

**e-Szignó Certificate Authority**

**eIDAS conform**

**Non-Qualified Certificate for Electronic Seal  
Certification Practice Statement**

**ver. 2.14**

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## 1 Introduction

This document is the *Certification Practice Statement* concerning the issuance of non-qualified certificate for electronic seal service of e-Szignó Certificate Authority operated by Microsec Ltd. (hereinafter: Microsec or *Trust Service Provider*).

The *Trust Service Provider* provides its services for its *Clients* with whom it has contractual relationship.

The present *Certification Practice Statement* describes the framework of the provision of the aforementioned services and includes the detailed procedures and miscellaneous operating rules. It makes recommendations for the *Relying Parties* for the verification of the electronic seals and *Certificates* created by using the services.

The *Certification Practice Statement* complies with the requirements set by the eIDAS Regulation [1], the service provided according to these regulations is an EU Trust Service.

The *Trust Service Provider* announced the provision of the trust service to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority on the 1st of July 2016.

### 1.1 Overview

The aim of the present *Certification Practice Statement* is to summarize all the information that the *Clients* coming into contact with the *Trust Service Provider* should know. This aims to foster that its *Clients* and future *Clients*:

- get better acquainted with the details and requirements of the services provided by the *Trust Service Provider*, and the practical background of the service provision;
- be able to see through the operation of the *Trust Service Provider*, and thus more easily decide whether the services comply or which type of services meet their individual needs and expectations.

Furthermore the aim of this document is to support the users and relying parties of *Certificates*, *Certificate Revocation Lists* and online Certificate Status Responses issued by the *Trust Service Provider* to understand unambiguously the ways of their management, the level of security guaranteed by them as well as the relevant technical, commercial and financial guarantees with legal responsibility related to them.

The content and format of the present document complies with the requirements of the IETF RFC 3647 [26] framework. It consists of 9 sections that contain the security requirements, processes defined by the *Trust Service Provider* and the practices to be followed during the provision of services. To strictly preserve the outline specified by IETF RFC 3647, section headings where the document does not impose a requirement have the statement "No stipulation".

Considering the end user activity related to the services used, besides the present *Certification Practice Statement* further requirements may be found in the *Time-Stamping Policy* [39], the General Terms and Conditions and the service agreement concluded with the provider, the *Certificate Policies* applied by the *Trust Service Provider* (see section 1.2.1 ) and other regulation or document independent from the *Trust Service Provider* as well.

Section 1.6 of this document specifies several terms which are not or not fully used in this sense in other areas. The terms to be used in this sense are indicated by capitalization and italicization throughout this document.

## 1.2 Document Name and Identification

Issuer	e-Szignó Certificate Authority
Document name	eIDAS conform Non-Qualified Certificate for Electronic Seal Certification Practice Statement
Document version	2.14
Date of effect	26/05/2020

The list and identification information of the *Certificate Policies* that can be used according to the present *Certification Practice Statement* can be found in section 1.2.1.

### 1.2.1 Certificate Policies

All *Certificates* issued by the *Trust Service Provider* refer to that *Certificate Policy* on the basis of which they were issued.

The first seven numbers of the OID identifying the *Certificate Policies* is the unique identifier of Microsec as follows:

(1)	International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
(3)	Organization identification schemes registered according to ISO/IEC 6523-2
(6)	United States Department of Defense (DoD)
(1)	Internet
(4)	Private projects
(1)	Private enterprises
(21528)	MICROSEC Ltd.

The system of the further numbers was allocated within Microsec's own scope of authority, the interpretation of it is as follows:

(1.3.6.1.4.1.21528)	MICROSEC Ltd.
(2)	e-Szignó Certificate Authority
(1)	documents
(1)	public documents
(x)	unique identifier number of the document
(y)	document version
(z)	document subversion

In accordance with this *Certification Practice Statement* the *Trust Service Provider* issues *Certificates* based on the following *Certificate Policies*:

OID	DENOMINATION	SHORT NAME
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1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.179.2.14	Not qualified code signing, certification class III., for legal persons issued as a software token , Certificate Policy prohibiting the use of pseudonyms.	HKJSN
1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.185.2.14	Not qualified for the generation and verification of electronic seals, certification class III., for legal persons issued as a software token , Certificate Policy prohibiting the use of pseudonyms.	HBJSN
1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.174.2.14	Not qualified for the generation and verification of electronic seals, certification class II. controlling the issuance of Certificates, Certificate Policy prohibiting the use of pseudonyms.	KBJxN
1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.180.2.14	Not qualified code signing, certification class II. controlling the issuance of Certificates, Certificate Policy prohibiting the use of pseudonyms.	KKJxN

The rules of the formation and interpretation of the *Certificate Policy* short names can be found in the Appendix of this document.

The detailed requirements of the listed *Certificate Policy(s)* can be found in " e-Szignó Certificate Authority – eIDAS conform Non-Qualified Electronic Seal Certificate Policies ver.2.14." [38]

The issuance of *Certificate* belonging to the III. certification class is bound to preliminary personal identification done by the *Trust Service Provider*, at class II. *Certificate* issuance, remote registration is permitted as well.

In case of *Certificate Policies* concerning *Certificates* issued to non-natural persons, the *Subject* is a legal person.

The denomination of the IT systems, applications and automatism by the help of the *Certificate* can be used, can be indicated within the *Certificates (Certificate for Automatism)*. All of the present *Certificate Policies* prohibit the use of pseudonyms, the real name of the *Subject* is indicated on the *Certificate* in all cases.

The signing *Certificates* issued in accordance with the [HBJSN] *Certificate Policy* fully comply with the requirements of the related legislation, like the (Hungarian) Government Decree 137/2016. (VI. 13.) on the requirements for the use of electronic signatures and stamps related to the provision of electronic administration services (later E-Signature Government Decree) [11] and the private keys belonging to them can be used for creating electronic seals for public administration use.

In case of the *Codesigning Certificate* the *Trust Service Provider* conforms to the current version of the "Minimum Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates" [32] published at

<https://casecurity.org/resources/>  
url.

If there is any inconsistency between this document and those Requirements, those Requirements take precedence over this document.

Among the present *Certificate Policies*:

- each *Certificate Policy* complies with the [LCP] *Certificate Policy* defined in the ETSI EN 319 411-1 [16] standard;
- except the [KBJxN] and [KKJxN] *Certificate Policy* each *Certificate Policy* complies with the [NCP] *Certificate Policy*.

### Compliance with the ETSI Certificate Policies

In cases when an ETSI Certificate Policy is based on another ETSI Certificate Policy and this way contains all the requirements of it, only the Identifier of the Higher Level Certificate Policy is referenced in the issued *Certificates*.

	[LCP]	[NCP]
HBJSN	(x)	X
HKJSN	(x)	X
KBJxN	X	
KKJxN	X	

### 1.2.2 Effect

#### Subject Scope

The *Certification Practice Statement* is related to the provision and usage of the services described in section 1.3.1.

#### Temporal Scope

The present version of the *Certification Practice Statement* is effective from the 26/05/2020 date of effect, until withdrawal. The effect automatically terminates at the cessation of the services or at the issuance of the newer version of the *Certification Practice Statement*.

#### Personal Scope

The effect of the *Certification Practice Statement* extends each of the participants mentioned in section 1.3.

The *Trust Service Provider* provides trust services primarily to citizens of the European Union and organizations registered in the European Union, but does not exclude natural or legal persons from other countries as long as they accept the system of rules followed by the *Trust Service Provider* and the controls necessary to provide the services can be done safely and economically.

### People with disabilities

The *Trust Service Provider* strives to ensure equal opportunity access to the services provided by the company to the highest possible standards.

In order to establish equal opportunities regarding the service, the *Trust Service Provider* applies every possible and reasonable measure to make its services available without obstructions to disabled people as well. It is especially important them to ensure that the disabled clients receive services, which are adapted to their special needs, of the same quality as those for the other clients.

The *Trust Service Provider* cooperates with clients in order to guarantee them an administrative process which is the most suitable for their personal needs within the framework determined by the *Certification Practice Statement*.

### Geographical Scope

The present *Certification Practice Statement* based on the European Union requirements includes Hungarian specific requirements for services operating under the Hungarian law in Hungary.

The *Trust Service Provider* can extend the geographical scope of the service, in this case it shall use not less stringent requirements than those applicable in the *Certification Practice Statement*. At services provided to foreign *Clients*, detailed conditions that differ from the *Certification Practice Statement* may be regulated in a specific service agreement.

The service provided according to the present *Certification Practice Statement* is available worldwide. The validity of the *Certificates*, Certificate Revocation Status Lists and OCSP responses issued according to the present *Certification Practice Statement* is independent of the geographical location where they were requested from, and where they will be used.

The service provided according to the present *Certification Practice Statement* can be only used as described in the present document and in the *Certificate Policy*.

### 1.2.3 Security Levels

The *Trust Service Provider* defined security levels by taking into account the relevant requirements as follows.

The authentication strength of the *Certificate Subject* in descending order:

- qualified *Certificates* [M\*\*\*\*];
- non-qualified III. certification class *Certificates* [H\*\*\*\*] issued by e-Szignó Certificate Authority;
- non-qualified II. certification class *Certificates* [K\*\*\*\*] issued by e-Szignó Certificate Authority;
- non-qualified *Certificates* issued not by the e-Szignó Certificate Authority.

Based on the used container in descending order by security:

- *Certificates* issued on *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device* [\*\*\*B\*];
- *Certificates* issued on *Cryptographic Hardware Device* [\*\*\*H\*];



- otherwise, for example *Certificates* issued by software [\*\*\*S\*].

By taking into account the two points of view the *Trust Service Provider* established the following aggregated order in descending order of security:

- qualified *Certificates* issued on *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device* [M\*\*B\*];
- qualified *Certificates* issued on *Cryptographic Hardware Device* [M\*\*H\*];
- qualified otherwise, for example *Certificates* issued by software [M\*\*S\*];
- non-qualified, III. certification class *Certificates* issued by e-Szignó Certificate Authority [H\*\*S\*];
- non-qualified, II. certification class *Certificates* issued by e-Szignó Certificate Authority [K\*\*S\*];
- non-qualified *Certificates* issued by other CA than e-Szignó Certificate Authority

During the communication with the *Clients* the *Trust Service Provider* supports the use of electronic channels and enables the use of electronic seal during the administration in most cases possible.

It is a general rule, that during the administration related to the *Certificates*, the *Client* can use its own signing *Certificate* to verify the electronic documents, if its level of security according to the aforementioned list is not lower than the relevant *Certificate*.

On an individual basis in special cases, the *Trust Service Provider* can deviate from the strict application of the above list with regard to particular tasks (for example the personal identification for III. certificate class *Certificates* in case of new qualified *Certificate* application or the modification of an existing one as a result of the same procedural identification rules it accepts the identification required for qualified *Certificate*).

### 1.3 PKI Participants

The participants applying the services provided within the framework of present *Certification Practice Statement* consist of the following:

- the Microsec e-Szignó Certificate Authority,
- the *Clients* of Microsec e-Szignó Certificate Authority (*Subscribers* and *Subjects*),
- *Relying Parties*,
- other participants.

### 1.3.1 Certification Authorities

#### Data of the *Trust Service Provider*

Name: MICROSEC Micro Software Engineering & Consulting  
Private Limited Company by Shares  
Company registry number: 01-10-047218 Company Registry Court of Budapest  
Head office: Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13.  
Telephone number: (+36-1) 505-4444  
Fax number: (+36-1) 505-4445  
Internet address: <https://www.microsec.hu>, <https://www.e-szigno.hu>

#### Customer Service Office

The name of the provider unit: e-Szignó Certificate Authority  
Customer service:  
Hungary, H-1033 Budapest,  
Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13.,  
Graphisoft Park South Area, Building C  
Office hours of the customer service: on workdays between 8:30-16:30 by prior arrangement  
Telephone number of the customer service: (+36-1) 505-4444  
Email address of the customer service: [info@e-szigno.hu](mailto:info@e-szigno.hu)  
Send revocation request to: [revocation@e-szigno.hu](mailto:revocation@e-szigno.hu)  
Service related information access: <https://www.e-szigno.hu>  
Place for registering complaints: Microsec Ltd.  
Hungary, H-1033 Budapest,  
Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13.,  
Graphisoft Park South Area, Building C  
Relevant Consumer Protection Inspectorate: Budapest Capital Authority for Consumer Protection  
1052 Budapest, Városház str. 7.  
1364 Budapest, Pf. 144.  
Relevant Arbitration Board: Arbitration Board of Budapest  
1016 Budapest, Krisztina krt. 99. III. em. 310.  
Mailing address: 1253 Budapest, Pf.: 10.

#### Introduction of the *Trust Service Provider*

Microsec Ltd. is an EU qualified trust service provider according to the 910/2014/EU Regulation [1] (hereinafter: eIDAS).

Microsec Ltd. (its predecessor) started the provision of its services related to electronic signatures under the effect of Act XXXV. of 2001. [4] (hereinafter: Eat.):

- provides non-qualified electronic signature certification services, time stamping, and placement of signature-creation data on signature creation devices services according to Eat. since May 30, 2002 (registration number: MH 6834 1/2002.);
- provides qualified electronic signature certification services, time stamping, and device services according to Eat. since May 15, 2005;
- provides qualified long term preservation service according to Eat. since February 1, 2007. (reference number of the decision on the registration: HL-3549-2/2007).

On the 1st of July, 2016. the whole system of services related to electronic signatures changed uniformly on a European basis with eIDAS and its complement Act CCXXII of 2015. [8] coming into force.

Microsec provides its non-qualified trust services conformant to eIDAS furthermore started the issuance of eIDAS qualified signing certificates for natural persons from the 1st of July 2016.

Microsec provides the following qualified trust services conformant to eIDAS form the 20th of December 2016:

- qualified certificates for electronic seals
- qualified time stamping
- qualified archiving (preservation of digital signatures).

Microsec provides the following qualified trust servic conformant to eIDAS form the 2nd of January 2019:

- qualified certificates for website authentication.

### **Quality and Information Security**

Microsec highlights the importance of *Client* experience. In order to maintain a high level of services, the *Trust Service Provider* has been operating a quality control system compliant with the ISO 9001 standard since January 23, 2002. Compliance with the standard has been verified by Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance.

Microsec assigns high priority to the security of the systems it operates, and has therefore been operating an information security management system that is compliant with ISO/IEC 27001 (formerly known as BS 7799) in its main areas of activity since May 19, 2003. Compliance with the standard has been verified by Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance.

The scope of both the quality control system and the information security management system cover the trust services provided by Microsec.

Microsec has two level risk assessment which covers beyond the information technology risks the whole organization including also the business risks. The risk assessment is updated at least yearly. Based on the results of the risk assessment the *Trust Service Provider*

- sets up new measures to eliminate the vulnerabilities, or/and
- accepts the identified residual risks by stating the reason of the decision.

The *Trust Service Provider* makes available for all interested parties its Information Security Policy on its web page on the following link:

<https://www.microsec.hu/hu/biztonsagi-garanciak>

Any change to the Information Security Policy is communicated to third parties through this web page.

Changes to the information security policy is communicated to third parties, where applicable. This includes subscribers, relying parties, assessment bodies, supervisory or other regulatory bodies.

Due to their confidential nature the *Trust Service Provider* doesn't disclose its internal Security Rules. The *Trust Service Provider* informs its subcontractors, contractors and other interested parties concerned of the security rules applicable to them when concluding the contract.

### **Business Providing Certification Services**

Operating as an independent business unit within the organization of Microsec, e-Szignó Certificate Authority is responsible for creation and management of *Certificates*, publication of *Certificate* repository and *Certificate* revocation status information, management and delivery of *Electronic Seal Creation Devices* and provision of the online certificate status service.

Tasks related to the management of policies and practices is also provided by this unit. The e-Szignó Certificate Authority has its own *Registration Authority*.

### **Services**

The *Trust Service Provider* provides the following trust services defined by the eIDAS Regulation [1] to the *Subscriber* within the framework of the present *Certification Practice Statement*:

- Issuance of *Certificates* for Electronic Seals

### **The Issuance of *Certificates* for Electronic Seals Service**

The *Trust Service Provider* to provide the Issuance of *Certificates* for Electronic Seals service signs a service agreement with the *Subscriber*, within the confines of it issues *Certificate(s)* to the *Subjects* specified by the *Subscriber*. The *Certificate* provides a certified connection between the data of the identified *Subject* and the public key belonging to the private key that the *Subject* holds. Within the framework of a service agreement, multiple *Certificates* can be issued to multiple *Subjects*.

In case of a valid a subscription, the *Applicant* may initiate the following actions:

- *Applicant* may apply for a *Certificate* (and a *Electronic Seal Creation Device* in addition) from the *Trust Service Provider*, the *Certificate* issuance is performed according to a *Certificate Policy* or policies;
- the *Applicant* may request the revocation of its *Certificate*;
- the *Applicant* may request the suspension and reinstation of its *Certificate*.

The *Subscriber* may also request the revocation, suspension or reinstatement of the belonging *Subject's Certificate*. These actions may also be requested by the *Organizational Administrator* authorized by the *Subscriber* and registered by the *Trust Service Provider*.

The *Trust Service Provider* makes the *Certificate Revocation Lists* publicly available, containing the revocation status of the issued *Certificates*. The *Trust Service Provider* also makes the *Certificate* public, according to the *Applicant's* consent. The suspended, revoked or expired *Certificate* is invalid. Seals created with an invalid *Certificates* do not have any legal effect.

The *Trust Service Provider* also issues test certificates with the purpose of testing its system. The test certificates do not have any legal effect.

Upon requests the *Trust Service Provider* may issue free *Certificates* for testing purposes on an individual bases. The *Certificates* issued this way need to be managed prudently because they have the same legal effect as the normal *Certificates*.

### Certificate Types

The *Certificate Policies* supported by the present *Certification Practice Statement* are presented in section 1.2.1 . The ID of the applied *Certificate Policy* is always indicated in the "Certificate Policies" field of the *Certificate*.

The e-Szignó Certificate Authority provides various certificate types for its *Clients*, which mainly differ concerning their properties and data authentically bound to the *Subject*.

- *Organizational Certificate* means a *Certificate* wherein the *Subject* is an *Organization*, a device under the control of the *Organization* or the *Certificate* attests the relationship of a natural person *Subject* with the *Organization*. In this case, the name of the *Organization* is indicated in the "O" field of the *Certificate*. This type of a *Certificate* can only be used as specified by the *Organization*.  
In case of an *Organizational Certificate* issued to a natural person, further restrictions can be indicated in the "Title" field, related to the usage of the *Certificate*.
- *Certificate for Automatism* means a *Certificate* wherein the denomination of the IT device (application, system) is indicated amongst the *Subject* data in the *Certificate*, by the help of the *Subject* uses the *Certificate*.
- *Pseudonymous Certificate* means a *Certificate* wherein not the official – verified by the *Trust Service Provider* – denomination of the *Subject* is in the *Certificate*. In the pseudonymous *Certificates* the requested name is indicated in the "Pseudonym" field, and it is stated in the "CN" field that the *Certificate* contains a pseudonym.
- *Personal Certificate* means a *Certificate* that does not contain either an "O" or a "Title" field. This type can only be issued to natural persons.

The e-Szignó Certificate Authority issues *Certificates* for natural persons and legal persons. In case of *Certificates* issued to legal persons the authorized representative natural person or a trustee authorized by the representative need to act on behalf of the legal person.

## Test Certificates

The *Trust Service Provider* issues test certificates – firstly to test their system, on the other hand, to third parties in order to test the services. No legal effect belongs to the certificates, and the *Trust Service Provider* does not take any responsibility for their issuance, usage and service availability.

The *Trust Service Provider* does not issue test certificates under the top level service provider (root) *Certification Unit*.

The issuance of the test certificates is done under the "Microsec e-Szigno Test Root CA 2008" root exclusively created and operating for this task.

The *Trust Service Provider* indicates the test certificates in the "Certificate Policies" field according to the following (see section 7.1.2 ):

- the 1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.9 OID is indicated as a *Certificate Policy* in the *Certificate*, or
- the 1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.1.1.100 OID is indicated as a *Certificate Policy* in the *Certificate*, or
- no *Certificate Policy* is indicated in the *Certificate*.

## Device Service

Within the confines of the device service *Trust Service Provider* puts the *Certificate* related signature-creation data of the *Subject* on a *Electronic Seal Creation Device*.

## Certification Units

In the following those *Certification Units* will be described, that appear in the system of the e-Szignó Certificate Authority and stay under the effect of this *Certification Practice Statement*. Further information can be found in the the certificate hierarchy of the *Trust Service Provider* at the following address:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/pki-services/ca-certificates.html>

## Active, SHA-256 based RSA hierarchy

- "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" – Root certification unit  
Issues SHA-256 based *Certificates* for the *Certification Units* of the *Trust Service Provider*. This *Certification Unit* has a self certified (SHA-256 based) certificate.
- "Advanced Class 3 e-Szigno CA 2009"  
This unit issues not *Codesigning Certificates* to natural and legal persons exclusively according to the III. certification class. Certified by "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009". This unit does not issue pseudonymous *Certificates*.  
This *Certification Unit* may issue special time stamping *Certificates* for the *Time-Stamping Units* of the Time Stamping service Providers.

