this in a retrievable way, on video and audio, on a way that does not degrade the quality of the image and sound recording.
  - (e) The condition of successful video technology identification is that the image resolution of the electronic communication device enabling video technology identification and the illumination of the image be suitable for recognizing the gender, age and facial features of the *Client*, and the *Client*
    - shall look into the camera so that his or her portrait can be recognized, captured and identified on the basis of the portrait shown on the ID document presented by him or her,



- shall communicate in a comprehensible manner the identifier of the document used for video identification,
  - present his / her ID document in such a way that the security features and data sets contained therein can be identified, recorded and verified, and
  - the data contained in the ID document can be matched with the data available about the *Client* at the *Provider*, and the *Client* can be identified with the image shown on the ID document based on his / her image.
- (f) The *Provider* makes sure that the document is suitable for performing video technology identification, so
- the document complies with the requirements of the issuing authority,
  - the individual security features, in particular the hologram, the kinegram or other equivalent security features, are recognizable and undamaged, and
  - the document ID is the same as the document ID provided by the *Client*, recognizable and undamaged.
- (g) During the video technology identification, the *Provider* makes sure that
- the *Client*'s portrait is recognizable and identifiable by the portrait on the document presented by him, and
  - the data contained in the document can be logically corresponded to the data available about the *Client* at the *Provider*.
- (h) A live telecommunications connection is also eligible if the *Provider* examines the terms by machine or after the termination of the telecommunications connection, but makes sure that the *Client* is in a live connection during the identification.

The *Provider* shall issue the *Certificate* only if the video technology identification fully complies with the above requirements.

The *Provider* uses the data reconciled during a previous natural person identification procedure, if the *Subject* requests new *Certificate* instead of an expired or a revoked one, or if he requests a new *Certificate* besides the existing one during the validity period of the service agreement. The authenticity of the *Certificate Application*, the validity of the data to be included in the *Certificate* and the identity of the *Applicant* is validated by the *Provider*.

The *Provider* guarantees by the proper usage of the trusted roles and the internal administrative processes that during the registration and verification process of the personal data at least two employees needed by the proper trusted roles.

### 3.2.4 Non-Verified Subscriber Information

Only that data can be in the *Certificate* issued by the *Provider* which has been verified by the *Provider*.

### 3.2.5 Validation of Authority

The identity of the natural person representing the legal person is verified according to the requirements of Section 3.2.3. before issuing an *Organizational Certificate*.

The right of representation of the natural person shall be verified.

Persons entitled to act on behalf of an *Organization*:

- a person authorized to represent the given *Organization*,
- a person who is mandated for that purpose by an authorized person to represent the *Organization*,
- an *Organizational Administrator* appointed by an authorized person to represent the *Organization*.

The *Organizational Administrator* can be appointed during *Certificate Application*, or anytime later with the help of the corresponding form. The identifier information of the designated person(s) shall be given on the form, by which he/she can be identified in later litigation. The form shall be signed (manually or by creating a qualified electronic signature based on a non pseudonymous *Certificate*) by the representative of the *Organization*, which is verified by the registration associate of the *Provider* when received.

Appointing an *Organizational Administrator* is not mandatory, and multiple *Organizational Administrators* can be appointed too. If there is no appointed *Organizational Administrator*, then the person entitled to represent the *Organization* can perform this task.

### 3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

The *Provider* does not work together with other Certification Authorities during the provision of the service.

### 3.2.7 Email address validation

For applications submitted on the *Provider's* web site, the *Provider* validates the *Applicant's* email address by verifying the email address before completing the *Certificate Application* form. The web page asks for the *Applicant's* email address before filling in the form and does not allow other details to be filled in. The *Provider* will send a randomly selected URL with a limited period of validity to the email address provided. The *Applicant* can only complete the form by clicking on the unique link provided. Each incoming *Certificate Application* therefore has an email address that is verified during operation.

In the case of a *Certificate Application* submitted otherwise, the *Provider* sends an e-mail with a random number to the e-mail address to be verified, to which the *Applicant* shall respond and confirm the request. The response email shall include the random number sent by the *Provider*. The random number is valid for 30 days.

## 3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests

Re-key is the process when the *Provider* issues a *Certificate* to a *Subject* with a replaced public key. Re-key can only be requested during the validity period of the service agreement.

In case of a re-key request, the *Provider* verifies the existence and checks the validity of the affected *Certificate*.

The *Provider* accepts re-key requests in case of valid and not valid (suspended, revoked or expired) *Certificates* too.

Details related to the re-key process can be read in section 4.7.

### 3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for valid Certificate

The identification of the *Subject* takes place as described in section 3.2.3.

When the expiry date of the new *Certificate* is not later than the *Certificate* to be re-keyed, the *Provider* re-uses the results and evidences collected during the original validation process.

### 3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for invalid Certificate

The *Provider* accepts re-key requests – only during the validity period of the service agreement– in case of *Certificates* suspended, revoked or expired.

The identification of the *Subject* takes place as described in section 3.2.3.

## 3.4 Identification and Authentication in Case of Certificate Renewal Requests

*Certificate* renewal is the process when the *Provider* issues a certificate with unchanged *Subject* identification information but for new validity period to a *Subject*. *Certificate* renewal can only be requested during the validity period of the service agreement and for valid *Certificates*.

### 3.4.1 Identification and Authentication in Case of a Valid Certificate

The identification of the *Subject* takes place as described in section 3.2.3.

In case of *Certificate* renewal initiated by the *Provider*, the *Provider* may re-use the results and evidences collected during the original validation process, when the expiry date of the new *Certificate* is not later than the *Certificate* to be renewed.

### 3.4.2 Identification and Authentication in Case of an Invalid Certificate

Invalid *Certificate* can't be renewed.

## 3.5 Identification and Authentication for Certificate Modification requests

*Certificate* modification is the process, when the *Provider* issues a new *Certificate* to the same *Subject* with an unchanged public key, but with different *Subject* identification data.

### 3.5.1 Identification and Authentication in Case of a Valid Certificate

The identification of the *Subject* takes place as described in section 3.2.3.

If the modified *Certificate* expires on the same time as the original *Certificate*, during the procedure, the *Provider* may use the results of inspections performed prior to the issuance of the original *Certificate*.

### 3.5.2 Identification and Authentication in Case of an Invalid Certificate

Invalid *Certificate* can't be renewed.

### 3.6 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request

The *Provider* receives and processes the requests related to the suspension and revocation of the *Certificates*, and the announcements (for example related to the private key compromise or to the improper use of the *Certificate*) concerning the revocation of the *Certificates*.

The *Provider* ensures that the requests only get accepted from authorized parties besides the rapid processing of the suspension and revocation requests.

The identity of the submitter persons and the authenticity of the applications are verified.

The identification and authentication aspects of such requests are described in section 4.9. .

## 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

The issuance of a new *Certificate* for a new *Subject* shall precede the transmission of the *Registration Application* required to the *Provider* and signing of the service agreement on the *Subscriber's* part as well as signing of the *Certificate Application* of the *Subject's* part.

Certificate replacement is the process, when previously registered (and during that, identified) *Subject* requests a new *Certificate* instead of the existing one (issued pursuant to a valid service agreement). Certificate replacement can take place for the below reasons:

- *Certificate renewal* means requesting a *Certificate* with the same data indicated in it as in the previous one by the *Subject* and both *Certificates* are issued for the same public key. The details of *Certificate renewal* are discussed in section 4.6.
- *Certificate modification* means requesting the modification of the *Subject's Certificate* considering the change of the *Subject's* data included in the *Certificate*. The *Provider* receives *Certificate modification* requests during the validity period of the *Certificate*. Over the course of *Certificate modification*, the new *Certificate* is issued to the same public key. The details of *Certificate modification* are described in section 4.8.
- *Re-key* means a new *Certificate* issuance by the *Provider* for a new public key at the request of the *Subject* during the *Certificate's* validity period or after expiration. The details of *Certificate renewal* are discussed in section 4.7.

When *Clients* – with a valid service agreement– request a new *Certificate*, then the modification of the service agreement is necessary.

The state of a *Certificate* can be valid, suspended, revoked or expired. Regulations related to the status changes are discussed in section 4.9., and the *Certificate* status service is discussed in section 4.10.

The *Provider* provides *Certificate* maintenance only under the force of the related service agreement. The requirements related to the termination of service agreement are discussed in section 4.11.

### 4.1 Application for a Certificate

For each new *Certificate* issuance, *Certificate Application* submission is required. Prior to submitting the first *Certificate Application*, the *Subject* shall submit a *Registration Application* to the

*Provider*, this can be done through the website of the *Provider*, for instance. The *Subject* shall specify their data to be indicated in the *Certificate* and shall specify what kind of *Certificate* they request, and they shall authorize the *Provider* for the management of their personal data in the Registration request.

The *Provider* doesn't consider the data indicated in the *Registration Application* authentic until the *Subject* confirms them in a *Certificate Application*.

In case the conclusion of a new service agreement is necessary, the *Provider* prepares the *Subscriber's* service agreement based on the information given in the *Registration Application*.

The service agreement shall contain the types of *Certificate* available for specific *Subjects* in the frame of the services within the confines of the Agreement.

A new *Certificate* can be requested within the confines of a previously concluded service agreement. If the *Certificate* (*Certificate* replacement) is issued as a replacement of a *Certificate* indicated in the service agreement, it is not necessary to modify the service agreement. If the *Client* requests a new *Certificate* in addition to the extant ones, the service agreement shall be modified.

The *Provider* informs the *Subscriber* about the *Certificate* usage terms and conditions prior to the conclusion of the contract.

If the *Subject* is not the same as the *Subscriber*, then the aforementioned information is also given to the *Subject*.

The *Provider* publishes the documents containing the information in an intelligible form, in an electronically downloadable form on its website, and upon request makes it available at the customer service office for on-site reading. At the Customer Service Office, the *Client* has the opportunity to read the documents and consult.

In the *Certificate Application* the *Subject* shall at least include the data below:

- data to be indicated in the *Certificate* (for example name, title, name of *Organization*, name of organizational unit, city, country, email address);
- the personal identification information of the *Subject* – in case of an *Organization* the *Organization* representative – (full name, number of the identity document, mother's name, date and time of birth);
- the contact of the *Subject* – in case of an *Organization* the *Organization* representative – (telephone number, email address);
- in case of *Organizational Certificate* application, the data of the *Organization* (official name, domicile, optionally: identification data, denomination of the organization department);
- the *Subscriber's* data (billing information);

In conjunction with the *Certificate Application* the *Provider* ask for and check at least the following documents, certifications, procurations and declarations (in case of remote identification the copies of these):

- documents necessary to identify the *Subject* – in case of an *Organization*, the *Organization* representative – according to Section 3.2.3;

- in case of *Organizational Certificate* application, the documents for the identification of the *Organization* according to Section 3.2.2;
- if the *Subject* is an *Organization*, then the certification or procuration delivered by the *Organization*, that the *Subject* is entitled to represent the *Organization* according to section 3.2.5;
- if the *Subject* is a natural person requesting the indication of belonging to an *Organization*, then the evidence of the consent of the *Organization*, to that according to section 3.2.2.;
- if the *Certificate* requested contains a trademark or a brand name, then a certification about the usage rights of the *Subject* according to section 3.1.6.

#### 4.1.1 Who May Submit a Certificate Application

*Certificate Application* may only be submitted by natural persons, to request a *Certificate* for themselves or for the organization represented.

In case of *Organizational Certificate* representatives may only be natural persons according to section 3.2.5. *Certificate Application* submitted by any other person is automatically rejected.

The precondition of *Certificate* issuance is a valid service agreement (signed by the *Subscriber* and the *Provider*) concerning *Certificate* issuance and maintenance.

The *Subject* – in case of an *Organization* the *Organization* representative – may submit the *Certificate Application* in the following ways:

- on paper signed manually at the customer service of the *Provider* or at the mobile registration associate of the *Provider*, on a date previously agreed (in this case, the personal identification takes place this time)
- on paper signed manually and sent to the customer service of the *Provider* (in this case, the personal identification will take place another time)
- in electronic form with an electronic signature or electronic seal based on a non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the requested *Certificate*, sent to the *Provider's* email address (see section 1.2.3.);

The *Subscriber* and the *Subject* – in case of an *Organization* the *Organization* representative – shall provide their contact information during the *Registration Application*.

#### 4.1.2 Enrolment Process and Responsibilities

During the process of the application the *Provider* ascertains the identity of the person submitting the *Certificate Application* (see section 3.2.3).

If the *Subject* is an *Organization* and the name of an *Organization* is indicated in the *Certificate* too (*Organizational Certificate*), then the *Provider* identifies the *Organization* (see section: 3.2.2.) and it ensures, that the *Subject* is entitled to represent the *Organization* (see section: 3.2.5.) and to request a *Certificate* related to the *Organization* (see section: 3.2.2.).

The *Subscriber* determines which *Subject* is entitled to request a *Certificate* according to which *Certificate Policy*.

The *Subject* – in case of an *Organization*, its representative – shall provide all the necessary information for the conduct of the identification processes.

If it is necessary the *Provider* performs data reconciliation with authentic government registers such as the personal data and address register or the company register). In case of a database if it can be arranged, the *Provider* performs the data reconciliation electronically.

During the process the *Provider* specifies the unique name of the *Subject* and assigns a globally unique ID (OID) to the *Subject*. This happens as defined in section 3.1.

The *Provider* registers all the necessary information on the identity of the *Subject* and the *Organization* for the provision of service and for keeping contact.

The *Provider* registers the service agreement signed beforehand by the *Subscriber* that shall contain the *Subscriber's* statement that the *Subscriber* is aware of its obligations and undertakes the compliance.

The *Provider* registers the *Certificate Application* signed by the *Subject* – in case of an *Organization*, its representative – which shall contain the following:

- a confirmation, that the data provided in the *Certificate Application* are accurate;
- a consent, that the *Provider* records and processes the data provided in the application;
- the consent about the disclosure of the *Certificate*;
- a statement that there's no brand name or trademark indicated in the requested *Certificate*, or it is indicated and the applicant is entitled to use that.

The *Provider* keeps the aforementioned records for the time period required by law.

The *Provider* archives the contracts, the *Certificate Application* form and every attestation that the *Represented Organization*, the *Subject* or the *Subscriber* handed in.

If the identity of the *Subject* – in case of an *Organization*, its representative – or in case of an *Organizational Certificate* the identity of the *Organization* or in case of an *Organizational Certificate* issued to a natural person, the *Subject's* inherency to the *Represented Organization* can not be verified without a doubt or any of the indicated data in the *Certificate Application* is incorrect, then the *Provider* gives the *Client* the opportunity to correct the missing or incorrect data, and to provide the missing attestations within 3 months from the submission of the *Certificate Application* according to its inner regulations.

## 4.2 Certificate Application Processing

### 4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

The *Provider* identifies the *Subject* according to Section 3.2., and it verifies the authenticity of the request.

In case of requesting an organization *Certificate*, the *Organization* is going to be identified too, and the verification of the privileges takes place according to section 3.2. The *Provider* registers all the information used by the *Subject* or in case of an *Organizational Certificate* the *Organization* to certify its identity, including the registration number of the documentation used for the certification and the incidental limitations related to its validity.

#### 4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

To avoid any conflicts of interests, the *Provider* ensures its personal and operational independence contrary to the *Subscribers*. It does not constitute a breach of conflicts of interests, if the *Provider* issues *Certificates* for its associates.

The *Provider* verifies the authenticity of all the information given in the *Certificate Application* to be indicated on the *Certificate* before issuing the *Certificate*.

If the *Subject* requests a *Certificate* containing an email address, the *Provider* verifies the email address to be indicated in the *Certificate*. It ascertains that the email address exists and verifies that it is the *Subject's* email address indeed.

After processing the *Certificate Application*, the *Provider* accepts or rejects the *Certificate Application*.

If the identity of the natural person or the organization which is to be identified, or in case of a personal *Certificate*, the *Subject's* inherency to the *Represented Organization* can not be verified without a doubt or any of the indicated data on the *Certificate Application* form is incorrect, and the *Client* did not correct it for the request of the *Provider*, then the *Provider* rejects the application.

The *Provider* will reject the submitted *Certificate Application* if it does not contain the consent required for the publication of the *Certificate*.

In case of rejection of the *Certificate Application*, the *Provider* informs the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* about the fact of the rejection, but the *Provider* is not obliged to justify its decision.

#### 4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

The *Provider* undertakes the processing of the *Certificate Application* within 5 workdays if all the necessary data and document is available.

### 4.3 Certificate Issuance

The *Provider* only issues the *Certificate* to the *Subject* in case of the acceptance of the *Certificate Application*.

The issued *Certificate* only contains the data that was indicated in the *Certificate Application* and that was verified by the *Provider* during the evaluation process.

If the Certification Authority provides the personal Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device— which will be physically given to the *Subject* within the framework of device provision service –, as a part of the personalization process, the *Provider* generates the *Subject's* keypairs, but the *Certificate's* will not be issued. The handover of the Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device containing the private key takes place in a controlled environment in accordance with the security regulations defined in section 6.1.2.

After the handover of the Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device the the *Provider's* Customer service Officer issues the *Subject's* *Certificates*. Along with the takeover of the *Electronic Signature Creation Device*, the *Subject* receives the activation codes necessary for activation, generated according to section 6.4.

If the takeover of the Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device containing the *Subject's* private key to the *Subject* do not take place right after the personal identification related to the



*Certificate Application*, then the *Subject* can take over their device after personal identification, in the course of they have to identify themselves with an identification document. The transferring party verifies, that the portrait of the *Subject* matches the one on his/her ID card, and the Signature of the *Subject* fits the one appears on the ID card.

The *Provider* issues only the requested *Subject's Certificates* after verifying in a credible manner that the Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device is already in the possession of the *Subject*. Along with the takeover of the Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device, the *Subject* receives the activation code, which is necessary for activation and generated according to section 6.4, through an independent channel.

If the *Subject's* private key is managed by a Remote Key Management Service Provider, the *Provider* will also send the issued *Certificate* directly to the trust service provider managing the key.

#### **4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance**

The *Certificate* issuance happens according to strictly regulated and controlled processes, the details are stated by the *Provider's* inner regulations and requirements.

The *Provider* guarantees by the proper usage of the trusted roles and the internal administrative processes that during the *Certificate* issuance process at least two employees needed by the proper trusted roles.

#### **4.3.2 Notification of the Subscriber about the Issuance of the Certificate**

The Certification Authority informs the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* on the issuance of the *Certificate* and enables the *Subject* to receive the *Certificate*.

### **4.4 Certificate Acceptance**

#### **4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance**

The *Subject* shall verify the accuracy of the data indicated in the *Certificate* during the takeover of the *Certificate*.

If the *Provider* provides Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device to the *Subject*, after the reception of the Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device containing the private key and the code necessary for activation the *Subject* shall sign manually a statement about takeover, in which – amongst others – he/she verifies that he/she received the related activation codes and that he/she is acquainted with the technical and legal requirements of the Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device usage.

The *Subject* accepts the *Certificate* by using the *Certificate*, no separate declaration is required.

#### **4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA**

After the issuance of the *Certificate* the *Provider* discloses the *Certificate* in its *Certificate Repository*.

#### 4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

If the *Certificate* was issued for the *Subject* to create electronic signature behalf of an *Organization* the contact of the *Represented Organization* is notified by the *Provider* on the *Certificate* issuance without delay.

### 4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

#### 4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

The *Subject* shall only use its private key corresponding to the *Certificate* for electronic signature creation, and any other usage (for example, authorization and encryption) is prohibited.

A private key corresponding to an expired, revoked, or suspended *Certificate* shall not be used for electronic signature creation.

The *Subject* is bound to ensure the adequate protection of the private key and the activation data.

The limitations determined in Section 1.4. have to be followed during the usage.

#### 4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

To retain the level of security guaranteed by the *Provider*, in the course of accepting the electronic signature verified, the *Relying Party* is recommended to proceed prudentially particularly regarding to the following:

- the *Relying Party* shall verify the validity and revocation status of the *Certificate*;
- *Certificates* for electronic signatures and the corresponding public keys shall only be used for electronic signature validation;
- the verifications related to the *Certificate* should be carried out for the entire certificate chain up to a trusted root or intermediate provider certificate;
- when building the certificate chain, accept a Trust Service Provider *Certificate* as a trusted issuer (trust anchor) that
  - is listed in the Hungarian Trust List [44] as a trust service entitled to issue qualified end-user *Certificates*, and
  - it is accompanied by a Service Provider *Certificate* that was valid at the time of creating the signature and at the time of issuing the enduser *Certificate* used to create the signature;
- the electronic signature verification shall be performed with a reliable application, which complies with the related technical specifications, can be resiliently configured, and has been set correctly, and it runs within a virus-free environment;
- in case of personal *Certificates* related to an organization, it is recommended to verify that the title of the Signatory by which it is entitled to sign the document can be identified by the certificate (for example indicated in the Title field);

- it is recommended to verify that the *Certificate* was issued according to the appropriate Certificate Policy;
- when accepting a qualified electronic signature it is recommended to verify that the *Certificate* was issued based on a *Certificate Policy* requiring *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*;
- if it is indicated in the *Certificate*, it is recommended to verify the highest value of the obligation undertaken at one time (the Certification Authority is not responsible for the claims arising from electronic documents issued and signed concerning transactions in excess of those limits and for the damage caused this way.);
- the *Relying Party* shall consider any restrictions indicated in the *Certificate* or in the regulations referenced in the *Certificate*.

The *Provider* makes available a service for its *Clients* and *Relying Parties* that they can use to verify the issued *Certificates*.

## 4.6 Certificate Renewal

The process when the *Provider* issues a new *Certificate* for a new validity period for the same public key with unchanged *Subject* identity information is called *Certificate* renewal.

If the *Subject* would like to use the *Certificate* after the expiration, then it shall initiate the *Certificate* renewal. The *Certificate* renewal technically means the issuance of a new *Certificate*, with the same *Subject* identification data, but new validity period. Other data can change in the *Certificate*, like the CRL, OCSP references or the provider key used for signing the *Certificate*.

### 4.6.1 Circumstances for Certificate Renewal

*Certificate* renewal is only permitted when all of the following conditions are met:

- the *Certificate* renewal request was submitted within the validity period of the *Certificate*;
- the *Certificate* to be renewed is not suspended or revoked;
- the private key corresponding to the *Certificate* is not compromised;
- the *Subject* identity information indicated in the *Certificate* is still valid.

The *Provider* shall only accept a *Certificate* renewal application within the effect of the service agreement.

If a previous *Certificate* of the *Subject* is revoked, then new *Certificate* can only be requested in the frame of *Re-key* (see section: 4.7. ) or new *Certificate Application* (see section: 4.6.).

If any of the *Subject* data indicated in the *Certificate* changed, then new *Certificate* shall be requested within the framework of *Certificate* modification (see section 4.8.).

During the *Certificate* renewal, the *Subject* is informed if the terms and conditions have changed since the previous *Certificate* issuance.

If the *Subject* is not the same as the *Subscriber*, then the information aforementioned is also provided to the *Subscriber*.

The *Certificate* renewal is performed within the framework of a valid service agreement, there is no need for its modification.

#### 4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal

The *Certificate* renewal shall be initiated by a person who is entitled to submit an application for a new *Certificate* of the same type on behalf of the *Subject* at the time of the submission of renewal application.

The applicant shall state in the *Certificate* renewal application, that the *Subject* identification data indicated in the *Certificate* are still valid.

The *Provider* is entitled to initiate the renewal of the *Certificate* if changes in the internal or external conditions of the provision of the service necessitate it, for example, but not exclusively in the following cases:

- due to changes in external requirements, the *Certificate* can no longer be used in its current form;
- the *Provider* becomes aware that the *Certificate* does not comply with the referred to *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* or *Certification Practice Statement*;
- if the service provider signing key used to issue the *Certificate* shall be replaced out of turn.

The *Provider* provides the following possibilities for *Certificate* renewal application submissions:

- on paper signed manually at the customer service of the *Provider* or at the mobile registration associate of the *Provider*, on a date previously agreed;
- in an electronic form with an electronic signature or electronic seal based on the non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the *Certificate* to be renewed (see section 1.2.3.);
- on paper signed manually and sent to the customer service of the *Provider* (in this case, the personal identification will take place another time)

#### 4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

During the evaluation of the *Certificate* renewal application, the *Provider* verifies that:

- the submitted *Certificate* renewal application is authentic;
- the submitter of the *Certificate* renewal application has the appropriate entitlement and authorization;
- the submitter of the *Certificate* renewal application stated that the data of the *Subject* to be indicated in the *Certificate* are unchanged and accurate;
- the *Certificate* renewal application was submitted during the *Certificate*'s validity period;

- the *Certificate* to be renewed is not suspended or revoked;
- based on currently available information about the cryptographic algorithms used, they still will be applicable even during the planned validity period of the *Certificate* to be issued.

The method used for identification and authentication during the *Certificate* renewal is stated in Section 3.4.

#### 4.6.4 Notification of the Client about the New Certificate Issuance

The *Provider* informs the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* about the *Certificate* issuance.

#### 4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewed Certificate

During the *Certificate* renewal process, there is no key generation, thus there is no need to handover key to the *Subject*.

The renewed *Certificate* can be received (downloaded) without personal encounter.

If the private key of the *Subject* is on a personal Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device which is physically hold by the *Subject*, then the *Subject* installs the *Certificate* to the device. The easiest way to do this is with a card management application provided by the *Provider*, for which the *Provider* provides written manuals, and if necessary, provides consultation possibility by telephone.

If the *Subject*'s private key is managed by a Remote Key Management Service Provider, the *Provider* will also send the issued *Certificate* directly to the trust service provider managing the key.

The *Subject* accepts the *Certificate* by using the *Certificate*, no separate declaration is required.

#### 4.6.6 Publication of the Renewed Certificate by the CA

The *Provider* discloses the renewed *Certificate* the same way as the original *Certificate*.

#### 4.6.7 Notification of Other Entities about the Certificate Issuance

If the *Certificate* was issued for the *Subject* to create electronic signature behalf of an *Organization* the contact of the *Represented Organization* is notified by the *Provider* on the *Certificate* issuance without delay.

### 4.7 Certificate Re-Key

*Re-key* means the process when the *Provider* issues a new *Certificate* for the *Subject* in a way that the public key is to be changed.

Further data may be optionally changed in the new *Certificate* issued during the *Re-key* process, for example validity period, the CRL and OCSP links or the provider key used to sign the *Certificate*.

#### 4.7.1 Circumstances for Certificate Re-Key

The validity of the previous *Certificate* is not required for *Re-key*, but the *Provider* shall only accept *Re-key* applications within the scope of the service agreement.

During the *Certificate Re-key*, the *Subject* is informed by the *Provider* if the terms and conditions have changed since the previous *Certificate* issuance. If the *Subject* is not the same as the *Subscriber*, then the information aforementioned is also given to the *Subscriber*.

*Certificate Re-key* is performed within the framework of a valid service agreement, there is no need for its modification.

#### 4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

The *Certificate Re-key* shall be initiated by a person who would be entitled to submit a new *Certificate Application* at the time of the submission of the *Re-key* application.

The applicant shall state in the *Certificate Re-key* application, that the *Subject* identification data indicated in the *Certificate* are still valid, or they shall give the new data and make a statement of its validity.

The *Provider* ensures the following possibilities to submit *Certificate* renewal application:

- on paper signed manually at the customer service of the *Provider* or at the mobile registration associate of the *Provider*, on a date previously agreed (in this case, the personal identification takes place this time)
- in electronic form with an electronic signature or electronic seal based on a non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the requested *Certificate*, sent to the *Provider's* email address (see section 1.2.3.);
- on paper signed manually and sent to the customer service of the *Provider* (in this case, the personal identification will take place another time)

#### 4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-Key Requests

During the evaluation of the *Certificate Re-key* application the *Provider* verifies that:

- the submitted application is authentic;
- the submitter of the application has the appropriate entitlement and authorization;
- the data indicated in the application are accurate;
- based on the currently available information about the cryptographic algorithms used, they still will be applicable even during the planned validity of the *Certificate* to be issued.

Before processing the *Re-key* request the identity of the person submitting the *Certificate Re-key* application shall be verified according to section 3.3.

#### 4.7.4 Notification of the Client about the New Certificate Issuance

The *Provider* informs the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* about the *Certificate* issuance.

#### 4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate

If the Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device in the possession of the *Subject* still has a usable private key, then it is not necessary to issue a new key or Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device, the *Provider* will issue the *Certificate* for a new key.

If it is necessary to issue a new Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device during the re-key process, the *Provider* will personalize the new Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device and deliver it to the *Subject* as described in chapter 4.3. The *Provider* issues only the requested *Subject's Certificates* after verifying in a credible manner that the Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device is already in the possession of the *Subject*.

If the *Subject's* private key is managed by a Remote Key Management Service Provider, the *Provider* will also send the issued *Certificate* directly to the trust service provider managing the key.

If the new key used during the *Re-key* was provided by the *Subject*, then there is no need for key and Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device handover.

The new *Certificate* issued as part of the re-key can be received (downloaded) without the need for a face-to-face meeting.

The *Subject* accepts the *Certificate* by using the *Certificate*, no separate declaration is required.

#### 4.7.6 Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate

The *Provider* discloses the renewed *Certificate* the same way as the original *Certificate*.

#### 4.7.7 Notification of Other Entities about the Certificate Issuance

If the *Certificate* was issued for the *Subject* to create electronic signature behalf of an *Organization* the contact of the *Represented Organization* is notified by the *Provider* on the *Certificate* issuance without delay.

### 4.8 Certificate Modification

*Certificate modification* means the process when the *Provider* issues a new *Certificate* for the *Subject* with changed *Subject* identity information but with unchanged public key.

The *Certificate* modification technically means new *Certificate* issuance. The *Provider* is bound to revoke the previous *Certificate*, that contains invalid data. (see section: 4.9.) .

Previous data can change in the new *Certificate* issued during the *Certificate* modification, such as the validity period, the CRL and OCSP references or the *Provider* key used for *Certificate* signing.

#### 4.8.1 Circumstances for Certificate Modification

*Certificate modification* becomes necessary in the following cases:

- change of data indicated in the *Subject's Certificate*;

- in the *Certificate* issuing system of the *Provider* any data of the *Certificate* issuer CA indicated in the "Subject DN" is changed, or its public key is changed and as a result of it, its provider *Certificate* is changed;
- the *Certificate* profile determined by the *Provider* is changed.

Requirements of *Certificate* modification:

- the *Certificate* modification application was submitted during the *Certificate's* validity period;
- the *Certificate* to be modified is not suspended or revoked;
- the private key corresponding to the *Certificate* is not compromised.

The *Provider* only accepts *Certificate* modification application in the scope of the Service Agreement.

If the previous *Certificate* of the *Subject* is revoked or expired, then the new *Certificate* can be requested within the framework of *Re-key* (see section: 4.7.) or new *Certificate Application* (see section: 4.6.).

During the *Certificate* modification, the *Subject* is informed if the terms and conditions have changed since the previous *Certificate* issuance.

If the *Subject* is not the same as the *Subscriber*, then the information aforementioned is also given to the *Subscriber*. The *Certificate* modification is performed within the framework of a valid service agreement, there is no need for its modification.

#### 4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification

The *Certificate* modification shall be initiated by a person who is entitled to submit a new *Certificate Application* at the time of the submission of the modification application.

In the *Certificate* modification request, the applicant shall give the new data and shall make a statement of their accuracy.

The *Provider* initiates the *Certificate* modification if it becomes aware of that the *Subject's* data indicated in the *Certificate* is changed.

The *Provider* ensures the following possibilities to submit *Certificate* renewal application:

- on paper signed manually at the customer service of the *Provider* or at the mobile registration associate of the *Provider*, on a date previously agreed (in this case, the personal identification takes place this time)
- in electronic form with an electronic signature or electronic seal based on a non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the requested *Certificate*, sent to the *Provider's* email address (see section 1.2.3.);
- on paper signed manually and sent to the customer service of the *Provider* (in this case, the personal identification will take place another time)



### 4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests

During the evaluation of the submitted *Certificate* modification application, the *Provider* verifies that:

- the submitted *Certificate* renewal application is authentic;
- the submitter of the *Certificate* renewal application has the appropriate entitlement and authorization;
- the data given in the application are accurate;
- the *Certificate* renewal application was submitted during the *Certificate's* validity period;
- based on the currently available information about the cryptographic algorithms used, they still will be applicable even during the planned validity period of the *Certificate* to be issued.

The *Provider* verifying the validity of the *Subject's* data proceeds the same as the initial verification performed before a new *Certificate* issuance.

Before the execution of the *Certificate* modification application, the applicant shall be identified according to section 3.5.

### 4.8.4 Notification of the Client about the New Certificate Issuance

The *Provider* informs the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* about the *Certificate* issuance.

### 4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

During *Certificate* modification, there is no new key generation, thus there is no need to handover key to the *Subject*. The modified *Certificate* can be received (downloadable) without personal encounter.

If the private key of the *Subject* is on a personal *Electronic Signature Creation Device* which is physically hold by the *Subject*, then the *Subject* installs the *Certificate* to the device. For that purpose, the *Provider* provides written manuals, and if necessary, provides consultation possibility by telephone.

If the *Subject's* private key is managed by a Remote Key Management Service Provider, the *Provider* will also send the issued *Certificate* directly to the trust service provider managing the key.

The *Subject* accepts the *Certificate* by its usage, and there is no need for further statement.

### 4.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

The *Provider* discloses the renewed *Certificate* the same way as the original *Certificate*.

### 4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

If the *Certificate* was issued for the *Subject* to create electronic signature behalf of an *Organization* the contact of the *Represented Organization* is notified by the *Provider* on the *Certificate* issuance without delay.

## 4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

The process when the *Provider* terminates the validity of the *Certificate* before expiration is called *Certificate* revocation. The *Certificate* revocation is a permanent and irreversible status change, the revoked certificate will never be valid again.

The process when the *Provider* temporarily ceases the validity of the *Certificate* before expiration is called *Certificate* suspension. The *Certificate* suspension is a temporary state; the suspended *Certificate* can be revoked, or before the end of the validity, with the withdrawal of the suspension it can be made valid again. In case of the withdrawal of suspension the *Certificate* becomes valid retroactively, as if it has not been suspended.

The usage of the private key belonging to the revoked or suspended *Certificate* shall be eliminated or suspended immediately. If possible, the private key belonging to the revoked *Certificate* shall be destroyed immediately after revocation.

Responsibility regulations related to suspension and revocation:

- If the *Provider* has already published the revoked status of the *Certificate*, the *Provider* does not take any responsibility, if the *Relying Party* considers the *Certificate* valid.

### 4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation

#### Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate

*Certification Authority* takes action on the revocation of the end-user *Certificate* in the following cases:

- the *Subject* or the *Subscriber* requests the revocation of the *Certificate* in writing;
- the *Subject* or the *Subscriber* notifies *Certification Authority* that the *Certificate Application* is not approved and subsequently the approval is not given;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the private key corresponding to the public key in the *Certificate* has been compromised;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the public key in the *Certificate* does not comply with the requirements defined in Section 6.1.5. and 6.1.6.;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the certificate was misused;
- the *Provider* is made aware that a *Subscriber* has violated one or more of its material obligations under the service agreement or General Terms and Conditions;
- the *Certification Authority* is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the *Certificate*;
- the *Certificate* modification because of data change referring to the *Subject*;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the *Certificate* was not issued according to the related *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* or the *Certification Practice Statement*;

- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that any of the data appearing in the *Certificate* is inaccurate;
- the *Certification Authority* is no longer entitled to issue *Certificates*, and maintenance is not provided for the existing CRL and OCSP services;
- the revocation is required by the *Certification Authority's Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* or the *Certification Practice Statement*;
- the *Certification Authority* issued the *Certificate* based on a document from a third party, and it withdraws that document in writing;
- the format and technical content of the *Certificate* presents an unacceptable risk to the *Relying Parties* (for example, if the used cryptographic algorithm or key size is no longer secure);
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the private key of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit might be compromised;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the *Subscriber* failed to fulfil any of its financial obligations according to the service agreement;
- the *Certificate* was suspended, and was not reinstated during the ensured time period (see section: 4.9.16.);
- the termination of service agreement;
- the *Certification Authority* has terminated its activities;
- the supervisory body enacts (smth.) in a legally binding and executable decision;
- the law makes revocation mandatory.

### Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate

*Certification Authority* is bound to take action on the revocation of the *Certificate* of the intermediate certification unit in the following cases:

- the CA operating the intermediate certification unit requests the revocation of the *Certificate* in writing;
- the Subordinate CA notifies the *Provider* that the original *Certificate Application* was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that it is not in the exclusive possession of the private key;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the public key in the *Certificate* does not comply with the requirements defined in Section 6.1.5 and 6.1.6. ;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the *Certificate* was misused;

- the *Certificate* was not issued according to the relevant *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* and the *Certification Practice Statement* or the operation of the intermediate certification unit does not comply with the relevant *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* or *Certification Practice Statement*;
- the *Certification Authority* determines that any of the information appearing in the *Certificate* is inaccurate or misleading;
- The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another *Certification Authority* to provide revocation support for the *Certificate*;
- *Certification Authority* is no longer entitled to issue *Certificates*, and maintenance is not provided for the CRL and OCSP services related to the *Certificates* ;
- the revocation is required by the Issuing CA's *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* or the *Certification Practice Statement*;
- *Certificate* modification because of data change relating to the certification unit or *Certification Authority*;
- the format and technical content of the *Certificate* presents an unacceptable risk to the *Relying Parties* (for example, if the used cryptographic algorithm or key size is no longer secure);
- the *Certification Authority* has terminated its activities;
- the law makes the revocation mandatory.

#### **Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate operated by another CA**

*Certification Authority* is bound to take action on the revocation of the *Certificate* of the intermediate certification unit operated by other *Certification Authority* in the following cases:

- the CA operating the intermediate certification unit requests the revocation of the *Certificate* in writing;
- the Subordinate CA notifies the *Provider* that the original *Certificate Application* was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
- the issuer *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the operator of the intermediate certification unit is not in the exclusive possession of the private key;
- the issuer *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the public key in the *Certificate* does not anymore comply with the requirements defined in Section 6.1.5 and 6.1.6. ;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the *Certificate* was misused;
- the issuer *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the *Certificate* is not issued according to the related *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* and the *Certification Practice Statement* or the operation of the intermediate certification unit operator does not comply with the relevant *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* or *Certification Practice Statement*;

- the *Certification Authority* determines that any of the information appearing in the *Certificate* is inaccurate or misleading;
- The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another *Certification Authority* to provide revocation support for the *Certificate*;
- the *Certification Authority* is no longer entitled to issue *Certificates*, and maintenance of the CRL and OCSP services for the existing *Certificates* is not provided;
- the revocation is required by the Issuing CA's *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* or the *Certification Practice Statement*;
- *Certificate* modification because of data change relating to the certification unit or the other *Certification Authority*;
- if *Certification Authority* issued the *Certificate* based on a document from a third party, and that third party withdraws the document in writing;
- the format and technical content of the *Certificate* presents an unacceptable risk to the Relying parties (for example, if the used cryptographic algorithm and key size is no longer safe);
- the *Certification Authority* operating the certification unit or the issuer *Certification Authority* of its *Certificate* has terminated its activities;
- the law makes the revocation mandatory.

#### 4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation

The revocation of the *Certificate* may be requested by the *Clients*, namely:

- the *Subscriber*;
- the *Subject*;
- in case of *Organizational Certificate*, the *Organization's* authorized representative;
- the contact person specified in the service agreement; *Organizational Administrator* appointed by the *Subscriber*;

and

- in case of remote key management service the Remote Key Management Service Provider;
- the *Provider*.

Additionally, *Subscribers*, *Relying Parties*, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties may submit High Risk Certificate Problem Reports informing the *Provider* of reasonable cause to revoke the *Certificate*, like fraud, misuse or key compromise.

The *Provider* provides clear instructions on how to report suspected Private Key Compromise, *Certificate* misuse, or other types of possible fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to *Certificates* on the following website:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/report-certification-security-events.html>

#### 4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request

The *Provider* ensures the following possibilities for the *Clients* to submit a revocation request:

- through the website of the *Provider* 24 hours a day.  
The IT system of the *Provider* processes the applications submitted through its website immediately, the site informs the application submitter about the results of the evaluation.
- in an electronic form with an electronic signature based on the non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the *Certificate* to be revoked (see section 1.2.3.);
- on paper signed manually at the customer service of the *Provider* during office hours in person, or sent by post.

The *Provider* verifies the authenticity of the request, and the submitter's eligibility during the evaluation of the request.

In case of Revocation request signed with a valid qualified electronic signature, there is no need for further verification of the identity of the applicant and the authenticity of the request.

In case of submitting revocation request on paper, via mail the *Provider* verifies the manual signature on the request.

The reason for revocation shall be stated. If the revocation was requested by the *Client*, and it does not state the reason for revocation, then the *Provider* considers that the reason for revocation is that the *Subject* does not want to use the *Certificate* anymore.

If the *Client* request the revocation due to key compromise, the *Provider* ensures a possibility during the revocation process, to request a new *Certificate* in the framework of *Re-key* to replace the *Certificate* to be revoked. The rules for *Re-key* are in section 4.7.

When the revocation is requested in writing, the *Provider* makes possible to ask the revocation in advance for a later date by giving the requested date of the revocation.

The revocation request shall contain the data to identify the *Certificate*.

The requester shall provide particularly the following information:

- the exact denomination of the *Subject*;
- if the *Certificate* was issued on a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*, the unique identifier of the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*;
- the *Certificate*'s unique identifier;

- the requested date of the revocation, if the revocation shall not happen immediately;
- identification data of the *Client*.

In case of invalid or incomplete revocation request the *Provider* rejects the request. The *Provider* notifies the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* about the fact and reason of the rejection by email.

In case of complete and valid request the *Provider* makes a decision about the acceptance of the request. Depending on the content of the request the *Provider* revokes the *Certificate* immediately or sets up the date of revocation according to the request.

In case of a successful revocation the *Provider* notifies the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* about the revocation by email.

Further information about the suspension and revocation can be found on the home page of the *Provider* on the following link:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/certificate-suspension-and-revocation.html>

### High-Priority Certificate Problem Report

The *Provider* maintains a continuous 24x7 ability to respond internally to a High Priority Certificate Problem Report.

The *Provider* begins investigating the Certificate Problem Report within 24 hours after receiving and decides whether revocation is appropriate based on the following criteria:

- the nature of the alleged problem,
- the consequences of revocation,
- the number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular *Certificate* or *Subscriber*,
- the entity making the complaint, and
- relevant legislation.

The *Provider* provides a preliminary report on its findings to both the *Subscriber* and the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances, the *Provider* works with the *Subscriber* and any entity reporting the Certificate Problem Report or other revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the *Certificate* will be revoked, and if so, a date which the *Provider* will revoke the *Certificate*.

The period from receipt of the Certificate Problem Report or revocation-related notice to published revocation shall not exceed the time frame set forth in Section 4.9.5.

If necessary, the *Provider* informs the National Media and Infocommunications Authority about the reported problem.

#### 4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period

The *Provider* does not apply grace period during the fulfilment of revocation requests.

#### 4.9.5 Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

The *Provider* processes the revocation requests issued through the website of the *Provider* immediately 24 hours a day .

The *Provider* processes the revocation requests issued by any other way within 24 hours following the arrival of the request.

- In case of applications submitted in person, the time of arrival is when the customer service officer of the *Provider* receives the application.
- In case of applications sent by post, the time of arrival is when the mail arrives to the *Provider* at office hours.
- In case of applications sent by electronic mail, the time of arrival is when the email is received to the dedicated email address `revocation@e-szigno.hu` on the server of the *Provider* during office hours of the Customer Service. Emails arriving out of office hours are considered as arrived at the beginning of the next business day.

The *Provider* undertakes to meet these requirements only for revocation requests sent to the indicated addresses stated in section 1.3.1. In case of revocation request sent to other addresses – specially directly sent to specific associate of the *Provider* – or via other channels, the *Provider* does not offer any availability.

If the *Client* wants to revoke its *Certificate* and the revocation is urgent, or the *Client* cannot appear in person at the office of the *Provider*, the *Provider* recommends to the *Client* to suspend the *Certificate* until the revocation by using the SMS based suspension service (see section 4.9.13). It is sufficient to take care of the revocation of the suspended certificates later, and the *Provider* automatically revokes the suspended *Certificates* after the time for restoration elapses (see section: 4.9.16.).

#### 4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

To maintain the level of security guaranteed by the *Provider*, prior to the adoption and use of the information indicated in the *Certificate*, it is necessary for *Relying Parties* to act with proper carefulness. It is particularly recommended for them to verify all of the *Certificates* located in the *Certificate* chain according to the relevant technical standards. The verification should cover the verification of the *Certificates*' validity, the policy requirements and key usage, and the checking of the referenced CRL or OCSP based revocation information.

#### 4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency

The *Provider* issues a new *Certificate Revocation List* for its end user *Certificates* at least once a day.

The validity of these *Certificate Revocation Lists* is 25 hours.

The *Provider* issues a new *Certificate Revocation List* for its intermediate certification units every day at the same time. The validity of the *Certificate Revocation Lists* is 25 hours.