- "Advanced CodeSigning Class3 e-Szigno CA 2016"  
This unit issues *Codesigning Certificates* to natural and legal persons exclusively according to the III. certification class. Certified by "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009". This unit does not issue pseudonymous *Certificates*.
- "Advanced Class 2 e-Szigno CA 2009"  
This unit issued *Certificates* to natural and legal persons exclusively according to the II. certification class till the 30th of June 2016. Certified by "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009". This unit hasn't issued pseudonymous *Certificates*.
- "Advanced eIDAS Class2 e-Szigno CA 2016"  
This unit issues other than *Codesigning Certificates* to natural and legal persons exclusively according to the II. certification class from the 1st of July 2016. Certified by "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009". This unit does not issue pseudonymous *Certificates*.
- "Advanced CodeSigning Class2 e-Szigno CA 2016"  
This unit issues *Codesigning Certificates* to natural and legal persons exclusively according to the II. certification class. Certified by "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009". This unit does not issue pseudonymous *Certificates*.
- OCSF responders;  
every *Certification Unit* with SHA-256 based *Certificate* certifies dedicated OCSF responder unit, which gives responses regarding the revocation status of the *Certificates* issued by the given certification unit. The OCSF responder unit's name contains the "OCSF Responder" text besides the given certification unit name. The "OCSFSigning" extended key usage is present in the OCSF responder *Certificates*.

The following *Certification Units* of the *Trust Service Provider* issue *Certificates* for the public administration:

- "Signature KET e-Szigno CA 2009"  
Productive not qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by KGYHSZ and "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" and issues not qualified *Certificates* for public administration usage.
- "Class3 KET e-Szigno CA 2018"  
Productive not qualified *Certification Unit*, certified by KGYHSZ and issues not qualified *Certificates* for public administration usage.

The aforementioned units have SHA-256 based *Certificates*, and issue SHA-256 based *Certificates*, and OCSF responses. Every provider and end-user RSA key is at least 2048 bit in the hierarchy above.

### Latest, ECC based hierarchy

- "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" – Root certification unit, that issues ECC based *Certificates* for the *Certification Units* of the *Trust Service Provider*. This *Certification Unit* has a self certified (ECC based) certificate.
- "e-Szigno Qualified TSA CA 2017"  
Productive qualified *Certification Unit*, issues *Certificates* for Time Stamping Authorities, that are certified by the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" and the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009".
- "e-Szigno Class3 CA 2017"  
This unit issues other than *Codesigning Certificates* to natural and legal persons exclusively according to the III. certification class. Certified by "e-Szigno Root CA 2017". This unit does not issue pseudonymous *Certificates*.
- "e-Szigno Class3 CodeSigning CA 2017"  
This unit issues *Codesigning Certificates* to natural and legal persons exclusively according to the III. certification class. Certified by "e-Szigno Root CA 2017". This unit does not issue pseudonymous *Certificates*.
- "e-Szigno Class2 CA 2017"  
This unit issues other than *Codesigning Certificates* to natural and legal persons exclusively according to the II. certification class. Certified by "e-Szigno Root CA 2017". This unit does not issue pseudonymous *Certificates*.
- "e-Szigno Class2 CodeSigning CA 2017"  
This unit issues *Codesigning Certificates* to natural and legal persons exclusively according to the II. certification class. Certified by "e-Szigno Root CA 2017". This unit does not issue pseudonymous *Certificates*.
- OCSP responders;  
every *Certification Unit* with ECC based *Certificate* certifies dedicated OCSP responder unit, which gives responses regarding the revocation status of the *Certificates* issued by the given certification unit. The OCSP responder unit's name contains the "OCSP Responder" text besides the given certification unit name. The "OCSPSigning" extended key usage is present in the OCSP responder *Certificates*.

The aforementioned units have ECC based *Certificates*.

Every end-user RSA key is at least 2048 bit in the hierarchy above.

### Retired, SHA-1 based RSA hierarchy

The *Trust Service Provider* issued SHA-1 *Certificates* based "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" *Certification Unit* beforehand. The *Trust Service Provider* does not issue *Certificates* according to this hierarchy. The *Trust Service Provider* keeps the SHA-1 based hierarchy for the verifiability



of the previously created signatures and *Time Stamps*. The following *Certification Units* are in the hierarchy:

- "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA"  
Root certification unit, which issued SHA-1 based *Certificates* to the *Certification Units* of the *Trust Service Provider*. This *Certification Unit* has a self-certified certificate.
- "Advanced e-Szigno CA3"  
This unit issued *Certificates* to natural persons and automatisms exclusively according to the III. certification class. Certified by "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA". This unit did not issue pseudonymous *Certificates*.
- "Advanced e-Szigno CA2"  
This unit issued *Certificates* to natural persons and automatisms exclusively according to the II. certification class. This unit issued III. class pseudonymous *Certificates*. Certified by "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA".
- "Signature e-Szigno CA6"  
This unit only issued non-qualified *Certificates* compliant with public administrative Certificate Policies. The *Certificates* were Certified by the Public Administrative Root Certification Authority (KGYHSZ).
- "Microsec e-Szigno Server CA"  
Certified by "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" and KGYHSZ. This *Certification Unit* certified the time stamping units, and issued *Certificates* compliant with public administrative certificate policies to automatisms.
- Time stamping units  
that were certified by "Microsec e-Szigno Server CA". The e-Szignó Certificate Authority issued SHA-1 based, non-qualified time stamps with the private keys of these units. The *Certificates* of the time stamping units contained "timeStamping" extended key usage.
- "e-Szigno OCSP CA" (self certified)  
OCSP responder certificate issuer *Certification Unit*.
- "Advanced e-Szigno OCSP Responder"  
OCSP responder – certified by the "e-Szigno OCSP CA".

Intermediate *Certification Units* in the SHA-1 based hierarchy issued "closing CRLs".

### Publication of the *Root Certificates*

The *Trust Service Provider* published the hash of the *Root Certificates* belonging to "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" and "e-Szigno OCSP CA" in the July 21, 2005 edition of Magyar Nemzet (a Hungarian daily newspaper), the hash of the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" *Root Certificate* in the June 17 2010 issue of Expressz (a Hungarian daily newspaper). All the *Root Certificates* are available through the webpage of the e-Szignó Certificate Authority.

- The SHA-1 fingerprint of the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" *Root Certificate*: 23 88 c9 d3 71 cc 9e 96 3d ff 7d 3c a7 ce fc d6 25 ec 19 0d,  
the SHA-256 fingerprint of the same *Root Certificate*: 32 7a 3d 76 1a ba de a0 34 eb 99 84 06 27 5c b1 a4 77 6e fd ae 2f df 6d 01 68 ea 1c 4f 55 67 d0
- The "e-Szigno OCSP CA" *Root Certificate* SHA-1 fingerprint: 56 2c 85 5b 9c d9 be 0e 64 e6 f7 95 86 24 95 a1 09 3e f1 68,  
the SHA-1 fingerprint of the same *Root Certificate*: 15 a9 45 a5 e4 92 c8 6c 3e 4e 0e a5 81 4c 9c 43 b0 4f 2e a6 83 1a 64 6c 37 8c d2 b1 82 05 aa 89
- The "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" *Root Certificate* SHA-1 fingerprint <sup>1</sup> :  
89 df 74 fe 5c f4 0f 4a 80 f9 e3 37 7d 54 da 91 e1 01 31 8e,  
the SHA-256 fingerprint of the same *Root Certificate*:  
3c 5f 81 fe a5 fa b8 2c 64 bf a2 ea ec af cd e8 e0 77 fc 86 20 a7 ca e5 37 16 3d f3 6e db f3 78
- The "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" *Root Certificate* SHA-1 fingerprint:  
89 d4 83 03 4f 9e 9a 48 80 5f 72 37 d4 a9 a6 ef cb 7c 1f d1,  
The "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" *Root Certificate* SHA-256 fingerprint:  
be b0 0b 30 83 9b 9b c3 2c 32 e4 44 79 05 95 06 41 f2 64 21 b1 5e d0 89 19 8b 51 8a e2 ea 1b 99

The following trusted certificate stores contain and distribute the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" *Root Certificate*:

- Microsoft Windows certificate store,
- Network Security Services (NSS) certificate store,
- Google Android from the v2.3 (Gingerbread) version,

The expired *Root Certificate* will be phased out from these trusted certificate stores.

The following trusted certificate stores contain and distribute the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" *Root Certificate*:

<sup>1</sup>The same root (trust anchor) formerly operated with a different certificate. The SHA-1 fingerprint of the former *Root Certificate* is : a6 5c b4 73 3d 94 a5 c8 65 a8 64 64 7c 2c 01 27 2c 89 b1 43, and the SHA-256 fingerprint is: 8e 8c 6e bf 77 dc 73 db 3e 38 e9 3f 48 03 e6 2b 6b 59 33 be b5 1e e4 15 2f 68 d7 aa 14 42 6b 31. the *Trust Service Provider* published this fingerprint in the 22 June 2009 issue of Magyar Hírlap (a Hungarian daily newspaper). Signatures and *Certificates* which were verified with the usage of the former *Root Certificate* can also be considered valid.

- Microsoft Windows certificate store,
- Network Security Services (NSS) certificate store,
- Google Android from the v2.3 (Gingerbread) version,
- Apple iOS from the 7.1.2 version.
- Apple Mac OS X from the 10.9.4 version.

The inclusion of the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" *Root Certificate* into the trusted certificate stores is in process.

The

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/pki-services/browser-compatibility.html>

webpage contains more information on other browsers and certificate stores that contain the root certificates of the *Trust Service Provider* by default.

The other *Certificates* of the *Trust Service Provider* can be verified based on the self certified *Root Certificates*, so these *Certificates* are only published by the *Trust Service Provider* on its webpage. If – law or in the framework of a contract or agreement between *Trust Service Providers* – other *Trust Service Provider* issues certificates for the *Certification Units* of the *Trust Service Provider*, the *Trust Service Provider* can publish the *Certificates* on its webpage. The *Trust Service Provider* undertakes that in case of *Certificates* issued for the *Trust Service Provider* in this manner, it complies with the cross certifying *Trust Service Provider's Certificate Policy* and considers the included information binding. According to this rule in case of *Certificates* issued for the public administration the *Trust Service Provider* follows the *Certificate Policy* of the Public Administration Root CA (KGYHSZ) [14] and – as a first level CA – considers the included requirements binding.

Before the expiration date of the provider *Certificates*, the *Trust Service Provider* generates new provider keys and starts new *Certification Units*, and takes all the necessary steps, so that the change of the provider *Certificates* does not endanger the continuity of the services.

### **Chained Certification Service**

The *Trust Service Provider* has the right to offer a chained certification service, where a *Certification Unit* of the *Trust Service Provider* issues a certificate to a *Certification Unit* controlled by another certification authority (hereinafter: cross-certified CA).

This cross-certification is arranged according to the following requirements:

- The *Trust Service Provider* and the cross-certified CA conclude a contract, the contract contains the exact conditions of the cross-certification. The cross-certified CA contracts the belonging *Clients* by itself, within this contract, the cross-certified CA is appointed as the certification authority.
- The *Trust Service Provider* takes full responsibility for the activities of the chained Certification Authority.
- The cross-certified certification authority can only issue *Certificates* for a well defined scope of users.

- The cross-certified certification authority shall publish its *Certificate Policy*, and it shall operate according to it.
- The *Trust Service Provider* is entitled to verify the operation of the cross-certified provider.
- The *Trust Service Provider* revokes the *Certificate* issued during the cross certification if the cross-certified certification authority does not comply with its own *Certificate Policy*, or if the cross-certified certification authority indicates that its cross certified provider key is compromised.
- If the *Trust Service Provider* issues provider *Certificate* for another Certification Authority, it announces the fact to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority. If the cross-certified CA issues *Certificates* that can be used natively and publicly, the cross-certified CA is bound to announce the cross-certification to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, and ask for registration (except it is already registered at the National Media and Infocommunications Authority). These rules apply to other services related to electronic signatures as subordinate services (e.g. time stamp).

### 1.3.2 Registration Authorities

The *Trust Service Provider* implements registration and other tasks related to the issuing of *Certificates*, as well as further certificate management tasks centrally, within the framework of a customer service operating within its own organization.

Tasks of the office:

- registration of the *Subject* indicated on end user *Certificates*,
- administration and registration activity related to the issuing of *Certificates* and *Electronic Seal Creation Devices*
- maintaining contact with *Clients* (reception of questions, announcements, requests and complaints, and the initiation of their processing),
- performance of certificate actions (revocation, suspension, reinstation, certificate renewal, certificate modification and re-key).

The customer service operated by the *Trust Service Provider* receives requests pertaining to various certificate actions, and initiates their processing.

The *Registration Authority* may perform registration activities at the following locations:

- in the customer service office of the *Trust Service Provider*;
- the associate of the *Registration Authority* may visit *Clients* and perform mobile registration activities on the site according to the internal statements of the *Trust Service Provider*.

### 1.3.3 Subscribers

The *Clients* of the services provided by the *Trust Service Provider*:

- *Subscriber*
  - signs the service agreement with the *Trust Service Provider*,
  - accepts the General Terms and Conditions,
  - defines the scope of the *Applicants*,
  - may appoint *Organizational Administrators*,
  - responsible for the payment of the fees arising from the usage of the service.
- *Subject*
  - the *Trust Service Provider* issues the *Certificate* for the *Subject*.
- *creator of the electronic seal*
  - the electronic seal certification service user party, who can create electronic seal with the help of the issued *Certificate*.

#### 1.3.4 Relying Parties

The *Relying Party* is not necessarily in a contractual relationship with the *Trust Service Provider*. The *Certification Practice Statement* sections 4.5.2, 4.9.6, 9.6.4 and 9.9.3 and the other policies mentioned in it contain the recommendations related to its operation.

The *Trust Service Provider* maintains its contacts with the *Relying Partys* mainly through its website.

#### 1.3.5 Other Participants

The independent auditor who makes the conformity assessment audit.

The supervisory authority.

There is no other participants.

### 1.4 Certificate Usage

#### 1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses

The private keys belonging to the end-user *Certificates* issued by the *Trust Service Provider* based on the present *Certification Practice Statement* can be only used for electronic seal creation, with the *Certificates* the *creator of the electronic seal* can verify the authenticity of the documents sealed by him.

The public key in the *Certificate*, the *Certificate* itself, the *Certificate Revocation Lists*, the *Time Stamps* and the online revocation status responses can be used for the electronic seal.

#### 1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses

##### Provider Certificates

The provider root and intermediate *Certificates*, and the associated private keys shall not be used for *Certificate* issuance prior to the disclosure of the provider *Certificates*.

## End-User Certificates

*Certificates* issued in accordance with the present *Certificate Policies*, and the private keys belonging to them using for other purposes than the generation and verification of electronic seal is prohibited.

## 1.5 Policy Administration

### 1.5.1 Organization Administering the Document

The data of the organization administering the present *Certification Practice Statement* can be found in the following table:

Organization name	Microsec e-Szignó Certificate Authority
Organization address	Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13.
Telephone number	+36 1 505-4444
Fax number	+36 1 505-4445
Email address	info@e-szigno.hu

### 1.5.2 Contact Person

Questions related to the present *Certification Practice Statement* can be directly put to the following person:

Contact person	Head of Process Management Department
Organization name	Microsec Ltd.
Organization address	Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13.
Telephone number	+36 1 505-4444
Fax number	+36 1 505-4445
Email address	info@e-szigno.hu

### 1.5.3 Person or Organization Responsible for the Suitability of the Practice Statement for the *Certificate Policy*

Person responsible for compliance with the present *Certification Practice Statement* and the *Certificate Policy* referenced therein is:

Responsible person	Head of Process Management Department
Organization name	Microsec Ltd.
Organization address	Hungary, H-1033 Budapest, Ángel Sanz Briz str. 13.
Telephone number	+36 1 505-4444
Fax number	+36 1 505-4445
Email address	info@e-szigno.hu

The *Certification Practice Statements* and the provision of the services are supervised by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority. The National Media and Infocommunications Authority maintains a register on the *Certificate Policies* and on the *Trust Service Providers* applying these policies.

The register of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority on trust services is available on the following link:

<http://webpub-ext.nmhh.hu/esign2016/>

#### 1.5.4 Practice Statement Approval Procedures

Preparing, modifying, acceptance and issuance of a new version of the *Certification Practice Statement* is implemented according to unified processes as described in detail in section 9.12.1.

### 1.6 Definitions and Acronyms

#### 1.6.1 Definitions

II. certification class	A group of non-qualified <i>Certificate Policies</i> , that make possible the <i>Certificate</i> issuance based on the <i>Applicant's</i> remote registration.
III. certification class	A group of non-qualified <i>Certificate Policies</i> , that bound the <i>Certificate</i> issuance to the <i>Applicant's</i> personal registration.
Data Centre	A facility designed for the placement and operation of computer systems and associated components. These components typically include telecommunications systems and communication connections, redundant power supply, data storage, air conditioning, fire protection and security systems.
Subject	A legal person with an identity or attribute verified by the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> with the <i>Certificate</i> .
Subject Unique Identifier	The globally unique identifier of the <i>Subject</i> , given by the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> . The identifier is in the "Subject DN Serial Number" field of the <i>Certificate</i> , according to the requirements of section 3.1.1.
<i>Certificate for Automatism</i>	A <i>Certificate</i> in which the name of the IT device (application, system) that is applied by the <i>Subject</i> to use the <i>Certificate</i> is to be recorded among the <i>Subject's</i> data.
Creator of a Seal	"A legal person who creates an electronic seal." ( <i>eIDAS [1] article 3. point 24.</i> )
Trust Service Supervisory Body	"The National Media and Infocommunications Authority, the supervising authority monitoring the <i>Trust Services</i> ." ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [8] 91.§ 1. paragraph</i> )

Trust Service	<p>"Means an electronic service normally provided for remuneration which consists of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the creation, verification, and validation of electronic signatures, electronic seals or electronic time stamps, electronic registered delivery services and certificates related to those services, or</li> <li>• the creation, verification and validation of <i>Website Authentication Certificate</i>; or</li> <li>• the preservation of electronic signatures, seals or certificates related to those services;</li> </ul> <p>" (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 16. point</i>)</p>
Trust Service Policy	<p>"A set of rules in which a <i>Trust Service Provider</i>, relying party or other person requires conditions for the usage of the <i>Trust Service</i> for a community of the relying parties and/or a class of applications with common security requirements." (<i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [8] 1. § 8. point</i>)</p>
Trust Service Provider	<p>"A natural or a legal person who provides one or more <i>Trust Services</i> either as a qualified or as a non-qualified <i>Trust Service Provider</i>." (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 19. point</i>)</p>
Electronic Seal	<p>Data in electronic form, which is attached to or logically associated with other data in electronic form to ensure the latter's origin and integrity. (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 25. point</i>)</p>
Certificate for Electronic Seal	<p>An electronic attestation that links electronic seal validation data to a legal person and confirms the name of that person. (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 29. point</i>)</p>
Electronic Seal Creation Data	<p>"Means unique data, which is used by the creator of the electronic seal to create an electronic seal." (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 28. point</i>)</p> <p>Typically cryptographic private key.</p>
Electronic Seal Creation Device	<p>"Means configured software or hardware used to create an electronic seal." (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 31. point</i>)</p>
Electronic Document	<p>"Means any content stored in electronic form, in particular text or sound, visual or audiovisual recording" (<i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 35. point</i>)</p>



Electronic Time Stamp	"Means data in electronic form which binds other data in electronic form to a particular time establishing evidence that the latter data existed at that time." ( <i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 33. point</i> )
Electronic seal for electronic administration	At least advanced level electronic seal can be used by bodies providing electronic administration services, which fulfils the requirements of the E-Signature Government Decree [11] 7. § b) and c) point.
Subscriber	A person or organization signing the service agreement with the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> in order to use some of its services.
Relying Party	Recipient of the electronic document, who acts relying on the electronic seal based on a given certificate.
Validation	"Means the process of verifying and confirming that an electronic signature or a seal is valid." ( <i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 41. point</i> )
Validation Chain	The electronic document or its hash, and the series of information assigned to one another (especially those certificates, information related to certificates, data used for signature or seal creation, the current status of the certificate, information on the withdrawal, as well as information on the validity data of the certificate issuer provider and its revocation information), with the help of which it can be established that the advanced or qualified electronic signature, seal or time-stamp placed on the electronic document was valid at the time of the signature, seal or time-stamp placement. ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [8] 1. § point 21. )</i>
Validation Data	"Means data that is used to validate an electronic signature or an electronic seal." ( <i>eIDAS [1] 3. article 40. point</i> )
Suspension	A temporary pause of the <i>Certificate's</i> validity before the end of the validity period indicated on the <i>Certificate</i> . The <i>Certificate</i> suspension is not definitive; the suspended <i>Certificate's</i> validity can be restored.