#### 4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs

At most 5 minutes elapse between the generation and disclosure of the *Certificate Revocation List* (CRL).

#### 4.9.9 Online Revocation/Status Checking Availability

The *Provider* provides online *Certificate* status (OCSP) service.

#### 4.9.10 Online Revocation Checking Requirements

The online *Certificate* status service complies with the requirements of Section 4.10 .  
*Certification Authority* provides OCSP service through GET method.

#### 4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available

The *Provider* makes available in its public *Certificate* Repository – with their status – the revoked and suspended *Certificates*. Thus by searching in the *Certificate* Repository the *Clients* and the *Relying Parties* can personally (without the help of an application) verify the revocation status of a *Certificate*.

#### 4.9.12 Special Requirements for Key Compromise

In case of any certification unit's private key is compromised, the *Provider* makes every reasonable effort in order to notify the *Relying Parties* about the incident. It publishes any status change on the provider *Certificates* on its webpage. In case of compromised *Certificates* issued by the *Provider*, the *Provider* is able to revoke the end-user *Certificate* belonging to the compromised private key. The revocation reason information (reasonCode) in this case is set to keyCompromise (1) value.

#### 4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension

The *Provider* ensures a possibility for *Clients* for the temporary suspension of the *Certificate* in case, that it can be assumed that any of the reasons establishing revocation exists.

The *Provider* is entitled for *Certificate* suspension for the following reasons:

- the *Subscriber* does not pay until the payment deadline;
- if the *Provider* presumes that the data indicated on the *Certificate* do not comply with reality. If the *Provider* becomes aware of those conditions, it initiates the suspension or revocation of the *Certificate*;
- if the *Provider* presumes that the private key belonging to the *Certificate* is not in the possession of the *Subject*, and it is confirmed by substantial evidence. If the *Provider* becomes aware of that the *Electronic Signature Creation Device* is possessed by an unauthorized person, the *Provider* suspends every *Certificate* it contains;

- the supervisory body enacts (smth.) in a legally binding and executable decision;

The *Provider* does not accept suspension requests related to *Certificates* not valid, in addition to justify the reason for rejection.

#### 4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension

The suspension of a *Certificate* can be requested by the same persons, who are eligible to initiate the revocation of the *Certificate* (see section: 4.9.2.)

#### 4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request

The *Provider* ensures opportunity for suspension initiation:

- via its webpage;
- by sending a fixed-format SMS text message;
- the same way as submitting the revocation requests.

#### Suspension via Web

Suspension is also available via the website of the *Provider* at the following address:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/suspension>

When suspending via the website of the *Provider* the *Client* needs to provide the following information:

- the suspension password as a data certifying the authenticity of the suspension request,
- the last three parts of the *Subject* OID in the *Certificate* (e.g. 2.2.123), or in case of natural person *Subject* instead of the OID the date of birth of the *Subject*.

Suspension requests submitted via the website of the *Provider* are processed without delay by the information system of the *Provider* and it immediately notifies the applicant about the result on its website.

In case of a successful revocation, the changed revocation status appears in the internal *Revocation Status Registry* of the *Provider* immediately. The inner processes of the *Provider* ensure that the processing ends within at most 5 minutes from the provision of data, so the changed revocation state is updated from the receipt of the request within maximum that interval.

The *Provider* logs every suspension request. In case of a successful suspension, the *Provider* notifies the *Subject* and the Subscriber about the fact of the suspension by email.

The *Provider* guarantees availability of suspension service only for suspension requests received from SMS text. If the webpage of the *Provider* is not available, the *Provider* recommends the *Client* to request suspension by sending SMS.

### **Suspension by sending a fixed-format SMS text message**

The *Clients* of the *Provider* may indicate in an SMS text message sent to the *Provider's* suspension phone number if a Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device or a private key is possessed by an unauthorized person.

The *Provider* immediately begins the processing of the suspension requests arriving in text messages. The *Provider's* system sends an automatically generated reply message to the phone number of the requester about the result of processing and the success of the suspension.

In the request sent in the text message the following data shall be provided separated by a space character:

- date of birth of the *Subject* in the "YYYY-MM-DD" format or the last three digits of the OID as indicated in the *Certificate*,
- the suspension password of the *Certificate*.

Examples of formally correct suspension request:

- "1976-11-04 a1b2c3d4"
- "2.1.134 pacsirta"

The *Provider* always declines the suspension request arriving in a text message from a hidden phone number regardless of the content of the message.

In order to ensure the availability of the suspension service, the *Provider* also maintains telephone numbers operated by two different mobile service providers. If sending an SMS to one phone number fails (no confirmation is received within a few minutes), please try sending the message to the other phone number.

Phone numbers to receive suspension SMS:

" +36 (20) 263-4943"

" +36 (30) 326-2187"

### **Suspension the Same Way as Revocation Request Submission**

The *Provider* enables the submission of the suspension requests the same way, as the revocation requests, according to the requirements of section 4.9.3. From the suspension application, the *Provider* shall be able to determine that exactly which *Certificate* the applicant asks to the suspend and upon what grounds. The registration staff member sends a notification via email to the *Subject* and the Subscriber.

At suspension, the reason of suspension shall be given. If the *Client* requests the suspension, and does not give the reason, the *Provider* assumes that the reason is private key compromise.

If the *Client* asks for the suspension because of key compromise, then the *Provider* provides an opportunity for the *Client* during the suspension process to indicate that if the *Certificate* is not reinstated within a time frame (and so it becomes revoked), then a new certificate will be requested within the framework of *Re-key*. The rules of *Re-key* are in section 4.7.

#### 4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period

If the suspension of the *Certificate* was requested by the *Client*, the *Client* may request the reinstatement of the *Certificate* within 5 working day after the suspension. If the reinstatement of the *Certificate* is not requested within this interval the *Provider* revokes the *Certificate*.

The reinstatement application can only be submitted to the *Provider*:

- personally in the customer service of the *Provider*;
- in an electronic form with an electronic signature based on the non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the suspended *Certificate* (see section 1.2.3.);

In case of a successful *Certificate* reinstatement, the *Provider* notifies the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* by email of the fact.

#### 4.10 Certificate Status Services

The *Provider* provides the following possibilities for the *Certificate* revocation status query:

- OSCP – online *Certificate* revocation status query service,
- CRL – *Certificate Revocation Lists*.

The *Provider* maintains an internal *Revocation Status Registry*, which contains the current revocation status information of all the *Certificates* issued by the *Provider*, including the valid, revoked and suspended statuses.

In case of suspension, reinstatement and revocation the new status of the *Certificate* – see section: 4.9. – appears immediately in the revocation records of *Provider* after the successful completion of the process.

The *Revocation Status Registry* contains also the revocation status information of the expired *Certificates*, which will be available till the expiry date of the issuing CA.

The *Provider* generates the *Certificate Revocation List* based on the actual information received from the *Revocation Status Registry*, so any change in the revocation statuses will be published in the first *Certificate Revocation List* issued after the given change.

The OSCP responses issued by the OSCP responders of the *Provider* are always based on the revocation status information received from the *Revocation Status Registry* at the time which is indicated in the OSCP response.

OCSP response issued by the *Provider* may contain "good" status information only for the *Certificates* that were issued by the given certification unit and are stored in the *Provider's Certificate Repository* (positive OSCP).

##### 4.10.1 Operational Characteristics

Each certification unit of the *Provider* issues *Certificate Revocation List* with the frequency below:

- The "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" root certification unit issues a CRL once in at the most of 24 hours.

- The productive (not root) SHA-256 based certification units operated within the system of the *Provider* issue CRL within 60 minutes after the revocation status change of any *Certificate* issued by the given certification unit, but at least once in every 24 hours.
- The "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" root certification unit issues a CRL once in at the most of 24 hours.
- The productive (not root) ECC based certification units operated within the system of the *Provider* issue CRL within 60 minutes after the revocation status change of any *Certificate* issued by the given certification unit, but at least once in every 24 hours.

The validity period of the *Certificate Revocation List* is 25 hours. The all-time current *Certificate Revocation Lists* for the specific *Certificates* can be reached at the following address:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/pki-services/ca-certificates.html>

The effective date of the *Certificate Revocation Lists* ("thisUpdate") marks also the time when the certification unit assembled and started signing the *Certificate Revocation List*. After that, in case of long *Certificate Revocation Lists* the publication of the *Certificate Revocation List* may even take 1 or 2 minutes. The appearance of the next *Certificate Revocation List* ("nextUpdate") marks the latest next time, from what the list is publicly available. Accordingly, the time interval between the date of the *Certificate Revocation List* entering into force, and the date of publication of the next *Certificate Revocation List* can be longer than the time intervals above, but this does not affect the time interval between the appearance of the CRLs is at most 24 hours.

Regarding, that amongst the provided services, the validity of the *Certificate* can be determined the fastest and the easiest with OCSP, the *Certification Authority* recommends the use of OCSP to its *Clients*.

### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)

The *Provider* publishes the revocation status of the *Certificates* with the OCSP service too.

In respect of the *Certificate* based on SHA-256, the *Provider* provides OCSP service according to the IETF RFC 6960 "authorized responder" principle, so its every certification unit certifies separately an OCSP responder, which provides information on the revocation status of the *Certificates* issued by the certification unit (section 1.3.1.).

The *Provider* provides OCSP services two different ways, below the characteristics of the two versions are shown.

### OCSP Service Provided for Clients

- Only those *Clients* use of this version of the OCSP service, that have a valid service agreement for the maintenance of that *Certificate*. The *Provider* can identify the *Client* by the *Certificate* or by a username password pair at the query.
- This version of the OCSP service is available for all *Certificates*, the responses always contain the current information listed in the registry of the *Provider*.
- The issued OCSP response is always made at the time of the query. The "thisUpdate" and "producedAt" time values in the OCSP response match with the time of the query.

- The "nextUpdate" indicated in the response is either not filled, or contains a time value not later than the responder certification expiration time.
- With the help of the OCSP service provided to *Clients*, an evidence always can be acquired that later verifies towards third parties the revocation status of the *Certificate* indicated in the registry of the *Provider* for the query date.

### Public and Free OCSP Service

- This version of the OCSP service is publicly and freely available, any *Relying Party* can avail itself of it same as the *Certificate Revocation Lists*. There is no need for authentication at query.
- This version of the OCSP service can be reached through the URLs indicated on the *Certificates*.
- Based on the IETF RFC 6960 "Response Pre-production" process, the issued OCSP response can be created before the query and does not necessarily contain the nonce element. The *Provider* can give the same response for multiple queries. The "thisUpdate" and "produce-dAt" time values are identical, but these can precede the time of the query.
- The "nextUpdate" indicated in the response is either not filled, or contains a time value not later than the responder certification expiration time.
- The "thisUpdate" value indicated in the issued OCSP response is never older than 24 hours, because the *Provider* creates a new OCSP response at least in every 24 hours.
- The time difference between the "nextUpdate" and "thisUpdate" values in the issued OCSP response is never greater than 10 days.
- The OCSP responses always contain the current information listed in the revocation registry of the *Provider*, but if the "thisUpdate" time of the OCSP response is earlier than the time for which the verification is carried out – which is either earlier or coincides with the time of the query –, then the OCSP response is not clear evidence for a third party regarding the revocation status of the *Certificate*.

Due to the indicated differences of the aforementioned two versions of the OCSP services, the public and free service can be considered equivalent to the service provided to the *Clients* in the following cases:

- If there is no need for OCSP response storage, rather it is used for prompt, immediate decision making. In this case, it is acceptable, that the OCSP response does not verify the validity of the *Certificate* clearly for third parties at a definite time subsequently.
- If the time span between the time of the OCSP query and the time, regarding when the verification is made, is bigger, than the difference of the "nextUpdate" and "thisUpdate" values of the stored OCSP response (which can be at most the validity period of the responder certificate used for signing the OCSP response). In this case, the OCSP responses provided by the public and free service can be accepted as a clear evidence for the third party, because the thisUpdate field in them is guaranteed to be later than the time, regarding when the verification is made.

- If the verifier party does not query the OCSP response itself (but for example uses an OCSP response attached to an archive signature), then it is not necessary to check, which sources the OCSP response came from originally. It is sufficient to verify only that the "thisUpdate" value in the OCSP response is later, than the time regarding which the verification is made.

The *Provider* ensures the aforementioned two versions of the OSCP services with the same availability.

#### 4.10.2 Service Availability

The *Provider* ensures that the availability of the *Certificate Repository* and the terms and conditions pertaining to the *Certificates* issued by the *Provider* is at least 99.9% per year, and the length of downtime shall not exceed at most 3 hours.

The *Provider* ensures that the availability of the revocation status information and the revocation management service is at least at least 99.9% per year, and the length of downtimes shall not exceed at most 3 hours on any occasion.

The response time of the revocation status service in case of normal operation is less than 10 seconds.

#### 4.10.3 Optional Features

The *Provider* provides various (CRL and two types of OCSP) services according to the descriptions in this section, in the framework of *Clients* and *Relying Parties* can verify the revocation status of the *Certificates* issued by the *Provider*. Besides these, the *Provider* makes available in its public *Certificate Repository* – with their status indicated – the revoked and suspended *Certificates*, so while searching in the *Certificate Repository* the *Clients* and *Relying Parties* can (without the help of an application) verify the revocation status of the *Certificate*.

### 4.11 End of Subscription

The *Provider* revokes the end-user *Certificates* in case of the termination of the contract concluded with the *Subscriber*.

### 4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery

The *Provider* does not provide key escrow service for a private key belonging to a signatory *Certificate*.

#### 4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices

The private key belonging to the signing *Certificate* shall not be escrowed.

#### 4.12.2 Symmetric Encryption Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices

The private key belonging to the signing *Certificate* shall not be escrowed, so regarding that the symmetric encryption keys do not have to be managed.

#### 4.13 Data Verification For Personal Identification By The Help Of Attribute Certificates

The *Provider* preserves the collected and supervised personal data to verify the *Subject's* identity according to its legal obligation.

On the basis of the preserved and supervised data, the range of data defined by the *Subject* is verified by an attribute certificate in accordance to Rfc 5280 [33] and Rfc 5755 [34] standards.

Data that the *Provider* may verify:

- the globally unique identifier of the *Subject* (OID),
- name of the *Subject*,
- name of birth,
- place of birth,
- date of birth,
- mother's name,
- the denomination and the identifier of the official identity card used at the initial identity validation.

## 5 Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

The *Provider* applies physical, procedural, and personnel security precautions that comply with acknowledged standards, along with the administrative and governance related procedures that enforce these.

The *Provider* keeps a record of the system units and resources related to the service provision, and conducts a risk assessment on these. It uses protective measures proportional to the risks related to the individual elements.

The *Provider* monitors the capacity demands and ensures that the adequate processing power and storage are available for the provision of the service.

### 5.1 Physical Controls

The *Provider* takes care that physical access to critical services is controlled, and keeps physical risk of the assets related to critical services at a minimum.

The purpose of physical precautions is to prevent illegitimate access, damage, and unauthorized access to the *Provider's* information, and physical zones.

Services that process critical and sensitive information are implemented at secure locations in the system of the *Provider*.

The provided protection is proportional to the identified threats of the risk analysis that the *Provider* has performed.

In order to provide adequate security:



- The *Provider* implements the strongly protected services in its protected computer room. This computer room has been designed and constructed specifically for this purpose, by its design uniform enforcement of various aspects of protection (the placement and structure of the site, physical access (access control and supervision), power supply, air conditioning, protection against water leakage and flooding, fire prevention and protection, media storage etc.) took place.
- The Customer Service office of the *Provider* was designed, to be able to meet the requirements for registration services under realistic costs.
- The *Provider* constructed its mobile registration units, so that they comply with the requirements imposed on the registration service.
- The *Provider* implements every critical service and every necessary tool in a separate security zone. All the devices necessary for this are placed in a protected computer room – forming part of the security zone.

### 5.1.1 Site Location and Construction

The IT system of the *Provider* is located and operated within a properly secured *Data Centre* with physical and logical protection that prevents illegitimate access. Defensive solutions – as for example guarding, security locks, intrusion detection systems, video surveillance system, access control system – are applied over the course of locating and establishing the *Data Centre* that are built on each other and interdependent and together they provide a powerful protection system for the IT systems participating in service provision, and for the preservation of the confidential data stored by the provider.

### 5.1.2 Physical Access

The *Provider* protects devices and equipment that take part in the service provision from unauthorized physical access in order to prevent tampering with the devices.

*Provider* ensures that:

- each entry to the *Data Centre* is registered;
- entry to the *Data Centre* may only happen after the simultaneous identification of two authorized staff members with trusted roles – and at least one of the staff members shall be a system administrator;
- persons without independent authorization can only stay in the *Data Centre* in justified cases, for the time required and accompanied by personnel with appropriate rights;
- the entry logs shall be archived continuously and evaluated weekly.

The activation data (passwords, PIN codes) of the devices shall not be stored openly even in the *Data Centre*.

In the presence of unauthorized persons:

- data media containing sensitive information are physically out of reach;

- the logged-in terminals are not left without supervision;
- no work process is carried out during which confidential information may be revealed.

When leaving the computer room the administrator shall verify that:

- every equipment of the *Data Centre* is in an adequately secure operation state;
- there's no terminal left logged-in;
- physical storage devices are locked properly;
- systems, devices providing physical protection operate properly;
- the alarm system has been activated.

There are appointed responsible people to carry out regular physical security assessments. The results of the examinations are recorded in the appropriate log entries.

### 5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning

The *Provider* applies an uninterruptible power supply unit in the *Data Centre* that:

- has adequate capacity to ensure power supply for the *Data Centre's* IT and subsidiary facility systems;
- protects IT equipment from voltage fluctuations in the external network, power outages, spikes and other;
- in case of lasting power outage has its own power generation equipment, which – by allowing refueling – is able to provide the necessary energy for any period of time.

The air of the outer environment shall not get into the *Data Centre* directly. The *Data Centre* air purity is ensured with adequate filter system to detect a variety of contaminants from the air (dust, pollutants, and corrosive materials, toxic or flammable substances). The ventilation system provides the necessary amount of fresh air with adequate filtration for the safe working conditions of the operators.

The humidity is reduced to the level required by the IT systems.

The *Provider* uses cooling systems with proper performance to provide the necessary operating temperature, to prevent overheating of IT devices.

### 5.1.4 Water Exposures

The *Data Centre* of the *Provider* is adequately protected from water intrusion and flooding. The total area of the security zone is free from sanitary facilities, there is not any drain or water pipe close to it. The total area of water security zone is monitored by an intrusion detection system. In the protected computer room security is further increased by the use of a raised floor.

### 5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection

In the *Data Centre* of the *Provider*, a fire protection system approved by the competent fire headquarters operates. Smoke and fire detectors automatically alert the fire brigade. Water vapor based, automatic fire extinguishing system has been installed in the computer room, which is not hazardous to human life, and does not damage the IT equipment.

There is the type and quantity of manual fire extinguishers in accordance with the relevant regulations at clearly visible locations in each room.

### 5.1.6 Media Storage

The *Provider* protects its media storages from unauthorized access and accidental damage. All audit and archive data is created in duplicate. The two copies are stored separately from each other physically, at locations in a safe distance from each other. The stored media storages are protected from damaging environmental influences such as low or high temperatures, dirt, moisture, sunlight, strong magnetic fields, strong radiation.

The *Provider* stores the primary media storages in the operational room of the certification organization, a code locked fireproof vault, the secondary copies in a vault in the customer service office.

### 5.1.7 Waste Disposal

The *Provider* ensures the environmental standards compliant disposal of the superfluous assets, and media.

The *Provider* does not use the electronic storage media containing information classified as confidential even for storing data classified as not confidential after deleting their content and devices like that shall not be taken outside of the premises of the *Provider*. The *Provider* physically destroys – according to the rules of disposal – the defective for any other reason unusable, redundant media storages containing confidential classified information:

- chops paper documents up in a shredder machine;
- disassembles the hard drives and smashes the critical components;
- destroys the optical disc with a suitable shredder machine.

### 5.1.8 Off-Site Backup

The *Provider* creates a backup weekly from which the whole service could be restored in case of a fatal error. The backups – at least including the last full backup – are stored at an external location that's physical and operational protection is identical to the primary site. The secure data transmission from the primary to the backup locations is resolved.

Based on the randomly selected backup data a restoration test is made at least yearly. The main circumstances and results of the restoration test is recorded in an audit report.

## 5.2 Procedural Controls

The *Provider* takes care that its systems are operated securely, according to the rules, and with a minimal risk of defects.

Procedural precautions have the objective of supplementing, and at the same time intensifying the effectiveness of physical safeguards, along with those applicable to personnel, by means of appointing and isolating trusted roles, documenting the responsibilities of various roles, as well as specifying the personnel headcounts and exclusion roles necessary for the various tasks, moreover identification and authentication expected in the various roles.

The *Provider's* internal governance system ensures that its operation complies with legal, as well as its internal regulations. In its system a responsible person shall be clearly assigned for every given system unit and process.

Individuals responsible for a given system element or process are assigned unambiguously to every system element and every process in its system. Development and operations related tasks are sharply segregated in the *Provider's* system. The auditing activity of the independent system auditor and the *Provider's* internal auditor ensures the system's appropriate operation.

### 5.2.1 Trusted Roles

The *Provider* creates trusted roles (in the wording of the regulation, scope of activities) according to the requirements of decree 24/2016. [10] for the performance of its tasks. The rights and functions are shared among the various trusted roles in such a way that one user alone shall not be able to bypass the security protection measures.

The *Provider* defines the following trusted roles, with the following responsibilities:

**Manager with overall responsibility for the IT system of the *Provider*:** The individual responsible for the IT system.

**Security officer:** Senior security associate, the individual with overall responsibility for the security of the service.

**System administrator:** Infrastructure administrator. The individual with the task to install, configure and maintain the systems of the *Provider*. Responsible, for the reliable and continuous operation of the assigned system units, and for monitoring the development of technology, and for the detection and proposing of development solutions of the vulnerabilities of each system component.

**Operator:** System operator, individual performing the IT system's continuous operation, backup and restore.

**Independent system auditor:** Individual who audits the logged, as well as archived dataset of the *Provider*, responsible for verifying the enforcement of control measures the service provider implements in the interest of operation that complies with regulations, moreover for the continuous auditing and monitoring of existing procedures.

**Registration officer:** Individual responsible for the approval of production, issuance, revocation and suspension of end-user certificates.

**Official active in the field of personalization:** The individual, whose task is to manage the intelligent cards, personalization and the *Certificate Application* compilation;

For the provision of trusted roles the manager responsible for the security of the *Provider* formally appoints the *Provider's* employees.