Advanced Electronic Seal	<p>"Means an advanced electronic seal that meets the following requirements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a/ it is uniquely linked to the creator of the seal;</li> <li>b/ it is capable of identifying the creator of the seal;</li> <li>c/ it is created using electronic seal creation data that the creator of the seal can, with a high level of confidence under its control, use for electronic seal creation; and</li> <li>d/ it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a way that any subsequent change in the data is detectable. " <p><i>(eIDAS [1] 3. article 26. point)</i></p> </li></ul>
Root Certificate	<p>Also known as top level certificate. Self-signed <i>Certificate</i>, which is issued by a specific <i>Certification Unit</i> for itself, which is signed with its own private key, so it can be verified with its own public key – indicated on the certificate.</p>
HSM: Hardware Security Module	<p>A hardware-based secure device that generates, stores and protects cryptographic keys and provides a secure environment for the implementation of cryptographic functions.</p>
Certification Authority	<p>A <i>Trust Service Provider</i>, who/which identifies the requester within the confines of the certification service, issues <i>Certificates</i>, keeps a record, receives the <i>Certificate</i> related data changes, and publishes the regulations belonging to the <i>Certificate</i> and the information on the current state (especially on possible revocation) of the <i>Certificate</i>.</p>
Certification Unit	<p>A unit of the <i>Trust Service Provider's</i> system that signs the <i>Certificates</i>. Always just one Certificate-Creation Data (signing key, signature-creation data) belongs to a <i>Certification Unit</i>. It is possible that a Certification Authority simultaneously operate several <i>Certification Units</i>.</p>
Certificate Policy	<p>"A <i>Trust Service Policy</i> which concerns the <i>Certificate</i> issued within the framework of the <i>Trust Service</i>." ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [8] 1. § 24. point</i>)</p>
Applicant	<p>That natural person who acts during the application for the given <i>Certificate</i>.</p>

Represented Organization	The <i>Organization</i> , which is represented by the <i>Organizational Administrator</i> during the actions related to the <i>Certificates</i> issued to the given <i>Organization</i> .
Code Signing Certificate	A <i>Certificate</i> , which can be used for justifying the origin and integrity of applications.
Compromise	A cryptographic key is considered as compromised, when it can be assumed, that unauthorized person has access to it.
Public Administration Root CA	Organization unit defined in the E-Signature Government Decree [11] in section 3. § (2).
Electronic seal for public administration	At least advanced level electronic seal can be used by government bodies providing electronic administration services, which fulfils the requirements of the E-Signature Government Decree [11] 7. § a), b) and c) point.
Intermediate Certification Unit	A <i>Certification Unit</i> whose <i>Certificate</i> was issued by another <i>Certification Unit</i> .
Cryptographic Key	A unique digital data string controlling a cryptographic transformation, the knowledge of which is required for encryption, decryption and the creation and verification of digital signatures.
Key Management	The production of cryptographic keys, their delivery to users or its algorithmic implementation, as well as the registration, storage, archival, revocation and termination of keys which are closely linked to the used security method.
Hash	"A specific length bit string assigned to the electronic document, during the creation of which the used procedure (hashing procedure) fulfils the requirements defined in Act CCXXII. of 2015. [8] at the time of the creation." ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [8] 1. § 34. point</i> ) The hash in practice a fixed-length bit string that is clearly dependent on the electronic document, from which it is derived from, with a very small probability that two different documents would have the same hash, and it is practically impossible given the hash prepare a document, which has the same hash.

Private Key	<p>In the public key infrastructure, the element of an asymmetric cryptographic key pair belonging to the key-pair owner that the <i>Subject</i> shall keep strictly secret.</p> <p>In case of electronic seals the <i>creator of the electronic seal</i> generates the seal with the help of the private key.</p> <p>During the issuance of <i>Certificates</i>, the <i>Certification Authority</i> uses the private keys of the <i>Certification Unit</i> for placing an electronic signature or seal on the <i>Certificate</i> to protect it.</p>
Qualified Electronic Seal	<p>An advanced electronic seal, which is created by a qualified electronic seal creation device, and that is based on a qualified certificate for electronic seal. (<i>eIDAS [1] article 3. point 27.</i>)</p>
Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device	<p>"Means an electronic seal creation device that meets mutatis mutandis the requirements laid down in Annex II of eIDAS" (<i>eIDAS [1] article 3. point 32.</i>)</p>
Public Key	<p>In the public key infrastructure, the element of an asymmetric cryptographic key pair belonging to key-pair owner, which should be made public. The disclosure is typically in the form of a <i>Certificate</i>, which links the name of the actor with its public key. In case of an electronic seal, the public key of the seal creator party is needed to verify the seal authenticity (this is the Certificate-Verifier Data).</p> <p>The authenticity of the <i>Certificates</i> can be verified with the public key of the <i>Certification Unit</i>.</p>
Public Key Infrastructure, PKI	<p>An infrastructure based on asymmetric cryptography, including the cryptographic algorithms, keys, certificates, the related standards and legislation, the underlying institutional system, a variety of providers and devices.</p>
Registration Claim	<p>The data and statement given beforehand for the preparation of the <i>Certificate Application</i> and the service agreement to the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> by the <i>Client</i> in which the Client authorizes the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> for data management.</p>
Registration Authority	<p>Organization that checks the authenticity of the <i>Certificate</i> holder's data and verifies that the <i>Certificate Application</i> is authentic, and it has been submitted by an authorized person.</p>

Extraordinary Operational Situation	An extraordinary situation causing disturbance in the course of the operation of the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> , when the continuation of the normal operation of the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> is not possible either temporarily or permanently.
Organization	Legal person.
Organizational Certificate	A <i>Certificate</i> , the <i>Subject</i> of which is the <i>Organization</i> , or which presents that the natural person <i>Subject</i> belongs to an <i>Organization</i> . In this case the name of the <i>Organization</i> is indicated in the "O" field of the <i>Certificate</i> . Every seal certificate is an <i>Organizational Certificate</i> .
Organizational Administrator	The natural person who is acting in the name of the <i>Subscriber</i> , and is eligible to issue the <i>Certificate Application</i> , to grant the issuance of the <i>Certificate</i> , to act during the application, replacement, suspension, reinstatement and revocation of the <i>Certificates</i> issued to the <i>Subscriber</i> .
Trust Service Practice Statement	"The statement of the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> of the detailed procedures or other operational requirements used in connection with the provision of particular <i>Trust Services</i> ." ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [8] 1. § point 41.</i> )
Service Agreement	"The contract between the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> and the <i>Trust Service</i> client, which includes the conditions for the provision of the <i>Trust Service</i> and for using the services." ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [8] 1. § point 42.</i> )
Certificate	"The electronic signature certificate, the electronic seal certificate and the <i>Website Authentication Certificate</i> , and all those electronic verifications issued within the framework of the <i>Trust Service</i> by the service provider, which includes the certificate related verification data and the certificate usage related information, and which as an electronic document is reliably protected against the available counterfeiting technologies at the time of the issuance and during its validity period." ( <i>Act CCXXII. of 2015. [8] 1. § point 44.</i> )
Certificate Application	The data and statements given by the <i>Applicant</i> to the <i>Trust Service Provider</i> for <i>Certificate</i> issuance, in which the <i>Applicant</i> reaffirms the authenticity of data to be indicated on the <i>Certificate</i> .

Certificate Repository	Data repository containing various <i>Certificates</i> . A Certification Authority has a Certificate Repository in which the issued <i>Certificates</i> are disclosed, but the system containing <i>Certificates</i> available to the application on the computer of the <i>Subject</i> and the <i>Relying Party</i> is also called Certificate Repository.
Client	The collective term for the <i>Subscriber</i> and every related <i>Applicant</i> denomination.
Revocation	The termination of the <i>Certificate's</i> validity before the end of the validity period indicated on the <i>Certificate</i> too. The <i>Certificate</i> revocation is permanent, the revoked <i>Certificate</i> cannot be reinstated any more.
Revocation Status Records	The internal records of the suspended and revoked <i>Certificates</i> which includes the fact of the suspension or revocation and the time of the suspension or revocation given in seconds maintained by the <i>Certification Authority</i> .

### 1.6.2 Acronyms

CA	Certification Authority			
CP	Certificate Policy			
CPS	Certification Practice Statement			
CRL	Certificate Revocation List			
eIDAS	electronic Identification, Authentication and Signature			
KGYSZ	Public Administration Root CA	Kormányzati Szolgáltató	Gyökér	Hitelesítés
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol			
NMHH	National Media and Infocommunications Authority			
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol			
OID	Object Identifier			
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure			
QCP	Qualified Certificate Policy			
RA	Registration Authority			
TSP	Trust Service Provider			

## 2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

### 2.1 Repositories

The *Trust Service Provider* discloses the contractual conditions and policies electronically on its website on the following link:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/terms-and-informations/>

The new documents to be introduced are disclosed on the website before coming into force.

The documents in force are available on the site in addition to all previous versions of all documents.

The actual version of policies and contractual conditions is readable in printed form at the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider*.

The *Trust Service Provider* makes available the *Certificate Policy*, the *Certification Practice Statement* and the Service Agreement to the *Client* on a durable medium following the conclusion of the contract.

The *Trust Service Provider* notifies its *Clients* about the change of the General Terms and Conditions.

### 2.2 Publication of Certification Information

The *Trust Service Provider* publishes on its webpage (<https://www.e-szigno.hu>) and through LDAP protocol (<ldap://ldap.e-szigno.hu>)

- its provider *Certificates*;
- the end user *Certificates*, provided that the *Applicant* consents to the disclosure;

#### Service Provider Certificates

With the following methods the *Certification Authority* discloses the *Certificates* of the time-stamping units, certification units and the online certificate status service units it operates:

- The denomination of the root certification units, and the hash of its root certificates in the *Certification Practice Statement*. (see section: 1.3.1.) The information related to their change of status are available at the website of the *Certification Authority*.
- The status change of *Certificates* of intermediate (non-root) certification units is and the *Time-Stamping Units* is disclosed on the *Certificate Revocation Lists*, its website and within the confines of the online certificate status response services.
- For the signers of the online certificate status responses the *Trust Service Provider* – compliant with the best international practice – issues a *Certificate* with extremely short period of validity (for 10 minutes) thereby eliminating the need for *Certificate* revocation status verification.

Each OCSP responder *Certificate* contains an indication that its revocation status doesn't need to be checked.

In case of key compromise, or any other problems there won't be any more new *Certificate* issued for the OCSP response signer old private key later. The *Trust Service Provider* issues OCSP response *Certificates* for a new, secure private key. For the detailed description of the OCSP response validation see section 4.5.2.

## End-User Certificates

With the following methods the *Trust Service Provider* discloses status information related to the end-user *Certificates* which it had issued:

- on *Certificate Revocation Lists*,
- within the confines of the online certification status response service.

The end-user *Certificate* revocation status information is disclosed by the *Trust Service Provider*, and the *Applicant's* consent is not required for it. For status information disclosing methods, see Section 4.10.

The *Trust Service Provider* guarantees, that the availability of its system publishing its service *Certificates*, the *Certificate Repository* and the revocation status information on an annual basis will be at least at least 99% per year, while service downtimes may not exceed at most 24 hours in each case.

## 2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication

### 2.3.1 Frequency of the Publication of Terms and Conditions

The most important terms and conditions for the service are contained in the service contract to be signed by the *Client* during the conclusion of the contract, or in the General Terms and Conditions [40] document referenced therein.

The *Trust Service Provider* reviews the General Terms and Conditions annually or in case of exceptional request for change with priority and performs the necessary changes. The document will receive a new version number even after the smallest change and by taking into account the time required by the endorsement process, the planned date of coming into effect will be determined too.

The accepted document will be published on the webpage of the *Trust Service Provider* and it will be sent for review to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority 30 days prior to the planned entry into force date.

The *Trust Service Provider* will accept comments connected to the General Terms and Conditions published for 14 days prior to their becoming effective, at the following email address:

info@e-szigno.hu

In case of observations that require substantive changes, the document will be amended.

The *Trust Service Provider* will close and publish the version of the General Terms and Conditions as amended with remarks on the 7th day prior to its becoming effective.



### 2.3.2 Frequency of the Certificates Disclosure

The *Trust Service Provider*, regarding the disclosure of *Certificates*, follows the practices below:

- the *Certificates* of the root certification units operated by it are disclosed before commencing the service;
- the *Certificates* of the intermediate certification units operated by it are disclosed within 5 workdays after issuance;
- the *Trust Service Provider* discloses in case of the *Applicant's* consent the end-user *Certificates* in its *Certificate Repository* after issuance without delay.

### 2.3.3 The Changed Revocation Status Publication Frequency

The status information related to the end-user *Certificates* issued by the *Trust Service Provider* and the provider *Certificates* are available immediately within the confines of the online certificate status service.

The information related to the status of the *Certificates* are disclosed in the Certificate Repository and on the *Certificate Revocation Lists*. The practices related to the issuance of the *Certificate Revocation Lists* are discussed in Section 4.10.

## 2.4 Access Controls on Repositories

The provided information is freely available for anybody for reading purposes according to the specifics of the publication method.

The information disclosed by the *Trust Service Provider* shall only be amended, deleted or modified by the *Trust Service Provider*. The *Trust Service Provider* prevents the unauthorized changes to the information with various protection mechanisms.

## 3 Identification and Authentication

### 3.1 Naming

The section contains requirements for the data indicated in the *Certificates* issued to end-users in accordance with the applied *Certificate Policies*.

The indicated Issuer ID and the Subject ID amongst the basic fields of the *Certificate* comply with the RCF 5280 [28] and IETF RFC 6818 [29] recommendations name-specific format requirements, in addition the *Trust Service Provider* supports the Subject Alternative Names and Issuer Alternative Names fields located amongst the extensions.

The *Trust Service Provider* may shorten the content of the *Certificate* fields in the frame of the name-specific format requirements or may indicate certain types of names in multiple instances.

### 3.1.1 Types of Names

#### Denomination of the *Subject*

The denomination of the *Certificate Subject* (content of the Subject field) consists of:

- commonName (CN) – OID: 2.5.4.3 The name of the *Subject*

The organization's full or shortened name is in this field in the same form as verified by the *Trust Service Provider* according to the section 3.2.2.

If neither the full nor the shortened name of the Organization fits because of the size limit of the *Certificate*, then the unambiguous abbreviation of the Organization name is presented here.

The name of the automatism by the help of the *Certificate* is used can be indicated in this field for the *Applicant's* request (*Certificate for Automatism*).

Always filled out.

- Surname – OID: 2.5.4.4 – Surname of the natural person

It is not filled.

- Given Name – OID: 2.5.4.42 – The given name of the natural person.

It is not filled.

- Pseudonym (PSEUDO) – OID: 2.5.4.65 Pseudonym of the Subject

The *Trust Service Provider* doesn't fill this field.

- Serial Number – OID: 2.5.4.5 Unique identifier of the *Subject*.

The indication of at least one filled out "Serial Number" field is in the *Certificate* which complies with the following requirements, so that it is able to form a part of the *Subject* permanent unique identifier in case of the usage of "Permanent Identifier" extension according to the IETF RFC 4043 [27] recommendation:

- the identifier value belongs to the *Subject* named in the *Certificate*, identified by the *Trust Service Provider*, and it is unique within the system of the *Trust Service Provider*;
- the *Trust Service Provider* guarantees that the identifier value of any two *Certificates* it issued only matches with each other, if both of the *Certificates* belong to the same *Subject*.

This field is part of the *Subject* denomination, and is not the same as the *Certificate* serial number defined by IETF RFC 5280.

- The unique identifier issued by the *Trust Service Provider* to the *Subject* is OID formatted: "1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2.x.y.z".
  - \* In it, the first numbers are fixed (1.3.6.1.4.1.21528.2: is the unique identifier of the *Trust Service Provider*),
  - \* "x" is the inner identifier used by the *Trust Service Provider*,
  - \* "y" is the inner identifier used by the *Trust Service Provider*,

\* "z" is an automatically issued, a unique identifier within a specific "x.y" value pair. So the "x.y.z" value set is the unique identifier of the *Subject* within the system of the *Trust Service Provider*.

Because the first part of the identifier identifies the *Trust Service Provider* globally, and the rest of the identifier specifies the *Subject* within the system of the *Trust Service Provider*, so the full identifier identifies the *Subject* in a unique way globally by itself. This identifier is part of the "Permanent Identifier" according to IETF RFC 4043 [27] recommendation if the *Certificate* "Subject Alternative Names" field contains the "assigner" but not the "identifierValue" according to IETF RFC 4043 recommendation. There may be multiple OIDs belonging to the same *Subject*, but only one *Subject* may belong to an OID. The *Subject* is always entitled to request a new (unassigned) OID. The *Trust Service Provider* only issues the same OID for two *Certificates* if it made sure that the *Subject* belonging to the two *Certificate* is the same.

– The *Certificate* may contain further Serial Number fields.

The identifier may be given in a format

- \* specified in the ETSI EN 319 412-1 section 5.1.3 (for example: "TINHU-8123456790"),
- \* in (Name:Value) format (for example: "ID card number:AAAAAA" ), or
- \* in other format requested by the *Clients*.

In the "Serial Number" field the *Trust Service Provider* – compliant with the standards – does not indicate accents.

- Organization (O) – OID: 2.5.4.10 The name of the *Organization*

The full or shortened name of the *Organization* is indicated in the "O" field according to the name verified by the *Trust Service Provider* according to the section 3.2.2.

The field is always filled out.

In case of a provider *Certificate* issued for a *Trust Service Provider*, the "O" field is always filled, and the real name of the organization providing the service is indicated in it.

- Organization Identifier (OrgId) – OID: 2.5.4.97 – Identifier of the organization

The identifier of the *Organization* indicated in the "O" field is in this field.

Only such data may be indicated, which was verified by the *Trust Service Provider*.

Filling out the field is mandatory.

- Organizational Unit (OU) – OID: 2.5.4.11 – The name of the organizational unit

The name of the organizational unit related to the organization named in the "O" field, or the trademark, or other information may be in this field.

Only that data may be indicated here that the *Trust Service Provider* verified and that the *Organization* has the right to use.

The "OU" field may be filled only if the "O", "L" and "C" fields are filled.

Optional field.

- CountryName (C) – OID: 2.5.4.6 – Identifier of the country.  
The two-letter country code - according to ISO 3166-1 [23] - of the place of incorporation of the *Organization* indicated in the "O" field.  
Always filled out.  
In case of Hungary the value of the "C" field is: "HU".
- Street Address (SA) – OID: 2.5.4.9 – Address data  
Not filled.
- Locality Name(L) – OID: 2.5.4.7 – Name of settlement  
The locality name of the *Organization's* place of incorporation.
- State or Province Name – OID: 2.5.4.8 – Member state, province name  
The state, province or county name of the *Organization's* place of incorporation.
- Postal Code – OID: 2.5.4.17 – Zip code  
The postal code of the *Organization's* place of incorporation. If filled, only verified information can be indicated.
- Title (T) – OID: 2.5.4.12 – Title of the subject  
The natural person *Subject's* role, title or job.  
Not filled.
- Email Address (EMAIL) – OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1 – The email address of the *Subject*  
Filling is optional.  
If filled, it is the same as the email address indicated in the "RFC822name" field of the *Subject* alternative names field.

The *Certificates* issued in accordance with the present *Certification Practice Statement* might contain further – in accordance with the referenced *Certificate Policies* – "Subject DN" fields. Only verified text values may be indicated on these fields (they shall not contain values indicating lack of data for example: ".", "-" or " ").

### Extensions

- Subject Alternative Names - "Subject Alternative Names"  
A "Subject Alternative Names" field is not listed as a critical extension in the *Certificate*. The content will be filled as follows.
  - In case of *Organizational Certificates*, for the request of the *Applicant* the trademark, trade name or DBA (Doing Business As) name or product name legitimately used by the *Organization* is indicated (possibly supplemented by a unique identifier) in this field. The *Trust Service Provider* is entitled to denote the nature of the name indicated. The *Trust Service Provider* also verifies the content to be in the "Subject Alternative Names" field, and decides on the names on an individual basis. A decision will be made on the basis whether it is proven that the *Organization* in question uses the name requested by the *Client* legally.

- The *Subject's* email address can be given in the subject alternative names "rfc822Name" field. If there's an email address indicated on the *Certificate*, then this field is definitely filled out. The same email address might be displayed in the "EMAIL" field of the *Certificate*.
- Furthermore the IETF RFC 4043 [27] "Permanent Identifier" can be included in the subject alternative names field. This is a different name forms that only contains the "assigner" field, in this the unique OID of the *Trust Service Provider* is indicated. Then according to the IETF RFC 4043 recommendation, this "assigner" OID together with the first "Serial Number" value – containing the OID allocated by the *Trust Service Provider*– of the "Subject" field makes up the *Subject* permanent identifier.