Only those persons may hold a trusted role who are in employment relationship with the *Provider*. Trusted roles shall not be hold in the context of a commission contract.

Up to date records are kept of the trusted roles and in case of any change, the National Media and Infocommunications Authority is notified without delay.

### 5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task

The security and operational regulations of the *Provider* define that the following tasks can be only performed in protected environment, with the contemporaneous presence of two employees holding trusted roles:

- the generation of the *Provider's* own service key pair;
- the backup of the provider's private key;
- the activation of the provider's private key;
- the destruction of the provider's private key.

At least one of the persons performing the procedures listed above shall be a system administrator, and the other person shall not be the independent system auditor.

During the implementation of the operations listed, unauthorized person shall not be present in the room.

### 5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role

The users managing the IT system of the *Provider* have unique identification data, enabling secure identification and authentication of the users.

The users can only access the IT systems critical from the aspect of the provision of the certification service after identification and authentication.

The identification and authentication data are revoked without delay in case of the cessation of user rights.

Every user of the IT system and every actor in the administrative process is identified individually. For the verification of the physical access, the *Provider* uses an RFID card based access control system, and for the logical access control, it uses VPN Certificates issued on a Secure Signature-Creation Device. Before successful authorization, not even a single security-critical task can be performed. Every employee of the *Provider* has exactly as many access rights, as it is absolutely necessary for the assigned role.

#### 5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

Employees of the *Provider* can hold multiple trusted roles at the same time, but the *Provider* ensures that:

- the security officer and the registration officer shall not hold the independent system auditor role;
- the system administrator shall not hold the security officer and the independent system auditor role;
- the manager with overall responsibility for the IT system shall not hold the security officer and the independent system auditor role.

In addition to the aforementioned, the *Provider* seeks the complete separation of trusted roles.

### 5.3 Personnel Controls

The *Provider* takes care that its personnel policy, and its practices applicable to employing staff members intensify and support the reliability of the *Provider's* operation. The objective of precautions applicable to personnel is to reduce the risk of human errors, theft, fraud and cases of misuse.

The *Provider* addresses personnel security already during the hiring stage, including the conclusion of contracts, as well as their validation when they are being employed. In the case of all trusted roles, applicants have valid certificate of no criminal record at the time of the application. Every employee in a trusted role and external parties – who get in contact with the *Provider's* services – shall sign a non-disclosure agreement.

At the same time, the *Provider* ensures for its employees obtaining as well as further developing of common, general know-how along with the specialized professional knowledge necessary for performing the various jobs.

#### 5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements

As a hiring requirement, the *Provider* requires at least intermediate education degree, but the *Provider* continues to take care that employees receive appropriate training. Immediately after recruitment, the *Provider* grants a training for its new employees, under the course of which they acquire the knowledge necessary to carry out the job. Registration officer can only be an employee, who finished a training course during which, he/she acquired the ability to recognize the ID cards acceptable by the *Provider* (ID card, passport and driver's license). The *Provider* usually supports the professional development of the employees, but it also expects employees to independently develop their skills in their respective fields. Some of the employees of the *Provider* have the role to detect and gather the technical and business innovations and to organize, and share this knowledge with their colleagues.

Trusted roles can be held at the *Provider* only by persons, who have no external influence and possess the necessary expertise validated by the *Provider*. All personnel in trusted roles shall be free from conflict of interest that might prejudice the impartiality of the *Provider's* operations.

The manager with overall responsibility for the IT system can only be a person who has:

- specialized degree (mathematics, physics college or university degree or a college/university degree acquired at an engineering department belonging to the technical field of science);
- at least three years of expertise in professional working experience related to information security.

### 5.3.2 Background Check Procedures

The *Provider* only hires employees for trusted or leading roles, who

- have a clean record and there's no proceeding in progress against them that may affect the impunity.
- are not subject to professional disqualifications prohibiting to exercise electronic signatures related services.

At the time of the appointment, shall the leading role holder *Provider* employee with a statement, a trusted role holder employee with a certificate of good conduct less than 3 months old justify the clean criminal record.

The *Provider* verifies the authenticity of the relevant information given in the applicant's CV during the hiring process, like previous employment, professional references, most relevant educational qualifications.

### 5.3.3 Training Requirements

The *Provider* trains the newly recruited employees, over the course of which they acquire

- basic PKI knowledge;
- the specifics and the way of handling the *Provider's* IT system;
- the necessary special knowledge for fulfilling their scope of activities;
- processes and procedures defined in the public and inner regulations of the *Provider*;
- the legal consequences of the individual activities;
- the applicable IT security regulations to the extent necessary to the specific scope of activities;
- the data protection rules.

The *Provider* trains the employees concerned with registration about the dangers and risks related to the verification of the data to be indicated on the Certificate.

The employees concerned with registration take and pass an exam on the knowledge of the related requirements and procedures for data verification before their appointment, and this fact is documented by the *Provider*.

Only employees having passed the training shall gain access to the he production IT system of the *Provider*.

### 5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements

The *Provider* ensures that the employees have the necessary knowledge continuously, so if needed, further or repeater type of training is held.

Further training is held if there's a change within the processes or the IT system of the *Provider*.

The training material is updated at least in every 12 months and contains the new threats and actual security practices.

The training is adequately documented, from what the syllabus and the scope of the participator employees can be clearly determined.

### 5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

The *Provider* does not apply mandatory rotation between individual work schedules.

### 5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

The *Provider* regulates the prosecution possibilities of the employees in an employment contract in case of failures, errors, accidental or intentional damage. If the employee – due to negligence or intentionally – violates their obligations, sanctions could be taken against him by the *Provider*, which it sets out having regard to the offense and the consequences. The sanctions may include disciplinary proceedings, dismissal, revocation of appointment, criminal liability. Upon appointment every trusted role employee as part of the employment documents:

- gets written information about legal liabilities, rights, certification and management standards for the treatment of personal data,
- gets a job description that includes the concerning security tasks,
- signs a confidentiality agreement in which the related consequences non-compliant with security measures, (criminal sanctions) can be found too.

All of these include the labor legislation or criminal consequences, that sanction the different discipline – job obligations – violation or breaking the law.

### 5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements

The *Provider* only assigns trusted roles to its employees.

The *Provider* chooses persons employed with engagement contract or subcontract to perform the other tasks, chosen if possible, from the list of previously qualified suppliers. The *Provider* concludes a written contract before working with suppliers.

Each contracting party – before the start of the active work – signs a confidentiality statement in which he agrees that the business / corporate secrets learned later on will not be covered up to unauthorized persons, and will not be exploited in any other way. The confidentiality statement includes sanctions in case of violation. External employees employed under the contract are expected to have appropriate technical skills, and the *Provider* does not hold any trainings for them.



### 5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel

The *Provider* continuously provides for the employees the availability of the current documentation and regulations necessary to perform their roles.

Each employee in trusted role receives the following documents in writing:

- the organizational security regulations of the *Provider*,
- the confidentiality agreement to be signed,
- personal job description,
- educational materials on the occasion of the planned or special training for the specific form of education.

All employees are informed in a written notice about any changes in the organizational security regulations.

## 5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

In order to maintain a secure IT environment the *Provider* implements and operates an event logger and control system covering its full IT system.

### 5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded

The *Provider* logs every security-related event that can provide information on events, changes happened in the IT system or in its physical environment according to the generally accepted information security practice. In case of every log entry, it stores the following data:

- the time of the event;
- the type of the event;
- the identification of the user or the system who/what triggered the event;
- the success or failure of the audited event.

All new audit record is appended to the audit records. The earlier saved audit records can't be modified or deleted.

All of the essential event logs are available to the independent system auditors, who examine the compliance of the *Provider's* operation.

The *Provider* logs The following events at minimum:

- INTERNAL CLOCK
  - the synchronization of the internal clock to the UTC time, including the operational re-calibrations too;
  - the loss of synchronization;

- LOGGING:
  - the shutdown, restart of the logging system or some of its components;
  - the modification of any parameter of the logging settings, for example the frequency, alert threshold, and the event to be examined;
  - the modification or deletion of the stored logging data;
  - the activities performed because of the logging system's failure.
- SYSTEM LOGINS:
  - successful logins, unsuccessful login attempts for trusted roles;
  - in case of password based authentication:
    - \* the change of the number of permitted unsuccessful attempts;
    - \* reaching the limit of the permitted number of the unsuccessful login attempts in case of user login;
    - \* readmission of the user blocked because of the unsuccessful login attempts;
  - changing the authentication technique ( for example from password based to PKI based).
- KEY MANAGEMENT:
  - all events for the entire life cycle of service keys (key generation, saving, loading, destruction etc.);
  - events related to generating, managing the user keys;
  - all events related to the management of private keys stored for any purpose by the *Provider*.
- CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT:
  - every event related to the issuance and the status change of the provider *Certificates*.
  - every request including *Certificate* issuance, re-key, key renewal , suspension and revocation;
  - events related to the request processing;
  - every verification activity performed related to the *Certificate* issuance.
  - approval or rejection of the *Certificate Applications*;
  - *Certificate* issuance or status change.
- DATA FLOWS:
  - any kind of security-critical data manually entered into the system;
  - security-relevant data, messages received by the system;
- CA CONFIGURATION:
  - re-parameterization , any change of the settings of any component, of the CA;

- user admission, deletion;
  - changing the user roles, rights;
  - changing the Certificate profile;
  - changing the CRL profile;
  - generation of a new CRL list;
  - generation of an OCSP response;
  - *Time Stamp* generation;
  - exceeding the required time accuracy threshold.
- *Hardware Security Module*:
    - installing *Hardware Security Module*;
    - removing *Hardware Security Module*;
    - disposing, destructing *Hardware Security Module*;
    - delivering *Hardware Security Module*;
    - clearing (resetting) *Hardware Security Module*;
    - uploading keys, certificates to the *Hardware Security Module*.
- CONFIGURATION CHANGE:
    - hardware;
    - software;
    - operating system;
    - patch;
    - installation, update and removal of software on a Certificate System;
- PHYSICAL ACCESS, LOCATION SECURITY:
    - person entry to and exit from the security zone holding the system components used for providing the trust service;
    - access to a system component used for providing the trust service;
    - a known or suspected breach of physical security;
    - firewall or router traffic.
- OPERATIONAL ANOMALIES:
    - system crash, hardware failure;
    - software failures;
    - software integrity validation error;
    - incorrect or wrongly addressed messages;
    - network attacks, attack attempts;
    - equipment failure;
    - electric power malfunctions;

- uninterruptible power supply error;
  - an essential network service access error;
  - violation of the *Certification Practice Statement*;
  - deletion of the operating system clock.
- OTHER EVENTS:
    - appointment of a person to a security role;
    - operating system installation;
    - PKI application installation;
    - initiation of a system;
    - entry attempt to the PKI application;
    - password modification, setting attempt;
    - saving the inner database, and restore from a backup;
    - file operations ( for example creating, renaming, moving);
    - database access.

#### 5.4.2 Frequency of Audit Log Processing

The independent system auditors of the *Provider* evaluates the generated log files every working day.

During the evaluation, the authenticity and integrity of the examined logs is ensured, the error messages in the logs are checked and if needed, document the differences and take measures to eliminate the cause of the deviation.

For the IT system evaluation, the *Provider* uses automated evaluation tools too, that are used to monitor the resulting log entries according to preset criteria and, where necessary, alert the operational staff. The notifications received from the automated evaluation tools are processed and evaluated by the experts of the IT operation within 24 hours.

The fact of the investigation, the results of the investigation and the measures undertaken to avert deficiencies found are properly documented.

#### 5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log

Before the deletion from the on-line system, the logs are archived and their secure preservation is ensured by the *Provider* for the amount of time defined in Section 5.5.2, but at least 10 years from the date of their creation.

For that time period, the *Provider* ensures the readability of archived data, and maintains the software and hardware tools necessary for that.

#### 5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log

The *Provider* protects the created logs for the required preservation time. During the whole preservation time, the following properties of the logs' data is ensured:

- protection against unauthorized disclosure: only authorized persons – primarily the independent system auditors – access the logs;
- availability: authorized persons are granted access to the logs;
- integrity: any data alteration, deletion in the log files and change in the order of the entries, etc. is prevented.

The *Provider* provides the log records with qualified *Time Stamps*, and they are stored in a way excluding the seamless insertion and deletion of the log entries.

The log files are protected against accidental and malicious damage by backups. In case of log entries containing personal data, the *Provider* makes sure of the confidential storage of the data. Only those individuals are entitled to access to the log entries, who absolutely need it for their work. The *Provider* verifies the accesses in a secure way. The *Provider* preserves the log files in a secure environment. Keeps copies of the files at the second operation site.

#### 5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures

Daily log files are created from the continuously generated log entries during the operation in each system.

The daily log files are archived in two copies after the evaluation and stored physically apart from each other, at separate sites for the required time.

The exact process of backups shall be defined in the backup regulations of the *Provider*.

#### 5.4.6 Audit Collection System (Internal vs External)

Each application automatically collects and sends the records to the logging system.

The logging functions start automatically at the time of the system launch and they are run continuously during the entire period of system operation.

In case of any anomaly in the automatic examiner and logging systems, the operation of the related areas are suspended by the *Provider* until the incident is resolved.

#### 5.4.7 Notification to Event-causing Subject

The persons, organizations and applications that caused the error event are not always notified, but if necessary the *Provider* involves them in the investigation of the event. The Clients affected by triggering the event has the duty to cooperate with the *Provider* to explore the event.

#### 5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments

Besides processing daily the log entries, the experts of the *Provider* monitor the publicly available information about possible vulnerabilities and the new software patches. They analyse the information, classify the vulnerability and if necessary inform the management about the result and propose an action plan to increase the security of the system.

Every major event of significant deficiencies detected or in case of external threat within a period of 48 hours after its discovery, but at least once a year the experts of the *Provider* perform a

comprehensive vulnerability analysis using a mapping of potential internal and external threats that may result in unauthorized access, and may affect the *Certificate* issuing process, or allow modification of the data stored in the *Certificate*.

Based on the results of the analysis the *Provider*

- creates and implements a plan to mitigate the vulnerability; or
- documents the factual basis for the decision that the residual risk is accepted and the vulnerability does not require remediation.

At first the new software versions and software patches are installed on the test system of the *Provider* and only after the successfully finished test are installed on the live system which is used to provide the services.

The new software patches are not installed on the live system if they introduce additional vulnerabilities or instabilities that outweigh the benefits of applying them. The reasons for not applying any security patches are documented.

## 5.5 Records Archival

### 5.5.1 Types of Records Archived

The *Provider* is prepared to the proper secure long-term archiving of electronic and paper documents.

The *Provider* archives the following types of information:

- every document related to the accreditation of the *Provider*;
- all issued versions of the *Certificate Policies*;
- all issued versions of the *Certification Practice Statements*;
- all issued versions of the General Terms and Conditions;
- contracts related to the operation of the *Provider*;
- all information related to the registration, including:
  - every document handed in with the *Certificate Application*;
  - the identification data of the document(s) presented during the personal identification;
  - service agreement(s);
  - other subscriber disclaimers;
  - the ID of the administrator assessing the registration application;
  - conditions and the results of the examination of the application;
- all information related to the *Certificate* for the whole life-cycle;
- information related to the impersonation of the *Electronic Signature Creation Device*;
- every electronic and paper based log entry.

### 5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive

The *Provider* preserves the archived data for the time periods below:

- the *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* for at least 10 years from the date of repeal;
- *Certification Practice Statement* for at least 10 years from the date of repeal;
- General Terms and Conditions for at least 10 years from the date of repeal;
- in the case of video identification, all communications recorded during the identification for at least 10 years from the date of recording;
- All electronic and / or paper-based information relating to Certificates for at least:
  - 10 years after the validity expiration of the Certificate;
  - until the completion of the dispute concerning the electronic signature generated with the certificate;
- all other documents to be archived for at least 10 years from the date of their creation.

### 5.5.3 Protection of Archive

The *Provider* stores all archived data in two copies at locations physically apart from each other. Authentic paper or electronic copy is made in accordance with the applicable law from the only authentic paper based copy of the document available.

Each of the two locations fulfils the requirements for archiving security and other requirements.

During the preservation of the archived data, it is ensured that:

- their integrity is preserved;
- they are protected against unauthorized access ;
- they are available;
- they preserve authenticity.

The archived electronic data is provided with at least an advanced electronic signature or seal and a qualified *Time Stamp*.

### 5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures

The *Provider* makes an authentic electronic copy of the original paper documents in accordance with the relevant legislation. Electronic copies are stored according to the same rules as other protected electronic documents.

After archiving the authentic electronic copies the *Provider* may destroy the original paper documents.

### 5.5.5 Requirements for Time-stamping of Records

Every electronic log entry is provided with a time mark, on which the system provided time is indicated at least to one second precision.

The time value is given by the internal clock of the *Provider* which is synchronized to two separate Stratum-1 UTC time sources:

- one accurate time source uses the satellite-based GPS signal;
- the other accurate time source is based on the longwave time signal service (DCF77).

In order to provide accuracy the *Provider* synchronizes its own internal time with the above Stratum-1 sources within a 0.1 second accuracy, and it performs this synchronization at least 4 times a day.

This way the *Provider* guarantees that the deviation of the time indicated in the time marks from the UTC time base is at most 1 second.

The *Provider* provides the daily log files with a qualified *Time Stamp*.

During the preservation of the archived data, if necessary (for example algorithm change expiration of the original *Time Stamp*) the authenticity of the data is ensured.

### 5.5.6 Archive Collection System (Internal or External)

The log entries are generated in the *Provider's* protected computer system, and only the log files that are electronically signed and protected with qualified timestamps can leave it.

One original copy of the documents created during the service provision is stored and protected by the *Provider* in an inner data storage operated by it.

### 5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information

The *Provider* creates the log files manually or automatically. In case of an automatic logging system, the certified log files are generated daily.

The archived files are protected from unauthorized access.

Controlled access to the archived data is only available to the eligible persons:

- *Clients* are eligible to see the data stored about them;
- in legal litigation in order to provide evidence the necessary data shall be provided.

## 5.6 CA Key Changeover

The *Provider* ensures that the used *Certification Units* are continuously possessing a valid key and Certificate for their operation. For that purpose, sufficient time before the expiration of their Certificates, and the usage expiration of the keys related to them, it generates a new key pair for the *Certification Units* and inform its *Clients* in time. The new provider key is generated and managed according to this regulation.

If the *Provider* changes any of its end-user *Certificates* issuer provider Certificate keys, it complies with the following requirements:



- it discloses the affected Certificates and public keys in accordance with the requirements defined in section 2.2 ;
- after the provider re-key the end-user *Certificates* to be issued will only be signed with the new provider keys;
- it preserves its old Certificates and public keys, and makes available the seal verification until all of the signing *Certificate* with the old provider key validity time expire.

## 5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

In case of a disaster, the *Provider* takes all necessary measures in order to minimize the damage resulting from the shortfall of the service, and it restores the services as quickly as possible.

Based on the assessment of the incident that occurred, it takes the necessary amendments, corrective measures to prevent future occurrence of the incident.

Once the problem resolved, the event is reported to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, as the supervisory authority.

### 5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

The *Provider* has a business continuity plan.

The *Provider* established and maintains a fully functional backup system, which is at a safe distance from the primary location, geographically located at a different place and is independently capable of supplying the full range of services.

The *Provider* annually tests the changeover to a backup system and reviews its business continuity plans.

The *Provider* has increased security tools and systems in order to minimize the software and hardware failures and data corruptions. The recoverability of services is guaranteed by the underpinning contracts and own backup tools of the *Provider*.

The *Provider* constructed its IT system providing the trust services in such a way that in case of the dropout of any one device, it is able to continue the provision of its trust services. If multiple units of the *Provider* fail, the *Provider* is able to launch its backup system within at most 3 hours, which is able to provide the services related to the continuously operating services – Certificate storage publication, suspension and revocation management, publication of revocation status information – of the *Provider* for its *Clients*.

### 5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted

The IT systems of the *Provider* are built of reliable hardware and software components. The critical functions are implemented using redundant system elements so that in the event of an item failure they are able to operate further.

The *Provider* makes a full daily backup of its databases and the generated log events.

The *Provider* makes full system backups as frequently as necessary to be able to restore the full service in case of a disaster.

The business continuity plan of the *Provider* includes accurate requirements for the tasks to be performed in case of critical system component failure.

Once the problem resolved and the integrity restored, the *Provider* restarts its services as soon as possible.

During the restoration of services, the certificate status information service systems have top priority.

### 5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures

The Business Continuity Plan of the *Provider* has an action plan in place in case the provider private keys compromise. The action plan reveals the circumstances of the compromise besides the revocation of the provider public key and the *Certificate* accompanying, arranges the notification of all concerned parties, takes the necessary steps against the recurrence of the compromise and, if necessary, provides new key to the service unit and the compromise affected end users. The *Provider* immediately ceases to use that particular key in case of certification unit key compromise.

In case another certificate authority also issued *Certificate* for the given certification unit - by law, contract or agreement between CAs based - and over or cross certified this certification unit of the *Provider*, the *Provider* promptly informs that other Certification Authority for that given key compromise and initiates the certificate revocation belonging to the key in question. In case of the key compromise of the intermediate CA issuing *Certificates* for the public administration this means the notification of the KGYHSZ.

The *Provider* publishes a notice about the provider public key revocation according to the section 1.3.1

### 5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster

The tasks to be performed in case of service failure due to natural or other disaster are defined in the *Provider's* business continuity plan.

In the event of disaster, the regulations come into force, the damage control and the restoration of the services begins.

The secondary services site is placed so far away from the primary site that a probable disaster cannot reach both locations simultaneously.

The *Provider* is obliged to notify the affected users as quickly as possible in the event of the disaster.

After the restoration of the services, the *Provider* restores its devices damaged during the disaster and the original service security level as quickly as possible

## 5.8 CA or RA Termination

In the event of the planned termination of the service, the *Provider* notifies the end users and the National Media and Infocommunications Authority at least 60 days prior to the termination of the service.

### The Certification Service and Certificate Status Service Termination

At the same time with the notification about the service termination, the *Provider* shuts down the following services:

- registration,
- *Certificate* creation,
- *Certificate* issuance,
- *Certificate* renewal,
- *Certificate* modification
- re-key.

The *Provider* at least 20 days before the planned termination, but at least 14 days after the notification of the *Clients* :

- revokes all valid enduser *Certificates*;
- stop processing the revocation and suspension requests;
- terminates the regular issuance of the *Certificate Revocation Lists*;
- issues a closing *Certificate Revocation List*, in which the value of the "nextUpdate" field is "99991231235959Z".

At the same time of the termination, the *Provider* shuts down the following services:

- *Certificate* publishing,
- *Certificate* revocation status publishing,
- OCSP service.
- technical support.
- information provision.

Before a planned termination, the *Provider* engages in negotiations about the taking over of its services with other Trust Service Provider whose rating is identical to its own. Under section 9.3 , it will hand over its records, including confidential user data, to such a Trust Service Provider or to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority come what may, along with its other services, depending on the outcome of the negotiations or terminates without handover.

The *Provider* takes measures concerning the revocation of provider *Certificates* (and destroying private keys) during the 60 day period – depending on the outcome of the negotiations.

The *Provider* informs the National Media and Infocommunications Authority about the final outcome of the negotiations. The *Provider* is to inform its *Clients* by electronic mail, and *Relying Parties* by means of a publication on its website.

Pursuant to section 2.1., the *Provider* will publish an announcement 5 days before its "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" and "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" *Certificate* is revoked.

Upon termination the service, the *Provider* produces a full scope backup of its data contained in its IT system, protected by a qualified *Time Stamp*.

The *Provider* provides for authorised *Relying Parties* the possibility to interpret the data appearing in its revoked and suspended *Certificates* records if necessary.

In order to make the handing over of its data to another Trust Service Provider possible, the *Provider* places data on media and in a format which the new Trust Service Provider can receive or provides the new Trust Service Provider with the opportunity to process data in the original format, and hands over the appropriate tools, documentation and know-how for this.

## 6 Technical Security Controls

The *Provider* uses systems consisting of reliable, and safety technically assessed equipment for the provision of its services. The *Provider* manages the provider cryptographic private keys during their whole life-cycle within a *Hardware Security Module* that has appropriate Certification.

Both the *Provider* and the system supplier and execution contractors have significant experience with deployment of PKI based systems and trust services and they use internationally recognized technology.

The *Provider* continuously monitors the capacity needs, and with setting the trends it estimates the expected future capacity demands. It can arrange if needed an extension of the limited capacity, thereby providing the necessary processing and continuous availability of storage capacities.

### 6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

The *Provider* makes sure that the generation and management of all the private keys generated by it – for the *Subjects*, for itself and for some of its departments (for example *Certificate Repository*, *Registration Authority*) – is secure and complies with the regulatory requirements in force and with industry standards.

#### 6.1.1 Key Pair Generation

The *Provider* uses key generation algorithms for the key pair generation, which comply with the requirements set out in the following normatives:

- ETSI TS 119 312 [25];
- the current National Media and Infocommunications Authority algorithmic regulation issued pursuant to the authorization of the year 2015. Act CCXXII [9] 92. § (1) b) .

#### Generation of Service Provider's key pairs

The *Provider* in case of the generation of a key pair of its own ensures:

- The production of provider key pair is performed based on a key generation script.
- In case of a CA key pair generation a Qualified Auditor witness the CA key pair generation process or the *Provider* records a video of the entire CA key pair generation process.

- If the CA key pair is generated for a root CA or a subordinate CA operated by another organization, a qualified auditor will witness the key generation process.

The Qualified Auditor issues a report opining that the CA followed its key ceremony during its Key generation process and the controls used to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the key pair.

- The generation of the key pair is

carried out in a physically protected environment (see section 5.1 ), with at least two trusted role holder (see section 5.2.1) authorized person simultaneously under the principle of split knowledge, excluding the presence of unauthorized persons.

- The creation of the provider key pair is carried out in a device, that:
  - meets the requirements of ISO/IEC 19790 [29] , or
  - meets the requirements of FIPS 140-2 [39] level 3 or higher, or
  - meets the requirements of CEN 419 221-5 [26], or
  - is a reliable system that is evaluated in accordance with MSZ/ISO/IEC 15408 [28] or equal security criteria valued to level 4 or higher guarantee level. The assessment shall be based on a security system design or on safety appropriations meeting the requirements of this document.
- Detailed log entries are made about the key generation process.
- The *Provider* takes the necessary measures to ensure that the private key has been generated and protected in accordance with the prescribed processes during key generation.
- In case of generatin key pairs for Service Provider's root and intermediate *Certificate* the *Provider* shall make a key generation record demonstrating that the process has been conducted in accordance with the predetermined workflow that ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the generated keys. The record shall be signed by:
  - in case of the generation of the Service Provider's root certification unit's key pair the trusted officer of the *Provider* responsible for key management and a trusted person independent from the operation of the *Provider*, as a witness (eg. qualified auditor), who verifies that the record corresponds to the performed process;
  - in case of the generation of the Service Provider's intermediate certification unit's key pair the trusted officer of the *Trust Service Provider* responsible for key management who verifies that the record corresponds to the performed process.

### Generation of Service Provider's infrastructure key pairs

In case of generating the infrastructure keys used in its own IT systems, the *Provider* ensures that:

- the generation of the *Provider's* infrastructure key is carried out in a physically protected environment (see section 5.1) by an authorized person in a role of trust (see section 5.2.1), excluding the presence of other unauthorized persons;

- the key generation fully complies with the instructions in the device user documentation.

### Subscriber's key pairs

In case of generating the key pair for the *Subjects*, the *Provider* ensures that:

- The creation of the keys is carried out in a protected environment with exclusively trusted role holder persons present.
- In case of *Certificate Policies* requiring the use of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* or a *Cryptographic Hardware Device* the *Provider* generates the signing private key on the user's *Subject Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* or on its *Cryptographic Hardware Device* which makes the disclosure of the signing private key impossible.
- The *Provider* never generates keypairs for software based enduser *Certificates*.
- The *Provider* ensures that the generated key pair is compliant with the requirements defined in Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 , and the private key is not one of a known weak key pair.
- If the private key is handed over to the *Subject*, the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* or the *Cryptographic Hardware Device* is stored in an adequately secure environment by the *Provider* to prevent the key compromise. The generated private keys are stored by the *Provider* until the documented key handover in an adequately secure environment to prevent disclosure.

In case of an *Subject* generated key pair:

- the production of keys shall be done in a properly secure environment that is under the supervision of the *Subject*;
- the *Subject* shall ensure the proper protection of the generated private key;
- the *Provider* shall ensure that the generated key pair is compliant with the requirements defined in Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6, and the public key is not one of a known weak key pair.

During processing the *Certificate Application* the *Provider* checks the key pair and rejects the *Certificate Application*, if one or more of the following conditions are met:

- the key pair does not meet the requirements set forth in Section 6.1.5 and/or Section 6.1.6;
- there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the private key was flawed;
- the *Provider* is aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the *Subject's* private key to compromise;
- the *Provider* has previously been made aware that the *Subject's* private key has suffered a key compromise, such as through the provisions of Section 4.9.1;
- the *Provider* is aware of a demonstrated or proven method to easily compute the *Subject's* private key based on the public key (such as a Debian weak key, see <https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys>).

### 6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

If the *Provider* generated the *Subject's* private key, then the following requirements are met:

#### If the Private Key is Handed Over to the *Subject*:

- Until the key handover, the *Provider* stores the private keys generated by it for the *Subjects* and the activation data securely to prevent the key disclosure, copy, modification, damage and the usage by unauthorized persons.
- The *Provider* shall ensure that the private keys and their activation data can only be taken over by the *Subject*.
- The *Provider* shall gain sufficient evidence of the handover of the private key to the *Subject*, and the exact time of the handover.
- After the handover of the signer private key to *Subject*, the *Provider* shall not reserve any copy of the signer private key.

In case of *Certificate Policies* requiring the use of a *Cryptographic Hardware Device* (in particular *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*) the private key of the *Subject* together with the *Cryptographic Hardware Device* providing the secure storage and usage of the private key, is handed over to the *Subject* in person with the closed envelope containing the activation code.

The *Provider* may also provide the *Cryptographic Hardware Device* to the *Subject* using a third party, in which case it shall ensure that

- the *Cryptographic Hardware Device* is in transport mode until handed over to the *Subject*;
- transmits the device activation code to the *Subject* on a separate channel;
- the *Certificate(s)* shall be issued only after the certified handover of the *Cryptographic Hardware Device* to the *Subject*.

Following the key generation the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* containing the private key is in transport mode, which ensures that the private key can not be used for electronic signature creation before the activation of the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*.

In case of *Certificate Policies* not requiring the use of a *Cryptographic Hardware Device* or *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* in all cases the *Client* generates the private key, so it does not have to be delivered to the *Client*.

### 6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

When the key pair is generated by the *Subject*, the following provisions shall be complied with:

- the public key shall be sent to the *Provider* in a manner that it can be unambiguously assigned to the *Subject*;
- the *Certificate Application* process shall prove that the *Subject* really owns the private key corresponding to the public key.

When the end user keys generated by the *Subject*, the *Subject* sends the *Provider* a PKCS#10 formatted *Certificate Application* which he or she signs with the private key belonging to the public key to be indicated on the *Certificate*. The PKCS#10 formatted *Certificate Application* contains the public key generated by the *Subject* and the *Subject* data to be indicated on the *Certificate*, so both requirements are met.

The *Provider* issues the provider *Certificates* needed for his trust services himself and generates the provider key pairs himself also, so there is not necessary to deliver the public keys. In case of the provider *Certificate* issued by another service provider – for example KGYHSZ –, the *Provider* sends to the issuer a PKCS#10 formatted *Certificate Application*, which is certified with the private key belonging to the public key to be indicated on the *Certificate*.

#### 6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

The *Provider* discloses the status information related to the provider *Certificates* for the Relying Parties by the following methods:

- The *Provider* publishes the full provider certificate hierarchy containing every root and intermediate provider certificate from which every current provider *Certificate* is downloadable (see at the Provider certificates point at the <https://e-szigno.hu/en/pki-services/ca-certificates.html> url ).
- The denomination of the root and intermediate certification units and the *Root Certificates'* hash is in the 1.3.1 section of the *Certification Practice Statement*.
- The *Certificates* of the intermediate certification units are published on the certified Hungarian Trust Service Provider List [44] maintained and published by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority within the framework of the European common regulations [43]. The list contains every provider certificate (even the expired and revoked ones).
- For the online certificate status response signer responders the *Provider* – according to the best international practice – issues *Certificates* with very short validity periods, thus eliminating the necessity of checking the revocation status of the *Certificates*. The current status of the *Certificates* is continuously available at the webpage of the *Provider* at the <https://e-szigno.hu/en/pki-services/ca-certificates.html> address.

The *Provider* discloses for the *Relying Parties* the status information related to the *Certificate* of the certification units operated by it, and of the units that take part in the online certificate status service by the following methods:

- The status information related to the *Certificate* of the root certification units is available on the webpage of the *Provider*.
- The status change information of the intermediate (not root) certification units' certificates is disclosed on the *Certificate Revocation Lists*, on its webpage and within the confines of the online certificate status response service.



- For the responders signing the online certificate status responses the *Provider* – according to the best international practices – issues a *Certificate* with very short validity period to eliminate the necessity of checking the *Certificate* revocation status. The *Provider* guarantees that in case of key compromise or other problem no new *Certificate* will be issued for the old private key signing the OCSP responses. The *Provider* issues the OCSP response *Certificates* for new, secure private keys.

Regarding the disclosure methods of the status information, also see Section 4.10.

### 6.1.5 Key Sizes

The *Provider* uses cryptographic algorithms and minimum key sizes, which comply with the requirements set out in the following norms:

- ETSI TS 119 312 [25];
- the current National Media and Infocommunications Authority algorithmic regulation issued pursuant to the authorization of the year 2015. Act CCXXII [9] 92. § (1) b).

The *Certification Authority* uses at least 2048 bit RSA keys or at least 256 bit ECC keys in every currently active root and intermediate provider *Certificate* and even in the *Certificates* of the *Time-Stamping Units* and the OCSP responders.

The *Certification Authority* issues the enduser *Certificates* only for at least 2048 bit RSA keys or at least 256 bit ECC keys.

The *Provider* supports the following ECC curves:

- ECC NIST P-256 (256 bit)

### 6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

The *Provider* generates the keys according to the description of the section 6.1.1.

#### Verification of Compliance of Parameters

The compliance of the key generation parameters is verified by the system from two points of view:

- checking the conformity of the random number generation used for the parameters (whether the generation is sufficiently statistically random),
- checking the fulfilment of the requirements for parameters.

Every *Hardware Security Module* used in the system is able to statistically test the uniformity and independence of the bit sequence it generated. The modules enable the invocation of the tests through a standard interface.

### 6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)

The *Provider* root certification unit private key may only be used for the following purposes:

- issuance of the self-signed *Certificate* of the root certification unit itself ,
- to sign the intermediate certification units' *Certificates*,
- to sign the OCSP responder *Certificate*,
- to sign CRLs.

The private key of the *Provider's* intermediate certification units – as well as the private key issued to the intermediate certification unit of other organizations – can only be used for the following purposes:

- to sign the intermediate certification units' *Certificates*,
- to sign the end user *Certificate*,
- to sign the *Time-Stamping Unit Certificate*,
- to sign the OCSP responder *Certificate*,
- to sign CRLs.

The *Provider* includes the Key Usage extensions in the end-user certificates that define the scope of the *Certificate* usage and in the X.509v3 [38] compatible applications technically restrict the usage of the *Certificates*. The requirements set out for the value of the field are in Section 7.1.2. The signer private key may only be used for electronic signature creation by the *Signatory*, any other uses of the key are specifically prohibited.

## 6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

The *Provider* ensures the secure management of the private keys held by it and prevents the private key disclosure, copy, deletion, modification and unauthorized usage. The *Provider* may only preserve the private keys as long as the provision of the service definitely requires.

The *Provider* stores and uses the Root CA private keys physically isolated from normal operations such that only designated trusted personnel have access to the keys for use.

The *Provider* private keys used for the certification organization *Certificate* issuance are stored at a physically secure location, in a secure *Hardware Security Module*.

The *Provider* deletes the signing private keys stored on the *Hardware Security Modules* which are out of order in as defined in the device's manual so that it is practically impossible to restore the keys.

The *Provider* the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* used to create *Certificates* issued according to *Certificate Policies* requiring the use of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* stores at a physically secure location, with special attention in order to prevent the illegal use of private keys after the on-board key generation until handing over to the *Subject*.

In case of *Certificates* issued according to *Certificate Policies* not requiring the use of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* the *Provider* does not issue private keys to the *Subject* beforehand, eliminating the need to ensure the preservation of the end-user private keys.

### 6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

The systems of the *Provider* issuing *Certificate*, signing OCSP responses and CRL lists stores the private keys in such secure hardware devices that are compliant with the following:

- the requirements of ISO/IEC 19790 [29], or
- the requirements of FIPS 140-2 [39] level 3 or higher, or
- the requirements of CEN 14167-2 [41] task force agreement, or
- the requirements of CEN 419 221-5 [26], or
- they are such reliable systems that are evaluated at a guarantee level 4 or higher according to MSZ/ISO/IEC 15408 [28] or an equivalent security criteria system. The assessment either shall be based on the appropriate security system plan that meets the requirements of the present document, or on security appropriations.

The *Provider* stores the provider private keys outside of the *Hardware Security Module* only in encrypted form. Only those algorithms and key parameters are used for encoding which fits to the actual algorithmic decision of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority that was issued according to the year 2015. Act CCXXII [9] 92. § (1) b) and that are expected to be able to withstand the cryptographic attacks during the entire lifetime of the keys.

The *Provider* provider private keys are stored in a physically secure site even in an encrypted form, in the safe of the *Data Centre*, where they are only accessible to authorized people.

In case of the weakening of cryptographic algorithms and key parameters, the *Provider* destroys the coded keys or recodes them again using algorithm and key parameters that ensure higher protection.

### 6.2.2 Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control

The *Provider* implements the "n out of m" at the activation of the private key related key management functions. The parameters are determined so that the simultaneous presence of at least two; trusted role holder employees is needed for the critical operations carried out with its provider private keys.

### 6.2.3 Private Key Escrow

The *Provider* copied its root CA keys in encrypted form into a CD. The CD is stored in a bank tressor in a closed envelop.

The *Provider* does not escrow its own provider private keys other than the root keys.

The *Provider* does not provide for the end-user signer private keys any escrow service, under no circumstance does it store their copy, multiple usage, except for a private key generated on a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*, stored on a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* until its hand over to the *Subject*.

#### 6.2.4 Private Key Backup

The *Provider* makes security copies of its provider private keys, before putting the provider private key into service as described in section 6.2.1. in a protected environment, in the simultaneous presence of at least two people holding trusted roles, with the exclusion of other people. During the backup, the private key leaves the module in an encrypted form, and this encrypted key can be loaded into another module. Both the backup and the restore can only be performed by protection mechanisms described in section 6.2.2..

The *Provider* stores the backup copy in duplicate, and at least one copy of those is stored at a different place from the service provider location.

The same strict security standards are applied to the management and preservation of backups as for the operation of the production system.

The *Provider* does not make any copy of the end-user signer private keys.

#### 6.2.5 Private Key Archival

The *Provider* does not archive its private keys and the end-user signer private keys.

#### 6.2.6 Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module

All of the provider private keys of the *Provider* are created in a *Hardware Security Module* that meets the requirements.

The private keys do not exist in an open form outside of the *Hardware Security Module*.

The *Provider* only exports the private key from the *Hardware Security Module* for the purpose of making a secure copy.

The export and loading of the provider private keys is performed according to section 6.2.2.

#### 6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

The *Provider* keeps its private keys used for service provision in *Hardware Security Modules* according to section 6.2.1.

Private keys are stored and used in the *Hardware Security Module* as specified in the certification of the device with full compliance with the related operating instructions.

#### 6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key

The *Provider* keeps its provider private keys in a secure *Hardware Security Module* and complies with its user guide and the requirements outlined in the certification documents. The *Hardware Security Module* can only be activated by the corresponding operator cards and the private keys within the *Hardware Security Module* can not be used before activating the module. The *Provider* keeps the operator cards in a safe environment and those cards can be only reached by entitled employees of the *Provider*.

The *Provider* ensures that signatures can only be created with the private key of the root unit certificate in case of commands issued directly by the trust official duly authorized to do so.

In case of the end-user private keys generated by the *Provider* it ensures that the private keys and the private key activation data are generated and managed in a properly secure way that excludes the possibility of the unauthorized usage of the private key.

The *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* or *Cryptographic Hardware Devices* prepared for the *Subject* and configured and handed over by the *Provider* to the *Subject* so that:

- it can be clearly established that the device has not been used for electronic signature creation before the handover;
- before the electronic signature creation the *Subject* shall identify itself towards the device.

In case of *Subject* generated private key the protection of the private key is the *Subject's* full responsibility.

## 6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key

### Provider Private Keys

The private key used by the *Provider*, and managed by the cryptographic devices becomes deactivated if (in a regular or irregular way) the device is removed from active status. This can happen in the following cases:

- the user deactivates the key,
- the power supply of the device is interrupted (switched off or power supply problem),
- the device enters an error state.

The private key deactivated like this can not be used until the module is in active state again.

### End-User Private Keys

In case of *Certificate Policies* requiring the use of *Cryptographic Hardware Device* the private keys shall be used in accordance with the requirements defined in the used cryptographic module's user guide and in the certification documents.

The *Cryptographic Hardware Device* handed over to the *Subject* ensures that the private keys become deactivated in the following cases:

- the power supply of the device ceases for any reason ;
- the *Subject* exits the application used for the signature creation;
- the *Subject* gives a deactivation (exit) instruction from the application to the device.

The deactivated key and the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* may only be used for electronic signature creation after the re-identification of the *Subject*.

In case of *Certificate Policies* not requiring the use of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* or *Cryptographic Hardware Device* the proper usage of the private keys is the responsibility of the *Subject*.

### 6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key

#### Provider Private Keys

The discarded, expired or compromised *Provider's* private keys are destroyed in a way that makes further use of the private keys impossible.

The *Provider* destroys the provider private keys stored in the secure *Hardware Security Module* of the certification organization according to the procedures, requirements defined in the user guide and in the certification documents of the used *Hardware Security Module*, in the simultaneous presence of two *Provider* employees (an infrastructure administrator and a security officer) with the exclusion of other persons.

The *Provider* destroys each backup copy of the private key in a documented way in such a way that its restoration and usage becomes impossible.

#### End-User Private Keys

The destruction of the discarded signer private keys issued on a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* is possible by the physical destruction of the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*, which is the responsibility of the *Subject*.

For the request of the *Client* in its presence the *Provider* destroys the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* presented by the *Client* personally free of charge.

In case of *Certificate Policies* requiring the use of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* the obsolete private keys shall be destroyed in accordance with the requirements defined in the used cryptographic module user guide and the certification documents. The compliant destruction of the private keys is the responsibility of the *Subject*.

In case of *Certificate Policies* requiring the use of a *Cryptographic Hardware Device* the obsolete private keys shall be destroyed in accordance with the requirements defined in the used cryptographic module user guide and the certification documents. The compliant destruction of the private keys is the responsibility of the *Subject*.

In case of *Certificate Policies* not requiring the use of a *Cryptographic Hardware Device* the proper destruction of the private keys is the responsibility of the *Subject*.

The discarded signer private keys of the end-users are recommended to be destroyed.

### 6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

According to the requirements of Section 6.2.1 every provider private key of the *Provider* is stored in a cryptographic module that

- has a certificate according to ISO/IEC 19790 [29], or
- has a certificate according to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 [39], or
- has an at least EAL-4 level Common Criteria [40] based certificate attesting compliance with the requirements of the CEN 14167-2 [41] workshop agreement, or

- has an at least EAL-4 level Common Criteria [40] based certificate attesting compliance with the requirements of the CEN 419 221-5 [26], or
- has a certificate issued for this purpose by an independent certification body eligible for evaluating electronic signature products, registered by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, or in a member state of the European Union

### 6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

#### 6.3.1 Public Key Archival

The *Provider* archives every *Certificate* its certification organization issued for ten years after the end of the validity period or until until the completion of the incurred dispute related to the *Certificate* (or to the electronic signature based on the *Certificate* ).

For the same time period, the *Provider* preserves devices, with which the content of the *Certificate* can be established.

#### 6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

##### The Keys and Certificates of the Root Certification Units

The validity period of the *Provider* root certification unit certificates and the private keys belonging to them shall not exceed the amount of time until which the used cryptographic algorithms can be used safely according to the algorithmic decision of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority.

The validity period of the *Provider* root certification unit certificates and the private keys:

- the key of the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" root certification unit was valid until 2017-04-06;
- the key of the "e-Szigno OCSP CA" root certification unit was valid until 2017-04-26;
- the key of the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" root certification unit is valid until 2029-12-30.
- the key of the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" root certification unit is valid until 2042-08-22;

##### The Keys and Certificates of the Intermediate Certification Units

The validity period of the *Provider* intermediate certification unit certificates and the private keys belonging to them:

- shall not exceed the amount of time until which the used cryptographic algorithms can be used safely according to the algorithmic decision of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority;
- shall not exceed the validity period of the issuer root or intermediate provider *Certificate* that issued the intermediate provider *Certificate*.