### The Denomination of the Certificate Issuer Certification Unit

The identifier of the *Certificate* issuer (Issuer field) is made up as follows:

- commonName (CN) – OID: 2.5.4.3  
The name of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit in English (see section: 1.3.1.).
- Organization (O) – OID: 2.5.4.10  
"Microsec Ltd."  
The name of the *Trust Service Provider* in English without accents.
- Organization Identifier (OrgId) – OID: 2.5.4.97  
Filling out is optional.
- Organizational Unit (OU) – OID: 2.5.4.11  
"e-Szigno CA"  
The name of the *Trust Service Provider* organization unit's name without accents.  
It was filled in the SHA-1 based provider *Certificates*, but it is not filled in the SHA-256 based provider *Certificates*.
- Locality (L) – OID: 2.5.4.7  
"Budapest"  
City of the seat of the *Trust Service Provider* without accents.
- CountryName (C) – OID: 2.5.4.6  
"HU"  
Two letter code of the country of the seat of the *Trust Service Provider* according to ISO 3166-1 [23].
- Email address (EMAIL) – OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1  
"info@e-szigno.hu"  
Filling out is optional.

The same data is indicated in the provider *Certificate* of the *Certificate* issuer, in the subject identifier field.

### The Alternate Names of the Certificate Issuer Certification Unit

The Issuer Alternative Names field is not filled in the end user *Certificates*.

Denominations indicated in the end user *Certificate* issuer's provider *Certificate*:

- In case of provider *Certificates* based on SHA-256 only the email address is indicated in the alternate names field (rfc822Name).

### The Denomination of the Time stamping Unit

- commonName (CN) – OID: 2.5.4.3  
The name of the *Time-Stamping Unit*.
- Organization (O) – OID: 2.5.4.10  
The name of the *Time-Stamping Service Provider*.
- Organization Identifier (OrgId) – OID: 2.5.4.97  
The tax number of the *Time-Stamping Service Provider*.  
Filling out is optional.
- Organizational Unit (OU) – OID: 2.5.4.11  
The name of the organizational unit of the *Time-Stamping Service Provider*.  
The filling out is optional.
- Locality (L) – OID: 2.5.4.7  
City of the seat of the *Time-Stamping Service Provider*.
- CountryName (C) – OID: 2.5.4.6  
Two letter code of the country of the seat of the *Time-Stamping Service Provider* according to ISO 3166-1 [23].
- Email address (EMAIL) – OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1  
It is not filled.

### The Alternative Names of the Time Stamping Unit

This field is not included in the *Certificates* issued for Time Stamping Units.

### The Denomination of the OCSP Responder

- commonName (CN) – OID: 2.5.4.3  
The field contains the name of the Certification Unit operating the OCSP Responder according to its "CN" concatenated with the following string:  
"OCSP Responder"
- Organization (O) – OID: 2.5.4.10  
"Microsec Ltd."  
The name of the *Trust Service Provider* in English without accents.

- Organization Identifier (OrgId) – OID: 2.5.4.97  
"VATHU-23584497"  
The tax number of the *Trust Service Provider*.  
Filling out is optional.
- Organizational Unit (OU) – OID: 2.5.4.11  
It is not filled.
- Locality (L) – OID: 2.5.4.7  
"Budapest"  
City of the seat of the *Trust Service Provider* without accents.
- CountryName (C) – OID: 2.5.4.6  
"HU"  
Two letter code of the country of the seat of the *Trust Service Provider* according to ISO 3166-1 [23].
- Email address (EMAIL) – OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1  
It is not filled.

### The Alternative Names of the OCSP Responder

This field is not included in the *Certificates* issued for OCSP Responders.

#### 3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful

The following rules are applied to the "SubjectDN" field:

- the identifier shall be meaningful;
- the name of the *Organization* in the *Certificate* shall be indicated the same way as verified by the *Trust Service Provider* according to the section 3.2.2.

#### 3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

Seal certificate shall not be pseudonymous.

#### 3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

In order to interpret the identifiers it is recommended for the *Relying Parties* to act as described in this document. If the *Relying Party* is in need for help related to the interpretation of the identifier or any other data indicated in the *Certificate*, it can contact directly the *Trust Service Provider*. In such case, the *Trust Service Provider* shall not give any further information on the *Client* than indicated in the *Certificate*, – provided that the law does not require it – only provides the information to help interpret the indicated data.

### 3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

The *Subject* has a unique name in the *Certificate Repository* of the *Trust Service Provider*. In order to ensure the uniqueness, the *Trust Service Provider* gives each *Subject* an identifier (OID), – unique in the *Trust Service Provider's* register – , which is indicated on the *Subject's* unique identifier "Subject DN Serial Number" field.

The *Subjects'* unique identifiers (OID) are distributed in accordance with the order of processing the received certification applications, ensuring the uniqueness of the "Subject" field in the *Certificate*.

The *Trust Service Provider* can indicate other unique identifier (for example, identity card number, tax number, and identification within the organization) on request.

### Procedures to Resolve Disputes Relating the Names

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures that the *Client* is entitled to use the indicated names. The *Trust Service Provider* is entitled to revoke the *Certificate* in question for the illegal use of the name or data.

### 3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

In the fields of the end-user *Certificate* required by the *Subscriber* trade marks may occur. The *Trust Service Provider* makes sure of their legitimate use, and in case of a complaint it is entitled to revoke the *Certificate*.

If the *Client* requests a *Certificate*, and asks for brand name or trade mark indication, then the *Client* shall provide evidence of the legitimacy of its use. The *Trust Service Provider* verifies the provided evidences before the issuance of the *Certificate* based on the following web page operated by the European Union Intellectual Property Office:

<https://www.tmdn.org/tmview/welcome>

The trade mark or brand name may be included in the *Certificate* only if:

- the trade mark or brand name is registered by the organization of the *Applicant*;
- the *Applicant* has the consent to use the trade mark or brand name issued by the registrant.

The trade mark or brand name may be included in the *Certificate* the following ways:

- in the field "O", in this case the trade mark or brand name is followed by the official - shortened as appropriate - name of the organization in parenthesis. In this case the *Applicant* may request the indication of the proper (C), (R) or (TM) mark in the *Certificate* after the trade mark or brand name;
- in the field "OU", in this case the trade mark or brand name is always followed by the proper (C), (R) or (TM) mark.

Any of the (C), (R) or (TM) marks may only be included in the *Certificate* in case of proper use of the trade mark or business name immediately following it.

The *Trust Service Provider* uses the e-Szignó trademark during its service provision. The trademark is the property of E-Szignó LP., for the usage of the trademark, the consent is given by the holder.



## 3.2 Initial Identity Validation

The *Trust Service Provider* can use any communication channel within the limits provided by law, for the verification of the identity of the person or organization requesting the *Certificate*, and for checking the authenticity of the data provided.

The *Trust Service Provider* may refuse the issuance of the required *Certificate* at its sole discretion, without any apparent justification.

### 3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

Prior to the issuance of a *Certificate* the *Trust Service Provider* ensures and makes sure that the *Applicant* actually owns or manages the private key belonging to the public key of the *Certificate*.

If the *Applicant* requests the *Certificate* issuance for a key provided by it – typically in case of software certificates –, then the *Trust Service Provider* accepts the *Certificate Application* in PKCS#10 format, which at the same time verifies, that the holder of the private key did indeed request the *Certificate*.

### 3.2.2 Authentication of an Organization Identity

The identity of the *Organization* is verified in the following cases:

- if the *Subject* of the *Certificate* to be issued is the *Organization*;
- if the *Subject* of the *Certificate* to be issued is the device or system operated by the *Organization*;

Prior to the issuance of an *Organizational Certificate* the *Trust Service Provider* verifies the organizational data authenticity to be included on the *Certificate* based on authentic public registers.

Furthermore it is verified in these cases, that:

- whether the natural person acting on behalf of the *Organization* is entitled to act on behalf of the *Organization*;
- whether the *Organization* consented to the issuance of the *Certificate*.

For performing the verification, the *Client* shall give the following data:

- the official denomination, registered office and legal status of the *Organization*,
- official registration number of the *Organization* (e.g. company registration number, tax identification number), if applicable;
- the name of the organization unit within the *Organization*, if its indication in the *Certificate* is requested,

The following certificates and evidences have to be attached to the *Certificate Application*:

- the statement with the application submitter's manual signature on that, justifying that the data given for the *Organization* identification is correct and comply with reality;
- a declaration of the the applicant with his signature that there is no trademark amongst the data to be indicated in the *Organization Certificate*, or if included, proof that the *Organization* is entitled to use the trademark;
- a certificate regarding that on behalf of the organization the *Certificate* application submitter natural person is entitled to submit the application <sup>2</sup>;
- the specimen signature of the person entitled to represent the *Organization* or other, official document equal to the specimen signature, which contains the name and signature of the persons entitled to represent the *Organization* <sup>3</sup>;
- the *Organization* existence, name and the legal status verification document <sup>4</sup>.

The *Trust Service Provider* is bound to verify the validity and authenticity of the presented documents.

### Identity validation of foreign Organizations

The *Trust Service Provider* does not exclude the verification of *Organizations* registered abroad, as far as the data verification with adequate records of the country or obtaining a certificate issued by a trusted third party is feasible.

In respect of data verification, the *Trust Service Provider* accepts:

- certificate issued by the embassy or consulate of the foreign country in Hungary, that the organization exists and the given information is correct;
- certificate issued by a Hungarian embassy or consulate in a foreign country, that the organization exists and the given information is correct.

The *Trust Service Provider* can accept other documents and evidences too, if it makes sure that the level of security is the same as of the above. Obtaining such evidence and submitting it to the *Trust Service Provider* is the *Clients* responsibility.

The *Trust Service Provider* only accepts valid documents, and evidences not older than 3 months.

The *Trust Service Provider* does not issue the *Certificate* if it considers that based on its internal rules it can not verify with corresponding confidence a certificate issued abroad, a document or the data of the foreign organization.

The *Trust Service Provider* guarantees by the proper usage of the trusted roles and the internal administrative processes that during the registration and verification process of the personal data at least two employees needed by the proper trusted roles.

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<sup>2</sup>Section 3.2.5. contains the details regarding the verification of the authorizations and privileges.

<sup>3</sup>In case of Court of Registration registered firms the above documents can be acquired by the *Trust Service Provider*.

<sup>4</sup>In case of Court of Registration registered firms the above documents can be acquired by the *Trust Service Provider*.

### 3.2.3 Authentication of an Individual Identity

The natural person's identity shall be verified:

- if a natural person is acting on behalf of an *Organization* for *Organizational Certificate* application.

The *Trust Service Provider* verifies the identity of the natural person applying one of the following methods.

#### 1. During face to face identity validation.

In case of *Certificates* belonging to the III. certification policy:

- the natural person shall appear in person before the person performing the identity validation, who may be one of the following:
  - officer of the *Registration Authority*,
  - state notary,
  - third party in accordance with the Hungarian law.

- the identity of the natural person is verified during personal identification based on a suitable official proof of identity card;

The identification can be based on the following official documents:

- in case of natural persons within the scope of Act LXVI. of 1992. (henceforth: Nytv. [3]) official cards appropriate for verifying identity defined in Nytv. in accordance with Eüt. 82.§ (3) [8];
  - in case of natural persons outside the scope of Nytv. [3] on the basis of a travel document defined in the Act on the entry and residence of persons enjoying the right of free movement and residence or the law on entry and residence of third-country nationals [5] in accordance with Eüt. 82.§ (4) [8];
  - in case of identification of natural persons who have none of the documents mentioned above the *Trust Service Provider* applies personal identity validation in accordance with Eüt. 82.§ (5) [8] only in the case of identifying European citizens. In such case a personal identity card with a photo issued by the European country of natural person's nationality is accepted as a trusted document for identity validation.
- the natural person shall declare the correctness of the personal identification data used for the identity validation with a written statement signed with a handwritten signature in the presence of the identification person; ;
  - The person performing the identity validation verifies, whether any alteration or counterfeiting happened to the presented identity cards.

In case of *Certificates* belonging to the II. certification class:

- there's no need for personal meeting for the identification of the person, in such cases the *Trust Service Provider* can identify the *Applicant* remotely;

- the *Applicant* sends a copy of one of its official identity cards suitable for identity validation to the *Trust Service Provider*.
- the natural person shall verify the accuracy of the data for the registration and identity validation with a statement signed with a handwritten signature;
- The *Trust Service Provider* performs data reconciliation with authentic public registers in case of certificates belonging to the II. certification class.
- The *Applicant* can prove its identity at its own discretion according to the III. certification class.

#### **Further rules for the identity validation of foreign citizens**

The *Trust Service Provider* may accept the identification carried out by a public notary as equivalent to the identity validation made by its own *Registration Authority*, if the public notary registered in such foreign country,

- which concluded an international bilateral treaty with Hungary on the mutual recognition of public deeds or
- which country ratified the "Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents" of 5th October 1961. (Apostille)

The document issued by the public notary shall follow the requirements specified in the given agreement.

The *Trust Service Provider* may accept the *Certificate Application* signed before the notary public if the notarial certification clause shows that

- the notary public has verified the identity of the *Applicant* based on a suitable official document for identity validation (ID card, passport etc.);
- the *Applicant* has signed the *Certificate Application* in the presence of the notary public.

The *Trust Service Provider* always accepts the original documents when issued in Hungarian or English language. In case of documents issued on any other language the *Trust Service Provider* may request the official Hungarian translation of the documents translated by the OFFI (Hungarian Office for Translation and Attestation).

The *Trust Service Provider* may also accept other documents and evidences, if it makes sure that the level of security is the same as of the above. Obtaining such evidence and submitting it to the *Trust Service Provider* is the *Client's* responsibility.

The *Trust Service Provider* only accepts valid documents and evidences not older than 3 months.

The *Trust Service Provider* does not issue the *Certificate* if it considers that based on its internal rules, that it can not verify with corresponding confidence the certificate, document or the data of the foreign organization.

**2. By identification traced back to a certificate of an electronic signature or electronic seal.**

In this case:

- The *Applicant* submits the *Certificate Application* in electronic format with an electronic signature or electronic seal based on a non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the requested *Certificate*. (see section 1.2.3.)
- The electronically signed *Certificate Application* shall contain the data needed for the unambiguous identification of the natural person.
- The authenticity and confidentiality of the *Certificate Application* shall be verified on the entire certification chain.
- The *Trust Service Provider* accepts only those electronic signatures or electronic seals which are based on a *Certificate* issued by a Trust Service Provider according to a Trust Service, which is listed on a national Trusted List published on the EU List of Lists and was valid at the time of the signature creation.

**3. Using another method of identification approved on national level**

Based on the 132/2020. (IV. 17.) Government Decree [13], the *Trust Service Provider* may also verify the identity of the natural person using video technology identification, which is recognized as equivalent to the face to face validation, until the end of the emergency situation declared by the 40/2020. (III. 11.) Government Decree.

In this case, the *Trust Service Provider* shall act as prescribed during the personal identification, with the difference that the personal meeting shall be replaced by a video technology based remote identification procedure in which:

- (a) The *Trust Service Provider* compares the photograph taken of the *Client* with the image in the official Identity card suitable for proving the identity used for identification. The identification is appropriate if the *Trust Service Provider* can satisfactorily establish that the person in the document is the same as the person in the photo or video recording.
- (b) The *Trust Service Provider* ensures that the *Client* has read the conditions of the video technology identification in detail and has expressly agreed to it.
- (c) The *Trust Service Provider* records and keeps for at least five years from the date of recording the entire communication established between the *Trust Service Provider* and the *Client* during the video technology identification, the detailed information of the *Client* related to video technology identification, and the *Client's* express consent to this in a retrievable way, on video and audio, on a way that does not degrade the quality of the image and sound recording.
- (d) The condition of successful video technology identification is that the image resolution of the electronic communication device enabling video technology identification and the illumination of the image be suitable for recognizing the gender, age and facial features of the *Client*, and the *Client*

- shall look into the camera so that his or her portrait can be recognized and captured,
  - shall communicate in a comprehensible manner the identifier of the document used for video identification, and
  - shall move the document used to prove the identity used for video technology identification (hereinafter: the document) in such a way that the security elements and data sets contained therein can be recognized and recorded.
- (e) The *Trust Service Provider* makes sure that the document is suitable for performing video technology identification, so
- the document complies with the requirements of the issuing authority,
  - the individual security features, in particular the hologram, the kinegram or other equivalent security features, are recognizable and undamaged, and
  - the document ID is the same as the document ID provided by the *Client*, recognizable and undamaged.
- (f) During the video technology identification, the *Trust Service Provider* makes sure that
- the *Client*'s portrait is recognizable and identifiable by the portrait on the document presented by him, and
  - the data contained in the document can be logically corresponded to the data available about the *Client* at the *Trust Service Provider*.

The *Trust Service Provider* shall enter into the service contract only if the video technology identification fully complies with the above requirements.

The *Trust Service Provider* uses the data reconciled during a previous identification procedure, if the *Applicant* requests new *Certificate* instead of an expired or a revoked one, or if he requests a new *Certificate* besides the existing one during the validity period of the service agreement. The authenticity of the *Certificate Application*, the validity of the data to be included in the *Certificate* and the identity of the *Applicant* is validated by the *Trust Service Provider*.

The *Trust Service Provider* guarantees by the proper usage of the trusted roles and the internal administrative processes that during the registration and verification process of the personal data at least two employees needed by the proper trusted roles.

### 3.2.4 Non-Verified Subscriber Information

Only that data can be in the *Certificate* issued by the *Trust Service Provider* which has been verified by the *Trust Service Provider*.

### 3.2.5 Validation of Authority

The identity of the natural person representing the legal person is verified according to the requirements of Section 3.2.3. before issuing an *Organizational Certificate*.

The right of representation of the natural person shall be verified.

Persons entitled to act on behalf of an *Organization*:

- a person authorized to represent the given *Organization*,

- a person who is mandated for that purpose by an authorized person to represent the *Organization*,
- an *Organizational Administrator* appointed by an authorized person to represent the *Organization*.

The *Organizational Administrator* can be appointed during *Certificate* application, or anytime later with the help of the corresponding form. The identifier information of the designated person(s) shall be given on the form, by which he/she can be identified in later litigation. The form shall be signed (manually or by creating a qualified electronic signature based on a non pseudonymous *Certificate*) by the representative of the *Organization*, which is verified by the registration associate of the *Trust Service Provider* when received.

Appointing an *Organizational Administrator* is not mandatory, and multiple *Organizational Administrators* can be appointed too. If there is no appointed *Organizational Administrator*, then the person entitled to represent the *Organization* can perform this task.

### 3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

The *Trust Service Provider* does not work together with other Certification Authorities during the provision of the service.

### 3.2.7 Email address validation

For applications submitted on the *Trust Service Provider's* web site, the *Trust Service Provider* validates the *Applicant's* email address by verifying the email address before completing the *Certificate Application* form. The web page asks for the *Applicant's* email address before filling in the form and does not allow other details to be filled in. The *Trust Service Provider* will send a randomly selected URL with a limited period of validity to the email address provided. The *Applicant* can only complete the form by clicking on the unique link provided. Each incoming *Certificate Application* therefore has an email address that is verified during operation.

In the case of a *Certificate Application* submitted otherwise, the *Trust Service Provider* sends an e-mail with a random number to the e-mail address to be verified, to which the *Applicant* shall respond and confirm the request. The response email shall include the random number sent by the *Trust Service Provider*. The random number is valid for 30 days.

## 3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests

Re-key is the process when the *Trust Service Provider* issues a *Certificate* to a *Subject* with a replaced public key. Re-key can only be requested during the validity period of the service agreement.

In case of a re-key request, the *Trust Service Provider* verifies the existence and checks the validity of the affected *Certificate*.

The *Trust Service Provider* accepts re-key requests in case of valid and not valid (suspended, revoked or expired) *Certificates* too.

Details related to the re-key process can be read in section 4.7.

In case of the certificates belonging to the II. certification class, the *Trust Service Provider* does not perform re-key. A *Certificate* containing a new key is issued only as part of the process of applying for a new *Certificate*.

### 3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for valid Certificate

The identification of the *Applicant* takes place as described in section 3.2.3.

When the expiry date of the new *Certificate* is not later than the *Certificate* to be re-keyed, the *Trust Service Provider* re-uses the results and evidences collected during the original validation process.

### 3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for invalid Certificate

The *Trust Service Provider* accepts re-key requests – only during the validity period of the service agreement– in case of *Certificates* suspended, revoked or expired.

The identification of the *Applicant* takes place as described in section 3.2.3.

## 3.4 Identification and Authentication in Case of Certificate Renewal Requests

*Certificate* renewal is the process when the *Trust Service Provider* issues a certificate with unchanged *Subject* identification information but for new validity period to a *Subject*. *Certificate* renewal can only be requested during the validity period of the service agreement and for valid *Certificates*.

### 3.4.1 Identification and Authentication in Case of a Valid Certificate

The identification of the *Applicant* takes place as described in section 3.2.3.

### 3.4.2 Identification and Authentication in Case of an Invalid Certificate

Invalid *Certificate* can't be renewed.

## 3.5 Identification and Authentication for Certificate Modification requests

*Certificate* modification is the process, when the *Trust Service Provider* issues a new *Certificate* to the same *Subject* with an unchanged public key, but with different *Subject* identification data.

### 3.5.1 Identification and Authentication in Case of a Valid Certificate

The identification of the *Applicant* takes place as described in section 3.2.3.

If the modified *Certificate* expires on the same time as the original *Certificate*, during the procedure, the *Trust Service Provider* may use the results of inspections performed prior to the issuance of the original *Certificate*.



### 3.5.2 Identification and Authentication in Case of an Invalid Certificate

Invalid *Certificate* can't be renewed.

### 3.6 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request

The *Trust Service Provider* receives and processes the requests related to the suspension and revocation of the *Certificates*, and the announcements (for example related to the private key compromise or to the improper use of the *Certificate*) concerning the revocation of the *Certificates*.

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures that the requests only get accepted from authorized parties besides the rapid processing of the suspension and revocation requests.

The identity of the submitter persons and the authenticity of the applications are verified.

The identification and authentication aspects of such requests are described in section 4.9. .

## 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

The issuance of a new *Certificate* for a new *Subject* shall precede the transmission of the *Registration Application* required to the *Trust Service Provider* and signing of the service agreement on the *Subscriber's* part as well as signing of the *Certificate Application* of the *Applicant's* part.

Certificate replacement is the process, when previously registered (and during that, identified) *Subject* requests a new *Certificate* instead of the existing one (issued pursuant to a valid service agreement). Certificate replacement can take place for the below reasons:

- *Certificate renewal* means requesting a *Certificate* with the same data indicated in it as in the previous one by the *Subject* and both *Certificates* are issued for the same public key. The details of *Certificate renewal* are discussed in section 4.6.
- *Certificate modification* means requesting the modification of the *Subject's Certificate* considering the change of the *Subject's* data included in the *Certificate*. The *Trust Service Provider* receives *Certificate modification* requests during the validity period of the *Certificate*. Over the course of *Certificate modification*, the new *Certificate* is issued to the same public key. The details of *Certificate modification* are described in section 4.8.
- *Re-key* means a new *Certificate* issuance by the *Trust Service Provider* for a new public key at the request of the *Subject* during the *Certificate's* validity period or after expiration. The details of *Certificate renewal* are discussed in section 4.7.

When *Clients* – with a valid service agreement– request a new *Certificate*, then the modification of the service agreement is necessary.

The state of a *Certificate* can be valid, suspended, revoked or expired. Regulations related to the status changes are discussed in section 4.9., and the *Certificate* status service is discussed in section 4.10.

The *Trust Service Provider* provides *Certificate* maintenance only under the force of the related service agreement. The requirements related to the termination of service agreement are discussed in section 4.11.

#### 4.1 Application for a Certificate

For each new *Certificate* issuance, *Certificate Application* submission is required. Prior to submitting the first *Certificate Application*, the *Applicant* shall submit a *Registration Application* to the *Trust Service Provider*, this can be done through the website of the *Trust Service Provider*, for instance. The *Applicant* shall specify their data to be indicated in the *Certificate* and shall specify what kind of *Certificate* they request, and they shall authorize the *Trust Service Provider* for the management of their personal data in the *Registration* request.

The *Trust Service Provider* doesn't consider the data indicated in the *Registration Application* authentic until the *Applicant* confirms them in a *Certificate Application*.

In case the conclusion of a new service agreement is necessary, the *Trust Service Provider* prepares the *Subscriber's* service agreement based on the information given in the *Registration Application*.

The service agreement shall contain the types of *Certificate* available for specific *Subjects* in the frame of the services within the confines of the Agreement.

A new *Certificate* can be requested within the confines of a previously concluded service agreement. If the *Certificate* (*Certificate* replacement) is issued as a replacement of a *Certificate* indicated in the service agreement, it is not necessary to modify the service agreement. If the *Client* requests a new *Certificate* in addition to the extant ones, the service agreement shall be modified.

The *Trust Service Provider* informs the *Subscriber* about the *Certificate* usage terms and conditions prior to the conclusion of the contract.

If the *Applicant* is not the same as the *Subscriber*, then the aforementioned information is also given to the *Applicant*.

The *Trust Service Provider* publishes the documents containing this information in a comprehensible manner, made available in an electronically downloadable format as well as upon request in printed form. At the Customer service office, the *Client* has the opportunity for survey and consultation.

In the *Certificate Application* the *Subject* shall at least include the data below:

- data to be indicated in the *Certificate* (for example name of *Organization* name of organizational unit, city, country, email address);
- the personal identification information of the person entitled to represent the *Subject* (full name, number of the identity document, mother's name, date and time of birth);
- the contact of the person entitled to represent the *Subject* (telephone number, email address);
- the *Subscriber's* data (billing information);

In conjunction with the *Certificate Application* the *Trust Service Provider* ask for and check at least the following documents, certifications, procurations and declarations (in case of remote identification the copies of these):

- documents necessary to identify the person entitled to represent the *Subject* according to Section 3.2.3;
- the documents for the identification of the *Organization* according to Section 3.2.2;

- the certification or procuration delivered by the *Organization*, that the *Applicant* is entitled to represent the *Organization* according to section 3.2.5;
- if the *Certificate* requested contains a trademark or a brand name, then a certification about the usage rights of the *Applicant* according to section 3.1.6.

#### 4.1.1 Who May Submit a Certificate Application

*Certificate Application* may only be submitted by natural persons, to request a *Certificate* for the organization represented.

In case of *Organizational Certificate* representatives may only be natural persons according to section 3.2.5. *Certificate Application* submitted by any other person is refused automatically.

The precondition of *Certificate* issuance is a valid service agreement (signed by the *Subscriber* and the *Trust Service Provider*) concerning *Certificate* issuance and maintenance.

The person entitled to represent the *Subject* may submit the *Certificate Application* in the following ways:

- on paper signed manually at the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider* or at the mobile registration associate of the *Trust Service Provider*, on a date previously agreed (then, in case of *Certificates* belonging to the III. certification class the personal identification takes place this time )
- on paper signed manually and sent to the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider* (then, in case of *Certificates* belonging to the III. certification class the personal identification will take place another time )
- in electronic form with an electronic signature or electronic seal based on a non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the requested *Certificate*, sent to the *Trust Service Provider's* email address (see section 1.2.3.);

The *Subscriber* and the person entitled to represent the *Subject* shall provide their contact information during the *Registration Application*.

#### 4.1.2 Enrolment Process and Responsibilities

During the process of the application the *Trust Service Provider* ascertains the identity of the person submitting the *Certificate Application* (see section 3.2.3).

The *Trust Service Provider* identifies the *Organization* (see section: 3.2.2.) and it ensures, that the *Applicant* is entitled to represent the *Organization* (see section: 3.2.5.) and to request a *Certificate* related to the *Organization* (see section: 3.2.2.).

The *Subscriber* determines which *Applicant* is entitled to request a *Certificate* according to which *Certificate Policy*.

The person entitled to represent the *Subject* shall provide all the necessary information for the conduct of the identification processes.

If it is necessary the *Trust Service Provider* performs data reconciliation with authentic government registers such as the personal data and address register or the company register). In case of

a database if it can be arranged, the *Trust Service Provider* performs the data reconciliation electronically.

During the process the *Trust Service Provider* specifies the unique name of the *Subject* and assigns a globally unique ID (OID) to the *Subject*. This happens as defined in section 3.1.

The *Trust Service Provider* registers all the necessary information on the identity of the *Applicant* and the *Organization* for the provision of service and for keeping contact.

The *Trust Service Provider* registers the service agreement signed beforehand by the *Subscriber* that shall contain the *Subscriber's* statement that the *Subscriber* is aware of its obligations and undertakes the compliance.

The *Trust Service Provider* registers the *Certificate Application* signed by the person entitled to represent the *Subject* which shall contain the following:

- a confirmation, that the data provided in the *Certificate Application* are accurate;
- a consent, that the *Trust Service Provider* records and processes the data provided in the application;
- the decision about the disclosure of the *Certificate*;
- a statement that there's no brand name or trademark indicated in the requested *Certificate*, or it is indicated and the applicant is entitled to use that.

The *Trust Service Provider* keeps the aforementioned records for the time period required by law.

The *Trust Service Provider* archives the contracts, the *Certificate* application form and every attestation that the *Applicant* or the *Subscriber* handed in.

If the identity of the person entitled to represent the *Subject* or the identity of the *Organization* can not be verified without a doubt or any of the indicated data in the *Certificate Application* is incorrect, then the *Trust Service Provider* gives the *Client* the opportunity to correct the missing or incorrect data, and to provide the missing attestations within 3 months from the submission of the *Certificate Application* according to its inner regulations.

## 4.2 Certificate Application Processing

### 4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

The *Trust Service Provider* identifies the *Applicant* according to Section 3.2 ., and it verifies the authenticity of the request.

The *Trust Service Provider* identifies the *Organization* too, and verifies the eligibility according to section 3.2. The *Trust Service Provider* registers all the information used by the *Organization* to certify its identity, including the registration number of the documentation used for certification and the incidental limitations related to its validity.

### 4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

To avoid any conflicts of interests, the *Trust Service Provider* ensures its personal and operational independence contrary to the *Subscribers*. It does not constitute a breach of conflicts of interests, if the *Trust Service Provider* issues *Certificates* for its associates.

The *Trust Service Provider* verifies the authenticity of all the information given in the *Certificate Application* to be indicated on the *Certificate* before issuing the *Certificate*.

If the *Subject* requests a *Certificate* containing an email address, the *Trust Service Provider* verifies the email address to be indicated in the *Certificate*. It ascertains that the email address exists and verifies that it is the *Subject's* email address indeed.

The *Trust Service Provider* accepts or refuses to fulfil the *Certificate Application* after processing it.

If the identity of the natural person or the organization can not be verified without a doubt, or any of the indicated data in the *Certificate Application* form is incorrect, and is not corrected by the *Client* upon request of the *Trust Service Provider*, then the *Trust Service Provider* rejects the application.

In case of *Certificate Application* refusal the *Trust Service Provider* informs the *Applicant* and the *Subscriber*, but the *Trust Service Provider* does not have to justify its decision.

#### 4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

The *Trust Service Provider* undertakes the processing of the *Certificate Application* within 5 workdays if all the necessary data and document is available.

### 4.3 Certificate Issuance

The *Trust Service Provider* only issues the *Certificate* to the *Subject* in case of certificates belonging to the III. certification class, in case of the acceptance of the *Certificate Application*.

The issued *Certificate* only contains the data that was indicated in the *Certificate Application* and that was verified by the *Trust Service Provider* during the evaluation process.

If the Certification Authority provides the *Electronic Seal Creation Device* to the *Subject* (within the framework of device provision service), as a part of the process, the issued *Certificate* is installed to the *Electronic Seal Creation Device* too. The handover of the *Electronic Seal Creation Device* containing the private key takes place in a controlled environment in accordance with the security regulations defined in section 6.1.2.

If the takeover of the *Electronic Seal Creation Device* containing the *Subject's Certificate* and private key to the *Applicant* do not take place right after the personal identification related to the *Certificate* application, then the representative of the *Subject* can take over their device after personal identification, in the course of they have to identify themselves with an identification document. The transferring party verifies, that the portrait of the *Applicant* matches the one on his/her ID card, and the Signature of the *Applicant* fits the one appears on the ID card.

Along with the takeover of the *Electronic Seal Creation Device*, the *Applicant* receives the activation codes necessary for activation, generated according to section 6.4.

In case of *Certificates* belonging to the II. certification class the *Trust Service Provider* only issues the *Certificate* to the *Subject* after verifying the data given in the *Registration Application* and receiving the signed *Certificate Application* and service agreement. The issued *Certificate* only contains that *Subject* data, that was given in the *Registration Application*, and that the *Trust Service Provider* verified during the evaluation.

#### 4.3.1 CA Actions During Certificate Issuance

The *Certificate* issuance happens according to strictly regulated and controlled processes, the details are stated by the *Trust Service Provider's* inner regulations and requirements.

The *Trust Service Provider* guarantees by the proper usage of the trusted roles and the internal administrative processes that during the *Certificate* issuance process at least two employees needed by the proper trusted roles.

#### 4.3.2 Notification of the Subscriber about the Issuance of the Certificate

The Certification Authority informs the *Applicant* and the *Subscriber* on the issuance of the *Certificate* and enables the *Applicant* to receive the *Certificate*.

### 4.4 Certificate Acceptance

#### 4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

In case of *Certificates* belonging to the III. certification class a person entitled to represent the *Subject* shall verify the accuracy of the data indicated in the *Certificate* during the takeover of the *Certificate* and shall make a written statement on that. The person entitled to represent the *Subject* verifies the reception of the *Certificate* by signing the statement.

In case of *Certificates* belonging to the II. certification class, the *Applicant* (or its representative) do not have to separately state the takeover of the issued *Certificate*. By signing the service agreement the *Subscriber* verifies in addition the acceptance of the *Certificate Policy* the *Certification Practice Statement* and other documents containing contractual conditions.

If the *Trust Service Provider* provides *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device* to the *Subject*, after the reception of the *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device* containing the private key, the *Certificate* of the *Subject* and the code necessary for activation the *Applicant* shall sign manually a statement about takeover, in which – amongst others – he/she verifies that the data – which were the bases of the *Certificate* issuance – are accurate, he/she received the related activation codes and that he/she is acquainted with the technical and legal requirements of the *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device* usage.

#### 4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA

After receiving the confirmation of acceptance of the *Certificate* – if the *Applicant* consents – the *Trust Service Provider* discloses the *Certificate* in its *Certificate Repository*.

#### 4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

The person entitled to represent the *Subject* is notified by the *Trust Service Provider* without delay about the issuance of the *Certificate*.

## 4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage

### 4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

The *Subject* shall only use its private key corresponding to the *Certificate* for electronic seal creation, and any other usage is prohibited.

A private key corresponding to an expired, revoked, or suspended *Certificate* shall not be used for electronic seal creation.

The *Subject* is bound to ensure the adequate protection of the private key and the activation data.

The limitations determined in Section 1.4. have to be followed during the usage.

### 4.5.2 Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

To retain the level of security guaranteed by the *Trust Service Provider*, in the course of accepting the electronic seal verified, the *Relying Party* is recommended to proceed prudentially particularly regarding to the following:

- the *Relying Party* shall verify the validity and revocation status of the *Certificate*;
- *Certificates* for electronic seals and the corresponding public keys shall only be used for electronic seal validation;
- the verifications related to the *Certificate* should be carried out for the entire certificate chain;
- the electronic seal verification shall be performed with a reliable application, which complies with the related technical specifications, can be resiliently configured, and has been set correctly, and it runs within a virus-free environment;
- it is recommended to verify that the *Certificate* was issued according to the appropriate Certificate Policy;
- it is recommended to verify the highest value of the obligation undertaken at one time indicated in the *Certificate* (the Certification Authority is not responsible for the claims arising from electronic documents issued and sealed concerning transactions in excess of those limits and for the damage caused this way.);
- the *Relying Party* shall consider any restrictions indicated in the *Certificate* or in the regulations referenced in the *Certificate*.

The *Trust Service Provider* makes available a service for its *Clients* and *Relying Parties* that they can use to verify the issued *Certificates*.

## 4.6 Certificate Renewal

The process when the *Trust Service Provider* issues a new *Certificate* for a new validity period for the same public key with unchanged *Subject* identity information is called *Certificate* renewal.

If the *Subject* would like to use the *Certificate* after the expiration, then it shall initiate the *Certificate* renewal. The *Certificate* renewal technically means the issuance of a new *Certificate*, with the same *Subject* identification data, but new validity period. Other data can change in the *Certificate*, like the CRL, OCSP references or the provider key used for signing the *Certificate*.

#### 4.6.1 Circumstances for Certificate Renewal

*Certificate renewal* is only permitted when all of the following conditions are met:

- the *Certificate* renewal request was submitted within the validity period of the *Certificate*;
- the *Certificate* to be renewed is not suspended or revoked;
- the private key corresponding to the *Certificate* is not compromised;
- the *Subject* identity information indicated in the *Certificate* is still valid.

The *Trust Service Provider* shall only accept a *Certificate* renewal application within the effect of the service agreement.

If a previous *Certificate* of the *Subject* is revoked or expired, then new *Certificate* can only be requested in the frame of *Re-key* (see section: 4.7. ) or new *Certificate* application (see section: 4.6.).

If any of the *Subject* data indicated in the *Certificate* changed, then new *Certificate* shall be requested within the framework of *Certificate* modification (see section 4.8.).

During the *Certificate renewal*, the *Applicant* is informed if the terms and conditions have changed since the previous *Certificate* issuance.

If the *Applicant* is not the same as the *Subscriber*, then the information aforementioned is also provided to the *Subscriber*.

The *Certificate* renewal is performed within the framework of a valid service agreement, there is no need for its modification.

#### 4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal

The *Certificate* renewal shall be initiated by a person who is entitled to submit an application for a new *Certificate* of the same type on behalf of the *Subject* at the time of the submission of renewal application.

The applicant shall state in the *Certificate* renewal application, that the *Subject* identification data indicated in the *Certificate* are still valid.

The *Trust Service Provider* is entitled to initiate the renewal of the *Certificate* if the service signatory key used for the issuance of the *Certificate* shall be replaced out of turn.

The *Trust Service Provider* provides the following possibilities for *Certificate* renewal application submissions:

- on paper signed manually at the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider* or at the mobile registration associate of the *Trust Service Provider*, on a date previously agreed;



- in an electronic form with an electronic signature or electronic seal based on the non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the *Certificate* to be renewed (see section 1.2.3.);
- on paper signed manually and sent to the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider* (then, in case of *Certificates* belonging to the III. certification class the personal identification will take place another time )

#### 4.6.3 Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

During the evaluation of the Certificate renewal application, the *Trust Service Provider* verifies that:

- the submitted *Certificate* renewal application is authentic;
- the submitter of the *Certificate* renewal application has the appropriate entitlement and authorization;
- the submitter of the *Certificate* renewal application stated that the data of the *Subject* to be indicated in the *Certificate* are unchanged and accurate;
- the *Certificate* renewal application was submitted during the *Certificate's* validity period;
- the *Certificate* to be renewed is not suspended or revoked;
- based on currently available information about the cryptographic algorithms used, they still will be applicable even during the planned validity period of the *Certificate* to be issued.

The method used for identification and authentication during the Certificate renewal is stated in Section 3.4.

#### 4.6.4 Notification of the Client about the New Certificate Issuance

The *Trust Service Provider* informs the *Applicant* and the *Subscriber* about the *Certificate* issuance.

#### 4.6.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewed Certificate

During the *Certificate* renewal process, there is no key generation, thus there is no need to handover key to the *Subject*.

The renewed *Certificate* can be received (downloaded) without personal encounter.

If the private key of the *Subject* is on a *Electronic Seal Creation Device*, then the *Subject* installs the *Certificate* to the device. For that purpose, the *Trust Service Provider* provides written manuals, and if necessary, provides consultation possibility by telephone.

The subject accepts the *Certificate* by its usage without additional declaration.

#### 4.6.6 Publication of the Renewed Certificate by the CA

The *Trust Service Provider* discloses the renewed *Certificate* the same way as the original *Certificate*.

#### 4.6.7 Notification of Other Entities about the Certificate Issuance

The contact of the *Represented Organization* is notified by the *Trust Service Provider* on the *Certificate* issuance without delay.

### 4.7 Certificate Re-Key

*Re-key* means the process when the *Trust Service Provider* issues a new *Certificate* for the *Subject* in a way that the public key is to be changed.

Further data may be optionally changed in the new *Certificate* issued during the *Re-key* process, for example validity period, the CRL and OCSP links or the provider key used to sign the *Certificate*. In case of keys belonging to the II. certification class, the Certification Authority does not perform *Re-key*. The issuance of a *Certificate* with a new key is exclusively performed within the framework of new *Certificate* application.

#### 4.7.1 Circumstances for Certificate Re-Key

The validity of the previous *Certificate* is not required for *Re-key*, but the *Trust Service Provider* shall only accept *Re-key* applications within the scope of the service agreement.

During the *Certificate Re-key*, the *Applicant* is informed by the *Trust Service Provider* if the terms and conditions have changed since the previous *Certificate* issuance. If the *Applicant* is not the same as the *Subscriber*, then the information aforementioned is also given to the *Subscriber*. *Certificate Re-key* is performed within the framework of a valid service agreement, there is no need for its modification.

#### 4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

The *Certificate Re-key* shall be initiated by a person who would be entitled to submit a new *Certificate Application* at the time of the submission of the *Re-key* application.

The applicant shall state in the *Certificate Re-key* application, that the *Subject* identification data indicated in the *Certificate* are still valid, or they shall give the new data and make a statement of its validity.