The intermediate (not root) certification unit keys of the *Provider* are valid until the expiration time of the *Certificates* belonging to them.

## End-User Certificates

The validity period of the end user *Certificates* issued by the *Provider*

- is maximum 2 years from issuance;
- shall not exceed the amount of time until which the used cryptographic algorithms can be used safely according to the algorithmic decision of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority;
- shall not exceed the expiration date of the provider *Certificate* that issued the *Certificate*.

During the Certificate renewal the *Provider* may issue the new *Certificate* for the same end-user private key.

Both the service provider and the end-user key validity period is affected, if the National Media and Infocommunications Authority issues a new algorithm decree, according to which the used cryptographic algorithm or key parameter is not secure to the end of the planned usage period. If this happens, the *Provider* revokes the related *Certificates*.

## 6.4 Activation Data

### 6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation

The *Provider's* private keys are protected in accordance with the procedures, requirements defined in the used *Hardware Security Module* user guide and the certification documents.

In case of password based activation data usage, the passwords are sufficiently complex in order to ensure the required level of protection.

In case of *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* and *Cryptographic Hardware Devices* provided by the *Provider* for the *Subject*, the *Provider* provides:

- the activation data is created and installed to the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* or to the *Cryptographic Hardware Device* is generated in a physically secure environment, with an adequate quality random number generator;
- the activation data to be handed over to the *Subject* using a safe method.

The *Provider* never generates software based private keys for the end user *Certificates*.

The creation and installation of the activation data of the *Subject* created private keys is the duty of the *Subject*.

### 6.4.2 Activation Data Protection

The employees of the *Provider* manage the private key activation devices and the activation data securely, protect them using technical and organizational measures and passwords are stored in encrypted form only.

In case of *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* or *Cryptographic Hardware Devices* issued for *Subjects* by the *Provider*:



- the *Provider* only records the activation data for the purpose of delivering them to the *Subject*;
- the *Provider* distributes the activation data to the *Subjects* using a secure method.

The protection of the activation data of the private keys created by the *Subject*, is the duty and responsibility of the *Subject*.

### 6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data

No stipulation.

## 6.5 Computer Security Controls

### 6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

During the configuration and operation of its IT system of the *Provider* ensures the compliance with the following requirements:

- the user identity is verified with two-factor authentication controls by using VPN certificates stored on the card before granting access to the system or the application;
- roles are assigned to users and it ensures that all users only have permissions appropriate for his or her roles;
- a log entry is created for every transaction, and the log entries are archived;
- for the security-critical processes it is ensured that the internal network domains of the *Provider* are sufficiently protected from unauthorized access;
- proper procedures are implemented to ensure service recovery after loss of key or system failure.

### 6.5.2 Computer Security Rating

Microsec highlights the importance of *Client* experience. In order to maintain a high level of services, the *Provider* has been operating a quality control system compliant with the ISO 9001 standard since January 23, 2002. Compliance with the standard has been verified by Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance.

Microsec assigns high priority to the security of the systems it operates, and has therefore been operating an information security management system that is compliant with ISO/IEC 27001 (formerly known as BS 7799) in its main areas of activity since May 19, 2003. Compliance with the standard has been verified by Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance.

The scope of both the quality control system and the information security management system cover the trust services provided by Microsec.

Microsec has two level risk assessment which covers beyond the information technology risks the whole organization including also the business risks. The risk assessment is updated at least yearly. Based on the results of the risk assessment the *Provider*

- sets up new measures to eliminate the vulnerabilities, or/and
- accepts the identified residual risks by stating the reason of the decision.

## 6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls

### 6.6.1 System Development Controls

The *Provider* only uses applications and devices in its production IT system that are:

- commercial boxed software, designed and developed by a documented design methodology, or;
- custom hardware and software solutions developed by the *Provider* itself during which design structured development methods and controlled development environment were used, or;
- custom hardware and software solutions developed by a reliable party for the *Provider* during which design structured development methods and controlled development environment were used, or;
- open source software which comply with the security requirements and their adequacy is ensured by software verification and structured development and life-cycle management.

Procurement of IT tools is performed in a way that excludes changes to the hardware and software components using reliable, regularly qualified suppliers.

The hardware and software components applied for the provision of services are not used for other purposes by the *Provider*.

The *Provider* prevents the malicious software from entering into the devices used for certification services with appropriate security measures.

The hardware and software components are checked regularly for malicious software prior the first usage, and subsequently.

The *Provider* acts with the same carefulness in case of program update purchases as at the acquisition of the first version.

The *Provider* employs reliable, adequately trained staff over the course of installing software and hardware.

The *Provider* only installs softwares to its service provider IT equipment necessary for the purpose of service provision.

The *Provider* has a version control system where every change of the IT system is documented.

The *Provider* operates automatic monitoring system to record all unauthorized changes, which records all changes in every file and in case of changes in the monitored files it generates a log entry or sends an alert to the system operators.

### 6.6.2 Security Management Controls

The *Provider* implements processes for documenting, operating, verifying, monitoring and maintaining the systems used in the service including their modification and further development. The version control system detects any kind of unauthorized changes, data entry that affects the system, the firewall, the routers, programs and other components used in the service. Installing the program used in the service the *Provider* ensures that the program to be installed is the proper version and that it is free from any unauthorized modification. The *Provider* regularly checks the integrity of the software in its system used in the service.

Each *Hardware Security Module* applied by the *Provider* has been verified, tested and evaluated. The *Provider* verifies the integrity of the modules:

- following the acquisition of the devices during the takeover,
- immediately before the first usage,
- regularly during operation.

The *Provider* deletes the provider keys from the *Hardware Security Modules* permanently or temporarily withdrawn from use.

The *Provider* stores the unused *Hardware Security Modules* at a physically protected location.

### 6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls

The *Provider* ensures the protection of the used *Hardware Security Modules* during their whole life cycle.

During the operation of the IT equipment and systems used for the provision of the services, the *Provider* takes into account the security aspects related to the life cycle of the equipment, according to which:

- it uses properly certified *Hardware Security Modules* in its systems;
- ensure, upon receipt of the *Hardware Security Modules*, that the quality control ensures that that the protection of the *Hardware Security Modules* against tampering was ensured during transportation;
- it stores the *Hardware Security Modules* in a safe place, and ensure the protection of the *Hardware Security Modules* against tampering during storage;
- continuously complies with the requirements set out in the *Hardware Security Module's* security target, instructions for use and certification report during operation;
- deletes the private keys stored in their decommissioned *Hardware Security Modules* in such a way that it becomes practically impossible to restore the keys;
- handle and dispose of decommissioned *Hardware Security Modules* in accordance with the requirements of its security target, instructions for use and certification report.

## 6.7 Network Security Controls

The *Provider* keeps its IT system configuration under strict control, and it documents every change including the smallest modification, development, software update too. The *Provider* implements proper procedures for the detection of any hardware or software change, system installation, and maintenance occurred on the IT system. The *Provider* checks the authenticity and integrity of every software component at their first loading.

The *Provider* applies proper network security measures for example:

- divides its IT system into well separated security zones;
- separates dedicated network for administration of IT systems and the *Provider's* operational network;
- separates the production systems for the TSP services from systems used in development and testing;
- establishes communication between distinct trustworthy systems only through trusted channels that are logically distinct from other communication channels and provide assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure;
- operates the IT systems used for the live operational network in secure network zones;
- restricts access and communications between zones to those necessary for the operation of the service;
- disables the not used protocols and user accounts;
- disables unused network ports and services ;
- only runs network applications unconditionally necessary for the proper operation of the IT system .
- reviews the established rule set on a regular basis.

The *Provider* undergoes or performs a vulnerability scan on public and private IP addresses:

- within one week of receiving a request from the CA/Browser Forum;
- after any system or network changes that the CA determines are significant;
- at least every three (3) months.

The *Provider* checks the compliance of the local network components (e.g. routers) configuration with the requirements specified by the *Provider* at least every three months.

The *Provider* orders a penetration test from an external independent expert who has the necessary skills, tools, proficiency and code of ethics to provide a reliable report yearly and in case of a significant change in the IT network.

## 6.8 Time-stamping

For the protection of the integrity of the log files and other electronic files to be archived the *Provider* uses qualified electronic *Time Stamps* issued by the e-Szignó Certificate Authority.

# 7 Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles

## 7.1 Certificate Profile

The end-user *Certificates* issued by the *Provider* and all the provider's root and intermediate *Certificates* which are in the *Certificate Chain* used to issue the *Certificates* comply with the following recommendations and requirements:

- ITU X.509 Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks [38]
- IETF RFC 3739 [31];
- IETF RFC 5280 [33]
- IETF RFC 6818 [35]
- ETSI EN 319 412-1 [20]
- ETSI EN 319 412-2 [21]
- ETSI EN 319 412-5 [24]

### 7.1.1 Version Number(s)

The provider certification unit (root and intermediate) *Certificates* used by the *Provider* and the end-user *Certificates* issued by the *Provider* are "v3" *Certificates* according to the X.509 specification [38].

The *Certificates* have the following basic fields:

- Version  
The *Certificate* complies with "v3" *Certificates* according to the X.509 specification, so the value "2" is in this field. [33]
- Serial Number  
The unique identifier generated by the *Certificate* issuer certification unit.  
In case of the end-user *Certificates* the "Serial Number" field contains a random number with at least 8 byte entropy.
- Algorithm Identifier  
The identifier (OID) of the cryptographic algorithm set used for the creation of the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate*.

The *Certification Authority* uses the following cryptographic algorithm:

- "sha256WithRSAEncryption" (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
- "ecdsa-with-SHA256" (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)

- Signature  
Electronic seal made by the *Certification Authority* certifying the *Certificate*, that has been created with an Algorithm set defined in the "Algorithm Identifier" field.
- Issuer  
The unique name of the *Certificate* issuer *Certification Unit* according to the X.501 name format.
- Validity (notBefore & notAfter)  
The beginning and the end of the validity period of the *Certificate*.  
The time is recorded according to UTC and compliant with IETF RFC 5280 encoding.
- Subject  
The unique name of the *Subject* according to the X.501 name format. Always filled out.
- Subject Public Key Algorithm Identifier

The *Provider* supports the RSA and the ECC algorithms in the end-user *Certificates*.

The value to be included in this field:

- "rsaEncryption" (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
- "ecPublicKey" (1.2.840.10045.2.1)

- Subject Public Key Value  
The public key of the Subject.
- Issuer Unique Identifier  
Not filled out.
- Subject Unique Identifier  
Not filled out.

### 7.1.2 Certificate Extensions

the *Provider* only uses the following certificate extensions according to the X.509 specification [38]:

#### Certificate of the Root Certification Unit

- Certificate Policies – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.32  
This field is not indicated.

- Authority Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.35  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the provider key used for the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate*.  
The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the provider public key.  
In case of the self-signed root certification unit certificate the value is identical with the value of the *Subject* key identifier field.
- Subject Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.14  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the *Subject* public key. The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the public key.  
Always filled in.
- Subject Alternative Names – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.17  
  
It is filled in according to section 3.1.1.
- Basic Constraints – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.19  
The specification whether the *Certificate* has been issued to a certification unit.  
The extension is required and its value is: CA = "TRUE".  
The "pathLenConstraint" field is not present in the root *Certificate*.
- Key Usage – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.15  
The scope definition of the approved key usage.  
The used values are:
  - "keyCertSign",
  - "cRLSign".
- Extended Key Usage – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.37  
The further scope definition of the approved key usage. It is not present.

The above fields are always filled out. There is no any more *Certificate* extension.

### **Certificate of the Intermediate Certification Unit**

- Certificate Policies – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.32  
This field may limit the *Certificate Policies* which can be used in the Enduser *Certificate*.  
The intermediate CAs below this CA may issue only that type of Enduser *Certificates* which fit to at least one of the *Certificate Policies* listed here.

It is always filled.

In case of *Certificates* issued to the intermediate certification units of the *Provider*, the "anyPolicy" Identifier may be present in this field.

The reference to the related *Certification Practice Statement* can be given in this field. In case of certification unit *Certificates* issued to other *Certification Authority*, only that identifier can be in this field, which relates to a *Certificate Policy* which complies to the *Certificate Policy* implemented by the issuer *Certification Authority*, and there can be no "anyPolicy" Identifier.

- Authority Key Identifier – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.35

The 40 character long unique identifier of the provider key used for the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate*.

It is always filled.

The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the provider public key.

- Subject Key Identifier – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.14

The 40 character long unique identifier of the *Subject* public key.

The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the public key.

It is always filled.

- Subject Alternative Names – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.17

It is filled in according to section 3.1.1.

- Basic Constraints – critical

OID: 2.5.29.19

The specification whether the *Certificate* has been issued to a certification unit.

The extension is required and its value is: CA = "TRUE".

The "pathLenConstraint" is not present in the *Certificate*.

- Key Usage – critical

OID: 2.5.29.15

The scope definition of the approved key usage.

The field contains the following values:

- "keyCertSign",
- "cRLSign".

- Extended Key Usage – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.37

The further scope definition of the approved key usage.

The Intermediate Certification Unit *Certificates* issued after 2019-01-01 contains the following "Extended Key Usage" values:

The Intermediate Certification Unit *Certificates* for issuing *Certificates* for the creation of qualified electronic signatures:



- Document Signing (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12)
- Secure E-mail (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
- CRL Distribution Points – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.31  
The field contains the CRL accessibility through http and/or ldap protocol.  
It is always filled.
- Authority Information Access – not critical  
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1  
The definition of the other services related to the usage of the *Certificate* provided by the *Provider*.  
Mandatory, and the field contains the following data:
  - For the purpose of the fast and reliable verification of the current *Certificate* revocation status, the *Provider* provides online certificate status service. The availability of this service is indicated here.
  - To facilitate the certificate chain building the *Provider* gives the access path through http or ldap protocol of the *Certificate* of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit.

The above fields are always filled out. There is not any more *Certificate* extensions.

### End-User Certificate

- *Certificate* Policies – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.32  
This field contains the denomination of the valid certification policy (see Section 1.2.1) at the time of the *Certificate* issuance and other information on the other uses of the *Certificate*.  
In case of end-user certificates, the *Provider* fills in this field in all cases by providing the following data:
  - the identifier of the *Certificate Policy* (OID according to section 1.2.1);
  - the availability of the *Certification Practice Statement*;
  - the textual warning in English and Hungarian <sup>6</sup> from which it can be established that
    - \* the *Certificate* is qualified;
    - \* the private key related to the *Certificate* is protected by a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* (exclusively in case of policies requiring the usage of *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*);
    - \* the preservation time of the data related to the *Certificate*.
  - the identifier (OID) of the certification policy specified by the ETSI EN 319 411-2 [19], which the *Certificate* complies with too.

The certification policies specified by the ETSI EN 319 411-2 are the following:

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<sup>6</sup>The same information is also stored in a computer-processable form in the Qualified Certificate Statements extension also indicated on the *Certificate*.

- \* QCP-n: Policy for EU qualified *Certificate* issued to a natural person  
OID: 0.4.0.194112.1.0;
- \* QCP-n-qscd: Policy for EU qualified *Certificate* issued to a natural person where the private key and the related *Certificate* reside on a qualified signature creation device  
OID: 0.4.0.194112.1.2.

The end-user *Certificates* that do not contain the "Certificate Policies" field shall be considered test certificates. The test *Certificate* can only be used for testing purposes, and they shall be declined in case of real transactions.

The reference to the related Certification Practice Statement may be given in this field.

- Authority Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.35  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the provider key used for the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate*.  
It is always filled in.  
The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the provider public key.
- Subject Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.14  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the *Subject* public key. The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the public key.  
It is always filled in.
- Subject Alternative Names – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.17  
See section: 3.1.1.
- Basic Constraints – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.19  
The specification whether the *Certificate* has been issued to a certification unit.  
The default value of the extension is: CA = "FALSE", so this field is not present in the end-user *Certificates*.  
The "pathLenConstraint" field is not present in the end-user *Certificates*.
- Key Usage – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.15  
The scope definition of the approved key usage.  
In end-user *Certificates* the value is exclusively set to the following:
  - "nonRepudiation".
- Extended Key Usage – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.37  
The further scope definition of the approved key usage.  
The values in the qualified signing end user *Certificates* are:

- "Document Signing (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12)"
- "emailProtection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)"
- CRL Distribution Points – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.31  
The field contains the CRL availability relevant to the Certificate through http and/or ldap protocol. The CRL availability related to the *Certificate* is present here (url).
- Authority Information Access – not critical  
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1  
The definition of the other services related to the usage of the *Certificate* provided by the *Provider*.  
In case of end-user certificate certificates the field contains the following data:
  - For the purpose of the fast and reliable verification of the current *Certificate* revocation status, the *Provider* provides online certificate status service. The availability of this service is indicated here.
  - To facilitate the certificate chain building the *Provider* gives the access path through http protocol of the *Certificate* of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit.

The *Provider* may give in this field the data of more than one service and *Certificate* of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit.

- Qualified *Certificate* Statements – not critical  
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3  
The field is intended for the indication of statements related to the qualified *Certificates*, but it has a field, that can be used in case of a non-qualified *Certificate* too.  
The following statements are present in every end-user qualified *Certificate*:
  - the *Certificate* is an EU qualified *Certificate* – 'id-etsi-qcs 1' (0.4.0.1862.1.1);
  - the transactional limit related to the *Certificate* – also known as the transaction value or financial transaction limit – 'id-etsi-qcs 2' (0.4.0.1862.1.2)  
- optional;
  - that statement that the *Provider* retains the registration data related to the *Certificate* for 10 years after the expiration of the *Certificate* – 'id-etsi-qcs 3' (0.4.0.1862.1.3);
  - that statement that the private key related to the *Certificate* resides inside a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* – 'id-etsi-qcs 4' (0.4.0.1862.1.4) – only in the case of certification policies requiring the use of a *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*;
  - the availability of the document that contains the shortened, extracted version of the Certification Practice Statement concerning the end-user *Certificate* – 'id-etsi-qcs 5' (0.4.0.1862.1.5);
  - that indication that the *Certificate* was issued for signing purposes – 'id-etsi-qcs-esign' (0.4.0.1862.1.6.1);

The above fields are always filled out according to the given rules.

Other certificate extensions will not be filled out.

### 7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

The denomination of the cryptographic algorithm that has been used to certify the *Certificate*. The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the *Certification Authority* for sealing the end-user *Certificates*:

- "sha256WithRSAEncryption" (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
- "ecdsa-with-SHA256" (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)

### 7.1.4 Name Forms

The *Provider* uses a distinguished name – composed of attributes defined in the standards IETF RFC 5280 [33], ETSI EN 319 412-2 [21], ETSI EN 319 412-3 [22] and ETSI EN 319 412-4 [23] – for the Subject identification in the *Certificates* issued based on this *Certification Practice Statement*.

The *Certificate* contains the globally unique identifier of the *Subject* (OID), filled out as defined in Section 3.1.1.

The value in the "Issuer DN" field of the *Certificate* is identical to the value in the "Subject DN" field of the issuer *Certificate*.

### 7.1.5 Name Constraints

The *Provider* does not use name constraints with the use of the "nameConstraints" field.

### 7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier

The *Provider* includes the not critical (*Certificate Policy*) extension in the *Certificates* according to the requirements of the Section 7.1.2..

### 7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

No stipulation.

### 7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

The *Provider* can put short information related to the *Certificate* usage into the *Certificate Policy* extension Policy Qualifier field. The field contains the on-line availability of the *Certification Practice Statement* (URI).

### 7.1.9 Processing Semantics for Critical Certificate Policy Extension

No stipulation.

## 7.2 CRL Profile

### 7.2.1 Version Number(s)

The *Certification Authority* issues version "v2" certificate *Certificate Revocation Lists* according to the IETF RFC 5280 [33] specification.

### 7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

The *Certificate Revocation Lists* issued by the *Certification Authority* contain the following fields:

1. tbsCertList

This field contains issuer information, validity, and other information, as well as a list of revoked *Certificates*.

The entire field is signed with the *Provider's* private key.

(a) Version

For the *Certificate Revocation List* version "v2" according to the IETF RFC 5280 [33] specification, the value of this field is mandatory "1".

(b) Signature

Identifier of the signing algorithm used by the *Certification Unit* during the issuance of the *Certificate*. Same as the algorithm ID used to sign the *Certificate Revocation List* (see signatureAlgorithm).

(c) Issuer Name

Unique name of the *Certification Unit* issuing the *Certificate Revocation List* (value of the "DN" field).

(d) Effect from (thisUpdate)

Start of entry into force of the *Certificate Revocation List*. UTC value with "UTCTime" encoding according to IETF RFC 5280 [33]. In the case of *Certificate Revocation Lists* issued by the *Certification Authority*, this is the same as the time of issue.

(e) Next issuance (nextUpdate)

Date of issuance of the next *Certificate Revocation List* (see Chapter 4.10). UTC value with "UTCTime" encoding according to IETF RFC 5280 [33].

(f) Revoked Certificates

The list of suspended or revoked *Certificates* is sorted in ascending order by the Certificate Serial Number. If there is no suspended or revoked *Certificate*, this field is not included in the *Certificate Revocation List*.

Required fields for all entries:

- Certificate Serial Number (CertificateSerialNumber)  
A unique identifier generated by the *Certification Authority* that issued the *Certificate*, which is an integer.
- Revocation Date (revocationDate)  
UTC value with "UTCTime" encoding according to IETF RFC 5280 [33].

Optional *Certificate Revocation List* Entry Extensions (crlEntryExtensions) that can be used by the *Certification Authority*:

- Revocation Reason (reasonCode) – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.21  
The reason for revocation is entered in this field.  
Mandatory field in suspended *Certificates*, the value is:  
"certificateHold (6)".
- Invalidity Date (InvalidityDate) – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.24  
This field can contain the time the private key became untrusted.  
This field is not necessarily filled by the *Certification Authority*.
- Guide to Suspended *Certificates* (holdInstruction) – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.23  
This field may contain the guide for managing the suspended *Certificate*.  
This field is not necessarily filled by the *Certification Authority*.

(g) CRL Extensions

- Provider Key Identifier (AuthorityKeyIdentifier)  
OID: 2.5.29.35  
The ID of the public key which belongs to the private key used to authenticate the *Certificate Revocation List* in the form of an "SHA1" hash.
- CRL Serial Number (cRLNumber) – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.20  
This field contains the monotonically increasing serial numbers of the *Certificate Revocation Lists*.

*Certificate Revocation List* Extension conditionally used by the *Certification Authority*:

- Expired Certificates on the CRL (expiredCertsOnCRL) – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.60  
The *Certification Authority* indicates with this standard field according to the X.509 specification that it does not remove expired *Certificates* from the CRL.  
(See: chapter 4.10.)

2. Signing Algorithm ID (signatureAlgorithm)

The cryptographic algorithm set identifier (OID) used to create the electronic seal that authenticates the *Certificate Revocation List*. Name and OID of the cryptographic algorithm sets supported by the *Certification Authority*:

- "sha256WithRSAEncryption" (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
- "ecdsa-with-SHA256" (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)

3. Signature (signatureValue)

The electronic seal of the *Certification Authority* certifying the *Certificate Revocation List*.  
The *Certificate Revocation List* is authenticated by the *Certification Authority* using the same key as used to seal the issued *Certificate*.

The *Certification Authority* is not obliged to fill out the extensions.

### 7.3 OCSP Profile

The *Provider* operates an online certificate status service according to the IETF RFC 6960 [36] and IETF RFC 8954 [37] standard.

The OCSP responses issued by *Certification Authority* contain the following fields:

- Algorithm identifier (signatureAlgorithm)  
The identifier of the cryptographic algorithm used for signing the OCSP response (OID). The *Provider* supports the following cryptographic algorithms:
  - "sha256WithRSAEncryption" (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
  - "ecdsa-with-SHA256" (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
- (Signature)  
The electronic signature or seal of the *Provider*.
- Identifier of the Responder (responderID)  
The unique identifier of the OCSP Responder which issues the OCSP Response.
- This Update (thisUpdate)  
The date of the entry into force of the OCSP Response. Value according to UTC with encoding according to IETF RFC 5280 [33].
- Next Update (nextUpdate)  
The latest issuance time of the next OCSP Response. Value according to UTC with encoding according to IETF RFC 5280 [33]. Optional.
- Certificate Status Response (SingleResponse)  
The field contains the ID of the *Certificate* (CertID) and the revocation status of the *Certificate* (CertStatus).  
  
The *Provider* issues positive OCSP response according to the requirements of the CABF BR. The Response contains the "good" value only if the *Certificate* is included in the *Certificate Repository* of the *Provider* and its revocation status is not suspended or revoked.

#### 7.3.1 Version Number(s)

The *Provider* supports the online certificate status requests and responses conforming to the "v1" version according to the standard IETF RFC 6960 [36]. The default value of the (Version) field is "v1", so this field is not included in the OCSP response.

#### 7.3.2 OCSP Extensions

The *Provider* may optionally include the following OCSP extension:

- ArchiveCutoff – not critical  
The *Certification Authority* may indicate with a standard notation according to the IETF RFC 6960 [36] specification that it retain revocation information beyond the *Certificate's* expiration. (See Section 4.10.)

The *Provider* may include the following OSCP registration extension:

- Reason Code – not critical  
The reason of the revocation is in this field.  
In case of suspended certificates it is a mandatory field, its value shall be: "certificateHold (6)".

## 8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

The operation of the *Provider* is supervised by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority in line with European Union regulations. The National Media and Infocommunications Authority holds site inspections on at least yearly basis at the *Provider* location. Before the site inspection, the *Provider* has a screening of its operations by an external auditor and sends the detailed report of the screening to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority within 3 days from its receipt. During the screening it is to be determined whether the operation of the *Provider* meets the requirements of the eIDAS Regulation [1] and the related Hungarian legislation and the requirements of the applied *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy(s)* and the corresponding *Certification Practice Statement(s)*.

The subject and methodology of the screening complies with the following normative documents:

- REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC [1];
- ETSI EN 319 403 V2.2.2 (2015-08) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Trust Service Provider Conformity Assessment - Requirements for conformity assessment bodies assessing Trust Service Providers; [17]
- ETSI EN 319 401 V2.2.1 (2018-04); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers [16]
- ETSI EN 319 411-1 V1.2.2 (2018-04); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements [18]
- ETSI EN 319 411-2 v2.2.2 (2018-04); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU qualified certificates; [19]

The result of the screening is a confidential document accessible only to authorized persons.

The conformity certificate issued in accordance with the conformity assessment report is published on the webpage of the *Provider*.

The *Provider* applies verified and certified elements (electronic signature production IT system elements) in connection with the service.

The *Provider* provides the following *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* for the *Subjects*:



- IDPrime MD 840 (contact mode only) and IDPrime MD 3840 (contact and non-contact mode) smartcard which consist of M7820 A11 security controller, MultiApp v3 Java Card platform and IAS v.4 electronic signature application.  
(Supplier: Gemalto)
- IDPrime MD 940 (contact mode only) and IDPrime MD 3940 (contact and non-contact mode) smartcard which consist of M7892 G12 security controller, MultiApp v4.0.1 Java Card platform and IAS Classic v.4.4.2 electronic signature application with MOC server v1.1.  
(Supplier: Gemalto)

In case of remote key management service:

- Product: Trident version 2.1.3  
(Supplier: I4P.informatikai Kft. (I4P Ltd.))

### Devices being phased out

The following *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* will be gradually phased out by the end of 2022 due to the planned change in the usable cryptographic algorithms. The *Provider* doesn't have these devices on stock so there will be no *Certificate* issuance on new *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* and there will be no new key generation on these type of devices.

The *Provider* may issue *Certificates* for the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* which were issued earlier and are still in use during the normal *Certificate* renewal or modification process. The *Provider* provides ongoing technical support and the software components required for the operation of the devices.

- Smartcard which consist of ST19WR66I microchip and Touch & Sign2048 V1.00 signature creation application.  
(Supplier: ST Incard)
- MultiApp ID Citizen 72k smartcard which consist of S3CC91C microchip, MultiApp v1.1 Java Card platform and IAS Classic v.3.0 electronic signature application.  
(Supplier: Gemalto)
- IDClassic 340 smartcard which consist of P5CC081V1A microchip, MultiApp ID v2.1 Java Card platform and IAS Classic v.3 electronic signature application (version: MPH117 V2.2 filter).  
(Supplier: Gemalto)

Before using *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device*, the *Provider* makes sure that it has a valid device certificate that meets the current requirements.

The *Provider* manages the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* throughout its life cycle in accordance with the requirements in the appendix to the device certificate.

The *Provider* monitors the certification status of the used *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* at least until the end of the validity period of the last *Certificate* issued on them and takes appropriate measures in case of modification of this status.

In case of the revocation of the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device's* certificate the *Provider* revokes all the valid *Certificates* issued on that *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device* in which *Certificates* the "id-etsi-qcs 4" statement was set (see in chapter 7.1.2 ).

The actual list of the *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* used by the *Provider* and the information related to its certification can be found on the web page of the *Provider* on the following link:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/certification-of-qscd-devices.html>

The informativ full list of the certified *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices* can be found on the web page of the European Commission. <sup>7</sup>

The *Provider* has rated every one of the system elements used for providing the services into security classes on the basis of its risk assessment system. The *Provider* keeps records about these system elements and the security ratings associated with them in the scope of its risk management system.

In addition to the external audit, the *Provider* also has its proprietary internal auditing system, which regularly examines compliance with previous audits, and takes the necessary steps in case of deviations.

The *Provider* has an ISO 9001 standard compliant quality management system since 2002, moreover an ISO 27001 (formerly BS 7799) compliant information security management system since 2003, which are continuously audited and reviewed by an external auditing organisation. (see section: 1.3.1.)

## 8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment

The *Provider* has the conformance assessment carried out annually on its IT system performing the provision of the services .

In case of a provider *Certificate* issued to a certification unit operated by another organization, the operation of the external certification unit is audited annually.

## 8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor

The *Provider* performs the internal audits with the help of its employees who hold the independent system auditor role.

The eIDAS and ETSI conformity assessment is performed by an organization, which has a qualifying mandate issued by the national accreditation organization of an EU Member State.

## 8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

External audit is performed by a person who:

- is independent from the owners, management and operations of the examined *Provider*;

<sup>7</sup><https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/content/compilation-member-states-notification-sscds-and-qscds>

- is independent from the examined organization, namely neither himself or herself nor his or her immediate relatives have any employment or business relationship with the *Provider*.
- remuneration is not dependent on the findings of the activities carried out during the audit.

#### 8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment

The review covers the following areas:

- compliance with the legislation currently in force;
- compliance with technical standards;
- compliance with the Certification Policy and the *Certification Practice Statement*;
- adequacy of the employed processes;
- documentation;
- physical security;
- adequacy of the personnel;
- IT security;
- compliance with the data protection rules.

If the *Provider* issued a subordinate *Certificate* for the certification unit of another organization then the listed areas are examined at these external organizations as well.

#### 8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

The independent auditor summarizes the result of the screening in a detailed screening report that covers the tested system components, processes, and contains the evidence used in the screening and the auditor statements. The discrepancies revealed during the examination and the deadlines set for correcting them are recorded in a separate chapter of the report.

The independent auditor may record based on their severity the differences and discrepancies revealed during the examination:

- modification suggestions to be optionally taken into consideration;
- derogations to be averted mandatorily.

The independent auditor shall report the revealed serious derogations without delay to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority that is authorized to take the necessary measures.

The *Provider* shall answer the problems stated by the independent auditor in writing, and to report the measures taken to avert them at the occasion of the next authority review.

The independent auditor shall send the assessment report in each case to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority.

## 8.6 Communication of Results

The *Provider* publishes the summary report of the assessment on its web page on the following url:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/eidas/>

The *Provider* doesn't publish the details of the findings, they are treated as confidential information.

## 9 Other Business and Legal Matters

### 9.1 Fees

The *Provider* publishes fees and prices on its webpage, and makes them available for reading at its customer service.

The *Provider* may unilaterally change the price list. The *Provider* publishes any modification to the price list 30 days before it comes into force. The changes favorable for the *Client* may come into force with shorter deadline than 30 days. Modifications will not affect the price of services paid in advance.

Provisions associated with the payment and refunding of fees are contained in the service agreement and its annexes – the General Terms and Conditions in particular.

#### 9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

See section: 9.1.

#### 9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees

The *Provider* grants free of charge on-line access to its *Certificate Repository* for the *Relying Parties*.

#### 9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

The *Provider* provides free of charge on-line CRL and OCSP service for the *Relying Parties* on the status of all end-user and intermediate *Certificates* it issued.

#### 9.1.4 Fees for Other Services

See section: 9.1.

#### 9.1.5 Refund Policy

See section: 9.1.

## 9.2 Financial Responsibility

In order to facilitate trust the *Provider* complies with the financial and liability requirements below.

### 9.2.1 Insurance Coverage

The *Provider* has sufficient financial resources for its responsibilities related to the provision of services and for providing the costs related to its termination.

### 9.2.2 Other Assets

No stipulation.

### 9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-entities

- The *Provider* has liability insurance to ensure reliability.
- The liability insurance covers the following damages caused by the *Provider* in connection with the provision of services:
  - damages caused by the breach of the service agreement to the trust service *Clients*;
  - damages caused out of contract to the trust service *Clients* or third parties;
  - damages caused to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority by the *Provider* terminating the provision of the trust service;
  - under the eIDAS Regulation [1] 17. article (4) e) point, the legal costs of conformity assessment bodies to perform a conformity assessment by the request of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority if it enforces the costs as legal costs.
- The liability insurance policy shall cover at least for 3.000.000 Hungarian forints. Coincidental damages occurred for the same reason constitute a single insurance event.
- The liability insurance provides coverage for the full damage of the aggrieved party – up to the liability limit – arising in context of the harmful behaviour of the *Provider* regardless of whether the damage was caused by breach of contract or outside the contract.
- If the valid claim of several entitled parties related to an insurance event exceeds the liability limit defined for an insurance event in the liability insurance, then the compensation of the claims takes place in the proportion of the liability limit to the total sum of the claims.

## 9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information

The *Provider* manages clients' data according to legal regulations. The *Provider* has a data processing regulation (see section 9.4), which addresses the processing of personal data in particular. By applying for a *Certificate*, and signing the service agreement, *Clients* consent to the *Provider* retaining and processing their personal data (in a manner that complies with the data processing regulations). Such consent applies to the forwarding of information specified by law and entered

in records to third parties in case the *Provider's* services go offline; moreover to forwarding such information to the *Provider's* subcontractors – solely for the purpose of performing tasks associated with providing the service.

*Subjects* shall make a declaration as to their consent to the disclosure of a *Certificate* on the *Certificate Application* form that is linked to the service agreement.

The *Provider* uses clients' data solely in connection with the provision of its services. The *Provider* discloses *Subjects'* and *Represented Organizations'* data appearing in a *Certificate* together with the *Certificate*. The *Provider* stores their data that are not entered in a *Certificate* in a secured manner, for the purpose of providing evidence about the *Subjects'* identity, *Represented Organizations'* organisational identity, and that of its miscellaneous data provision related obligations. The *Provider* retains data of which it becomes aware in accordance with statutory requirements, and for the stipulated period of time. In the course of retaining data, the *Provider* sees to the intactness, confidentiality, and secure storage of information. It only permits accessing information to individuals whose tasks justify this.

The *Provider* provides for the confidentiality and intactness of information that is not public during the forwarding of *Clients'* data.

### 9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

The *Provider* treats as confidential:

- all *Client* data, with the exception of those that qualify as information not considered confidential in section 9.3.2;
- besides the *Client* data:
  - private keys and activation codes,
  - *Certificate Applications* and Service Contracts,
  - transaction related data and log data,
  - non-public regulations,
  - all data whose public disclosure would have an adverse effect on the security of the service.

### 9.3.2 Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information

The *Provider* considers all data public that can be obtained from a public source, or to the disclosure of which the *Subscriber* gave its consent in writing beforehand.

The *Provider* treats all of the data it indicates in a *Certificate* as non-confidential information. Such data appear in the *Certificate Application* form linked to the service agreement in a clearly marked way.

The *Provider* manages the revocation and suspension status of the end-user and intermediate provider *Certificates* as public information and makes it available without restriction to the *Relying Parties* by publishing a *Certificate Revocation List* (CRL) and by providing on-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) service. The disclosed information contains the serial number of the Certificate, the time of the revocation and optionally the reason for revocation. For more information, see section 7.2. and 7.3.

### 9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

The *Provider* is responsible for the protection of the confidential data it manages.

The *Provider* obliges its employees, subcontractors, affiliated partners to protect all confidential data by signing declaration of confidentiality or by contract.

The *Provider* processes confidential information it comes to possess according to the provisions of Act CXII of 2011. on the Right to Freedom Of Information, and only discloses it to persons/organizations in the following case:

- **Information provision for authorities**

For the purpose of investigating or preventing acts of crime committed using the trusted services it provides, as well as in the case of national security related interests, the *Provider* – if the statutory criteria applicable to data requests are met – discloses the related identity information and the information verified by the *Provider* according to the section (1) of the Eüt. [9] 90. § to investigating authorities and national security services free of charge.

The *Provider* records the fact of data transfers, but does not inform involved clients about it.

- **Provision of information in the scope of litigation**

In the course of litigation and non-litigious actions under common law, the *Provider* may hand over – in case their being affected is certified – *Subject* identity information and the information verified by the *Provider*, to an adverse party or its representative, as well as it may disclose them to the inquiring court.

The *Provider* records the fact of data transfers and informs impacted clients about it.

- **Disclosure upon owner's request**

Upon a *Client's* personal request to do so or on the basis of its authorisation granted officially, in writing, the *Provider* reveals confidential user information pertaining to the *Client* to third parties.

- **Miscellaneous circumstances resulting in the disclosure of information**

Upon termination of its activity the *Provider* is bound to hand over its records subject to the access obligations together with confidential user data to the trusted service provider that takes it over according to section (6) of 88. § Eüt. [9].

## 9.4 Privacy of Personal Information

The *Provider* takes care of the protection of the personal data it manages, the operation and regulations of the *Provider* comply with the requirements of the Act CXII of 2011. on the Right to Freedom Of Information [7] and the 2016/679 EU General Data Protection Regulation [2].

The *Provider*:

- preserves,
- upon expiry of the obligation to retain – unless the *Client* otherwise indicates – deletes from the client database

the registered personal data and information on the *Client* in accordance with the legal requirements.

The *Provider* stores identification data, data about the *Subject* appearing in the *Certificate*, data about the *Subscriber* associated with contact details and data connected to the provision of the service in its records.

The *Provider* hands over *Client* data to third parties solely in cases where this is stipulated by a legal regulation or if the *Client* has granted its consent to this in writing.

#### 9.4.1 Privacy Plan

The *Provider* has a Privacy Policy and a Privacy Notice document, which contain detailed regulations on the handling of personal data.

The Privacy Policy is published on the webpage of the e-Szignó Certificate Authority on the following URL:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/all-documents.html>

The Privacy Notice is published on the webpage of the e-Szignó Certificate Authority on the following URL:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/privacynotice.html>

#### 9.4.2 Information Treated as Private

The *Provider* protects all personal data related to the data subject or containing conclusions on the data subject that cannot be accessed publicly from the Certificate or other public data source.

#### 9.4.3 Information Not Deemed Private

The *Provider* may disclose the data of the *Subjects* indicated in the *Certificate* based on the written consent of the *Subject*.

The *Provider* may indicate the unique provider identifier assigned to the *Subject* in the *Certificate*.

#### 9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information

The *Provider* stores securely and protects the personal data related to the *Certificate* issuance and not indicated in the *Certificate*. The data is protected by appropriate measures in particular against unauthorized access, alteration, and against disclosure.

#### 9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

The *Provider* only discloses personal data indicated in the *Certificates* with the written consent of the *Client*.



#### **9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process**

In cases defined in the 90. § of the Electronic Administration Act [9] the *Provider* may disclose the stored personal data about the *Client* without notifying the *Client*.

#### **9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances**

No stipulation.

### **9.5 Intellectual Property Rights**

During its business operation, the *Provider* shall not harm any intellectual property rights of a third person.

The owner of the private and public key issued by the *Provider* to clients is the *Subscriber* and the full user is the *Subject* regardless of the physical media that contains and protects the keys.

The owner of the *Certificate* issued by the *Provider* to its clients is the *Provider* and its full user is the *Subject*.

The *Provider* may publish, reproduce, revoke and manage the issued end-user *Certificates*, with the public key contained in them in the manner described in the terms and conditions.

The certificate revocation status information is the property of the *Provider* which is disclosed as defined in sections 7.2. and 7.3.

The unique provider identifier issued to the *Clients* by the *Provider* is the property of the *Provider* which

is disclosed as a part of the *Certificate* by the *Provider* in the *Certificate Repository*.

The named *Subject* and the *Client* is entitled to the use of the identification in the certificate (which identifies the *Certificate* subject).

The present *Certification Practice Statement* is the exclusive property of the *Provider*. The *Clients* and other *Relying Parties* are only entitled to use the document according to the requirements of the present *Certification Practice Statement* and any other use for commercial or other purposes is strictly prohibited.

The present *Certification Practice Statement* may be freely distributed in unchanged form, in full length and with the indication of origin.

The rules of the application of the software provided for the use of the service by the *Provider* is accessible in the description of the software and it is included in the user's guide referenced in the description.

### **9.6 Representations and Warranties**

#### **9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties**

##### **Certification Authority's Responsibility**

The responsibility of the *Provider* is in the *Certification Practice Statement*, the related *Certificate Policies*, and the service agreement with the *Client* and its attachments.

- The *Provider* assumes responsibility for compliance with the procedures described in *Certificate Policies* it supports;
- The *Provider* assumes responsibility as its own for the damages caused during the provision of the service by its subcontractors;
- The *Provider* is liable under the rules of liability for breach of contract in the Civil Code of the Republic of Hungary [8] in relation to the *Clients* which are in a contractual relationship with it.
- The *Provider* is liable under the rules of causing damage outside of contract in the Civil Code of the Republic of Hungary [8] in relation to third parties (such as the *Relying Party*) that are not in a contractual relationship with it.
- The *Provider* will pay compensation for damages with the limitations specified in its regulations, and the service contracts concluded with Clients for proven damages that occur in the scope of its responsibility (see the section Limitation of Liability 9.8.).
- If the valid claim of several entitled parties related to an insurance event exceeds the amount defined for an insurance event in the liability insurance for the damages, then the compensation of the claims takes place in a relative ratio to the amount determined in the liability contract.

The *Provider* is not responsible:

- for the *Subject* activities related to the private key;
- for the *Subject* activities related to the *Electronic Signature Creation Device*;
- for the certificate verification and usage activities of the *Relying Parties*;
- for the regulations issued by the *Relying Parties* or others.

### **Certification Authority Obligations**

The *Provider* shall fulfil the requirements defined in section (2) of article 24. of the eIDAS regulation [1].

The *Provider's* basic obligations is that it shall provide the service in line with the *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*, this *Certification Practice Statement*, the General Terms and Conditions, furthermore corporate and security related internal regulations. These basic obligations are as follows:

- to establish the legal, regulatory, material, contractual, etc. framework appropriate for the service;
- to provide high standard and secure services in accordance with the applicable regulations;
- to continuously operate and audit organisations associated with the services (certification body, customer service etc.);

- to abide by the procedures prescribed in the regulations, and to avoid or eliminate any potentially occurring incorrect operation;
- to ensure the Services to every applicant who accepts the terms and conditions specified in the regulations;
- to maintain public and proprietary records, as well as to make them continuously available to anybody over the internet.

### **Certification Organization Obligations**

The certification organization has the task of setting up and operating the certification units (see section: 1.3.1), as well as units necessary for the online certificate status service, to take care of the certificate repository and revocation status related information to manage and make available smart cards, moreover to manage regulations.

The *Provider's* internal, operative regulations specify how a certification organization shall be operated. Certification Authority's certificates issued by certification units are managed (for registration staff members, on-call duty staff, etc.) in accordance with the stipulations of operative regulations. This statement only includes stipulations in connection with the public provider and end-user certificates.

Tasks to be performed in the scope of managing regulations:

- the specification, approval, and maintenance of certificate types that are used;
- preparing the public regulations of the services and internal (not public) stipulations, their reconciliation with legal regulations and internal (not public) regulations, furthermore carrying out any updates;
- the recording of observations associated with regulations applicable to the services, and to evaluate recommendations.

The e-Szignó Certificate Authority is responsible:

- for the authenticity and accuracy of the *Certificates* it issued;
- for the regulations it has issued, and for their the conformity and compliance with statutory regulations;
- for the compliance of the key pairs it generated, and for the relationship between the private-public key and the *Certificate*;
- for the relationship of the *Electronic Signature Creation Device* activation code and the keys uploaded to the device;
- in general for the compliance with its obligations.