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures the following possibilities to submit *Certificate* renewal application:

- on paper signed manually at the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider* or at the mobile registration associate of the *Trust Service Provider*, on a date previously agreed (then, in case of *Certificates* belonging to the III. certification class the personal identification takes place this time )

- in electronic form with an electronic signature or electronic seal based on a non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the requested *Certificate*, sent to the *Trust Service Provider's* email address (see section 1.2.3.);
- on paper signed manually and sent to the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider* (then, in case of *Certificates* belonging to the III. certification class the personal identification will take place another time )

#### 4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-Key Requests

During the evaluation of the *Certificate Re-key* application the *Trust Service Provider* verifies that:

- the submitted application is authentic;
- the submitter of the application has the appropriate entitlement and authorization;
- the data indicated in the application are accurate;
- based on the currently available information about the cryptographic algorithms used, they still will be applicable even during the planned validity of the *Certificate* to be issued.

Before processing the *Re-key* request the identity of the person submitting the *Certificate Re-key* application shall be verified according to section 3.3.

#### 4.7.4 Notification of the Client about the New Certificate Issuance

The *Trust Service Provider* informs the *Applicant* and the *Subscriber* about the *Certificate* issuance.

#### 4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate

If the new key used is generated on an *Electronic Seal Creation Device* during the *Re-key*, then the issued *Certificate* will be installed to the *Electronic Seal Creation Device* too as part of the *Re-key* process. The handover of the *Electronic Seal Creation Device* containing the private key to the *Applicant* takes place in a controlled environment while in accordance with the security regulations defined in section 6.1.2. The representative of the *Subject* can take over the *Electronic Seal Creation Device* following a personal identification, in the course of it shall identify itself with an identification document personal. The transferring party verifies, that the portrait of the *Applicant* matches the one on his/her ID card, and the Signature of the *Applicant* fits the one appears on the ID card.

Along with the takeover of the *Electronic Seal Creation Device*, the *Applicant* receives the activation codes necessary for activation, generated according to section 6.4. These codes are handed in a closed envelope, and it is mandatory for the *Subject* to verify that the envelope hasn't been opened. The *Applicant* shall sign a statement manually about the takeover, in which – amongst others – it verifies that the data – which were the bases of the *Certificate* issuance – are valid, it received the *Electronic Seal Creation Device* and the related activation codes, and that it is aware of the technical and legal requirements of the device usage.

If the new key used during the *Re-key* was provided by the *Subject*, then there is no need for key and *Electronic Seal Creation Device* handover. The new *Certificate* issued as part of the re-key can be received (downloaded) without the need for a face-to-face meeting. By using the *Certificate*, the *Subject* accepts it, no special declaration is required.

#### 4.7.6 Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate

The *Trust Service Provider* discloses the renewed *Certificate* the same way as the original *Certificate*.

#### 4.7.7 Notification of Other Entities about the Certificate Issuance

The contact of the *Represented Organization* is notified by the *Trust Service Provider* on the *Certificate* issuance without delay.

### 4.8 Certificate Modification

*Certificate modification* means the process when the *Trust Service Provider* issues a new *Certificate* for the *Subject* with changed *Subject* identity information but with unchanged public key.

The *Certificate* modification technically means new *Certificate* issuance. The *Trust Service Provider* is bound to revoke the previous *Certificate*, that contains invalid data. (see section: 4.9.) .

Previous data can change in the new *Certificate* issued during the *Certificate* modification, such as the validity period, the CRL and OCSP references or the *Trust Service Provider* key used for *Certificate* signing.

#### 4.8.1 Circumstances for Certificate Modification

*Certificate modification* becomes necessary in the following cases:

- change of data indicated in the *Subject's Certificate*;
- in the *Certificate* issuing system of the *Trust Service Provider* any data of the *Certificate* issuer CA indicated in the "Subject DN" is changed, or its public key is changed and as a result of it, its provider *Certificate* is changed;
- the *Certificate* profile determined by the *Trust Service Provider* is changed.

Requirements of *Certificate* modification:

- the *Certificate* modification application was submitted during the *Certificate's* validity period;
- the *Certificate* to be modified is not suspended or revoked;
- the private key corresponding to the *Certificate* is not compromised.

The *Trust Service Provider* only accepts *Certificate* modification application in the scope of the Service Agreement.

If the previous *Certificate* of the *Subject* is revoked or expired, then the new *Certificate* can be requested within the framework of *Re-key* (see section: 4.7.) or new *Certificate* application (see section: 4.6.).

During the *Certificate* modification, the *Applicant* is informed if the terms and conditions have changed since the previous *Certificate* issuance.

If the *Applicant* is not the same as the *Subscriber*, then the information aforementioned is also given to the *Subscriber*. The *Certificate* modification is performed within the framework of a valid service agreement, there is no need for its modification.

#### 4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification

The *Certificate* modification shall be initiated by a person who is entitled to submit a new *Certificate* application at the time of the submission of the modification application.

In the *Certificate* modification request, the applicant shall give the new data and shall make a statement of their accuracy.

The *Trust Service Provider* initiates the *Certificate* modification if it becomes aware of that the *Subject's* data indicated in the *Certificate* is changed.

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures the following possibilities to submit *Certificate* renewal application:

- on paper signed manually at the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider* or at the mobile registration associate of the *Trust Service Provider*, on a date previously agreed (then, in case of *Certificates* belonging to the III. certification class the personal identification takes place this time )
- in electronic form with an electronic signature or electronic seal based on a non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the requested *Certificate*, sent to the *Trust Service Provider's* email address (see section 1.2.3.);
- on paper signed manually and sent to the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider* (then, in case of *Certificates* belonging to the III. certification class the personal identification will take place another time )

#### 4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests

During the evaluation of the submitted *Certificate* modification application, the *Trust Service Provider* verifies that:

- the submitted *Certificate* renewal application is authentic;
- the submitter of the *Certificate* renewal application has the appropriate entitlement and authorization;
- the data given in the application are accurate;

- the *Certificate* renewal application was submitted during the *Certificate's* validity period;
- based on the currently available information about the cryptographic algorithms used, they still will be applicable even during the planned validity period of the *Certificate* to be issued.

The *Trust Service Provider* verifying the validity of the *Subject's* data proceeds the same as the initial verification performed before a new *Certificate* issuance.

Before the execution of the *Certificate* modification application, the applicant shall be identified according to section 3.5.

#### **4.8.4 Notification of the Client about the New Certificate Issuance**

The *Trust Service Provider* informs the *Applicant* and the *Subscriber* about the *Certificate* issuance.

#### **4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate**

During *Certificate* modification, there is no new key generation, thus there is no need to handover key to the *Subject*. The modified *Certificate* can be received (downloadable) without personal encounter.

If the private key of the *Subject* is on a *Electronic Seal Creation Device* then the *Certificate* can be installed to the device by the *Subject* too. For that, the *Trust Service Provider* provides written guidelines, and if necessary, it provides consultation possibilities by telephone. The *Subject* accepts the *Certificate* by its usage, and there is no need for further statement.

#### **4.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA**

The *Trust Service Provider* discloses the renewed *Certificate* the same way as the original *Certificate*.

#### **4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

The person entitled to represent the *Subject* is notified by the *Trust Service Provider* on the *Certificate* issuance without delay.

### **4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension**

The process when the *Trust Service Provider* terminates the validity of the *Certificate* before expiration is called *Certificate* revocation. The *Certificate* revocation is a permanent and irreversible status change, the revoked certificate will never be valid again.

The process when the *Trust Service Provider* temporarily ceases the validity of the *Certificate* before expiration is called *Certificate* suspension. The *Certificate* suspension is a temporary state; the suspended *Certificate* can be revoked, or before the end of the validity, with the withdrawal of the suspension it can be made valid again. In case of the withdrawal of suspension the *Certificate* becomes valid retroactively, as if it has not been suspended.

The usage of the private key belonging to the revoked or suspended *Certificate* shall be eliminated or suspended immediately. If possible, the private key belonging to the revoked *Certificate* shall be destroyed immediately after revocation.

Responsibility regulations related to suspension and revocation:

- If the *Trust Service Provider* has already published the revoked status of the *Certificate*, the *Trust Service Provider* does not take any responsibility, if the *Relying Party* considers the *Certificate* valid.

#### 4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation

##### Reasons for Revoking a Subscriber Certificate

*Certification Authority* takes action on the revocation of the end-user *Certificate* in the following cases:

- the *Applicant* or the *Subscriber* requests the revocation of the *Certificate* in writing;
- the *Applicant* or the *Subscriber* notifies *Certification Authority* that the *Certificate Application* is not approved and subsequently the approval is not given;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the private key corresponding to the public key in the *Certificate* has been compromised;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the public key in the *Certificate* does not comply with the requirements defined in Section 6.1.5. and 6.1.6.;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the certificate was misused;
- the *Trust Service Provider* is made aware that a *Subscriber* has violated one or more of its material obligations under the service agreement or General Terms and Conditions;
- the *Certification Authority* is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the *Certificate*;
- the *Certificate* modification because of data change referring to the *Subject*;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the *Certificate* was not issued according to the related *Certificate Policy* or the *Certification Practice Statement*;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that any of the data appearing in the *Certificate* is inaccurate;
- the *Certification Authority* is no longer entitled to issue *Certificates*, and maintenance is not provided for the existing CRL and OCSP services;
- the revocation is required by the *Certification Authority's Certificate Policy* or the *Certification Practice Statement*;
- the *Certification Authority* issued the *Certificate* based on a document from a third party, and it withdraws that document in writing;

- the format and technical content of the *Certificate* presents an unacceptable risk to the *Relying Parties* (for example, if the used cryptographic algorithm or key size is no longer secure);
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the private key of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit might be compromised;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the *Subscriber* failed to fulfil any of its financial obligations according to the service agreement;
- the *Certificate* was suspended, and was not reinstated during the ensured time period (see section: 4.9.16.);
- the termination of service agreement;
- the *Certification Authority* has terminated its activities;
- the supervisory body enacts (smth.) in a legally binding and executable decision;
- the law makes revocation mandatory.

#### **Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate**

*Certification Authority* is bound to take action on the revocation of the *Certificate* of the intermediate certification unit in the following cases:

- the CA operating the intermediate certification unit requests the revocation of the *Certificate* in writing;
- the Subordinate CA notifies the *Trust Service Provider* that the original *Certificate Application* was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that it is not in the exclusive possession of the private key;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the public key in the *Certificate* does not comply with the requirements defined in Section 6.1.5 and 6.1.6. ;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the *Certificate* was misused;
- the *Certificate* was not issued according to the relevant *Certificate Policy* and the *Certification Practice Statement* or the operation of the intermediate certification unit does not comply with the relevant *Certificate Policy* or *Certification Practice Statement*;
- the *Certification Authority* determines that any of the information appearing in the *Certificate* is inaccurate or misleading;
- The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another *Certification Authority* to provide revocation support for the *Certificate*;
- *Certification Authority* is no longer entitled to issue *Certificates*, and maintenance is not provided for the CRL and OCSP services related to the *Certificates* ;



- the revocation is required by the Issuing CA's *Certificate Policy* or the *Certification Practice Statement*;
- *Certificate* modification because of data change relating to the certification unit or *Certification Authority*;
- the format and technical content of the *Certificate* presents an unacceptable risk to the *Relying Parties* (for example, if the used cryptographic algorithm or key size is no longer secure);
- the *Certification Authority* has terminated its activities;
- the law makes the revocation mandatory.

#### **Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate operated by another CA**

*Certification Authority* is bound to take action on the revocation of the *Certificate* of the intermediate certification unit operated by other *Certification Authority* in the following cases:

- the CA operating the intermediate certification unit requests the revocation of the *Certificate* in writing;
- the Subordinate CA notifies the *Trust Service Provider* that the original *Certificate Application* was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
- the issuer *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the operator of the intermediate certification unit is not in the exclusive possession of the private key;
- the issuer *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the public key in the *Certificate* does not anymore comply with the requirements defined in Section 6.1.5 and 6.1.6. ;
- the *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the *Certificate* was misused;
- the issuer *Certification Authority* becomes aware that the *Certificate* is not issued according to the related *Certificate Policy* and the *Certification Practice Statement* or the operation of the intermediate certification unit operator does not comply with the relevant *Certificate Policy* or *Certification Practice Statement*;
- the *Certification Authority* determines that any of the information appearing in the *Certificate* is inaccurate or misleading;
- The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another *Certification Authority* to provide revocation support for the *Certificate*;
- the *Certification Authority* is no longer entitled to issue *Certificates*, and maintenance of the CRL and OCSP services for the existing *Certificates* is not provided;
- the revocation is required by the Issuing CA's *Certificate Policy* or the *Certification Practice Statement*;

- *Certificate* modification because of data change relating to the certification unit or the other *Certification Authority*;
- if *Certification Authority* issued the *Certificate* based on a document from a third party, and that third party withdraws the document in writing;
- the format and technical content of the *Certificate* presents an unacceptable risk to the Relying parties (for example, if the used cryptographic algorithm and key size is no longer safe);
- the *Certification Authority* operating the certification unit or the issuer *Certification Authority* of its *Certificate* has terminated its activities;
- the law makes the revocation mandatory.

#### 4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation

The revocation of the *Certificate* may be requested by the *Clients*, namely:

- the *Subscriber*;
- the contact person specified in the service agreement; *Organizational Administrator* appointed by the *Subscriber*;
- the *Trust Service Provider*.

Additionally, *Subscribers*, *Relying Parties*, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties may submit High Risk Certificate Problem Reports informing the *Trust Service Provider* of reasonable cause to revoke the *Certificate*, like fraud, misuse or key compromise.

The *Trust Service Provider* provides clear instructions on how to report suspected Private Key Compromise, *Certificate* misuse, or other types of possible fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or any other matter related to *Certificates* on the following website:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/report-certification-security-events.html>

#### 4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures the following possibilities for the *Clients* to submit a revocation request:

- through the website of the *Trust Service Provider* 24 hours a day.  
The IT system of the *Trust Service Provider* processes the applications submitted through its website immediately, the site informs the application submitter about the results of the evaluation.
- in an electronic form with an electronic signature based on the non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the *Certificate* to be revoked (see section 1.2.3.);
- in an electronic form with an electronic seal created by the *Certificate* of the *Subscriber* with a security classification not lower than the *Certificate* to be revoked (see section 1.2.3.);

- on paper signed manually at the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider* during office hours in person, or sent by post.

The *Trust Service Provider* verifies the authenticity of the request, and the submitter's eligibility during the evaluation of the request.

In case of Revocation request signed with a valid electronic signature, there is no need for further verification of the identity of the applicant and the authenticity of the request.

In case of submitting revocation request on paper, via mail the *Trust Service Provider* verifies the manual signature on the request.

The reason for revocation shall be stated. If the revocation was requested by the *Client*, and it does not state the reason for revocation, then the *Trust Service Provider* considers that the reason for revocation is that the *Subject* does not want to use the *Certificate* anymore.

If the *Client* request the revocation due to key compromise, the *Trust Service Provider* ensures a possibility during the revocation process, to request a new *Certificate* in the framework of *Re-key* to replace the *Certificate* to be revoked. The rules for *Re-key* are in section 4.7.

When the revocation is requested in writing, the *Trust Service Provider* makes possible to ask the revocation in advance for a later date by giving the requested date of the revocation.

The revocation request shall contain the data to identify the *Certificate*.

The requester shall provide particularly the following information:

- the exact denomination of the *Subject*;
- the *Certificate's* unique identifier;
- the requested date of the revocation, if the revocation shall not happen immediately;
- identification data of the *Client*.

In case of invalid or incomplete revocation request the *Trust Service Provider* rejects the request. The *Trust Service Provider* notifies the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* about the fact and reason of the rejection by email.

In case of complete and valid request the *Trust Service Provider* makes a decision about the acceptance of the request. Depending on the content of the request the *Trust Service Provider* revokes the *Certificate* immediately or sets up the date of revocation according to the request.

In case of a successful revocation the *Trust Service Provider* notifies the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* about the revocation by email.

Further information about the suspension and revocation can be found on the home page of the *Trust Service Provider* on the following link:

<https://e-szigno.hu/hitelesites-szolgalatas/tanusitvanyok/tanusitvany-felfuggesztese-es-visszavonasa.html>

### High-Priority Certificate Problem Report

The *Trust Service Provider* maintains a continuous 24x7 ability to respond internally to a High Priority Certificate Problem Report.

The *Trust Service Provider* begins investigating the Certificate Problem Report within 24 hours after receiving and decides whether revocation is appropriate based on the following criteria:

- the nature of the alleged problem,
- the consequences of revocation,
- the number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular *Certificate* or *Subscriber*,
- the entity making the complaint, and
- relevant legislation.

The *Trust Service Provider* provides a preliminary report on its findings to both the *Subscriber* and the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances, the *Trust Service Provider* works with the *Subscriber* and any entity reporting the Certificate Problem Report or other revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the *Certificate* will be revoked, and if so, a date which the *Trust Service Provider* will revoke the *Certificate*.

The period from receipt of the Certificate Problem Report or revocation-related notice to published revocation shall not exceed the time frame set forth in Section 4.9.5.

If necessary, the *Trust Service Provider* informs the National Media and Infocommunications Authority about the reported problem.

#### 4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period

The *Trust Service Provider* does not apply grace period during the fulfilment of revocation requests.

#### 4.9.5 Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

The *Trust Service Provider* processes the revocation requests issued through the website of the *Trust Service Provider* immediately 24 hours a day .

The *Trust Service Provider* processes the revocation requests issued by any other way within 24 hours following the arrival of the request.

- In case of applications submitted in person, the time of arrival is when the customer service officer of the *Trust Service Provider* receives the application.
- In case of applications sent by post, the time of arrival is when the mail arrives to the *Trust Service Provider* at office hours.
- In case of applications sent by electronic mail, the time of arrival is when the email is received to the dedicated email address `revocation@e-szigno.hu` on the server of the *Trust Service Provider* during office hours of the Customer Service. Emails arriving out of office hours are considered as arrived at the beginning of the next business day.

The *Trust Service Provider* undertakes to meet these requirements only for revocation requests sent to the indicated addresses stated in section 1.3.1. In case of revocation request sent to other addresses – specially directly sent to specific associate of the *Trust Service Provider* – or via other channels, the *Trust Service Provider* does not offer any availability.

If the *Client* wants to revoke its *Certificate* and the revocation is urgent, or the *Client* cannot appear in person at the office of the *Trust Service Provider*, the *Trust Service Provider* recommends to the *Client* to suspend the *Certificate* until the revocation by using the SMS based suspension service (see section 4.9.13). It is sufficient to take care of the revocation of the suspended certificates later, and the *Trust Service Provider* automatically revokes the suspended *Certificates* after the time for restoration elapses (see section: 4.9.16.).

#### 4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

To maintain the level of security guaranteed by the *Trust Service Provider*, prior to the adoption and use of the information indicated in the *Certificate*, it is necessary for *Relying Parties* to act with proper carefulness. It is particularly recommended for them to verify all of the *Certificates* located in the *Certificate* chain according to the relevant technical standards. The verification should cover the verification of the *Certificates*' validity, the policy requirements and key usage, and the checking of the referenced CRL or OCSP based revocation information.

#### 4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency

The *Trust Service Provider* issues a new *Certificate Revocation List* for its end user *Certificates* at least once a day.

The validity of these *Certificate Revocation Lists* is 25 hours.

The *Trust Service Provider* issues a new *Certificate Revocation List* for its intermediate certification units every day at the same time. The validity of the *Certificate Revocation Lists* is 25 hours.

#### 4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs

At most 5 minutes elapse between the generation and disclosure of the *Certificate Revocation List* (CRL).

#### 4.9.9 Online Revocation/Status Checking Availability

The *Trust Service Provider* provides online *Certificate* status (OCSP) service.

#### 4.9.10 Online Revocation Checking Requirements

The online *Certificate* status service complies with the requirements of Section 4.10 .  
*Certification Authority* provides OCSP service through GET method.

#### 4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available

The *Trust Service Provider* makes available in its public *Certificate* Repository – with their status – the revoked and suspended *Certificates*. Thus by searching in the *Certificate* Repository the *Clients* and the *Relying Parties* can personally (without the help of an application) verify the revocation status of a *Certificate*.

#### 4.9.12 Special Requirements for Key Compromise

In case of any certification unit's private key is compromised, the *Trust Service Provider* makes every reasonable effort in order to notify the *Relying Parties* about the incident. It publishes any status change on the provider *Certificates* on its webpage. In case of compromised *Certificates* issued by the *Trust Service Provider*, the *Trust Service Provider* is able to revoke the end-user *Certificate* belonging to the compromised private key. The revocation reason information (reasonCode) in this case is set to keyCompromise (1) value.

#### 4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures a possibility for *Clients* for the temporary suspension of the *Certificate* in case, that it can be assumed that any of the reasons establishing revocation exists. The *Trust Service Provider* is entitled for *Certificate* suspension for the following reasons:

- the *Subscriber* does not pay until the payment deadline;
- if the *Trust Service Provider* presumes that the data indicated on the *Certificate* do not comply with reality. If the *Trust Service Provider* becomes aware of those conditions, it initiates the suspension or revocation of the *Certificate*;
- if the *Trust Service Provider* presumes that the private key belonging to the *Certificate* is not in the possession of the *Subject*, and it is confirmed by substantial evidence. If the *Trust Service Provider* becomes aware of that the *Electronic Seal Creation Device* is possessed by an unauthorized person, the *Trust Service Provider* suspends every *Certificate* it contains;
- the supervisory body enacts (smth.) in a legally binding and executable decision;

The *Trust Service Provider* does not accept suspension requests related to *Certificates* not valid, in addition to justify the reason for rejection.

#### 4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension

The suspension of a *Certificate* can be requested by the same persons, who are eligible to initiate the revocation of the *Certificate* (see section: 4.9.2.)

#### 4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures opportunity for suspension initiation:

- via its webpage;
- by sending a fixed-format SMS text message;
- the same way as submitting the revocation requests.

### Suspension via Web

Suspension is also available via the website of the *Trust Service Provider* at the following address:  
<https://www.e-szigno.hu/felfuggesztes>

When suspending via the website of the *Trust Service Provider* the *Client* needs to provide the following information:

- the suspension password as a data certifying the authenticity of the suspension request,
- the last three parts of the *Subject* OID in the *Certificate* (e.g. 2.2.123), or in case of natural person *Subject* instead of the OID the date of birth of the *Subject*.

Suspension requests submitted via the website of the *Trust Service Provider* are processed without delay by the information system of the *Trust Service Provider* and it immediately notifies the applicant about the result on its website.

In case of a successful revocation, the changed revocation status appears in the internal *Revocation Status Registry* of the *Trust Service Provider* immediately. The inner processes of the *Trust Service Provider* ensure that the processing ends within at most 5 minutes from the provision of data, so the changed revocation state is updated from the receipt of the request within maximum that interval.

The *Trust Service Provider* logs every suspension request. In case of a successful suspension, the *Trust Service Provider* notifies the *Subject* and the Subscriber about the fact of the suspension by email.

The *Trust Service Provider* guarantees availability of suspension service only for suspension requests received from SMS text. If the webpage of the *Trust Service Provider* is not available, the *Trust Service Provider* recommends the *Client* to request suspension by sending SMS.

### Suspension by sending a fixed-format SMS text message

The *Clients* of the *Trust Service Provider* may indicate in an SMS text message sent to the *Trust Service Provider's* suspension phone number if a Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device or a private key is possessed by an unauthorized person.

The *Trust Service Provider* immediately begins the processing of the suspension requests arriving in text messages. The *Trust Service Provider's* system sends an automatically generated reply message to the phone number of the requester about the result of processing and the success of the suspension.

In the request sent in the text message the following data shall be provided separated by a space character:

- date of birth of the *Subject* in the "YYYY-MM-DD" format or the last three digits of the OID as indicated in the *Certificate*,
- the suspension password of the *Certificate*.

Examples of formally correct suspension request:

- "1976-11-04 a1b2c3d4"

- "2.1.134 pacsirta"

The *Trust Service Provider* always declines the suspension request arriving in a text message from a hidden phone number regardless of the content of the message.

### **Suspension the Same Way as Revocation Request Submission**

The *Trust Service Provider* enables the submission of the suspension requests the same way, as the revocation requests, according to the requirements of section 4.9.3. From the suspension application, the *Trust Service Provider* shall be able to determine that exactly which *Certificate* the applicant asks to be suspended and upon what grounds. The registration staff member sends a notification via email to the *Subject* and the Subscriber.

At suspension, the reason of suspension shall be given. If the *Client* requests the suspension, and does not give the reason, the *Trust Service Provider* assumes that the reason is private key compromise.

If the *Client* asks for the suspension because of key compromise, then the *Trust Service Provider* provides an opportunity for the *Client* during the suspension process to indicate that if the *Certificate* is not reinstated within a time frame (and so it becomes revoked), then a new certificate will be requested within the framework of *Re-key*. The rules of *Re-key* are in section 4.7.

#### **4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period**

If the suspension of the *Certificate* was requested by the *Client*, the *Client* may request the reinstatement of the *Certificate* within 5 working days after the suspension. If the reinstatement of the *Certificate* is not requested within this interval the *Trust Service Provider* revokes the *Certificate*.

The *Certificate* reinstatement can be requested by the person who requested the certificate suspension. The reinstatement application can only be submitted to the *Trust Service Provider*:

- personally in the customer service of the *Trust Service Provider*;
- in an electronic form with an electronic signature based on the non-pseudonymous *Certificate* with a security classification not lower than the suspended *Certificate* (see section 1.2.3.);

In case of a successful *Certificate* reinstatement, the *Trust Service Provider* notifies the *Subject* and the *Subscriber* by email of the fact.

#### **4.10 Certificate Status Services**

The *Trust Service Provider* provides the following possibilities for the *Certificate* revocation status query:

- OCSP – online *Certificate* revocation status query service,
- CRL – *Certificate Revocation Lists*.



In case of *Codesigning Certificates* the *Trust Service Provider* guaranties the availability of the OSCP based revocation information beyond the *Codesigning Certificate's* expiration date for at least 10 years.

The *Trust Service Provider* maintains an internal *Revocation Status Registry*, which contains the current revocation status information of all the *Certificates* issued by the *Trust Service Provider*, including the valid, revoked and suspended statuses.

In case of suspension, reinstatement and revocation the new status of the *Certificate* – see section: 4.9. – appears immediately in the revocation records of *Trust Service Provider* after the successful completion of the process.

The *Revocation Status Registry* contains also the revocation status information of the expired *Certificates*, which will be available till the expiry date of the issuing CA.

The *Trust Service Provider* generates the *Certificate Revocation List* based on the actual information received from the *Revocation Status Registry*, so any change in the revocation statuses will be published in the first *Certificate Revocation List* issued after the given change.

The OSCP responses issued by the OSCP responders of the *Trust Service Provider* are always based on the revocation status information received from the *Revocation Status Registry* at the time which is indicated in the OSCP response.

OCSP response issued by the *Trust Service Provider* may contain "good" status information only for the *Certificates* that were issued by the given certification unit and are stored in the *Trust Service Provider's Certificate Repository* (positive OSCP).

#### 4.10.1 Operational Characteristics

Each certification unit of the *Trust Service Provider* issues *Certificate Revocation List* with the frequency below:

- The productive (not root) SHA-256 based certification units operated within the system of the *Trust Service Provider* issue CRL within 60 minutes after the revocation status change of any *Certificate* issued by the given certification unit, but at least once in every 24 hours.
- The "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" root certification unit issues a CRL once in at the most of 24 hours.
- The "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" root certification unit issues a CRL once in at the most of 24 hours.
- The productive (not root) ECC based certification units operated within the system of the *Trust Service Provider* issue CRL within 60 minutes after the revocation status change of any *Certificate* issued by the given certification unit, but at least once in every 24 hours.

The validity period of the *Certificate Revocation List* is 25 hours. The all-time current *Certificate Revocation Lists* for the specific *Certificates* can be reached at the following address:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/pki-services/ca-certificates.html>

The effective date of the *Certificate Revocation Lists* ("thisUpdate") marks also the time when the certification unit assembled and started signing the *Certificate Revocation List*. After that, in case of long *Certificate Revocation Lists* the publication of the *Certificate Revocation List* may

even take 1 or 2 minutes. The appearance of the next *Certificate Revocation List* ("nextUpdate") marks the latest next time, from what the list is publicly available. Accordingly, the time interval between the date of the *Certificate Revocation List* entering into force, and the date of publication of the next *Certificate Revocation List* can be longer than the time intervals above, but this does not affect the time interval between the appearance of the CRLs is at most 24 hours.

Regarding, that amongst the provided services, the validity of the *Certificate* can be determined the fastest and the easiest with OCSP, the *Certification Authority* recommends the use of OCSP to its *Clients*.

### Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)

The *Trust Service Provider* publishes the revocation status of the *Certificates* with the OCSP service too.

In respect of the *Certificate* based on SHA-256, the *Trust Service Provider* provides OCSP service according to the IETF RFC 6960 "authorized responder" principle, so its every certification unit certifies separately an OCSP responder, which provides information on the revocation status of the *Certificates* issued by the certification unit (section 1.3.1.).

The *Trust Service Provider* provides OCSP services two different ways, below the characteristics of the two versions are shown.

#### OCSP Service Provided for Clients

- Only those *Clients* use of this version of the OCSP service, that have a valid service agreement for the maintenance of that *Certificate*. The *Trust Service Provider* can identify the *Client* by the *Certificate* or by a username password pair at the query.
- This version of the OCSP service is available for all *Certificates*, the responses always contain the current information listed in the registry of the *Trust Service Provider*.
- The issued OCSP response is always made at the time of the query. The "thisUpdate" and "producedAt" time values in the OCSP response match with the time of the query.
- The "nextUpdate" indicated in the response is either not filled, or contains a time value not later than the responder certification expiration time.
- With the help of the OCSP service provided to *Clients*, an evidence always can be acquired that later verifies towards third parties the revocation status of the *Certificate* indicated in the registry of the *Trust Service Provider* for the query date.

#### Public and Free OCSP Service

- This version of the OCSP service is publicly and freely available, any *Relying Party* can avail itself of it same as the *Certificate Revocation Lists*. There is no need for authentication at query.
- This version of the OCSP service can be reached through the URLs indicated on the *Certificates*.

- Based on the IETF RFC 6960 "Response Pre-production" process, the issued OCSP response can be created before the query and does not necessarily contain the nonce element. The *Trust Service Provider* can give the same response for multiple queries. The "thisUpdate" and "producedAt" time values are identical, but these can precede the time of the query.
- The "nextUpdate" indicated in the response is either not filled, or contains a time value not later than the responder certification expiration time.
- The "thisUpdate" value indicated in the issued OCSP response is never older than 24 hours, because the *Trust Service Provider* creates a new OCSP response at least in every 24 hours.
- The time difference between the "nextUpdate" and "thisUpdate" values in the issued OCSP response is never greater than 10 days.
- The OCSP responses always contain the current information listed in the revocation registry of the *Trust Service Provider*, but if the "thisUpdate" time of the OCSP response is earlier than the time for which the verification is carried out – which is either earlier or coincides with the time of the query –, then the OCSP response is not clear evidence for a third party regarding the revocation status of the *Certificate*.

Due to the indicated differences of the aforementioned two versions of the OCSP services, the public and free service can be considered equivalent to the service provided to the *Clients* in the following cases:

- If there is no need for OCSP response storage, rather it is used for prompt, immediate decision making. In this case, it is acceptable, that the OCSP response does not verify the validity of the *Certificate* clearly for third parties at a definite time subsequently.
- If the time span between the time of the OCSP query and the time, regarding when the verification is made, is bigger, than the difference of the "nextUpdate" and "thisUpdate" values of the stored OCSP response (which can be at most the validity period of the responder certificate used for signing the OCSP response). In this case, the OCSP responses provided by the public and free service can be accepted as a clear evidence for the third party, because the thisUpdate field in them is guaranteed to be later than the time, regarding when the verification is made.
- If the verifier party does not query the OCSP response itself (but for example uses an OCSP response attached to an archive signature), then it is not necessary to check, which sources the OCSP response came from originally. It is sufficient to verify only that the "thisUpdate" value in the OCSP response is later, than the time regarding which the verification is made.

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures the aforementioned two versions of the OCSP services with the same availability.

#### 4.10.2 Service Availability

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures that the availability of the *Certificate Repository* and the terms and conditions pertaining to the *Certificates* issued by the *Trust Service Provider* is at least 99% per year, and the length of downtime shall not exceed at most 24 hours.

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures that the availability of the revocation status information and the revocation management service is at least at least 99% per year, and the length of downtimes shall not exceed at most 24 hours on any occasion.

The response time of the revocation status service in case of normal operation is less than 10 seconds.

#### 4.10.3 Optional Features

The *Trust Service Provider* provides various (CRL and two types of OCSP) services according to the descriptions in this section, in the framework of *Clients* and *Relying Parties* can verify the revocation status of the *Certificates* issued by the *Trust Service Provider*. Besides these, the *Trust Service Provider* makes available in its public *Certificate Repository* – with their status indicated – the revoked and suspended *Certificates*, so while searching in the *Certificate Repository* the *Clients* and *Relying Parties* can (without the help of an application) verify the revocation status of the *Certificate*.

#### 4.11 End of Subscription

The *Trust Service Provider* revokes the end-user *Certificates* in case of the termination of the contract concluded with the *Subscriber*.

#### 4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery

The *Trust Service Provider* does not provide key escrow service for a private key belonging to a seal *Certificate*.

##### 4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices

The private key belonging to the seal *Certificate* shall not be escrowed.

##### 4.12.2 Symmetric Encryption Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices

The private key belonging to the seal *Certificate* shall not be escrowed, so regarding that the symmetric encryption keys do not have to be managed.

## 5 Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

The *Trust Service Provider* applies physical, procedural, and personnel security precautions that comply with acknowledged standards, along with the administrative and governance related procedures that enforce these.

The *Trust Service Provider* keeps a record of the system units and resources related to the service provision, and conducts a risk assessment on these. It uses protective measures proportional to the risks related to the individual elements.

The *Trust Service Provider* monitors the capacity demands and ensures that the adequate processing power and storage are available for the provision of the service.

## 5.1 Physical Controls

The *Trust Service Provider* takes care that physical access to critical services is controlled, and keeps physical risk of the assets related to critical services at a minimum.

The purpose of physical precautions is to prevent illegitimate access, damage, and unauthorized access to the *Trust Service Provider's* information, and physical zones.

Services that process critical and sensitive information are implemented at secure locations in the system of the *Trust Service Provider*.

The provided protection is proportional to the identified threats of the risk analysis that the *Trust Service Provider* has performed.

In order to provide adequate security:

- The *Trust Service Provider* implements the strongly protected services in its protected computer room. This computer room has been designed and constructed specifically for this purpose, by its design uniform enforcement of various aspects of protection (the placement and structure of the site, physical access (access control and supervision), power supply, air conditioning, protection against water leakage and flooding, fire prevention and protection, media storage etc.) took place.
- The Customer Service office of the *Trust Service Provider* was designed, to be able to meet the requirements for registration services under realistic costs.
- The *Trust Service Provider* constructed its mobile registration units, so that they comply with the requirements imposed on the registration service.
- The *Trust Service Provider* implements every critical service and every necessary tool in a separate security zone. All the devices necessary for this are placed in a protected computer room – forming part of the security zone.

### 5.1.1 Site Location and Construction

The IT system of the *Trust Service Provider* is located and operated within a properly secured *Data Centre* with physical and logical protection that prevents illegitimate access. Defensive solutions – as for example guarding, security locks, intrusion detection systems, video surveillance system, access control system – are applied over the course of locating and establishing the *Data Centre* that are built on each other and interdependent and together they provide a powerful protection system for the IT systems participating in service provision, and for the preservation of the confidential data stored by the provider.

### 5.1.2 Physical Access

The *Trust Service Provider* protects devices and equipment that take part in the service provision from unauthorized physical access in order to prevent tampering with the devices.

*Trust Service Provider* ensures that:

- each entry to the *Data Centre* is registered;

- only authorized staff members with trusted roles with the right permissions can entry to the computer room individually;
- persons without independent authorization can only stay in the *Data Centre* in justified cases, for the time required and accompanied by personnel with appropriate rights;
- the entry logs shall be archived continuously and evaluated weekly.

The activation data (passwords, PIN codes) of the devices shall not be stored openly even in the *Data Centre*.

In the presence of unauthorized persons:

- data media containing sensitive information are physically out of reach;
- the logged-in terminals are not left without supervision;
- no work process is carried out during which confidential information may be revealed.

When leaving the computer room the administrator shall verify that:

- every equipment of the *Data Centre* is in an adequately secure operation state;
- there's no terminal left logged-in;
- physical storage devices are locked properly;
- systems, devices providing physical protection operate properly;
- the alarm system has been activated.

There are appointed responsible people to carry out regular physical security assessments. The results of the examinations are recorded in the appropriate log entries.

### 5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning

The *Trust Service Provider* applies an uninterruptible power supply unit in the *Data Centre* that:

- has adequate capacity to ensure power supply for the *Data Centre's* IT and subsidiary facility systems;
- protects IT equipment from voltage fluctuations in the external network, power outages, spikes and other;
- in case of lasting power outage has its own power generation equipment, which – by allowing refueling – is able to provide the necessary energy for any period of time.

The air of the outer environment shall not get into the *Data Centre* directly. The *Data Centre* air purity is ensured with adequate filter system to detect a variety of contaminants from the air (dust, pollutants, and corrosive materials, toxic or flammable substances). The ventilation system provides the necessary amount of fresh air with adequate filtration for the safe working conditions of the operators.

The humidity is reduced to the level required by the IT systems.

The *Trust Service Provider* uses cooling systems with proper performance to provide the necessary operating temperature, to prevent overheating of IT devices.

#### 5.1.4 Water Exposures

The *Data Centre* of the *Trust Service Provider* is adequately protected from water intrusion and flooding. The total area of the security zone is free from sanitary facilities, there is not any drain or water pipe close to it. In the protected computer room security is further increased by the use of a raised floor.

#### 5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection

In the *Data Centre* of the *Trust Service Provider*, a fire protection system approved by the competent fire headquarters operates.

There is the type and quantity of manual fire extinguishers in accordance with the relevant regulations at clearly visible locations in each room.

#### 5.1.6 Media Storage

The *Trust Service Provider* protects its media storages from unauthorized access and accidental damage. All audit and archive data is created in duplicate. The two copies are stored separately from each other physically, at locations in a safe distance from each other. The stored media storages are protected from damaging environmental influences such as low or high temperatures, dirt, moisture, sunlight, strong magnetic fields, strong radiation.

The *Trust Service Provider* stores the primary media storages in the operational room of the certification organization, a code locked fireproof vault, the secondary copies in a vault in the customer service office.

#### 5.1.7 Waste Disposal

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures the environmental standards compliant disposal of the superfluous assets, and media.

The *Trust Service Provider* does not use the electronic storage media containing information classified as confidential even for storing data classified as not confidential after deleting their content and devices like that shall not be taken outside of the premises of the *Trust Service Provider*. The *Trust Service Provider* physically destroys – according to the rules of disposal – the defective for any other reason unusable, redundant media storages containing confidential classified information:

- chops paper documents up in a shredder machine;
- disassembles the hard drives and smashes the critical components;
- destroys the optical disc with a suitable shredder machine.

#### 5.1.8 Off-Site Backup

The *Trust Service Provider* creates a backup weekly from which the whole service could be restored in case of a fatal error. The backups – at least including the last full backup – are stored at an

external location that's physical and operational protection is identical to the primary site. The secure data transmission from the primary to the backup locations is resolved.

Based on the randomly selected backup data a restoration test is made at least yearly. The main circumstances and results of the restoration test is recorded in an audit report.

## 5.2 Procedural Controls

The *Trust Service Provider* takes care that its systems are operated securely, according to the rules, and with a minimal risk of defects.

Procedural precautions have the objective of supplementing, and at the same time intensifying the effectiveness of physical safeguards, along with those applicable to personnel, by means of appointing and isolating trusted roles, documenting the responsibilities of various roles, as well as specifying the personnel headcounts and exclusion roles necessary for the various tasks, moreover identification and authentication expected in the various roles.

The *Trust Service Provider's* internal governance system ensures that its operation complies with legal, as well as its internal regulations. In its system a responsible person shall be clearly assigned for every given system unit and process.

Individuals responsible for a given system element or process are assigned unambiguously to every system element and every process in its system. Development and operations related tasks are sharply segregated in the *Trust Service Provider's* system. The auditing activity of the independent system auditor and the *Trust Service Provider's* internal auditor ensures the system's appropriate operation.

### 5.2.1 Trusted Roles

The *Trust Service Provider* creates trusted roles (in the wording of the regulation, scope of activities) according to the requirements of decree 24/2016. [9] for the performance of its tasks. The rights and functions are be shared among the various trusted roles in such a way that one user alone shall not be able to bypass the security protection measures.

The *Trust Service Provider* defines the following trusted roles, with the following responsibilities:

**Manager with overall responsibility for the IT system of the *Trust Service Provider*:**

The individual responsible for the IT system.

**Security officer:** Senior security associate, the individual with overall responsibility for the security of the service.

**System administrator:** Infrastructure administrator. The individual with the task to install, configure and maintain the systems of the *Trust Service Provider*. Responsible, for the reliable and continuous operation of the assigned system units, and for monitoring the development of technology, and for the detection and proposing of development solutions of the vulnerabilities of each system component.

**Operator:** System operator, individual performing the IT system's continuous operation, backup and restore.



**Independent system auditor:** Individual who audits the logged, as well as archived dataset of the *Trust Service Provider*, responsible for verifying the enforcement of control measures the service provider implements in the interest of operation that complies with regulations, moreover for the continuous auditing and monitoring of existing procedures.

**Registration officer:** Individual responsible for the approval of production, issuance, revocation and suspension of end-user certificates.

**Official active in the field of personalization:** The individual, whose task is the Certificate application compilation;

For the provision of trusted roles the manager responsible for the security of the *Trust Service Provider* formally appoints the *Trust Service Provider's* employees.

Only those persons may hold a trusted role who are in employment relationship with the *Trust Service Provider*. Trusted roles shall not be hold in the context of a commission contract.