### 9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties

The customer service has the task of representing the *Provider* at end-users in connection with the services. It performs the following tasks in the scope thereof:

- participates in selling the services;
- performs the registration of *Subjects*;
- receives requests pertaining to various certificate operations (suspension, revocation, reinstatement, certificate replacement);
- receives and handles data modification related filings;
- participates in revocation status publication;
- offers information provision activity to *Clients* and *Relying Parties* in connection with its activities associated with the services provided by the *Provider*;

The *Registration Authority* is responsible:

- for establishing the personal identity of *Subjects*;
- for establishing the organisational identity of *Represented Organizations*, and in this latter case for establishing the right of representation of an individual acting in the name of a *Represented Organization*;
- for the genuineness of recorded registration data;
- for providing information to those using the services as to the contents and availability of the *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* and the *Certification Practice Statement*, as well as the terms and conditions of using the service prior to concluding the service agreement;
- in general to fully comply with its obligations.

### 9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties

#### **Subscriber Responsibility**

The responsibility of the *Subscriber* is set by the service agreement and its attachments (including the terms and conditions).

#### **Subscriber Obligations**

The responsibility of the *Subscriber* is to act in accordance with the contractual terms and regulations of the *Provider* while using the service including requesting and applying the *Certificates* and private keys.

The obligations of the *Subscriber* are determined by this *Certification Practice Statement*, the service agreement, the General Terms and Conditions, as well as the relevant *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*.

When the *Subscriber* is informed about any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the private key associated with the public key included in a *Certificate* belonging to the *Subscriber*, the *Subscriber* is obliged to

- promptly report this fact to the *Provider*,
- promptly request the revocation or suspension of the *Certificate*,
- promptly cease using the *Certificate* and its associated private key.

### **Subscriber Rights**

- *Subscribers* have the right to use the services in accordance with this *Certification Practice Statement*.
- *Subscribers* are entitled to specify which *Subjects* should be allowed to receive *Certificates*, in writing, and *Subscribers* have the right to request the suspension and revocation of such *Certificates*.
- *Subscribers* have the right to request the suspension and revocation of *Certificates*.
- *Subscribers* are entitled to appoint *Organizational Administrators*.

### **Subject Responsibility**

The *Subject* is responsible for:

- the authentication, accuracy and validity of the data provided during registration;
- the verification of the data indicated in the *Certificate*;
- to provide immediate information on the changes of its data;
- using its *Electronic Signature Creation Device*, private key and *Certificate* according to the regulations;
- the secure management of its private key and activation code;
- the secure management of the *Electronic Signature Creation Device*
- for the immediate notification and for full information of the *Provider* in cases of dispute;
- to generally comply with its obligations.

### **Subject obligations**

The *Subject* shall:

- read carefully this *Certification Practice Statement* before using the service;
- completely provide the data required by the *Provider* necessary for using the service, and to provide truthful data;

- if the *Subject* becomes aware of the fact that the necessary data supplied for using the service – especially data indicated in the certificate – have changed, it is obliged to immediately:
  - notify the *Provider* in writing,
  - request the suspension or revocation of the *Certificate* and
  - terminate the usage of the *Certificate*;
- immediately terminate the usage of the private key belonging to the *Certificate*, if the *Subject* becomes aware of the fact that the subject's *Certificate* has been revoked, or that the issuing CA has been compromised;
- use the service solely for the purposes allowed or not proscribed by legal regulations, according to the cited regulations and documents;
- ensure that no unauthorized individuals have access to data and tools (passwords, secret codes, signature-creation devices) necessary for using the service;
- notify the *Provider* in writing and without delay in case a legal dispute starts in connection with any of the electronic signature or the *Certificates* associated with the service;
- cooperate with the *Provider* in order to validate the data necessary for issuing certificates, and to do everything they can to allow the soonest possible completion of such verification;
- report this fact to the *Provider* promptly and in writing, in case a *Subject's* private key, *Electronic Signature Creation Device* or the secret codes necessary for activating the device end up in unauthorized hands or are destroyed, and will also be obliged to initiate the revocation and/or suspension of the *Certificates* and terminating the usage of the *Certificate*;
- answer to the requests of the *Provider* within the period of time determined by the *Provider* in case of key compromise or the suspicion of illegal use arises;
- acknowledge that the *Subscribers* entitled to request the revocation and/or suspension of the *Certificate*;
- acknowledge that the *Provider* issues *Certificates* in the manner specified in the *Certification Practice Statement*, upon the completion of the validation steps described therein;
- acknowledge that the *Provider* only displays data that are corresponding to reality in issued *Certificates*. Accordingly, the *Provider* validates data to be entered in *Certificates* according to the *Certification Practice Statement*;
- acknowledge that in case of requesting an *Organizational Certificate*, the *Provider* will issue the *Certificate* solely in the case of the consent of the *Represented Organization*;

- acknowledge that  
in case of requesting an *Organizational Certificate*,  
the *Represented Organization* has the right to request the revocation of the *Certificate*;
- acknowledge and accept that the *Provider* is entitled to suspend and/or revoke the issued *Certificate* immediately if
  - the *Provider* becomes aware that the data indicated in the *Certificate* do not correspond to the reality or the private key is not in the sole possession or usage of the *Subject* and in this case, the *Subject* is bound to terminate the usage of the *Certificate*;
  - the *Subscriber* violates the terms of service agreement or General Terms and Conditions;
  - the revocation is required by the *Provider's Certificate Policy* or *Certification Practice Statement*;
  - the *Provider* becomes aware that the *Certificate* was used for an illegal activity
  - the *Subscriber* fails to pay the fees of the services by the deadline.

### **Subject Rights**

- *Subjects* have the right to apply for *Certificates* in accordance with the *Certification Practice Statement*.
- In case this is allowed by the applicable *Certificate Policy*, *Subjects* are entitled to request the suspension and the revocation of their *Certificates*, according to this *Certification Practice Statement*.

#### **9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties**

The *Relying Parties* decide based on their discretion and/or their policies about the way of accepting and using the *Certificate* . During the verification of the validity for keeping the security level guaranteed by the *Provider* it is necessary for the *Relying Party* to act with caution, so it is particularly recommended to:

- comply with the requirements, regulations defined in the present *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* and the corresponding *Certification Practice Statement*;
- use reliable IT environment and applications;
- verify the revocation status of the *Certificate* based on the current CRL or OCSP response;
- take into consideration every restriction in relation to the *Certificate* usage which is included in the *Certificate*, in the *Certification Practice Statement* and in the corresponding *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*.

### 9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants

#### Represented Organisation responsibility

The *Represented Organization* is solely responsible for the documents it issues. In particular for document in which it attests that a *Subject* is a staff member of the *Provider*, moreover is entitled to appear in the *Represented Organization's Certificate*. In case the information appearing in any certification made out by the *Represented Organization* is changed, reporting this to the *Provider* without delay is the *Represented Organization's* responsibility.

#### Represented Organisation rights

- The *Provider* only issues *Certificates* in which the *Represented Organization's* name is indicated in possession of the *Represented Organization's* consent.
- The *Represented Organization* is entitled to suspend and revoke *Certificates* in which the *Represented Organization's* name was also indicated.

### 9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties

The *Provider* excludes its liability if:

- the *Subjects* do not follow the requirements related to the management of the *Electronic Signature Creation Device* and of the private key;
- it is unable to provide information or fulfil communication obligations due to the problems of the Internet, or part of it;
- the damage comes from a vulnerability or error of the cryptographic algorithms accepted by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority algorithmic decree.

### 9.8 Limitations of Liability

- The *Provider* is not responsible for damages that arise from the *Relying Party* failing to proceed as recommended according to effective legal regulations and the *Provider's* regulations in the course of validating and using certificates, moreover its failing to proceed as may be expected in the situation.
- The *Provider* shall only be liable for contractual and non-contractual damages connected to its services in relation to third parties with respect to provable damages that occur solely on account of the chargeable violation of its obligations.
- The *Provider* is not liable for damages that result from its inability to tend to its information provision and other communication related obligations due to the operational malfunction of the Internet or one of its components because of some kind of external incident beyond its control.



- If The *Provider* engages data comparison with an authentic database before the issuance of the *Subject's Certificate*, it relays on the data received from the authentic database. The *Provider* will not assume any liability for damages arising out of the inaccuracy of information provided by such authentic databases.
- The *Provider* assumes liability solely for providing the services in accordance with the provisions of this *Certification Practice Statement*, as well as the documents to which reference is cited herein (Certification Policies, standards, recommendations), moreover with its proprietary internal regulations.

### Administrative Processes

The *Provider* logs its activities, protects the intactness and authenticity of log entries, moreover retains (archives) log data over the long term in the interest of allowing for the establishing, documenting, and evidencing of financial accountability, its proprietary liability related to damage it causes, as well as that of damage compensation due to it for damage it suffers.

### Financial Liability

The *Provider* has appropriate deposit according to the relevant legal requirements for its financial liability and to guarantee costs related to its termination and for reliability.

The *Provider* has liability insurance according to the legal regulations required in order to ensure reliability.

### Limitation of Financial Liability

The *Provider* does not limit the highest level of the obligation undertaken at the same time.

In connection with the services provided as a qualified provider, the *Provider* defines tariff plans, which differ from each other in the financial liability of the *Provider* as stated below.

Certificate type	Limitation of the provider liability [M HUF]
basic	0,02
bronze	0,1
silver	5
gold	20
platinum	200

If the valid claim of several entitled parties related to an insurance event exceeds the amount defined for an insurance event in the liability insurance for the damages, then the compensation of the claims takes place in a relative ratio to the amount determined in the liability contract.

## 9.9 Indemnities

### 9.9.1 Indemnification by the *Provider*

The detailed rules of the indemnities of the *Provider* are specified in this regulation (see section: 9.8. ), the service agreement and the contracts concluded with the *Clients*.

### 9.9.2 Indemnification by Subscribers

The *Subscriber* and the Subject are liable for damages to the *Provider* for the loss or damage caused by non-compliance with their obligations and the relevant recommendations.

### 9.9.3 Indemnification by Relying Parties

See section: 9.8.

## 9.10 Term and Termination

### 9.10.1 Term

The effective date of the specific *Certification Practice Statement* is specified on the cover of the document.

### 9.10.2 Termination

The *Certification Practice Statement* is valid without a time limit until withdrawal or the issuance of the newer version of the *Certification Practice Statement*.

Section 9. of the *Certification Practice Statement* shall remain effective even after the termination of the *Certification Practice Statement*'s effect (regardless of the manner in which effectiveness is terminated) in connection with any and all *Certificates* which the *Provider* will have issued while the *Certification Practice Statement* was effective.

### 9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival

In case of the withdrawal of the *Certification Practice Statement* the *Provider* publishes the detailed rules of the withdrawal and the rights and obligations persisting after withdrawal on its webpage.

The *Provider* guarantees that in case of a the *Certification Practice Statement* withdrawal, requirements for the protection of the confidential data remain in effect.

## 9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants

The *Provider* maintains a customer service in order to contact with its *Clients*.

The *Clients* may make their legal declarations to the *Provider* solely in writing, and in executed form. Executing in representation of an organisation shall only be valid together with certification of such right of representation.

Issued *Certificates* may also be suspended by sending an SMS. Notifications of other nature may also be given in writing, in the form of electronic mail or fax.

The e-Szignó Certificate Authority informs its *Clients* by means of publication on its webpage or in electronic mail.

## 9.12 Amendments

The *Provider* reserves the right to change the *Certification Practice Statement* in a controlled way in case of the change of normative rules, security requirements, market conditions or other circumstances.

### 9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment

The *Provider* only discloses those of its procedures in its public domain regulations whose knowledge does not jeopardize the security of the services. The *Provider* has a number of internal security and other regulations, as well as operative level stipulations which it treats in confidence (this certificate practice statement mentions several such). The procedures described in section 8.4. audit these documents as well.

A team responsible for maintaining regulations and documentation operates within the *Provider's* organization. This team collects change requests, carries out modifications, and meets any internal and external information provision related obligations. The statement is approved by the director of the e-Szignó Certificate Authority.

The team produces internal, non-public working copies of the regulations as it collects changes, and these undergo internal review before being published. The *Provider* strives to only issue new regulations at the least frequent intervals possible.

The *Provider* reviews the *Certification Practice Statement* annually or in case of exceptional request for change with priority and performs the necessary changes. The document will receive a new version number even after the smallest change and by taking into account the time required by the endorsement process, the planned date of coming into effect will be determined too.

The accepted document will be published on the webpage of the *Provider* and it will be sent for review to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority 30 days prior to the planned entry into force date.

The *Provider* will accept remarks connected to new regulations published for 14 days prior to their becoming effective, at the following email address:

info@e-szigno.hu

In case of observations that require substantive changes, the document will be amended.

The *Provider* will close and publish the version of the regulation as amended with remarks on the 7th day prior to its becoming effective.

### 9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period

The *Provider* notifies the *Relying Parties* of new document version issuances as described in Section 9.12.1..

### 9.12.3 Circumstances Under Which OID Must Be Changed

The *Provider* issues a new version number in case of even the smallest change to the *Certification Practice Statement*, which is part of the document identifier (OID), so any change to the document will result in an OID change, namely two documents – entered into force – with different content cannot have the same OID.

### 9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions

The *Provider* aims for the peaceful and negotiated settlement of the disputes arising from its operation. The settlement follows the principle of gradual approach.

The *Provider* and the *Client* mutually agree that in the case of any disputed issue or complaint arising whatsoever, they will attempt amicable consultation through negotiation before taking the dispute to legal channels. The initiating party will be obliged to notify every other affected party promptly and to inform them fully concerning all of the case's implications.

The *Client* in case of a deputation is entitled to appeal to the Arbitration Board of Budapest before incidental judicial proceedings.

Questions, objections, and complaints related to the activity of the *Provider* or the use of issued *Certificates* shall be addressed to the customer care centre office in written form. The *Provider* notifies submitting parties at the address they specify about having received a submission and the time required for investigation, within 3 business days calculated as of receiving a submission. The *Provider* is obliged to issue a written response to the submitter within the specified time limit. The *Provider* may request the provision of information required for giving a response from the submitter. The *Provider* investigates complaints within 30 days, and notifies submitters about the results thereof.

Should a submitter find the response inadequate or if the dispute which had arisen can not be settled based on it without getting the *Provider* involved, the submitter may initiate consultation with the *Provider* and the *Relying Parties*. All participants of such consultation shall be given written notice regarding the date of consultation 10 business days in advance thereof; and the submission, the *Provider's* response, as well as any documents containing other required information shall be sent to them in writing.

Should consultation fail to achieve a result within 30 business days calculated as of a complaint being submitted, the submitter may file a lawsuit with respect to the issue. The *Relying Parties* shall subject themselves to the sole jurisdiction of the II. and III. District Court of Budapest and/or that of the Municipal Court of Budapest.

### 9.14 Governing Law

The *Provider* at all times operates in accordance with the Hungarian legislation in force. The Hungarian law is the proper law of the *Provider* contracts, regulations, and their execution, and they are to be construed by the Hungarian law.

### 9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

The applicable regulations:

- REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 of the EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC [1];
- (Hungarian) Act CXII of 2011 on the Right to Freedom Of Information [7];
- (Hungarian) Act V of 2013. on the Civil Code. [8].

- (Hungarian) Act CCXXII of 2015 on electronic administration and the general rules of trust services [9];
- (Hungarian) Ministry of Interior Decree 24/2016. (VI. 30.) on the requirements for trust service providers and their services [10];
- (Hungarian) Ministry of Interior Decree 25/2016. (VI. 30.) on the administrative service fees paid to the trust service supervisory body and on fee rates [11];
- (Hungarian) Government Decree 470/2017. (XII. 28.) on the announcement according to trust services and on the content of registers maintained by the trust service supervisory body [13];
- (Hungarian) Government Decree 137/2016. (VI. 13.) on the requirements for the use of electronic signatures and seals related to the provision of electronic administration services [12];

## **9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions**

### **9.16.1 Entire Agreement**

No stipulation.

### **9.16.2 Assignment**

The providers operating according to this *Certification Practice Statement* may only assign their rights and obligations to a third party with the prior written consent of *Provider*.

### **9.16.3 Severability**

Should some of the provisions of the present *Certification Practice Statement* become invalid for any reason, the remaining provisions will remain in effect unchanged.

### **9.16.4 Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of Rights)**

The *Provider* is entitled to claim payment for damages and attorney fees for reimbursement of the damages, losses, expenses caused by its partners. If in a particular case the *Provider* does not exercise its claim for damages that does not mean that in similar cases in the future or in case of violation of other provisions of the present *Certification Practice Statement*, it would waive the enforcement of claims for damages.

### **9.16.5 Force Majeure**

The *Provider* is not responsible for the defective or delayed performance of the requirements set out in the *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy* and the *Certification Practice Statement* if the reason for failure or delay was a condition that is outside the control of the *Provider*.

**9.17 Other Provisions**

No stipulation.

## A Interpretation of the short policy names

For the simpler handling of the *Certificate Policies* the *Provider* defines a five characters long short name (identifier) for each *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*, where each character is meaningful and defines some basic features of the given policy according to the following rules:

- First character [?....]
  - M: qualified *Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - H: non-qualified, III. certificate class *Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - K: non-qualified, II. certificate class *Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - A: non-qualified, automatic issuance *Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
- Second character [.?...]
  - A: Signing purpose *Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - B: Seal creation purpose *Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - W: *Website Authentication Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - K: *Codesigning Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - E: Other purpose *Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
- Third character [..?..]
  - T: *Certificate* issued to a natural person *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - J: *Certificate* issued to a legal person *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - x: no stipulation, can be issued to any type of *Subject*
- Fourth character [...?.]
  - B: *Certificate* issued on *Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - H: *Certificate* issued on *Cryptographic Hardware Device Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - S: *Certificate* issued by software *Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - x: no stipulation, it can be issued on any platforms
- Fifth character [....?]
  - A: pseudonymous *Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*
  - N: pseudonym excluding *Certificate Qualified Signature Certificate Policy*

## B REFERENCES

- [1] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC .
- [2] REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) .
- [3] (Hungarian) Act III of 1952 on Civil Procedure .
- [4] (Hungarian) Act LXVI of 1992 on the registration of citizens' personal data and address .
- [5] (Hungarian) Act XXXV of 2001 on Electronic Signatures (repealed from 1st July 2016.) .
- [6] (Hungarian) Act II of 2007 on the entry and residence of persons enjoying the right of free movement and residence .
- [7] (Hungarian) Act CXII of 2011 on the Right to Freedom Of Information .
- [8] (Hungarian) Act V of 2013. on the Civil Code .
- [9] (Hungarian) Act CCXXII of 2015 on the general rules of electronic administration and trust services .
- [10] (Hungarian) Ministry of Interior Decree 24/2016. (VI. 30.) on the requirements for trust service providers and their services .
- [11] (Hungarian) Ministry of Interior Decree 25/2016. (VI. 30.) on the administrative service fees paid to the trust service supervisory body and on fee rates .
- [12] (Hungarian) Government Decree 137/2016. (VI. 13.) on the requirements for the use of electronic signatures and stamps related to the provision of electronic administration services .
- [13] (Hungarian) Government Decree 470/2017. (XII. 28.) on the announcement according to trust services and on the content of registers maintained by the trust service supervisory body .
- [14] (Hungarian) Government Decree 541/2020. (XII. 2.) on Other Methods of Identification Recognized at National Level as Providing Trust Equivalent to Personal Presence in the Case of Trust Services.
- [15] A Közigazgatási Gyökér Hitelesítés Szolgáltató (KGYHSZ) hitelesítési rendje, [http://www.kgyhsz.gov.hu/KGYHSZ\\_HR\\_v1.0.pdf](http://www.kgyhsz.gov.hu/KGYHSZ_HR_v1.0.pdf), 1.0.
- [16] ETSI EN 319 401 V2.2.1 (2018-04); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers.



- [17] ETSI EN 319 403 V2.2.2 (2015-08) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Trust Service Provider Conformity Assessment - Requirements for conformity assessment bodies assessing Trust Service Providers;.
- [18] ETSI EN 319 411-1 V1.2.2 (2018-04); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements.
- [19] ETSI EN 319 411-2 v2.2.2 (2018-04); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Requirements for trust service providers issuing EU qualified certificates;.
- [20] ETSI EN 319 412-1 V1.1.1 (2016-02); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 1: Overview and common data structures.
- [21] ETSI EN 319 412-2 V2.1.1 (2016-02); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 2: Certificate profile for certificates issued to natural persons;.
- [22] ETSI EN 319 412-3 V1.1.1 (2016-02); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 3: Certificate profile for certificates issued to legal persons.
- [23] ETSI EN 319 412-4 V1.1.1 (2016-02); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 4: Certificate profile for web site certificates.
- [24] ETSI EN 319 412-5 V2.2.1 (2017-11); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 5: QCStatements.
- [25] ETSI TS 119 312 V1.3.1 (2019-02); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Cryptographic Suites.
- [26] CEN 419 221-5; Protection Profiles for TSP Cryptographic Modules - Part 5: Cryptographic Module for Trust Services.
- [27] ISO 3166-1:2013, Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions – Part 1: Country codes.
- [28] MSZ/ISO/IEC 15408-2002, Information Technology - Methods and Means of a Security - Evaluation Criteria for IT Security .
- [29] ISO/IEC 19790:2012: Information technology – Security techniques – Security requirements for cryptographic modules.
- [30] IETF RFC 3647: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, November 2003.
- [31] IETF RFC 3739: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Qualified Certificates Profile, MARCH 2004.
- [32] IETF RFC 4043: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Permanent Identifier, May 2005.
- [33] IETF RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, May 2008.

- [34] IETF RFC 5755: An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization, January 2010.
- [35] IETF RFC 6818: Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, January 2013.
- [36] IETF RFC 6960: X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure - Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), June 2013.
- [37] IETF RFC 8954: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension, November 2020.
- [38] ITU X.509 Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks.
- [39] FIPS PUB 140-2 (2001 May 25): Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.
- [40] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1 - 3.
- [41] CEN Workgroup Agreement CWA 14167-2: Cryptographic module for CSP signing operations with backup - Protection profile - CMCSOB PP.
- [42] CEN CWA 14169: Secure signature-creation devices "EAL 4+", March 2004.
- [43] EU Trusted Lists of Certification Service Providers, (<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/eu-trusted-lists-certification-service-providers>).
- [44] Magyarország (Hungary): Trusted List ([http://www.nmhh.hu/tl/pub/HU\\_TL.pdf](http://www.nmhh.hu/tl/pub/HU_TL.pdf)).
- [45] e-Szignó Certification Authority - eIDAS conform Qualified Certificate for Electronic Signature Certificate Policies.
- [46] e-Szignó Certification Authority - Qualified Signing Certificate Policies .
- [47] e-Szignó Certification Authority - General Terms and Conditions. .
- [48] Microsec Ltd. - Information on online video identification terms .