Up to date records are kept of the trusted roles and in case of any change, the National Media and Infocommunications Authority is notified without delay.

### 5.2.2 Number of Persons Required per Task

The security and operational regulations of the *Trust Service Provider* define that the following tasks can be only performed in protected environment, with the contemporaneous presence of two employees holding trusted roles:

- the generation of the *Trust Service Provider's* own service key pair;
- the backup of the provider's private key;
- the activation of the provider's private key;
- the destruction of the provider's private key.

At least one of the persons performing the procedures listed above shall be a system administrator, and the other person shall not be the independent system auditor.

During the implementation of the operations listed, unauthorized person shall not be present in the room.

### 5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role

The users managing the IT system of the *Trust Service Provider* have unique identification data, enabling secure identification and authentication of the users.

The users can only access the IT systems critical from the aspect of the provision of the certification service after identification and authentication.

The identification and authentication data are revoked without delay in case of the cessation of user rights.

Every user of the IT system and every actor in the administrative process is identified individually.

For the verification of the physical access, the *Trust Service Provider* uses an RFID card based access control system, and for the logical access control, it uses VPN Certificates issued on a Secure

Signature-Creation Device. Before successful authorization, not even a single security-critical task can be performed. Every employee of the *Trust Service Provider* has exactly as many access rights, as it is absolutely necessary for the assigned role.

#### 5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

Employees of the *Trust Service Provider* can hold multiple trusted roles at the same time, but the *Trust Service Provider* ensures that:

- the security officer and the registration officer shall not hold the independent system auditor role;
- the system administrator shall not hold the security officer and the independent system auditor role;
- the manager with overall responsibility for the IT system shall not hold the security officer and the independent system auditor role.

In addition to the aforementioned, the *Trust Service Provider* seeks the complete separation of trusted roles.

### 5.3 Personnel Controls

The *Trust Service Provider* takes care that its personnel policy, and its practices applicable to employing staff members intensify and support the reliability of the *Trust Service Provider's* operation. The objective of precautions applicable to personnel is to reduce the risk of human errors, theft, fraud and cases of misuse.

The *Trust Service Provider* addresses personnel security already during the hiring stage, including the conclusion of contracts, as well as their validation when they are being employed. In the case of all trusted roles, applicants have valid certificate of no criminal record at the time of the application. Every employee in a trusted role and external parties – who get in contact with the *Trust Service Provider's* services – shall sign a non-disclosure agreement.

At the same time, the *Trust Service Provider* ensures for its employees obtaining as well as further developing of common, general know-how along with the specialized professional knowledge necessary for performing the various jobs.

#### 5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements

As a hiring requirement, the *Trust Service Provider* requires at least intermediate education degree, but the *Trust Service Provider* continues to takes care that employees receive appropriate training. Immediately after recruitment, the *Trust Service Provider* grants a training for its new employees, under the course of which they acquire the knowledge necessary to carry out the job. Registration officer can only be an employee, who finished a training course during which, he/she acquired the ability to recognize the ID cards acceptable by the *Trust Service Provider* (ID card, passport and driver's license). The *Trust Service Provider* usually supports the professional development of the employees, but it also expects employees to independently develop their skills in their respective

fields. Some of the employees of the *Trust Service Provider* have the role to detect and gather the technical and business innovations and to organize, and share this knowledge with their colleagues. Trusted roles can be held at the *Trust Service Provider* only by persons, who have no external influence and possess the necessary expertise validated by the *Trust Service Provider*. All personnel in trusted roles shall be free from conflict of interest that might prejudice the impartiality of the the *Trust Service Provider's* operations.

The manager with overall responsibility for the IT system can only be a person who has:

- specialized degree (mathematics, physics college or university degree or a college/university degree acquired at an engineering department belonging to the technical field of science);
- at least three years of expertise in professional working experience related to information security.

### 5.3.2 Background Check Procedures

The *Trust Service Provider* only hires employees for trusted or leading roles, who

- have a clean record and there's no proceeding in progress against them that may affect the impunity.
- are not subject to professional disqualifications prohibiting to exercise electronic signatures related services.

At the time of the appointment, shall the leading role holder *Trust Service Provider* employee with a statement, a trusted role holder employee with a certificate of good conduct less than 3 months old justify the clean criminal record.

The *Trust Service Provider* verifies the authenticity of the relevant information given in the applicant's CV during the hiring process, like previous employment, professional references, most relevant educational qualifications.

### 5.3.3 Training Requirements

The *Trust Service Provider* trains the newly recruited employees, over the course of which they acquire

- basic PKI knowledge;
- the specifics and the way of handling the *Trust Service Provider's* IT system;
- the necessary special knowledge for fulfilling their scope of activities;
- processes and procedures defined in the public and inner regulations of the *Trust Service Provider*;
- the legal consequences of the individual activities;
- the applicable IT security regulations to the extent necessary to the specific scope of activities;

- the data protection rules.

The *Trust Service Provider* trains the employees concerned with registration about the dangers and risks related to the verification of the data to be indicated on the Certificate.

The employees concerned with registration take and pass an exam on the knowledge of the related requirements and procedures for data verification before their appointment, and this fact is documented by the *Trust Service Provider*.

Only employees having passed the training shall gain access to the he production IT system of the *Trust Service Provider*.

#### **5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements**

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures that the employees have the necessary knowledge continuously, so if needed, further or repeater type of training is held.

Further training is held if there's a change within the processes or the IT system of the *Trust Service Provider*.

The training material is updated at least in every 12 months and contains the new threats and actual security practices.

The training is adequately documented, from what the syllabus and the scope of the participator employees can be clearly determined.

#### **5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence**

The *Trust Service Provider* does not apply mandatory rotation between individual work schedules.

#### **5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions**

The *Trust Service Provider* regulates the prosecution possibilities of the employees in an employment contract in case of failures, errors, accidental or intentional damage. If the employee – due to negligence or intentionally – violates their obligations, sanctions could be taken against him by the *Trust Service Provider*, which it sets out having regard to the offense and the consequences. The sanctions may include disciplinary proceedings, dismissal, revocation of appointment, criminal liability. Upon appointment every trusted role employee as part of the employment documents:

- gets written information about legal liabilities, rights, certification and management standards for the treatment of personal data,
- gets a job description that includes the concerning security tasks,
- signs a confidentiality agreement in which the related consequences non-compliant with security measures, (criminal sanctions) can be found too.

All of these include the labor legislation or criminal consequences, that sanction the different discipline – job obligations – violation or breaking the law.

### 5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements

The *Trust Service Provider* only assigns trusted roles to its employees.

The *Trust Service Provider* chooses persons employed with engagement contract or subcontract to perform the other tasks, chosen if possible, from the list of previously qualified suppliers. The *Trust Service Provider* concludes a written contract before working with suppliers.

Each contracting party – before the start of the active work – signs a confidentiality statement in which he agrees that the business / corporate secrets learned later on will not be covered up to unauthorized persons, and will not be exploited in any other way. The confidentiality statement includes sanctions in case of violation. External employees employed under the contract are expected to have appropriate technical skills, and the *Trust Service Provider* does not hold any trainings for them.

### 5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel

The *Trust Service Provider* continuously provides for the employees the availability of the current documentation and regulations necessary to perform their roles.

Each employee in trusted role receives the following documents in writing:

- the organizational security regulations of the *Trust Service Provider*,
- the confidentiality agreement to be signed,
- personal job description,
- educational materials on the occasion of the planned or special training for the specific form of education.

All employees are informed in a written notice about any changes in the organizational security regulations.

## 5.4 Audit Logging Procedures

In order to maintain a secure IT environment the *Trust Service Provider* implements and operates an event logger and control system covering its full IT system.

### 5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded

The *Trust Service Provider* logs every security-related event that can provide information on events, changes happened in the IT system or in its physical environment according to the generally accepted information security practice. In case of every log entry, it stores the following data:

- the time of the event;
- the type of the event;
- the identification of the user or the system who/what triggered the event;
- the success or failure of the audited event.

All new audit record is appended to the audit records. The earlier saved audit records can't be modified or deleted.

All of the essential event logs are available to the independent system auditors, who examine the compliance of the *Trust Service Provider's* operation.

The *Trust Service Provider* logs The following events at minimum:

- INTERNAL CLOCK
  - the synchronization of the internal clock to the UTC time, including the operational re-calibrations too;
  - the loss of synchronization;
- LOGGING:
  - the shutdown, restart of the logging system or some of its components;
  - the modification of any parameter of the logging settings, for example the frequency, alert threshold, and the event to be examined;
  - the modification or deletion of the stored logging data;
  - the activities performed because of the logging system's failure.
- SYSTEM LOGINS:
  - successful logins, unsuccessful login attempts for trusted roles;
  - in case of password based authentication:
    - \* the change of the number of permitted unsuccessful attempts;
    - \* reaching the limit of the permitted number of the unsuccessful login attempts in case of user login;
    - \* readmission of the user blocked because of the unsuccessful login attempts;
  - changing the authentication technique ( for example from password based to PKI based).
- KEY MANAGEMENT:
  - all events for the entire life cycle of service keys (key generation, saving, loading, destruction etc.);
  - events related to generating, managing the user keys;
  - all events related to the management of private keys stored for any purpose by the *Trust Service Provider*.
- CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT:
  - every event related to the issuance and the status change of the provider *Certificates*.
  - every request including *Certificate* issuance, re-key, key renewal , suspension and revocation;
  - events related to the request processing;

- every verification activity performed related to the *Certificate* issuance.
- refusal of the certificate applications;
- *Certificate* issuance or status change.
- DATA FLOWS:
  - any kind of security-critical data manually entered into the system;
  - security-relevant data, messages received by the system;
- CA CONFIGURATION:
  - re-parameterization , any change of the settings of any component, of the CA;
  - user admission, deletion;
  - changing the user roles, rights;
  - changing the Certificate profile;
  - changing the CRL profile;
  - generation of a new CRL list;
  - generation of an OCSP response;
  - *Time Stamp* generation;
  - exceeding the required time accuracy threshold.
- *Hardware Security Module*:
  - installing *Hardware Security Module*;
  - removing *Hardware Security Module*;
  - disposing, destructing *Hardware Security Module*;
  - delivering *Hardware Security Module*;
  - clearing (resetting) *Hardware Security Module*;
  - uploading keys, certificates to the *Hardware Security Module*.
- CONFIGURATION CHANGE:
  - hardware;
  - software;
  - operating system;
  - patch;
- PHYSICAL ACCESS, LOCATION SECURITY:
  - person entry to and exit from the security zone holding the system components used for providing the trust service;
  - access to a system component used for providing the trust service;
  - a known or suspected breach of physical security;
  - firewall or router traffic.

- OPERATIONAL ANOMALIES:
  - system crash, hardware failure;
  - software failures;
  - software integrity validation error;
  - incorrect or wrongly addressed messages;
  - network attacks, attack attempts;
  - equipment failure;
  - electric power malfunctions;
  - uninterruptible power supply error;
  - an essential network service access error;
  - violation of the *Certification Practice Statement*;
  - deletion of the operating system clock.
- OTHER EVENTS:
  - appointment of a person to a security role;
  - operating system installation;
  - PKI application installation;
  - initiation of a system;
  - entry attempt to the PKI application;
  - password modification, setting attempt;
  - saving the inner database, and restore from a backup;
  - file operations ( for example creating, renaming, moving);
  - database access.

#### 5.4.2 Frequency of Audit Log Processing

The independent system auditors of the *Trust Service Provider* evaluates the generated log files every working day.

During the evaluation, the authenticity and integrity of the examined logs is ensured, the error messages in the logs are checked and if needed, document the differences and take measures to eliminate the cause of the deviation.

For the IT system evaluation, the *Trust Service Provider* uses automated evaluation tools too, that are used to monitor the resulting log entries according to preset criteria and, where necessary, alert the operational staff. The notifications received from the automated evaluation tools are processed and evaluated by the experts of the IT operation within 24 hours.

The fact of the investigation, the results of the investigation and the measures undertaken to avert deficiencies found are properly documented.



### 5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log

Before the deletion from the on-line system, the logs are archived and their secure preservation is ensured by the *Trust Service Provider* for the amount of time defined in Section 5.5.2, but at least 10 years from the date of their creation.

For that time period, the *Trust Service Provider* ensures the readability of archived data, and maintains the software and hardware tools necessary for that.

### 5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log

The *Trust Service Provider* protects the created logs for the required preservation time. During the whole preservation time, the following properties of the logs' data is ensured:

- protection against unauthorized disclosure: only authorized persons – primarily the independent system auditors – access the logs;
- availability: authorized persons are granted access to the logs;
- integrity: any data alteration, deletion in the log files and change in the order of the entries, etc. is prevented.

The *Trust Service Provider* provides the log records with qualified *Time Stamps*, and they are stored in a way excluding the seamless insertion and deletion of the log entries.

The log files are protected against accidental and malicious damage by backups. In case of log entries containing personal data, the *Trust Service Provider* makes sure of the confidential storage of the data. Only those individuals are entitled to access to the log entries, who absolutely need it for their work. The *Trust Service Provider* verifies the accesses in a secure way. The *Trust Service Provider* preserves the log files in a secure environment. Keeps copies of the files at the second operation site.

### 5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures

Daily log files are created from the continuously generated log entries during the operation in each system.

The daily log files are archived in two copies after the evaluation and stored physically apart from each other, at separate sites for the required time.

The exact process of backups shall be defined in the backup regulations of the *Trust Service Provider*.

### 5.4.6 Audit Collection System (Internal vs External)

Each application automatically collects and sends the records to the logging system.

The logging functions start automatically at the time of the system launch and they are run continuously during the entire period of system operation.

In case of any anomaly in the automatic examiner and logging systems, the operation of the related areas are suspended by the *Trust Service Provider* until the incident is resolved.

#### 5.4.7 Notification to Event-causing Subject

The persons, organizations and applications that caused the error event are not always notified, but if necessary the *Trust Service Provider* involves them in the investigation of the event. The Clients affected by triggering the event has the duty to cooperate with the *Trust Service Provider* to explore the event.

#### 5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments

Besides processing daily the log entries, the experts of the *Trust Service Provider* monitor the publicly available information about possible vulnerabilities and the new software patches. They analyse the information, classify the vulnerability and if necessary inform the management about the result and propose an action plan to increase the security of the system.

Every major event of significant deficiencies detected or in case of external threat within a period of 48 hours after its discovery, but at least once a year the experts of the *Trust Service Provider* perform a comprehensive vulnerability analysis using a mapping of potential internal and external threats that may result in unauthorized access, and may affect the *Certificate* issuing process, or allow modification of the data stored in the *Certificate*.

Based on the results of the analysis the *Trust Service Provider*

- creates and implements a plan to mitigate the vulnerability; or
- documents the factual basis for the decision that the residual risk is accepted and the vulnerability does not require remediation.

At first the new software versions and software patches are installed on the test system of the *Trust Service Provider* and only after the successfully finished test are installed on the live system which is used to provide the services.

The new software patches are not installed on the live system if they introduce additional vulnerabilities or instabilities that outweigh the benefits of applying them. The reasons for not applying any security patches are documented.

### 5.5 Records Archival

#### 5.5.1 Types of Records Archived

The *Trust Service Provider* is prepared to the proper secure long-term archiving of electronic and paper documents.

The *Trust Service Provider* archives the following types of information:

- every document related to the accreditation of the *Trust Service Provider*;
- all issued versions of the *Certificate Policies*;
- all issued versions of the *Certification Practice Statements*;
- all issued versions of the General Terms and Conditions;
- contracts related to the operation of the *Trust Service Provider*;

- all information related to the registration, including:
  - every document handed in with the Certificate application;
  - the identification data of the document(s) presented during the personal identification;
  - service agreement(s);
  - other subscriber disclaimers;
  - the ID of the administrator assessing the registration application;
  - conditions and the results of the examination of the application;
- all information related to the Certificate for the whole life-cycle;
- information related to the impersonation of the *Electronic Seal Creation Device*;
- every electronic and paper based log entry.

### 5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive

The *Trust Service Provider* preserves the archived data for the time periods below:

- the *Certificate Policy* for at least 10 years from the date of repeal;
- *Certification Practice Statement* for at least 10 years from the date of repeal;
- General Terms and Conditions for at least 10 years from the date of repeal;
- All electronic and / or paper-based information relating to Certificates for at least:
  - 10 years after the validity expiration of the Certificate;
  - until the completion of the dispute concerning the electronic seal generated with the certificate;
- all other documents to be archived for at least 10 years from the date of their creation.

### 5.5.3 Protection of Archive

The *Trust Service Provider* stores all archived data in two copies at locations physically apart from each other. Authentic paper or electronic copy is made in accordance with the applicable law from the only authentic paper based copy of the document available.

Each of the two locations fulfils the requirements for archiving security and other requirements.

During the preservation of the archived data, it is ensured that:

- their integrity is preserved;
- they are protected against unauthorized access ;
- they are available;
- they preserve authenticity.

The archived electronic data is provided with at least an advanced electronic signature or seal and a qualified *Time Stamp*.

#### 5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures

The *Trust Service Provider* makes an authentic electronic copy of the original paper documents in accordance with the relevant legislation. Electronic copies are stored according to the same rules as other protected electronic documents.

After archiving the authentic electronic copies the *Trust Service Provider* may destroy the original paper documents.

#### 5.5.5 Requirements for Time-stamping of Records

Every electronic log entry is provided with a time mark, on which the system provided time is indicated at least to one second precision.

The time value is given by the internal clock of the *Trust Service Provider* which is synchronized to two separate Stratum-1 UTC time sources:

- one accurate time source uses the satellite-based GPS signal;
- the other accurate time source is based on the longwave time signal service (DCF77).

In order to provide accuracy the *Trust Service Provider* synchronizes its own internal time with the above Stratum-1 sources within a 0.1 second accuracy, and it performs this synchronization at least 4 times a day.

This way the *Trust Service Provider* guarantees that the deviation of the time indicated in the time marks from the UTC time base is at most 1 second.

The *Trust Service Provider* provides the daily log files with a qualified *Time Stamp*.

During the preservation of the archived data, if necessary (for example algorithm change expiration of the original *Time Stamp*) the authenticity of the data is ensured.

#### 5.5.6 Archive Collection System (Internal or External)

The log entries are generated in the *Trust Service Provider's* protected computer system, and only the log files that are electronically signed and protected with qualified timestamps can leave it.

One original copy of the documents created during the service provision is stored and protected by the *Trust Service Provider* in an inner data storage operated by it.

#### 5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information

The *Trust Service Provider* creates the log files manually or automatically. In case of an automatic logging system, the certified log files are generated daily.

The archived files are protected from unauthorized access.

Controlled access to the archived data is only available to the eligible persons:

- *Clients* are eligible to see the data stored about them;
- in legal litigation in order to provide evidence the necessary data shall be provided.

## 5.6 CA Key Changeover

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures that the used *Certification Units* are continuously possessing a valid key and Certificate for their operation. For that purpose, sufficient time before the expiration of their Certificates, and the usage expiration of the keys related to them, it generates a new key pair for the *Certification Units* and inform its Clients in time. The new provider key is generated and managed according to this regulation.

If the *Trust Service Provider* changes any of its end-user *Certificates* issuer provider Certificate keys, it complies with the following requirements:

- it discloses the affected Certificates and public keys in accordance with the requirements defined in section 2.2 ;
- after the provider re-key the end-user *Certificates* to be issued will only be signed with the new provider keys;
- it preserves its old Certificates and public keys, and makes available the signature verification until all of the sealing *Certificate* with the old provider key validity time expire.

## 5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery

In case of a disaster, the *Trust Service Provider* takes all necessary measures in order to minimize the damage resulting from the shortfall of the service, and it restores the services as quickly as possible.

Based on the assessment of the incident that occurred, it takes the necessary amendments, corrective measures to prevent future occurrence of the incident.

Once the problem resolved, the event is reported to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, as the supervisory authority.

### 5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

The *Trust Service Provider* has a business continuity plan.

The *Trust Service Provider* established and maintains a fully functional backup system, which is at a safe distance from the primary location, geographically located at a different place and is independently capable of supplying the full range of services.

The *Trust Service Provider* annually tests the changeover to a backup system and reviews its business continuity plans.

The *Trust Service Provider* has increased security tools and systems in order to minimize the software and hardware failures and data corruptions. The recoverability of services is guaranteed by the underpinning contracts and own backup tools of the *Trust Service Provider*.

### 5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted

The IT systems of the *Trust Service Provider* are built of reliable hardware and software components. The critical functions are implemented using redundant system elements so that in the event of an item failure they are able to operate further.

The *Trust Service Provider* makes a full daily backup of its databases and the generated log events. The *Trust Service Provider* makes full system backups as frequently as necessary to be able to restore the full service in case of a disaster.

The business continuity plan of the *Trust Service Provider* includes accurate requirements for the tasks to be performed in case of critical system component failure.

Once the problem resolved and the integrity restored, the *Trust Service Provider* restarts its services as soon as possible.

During the restoration of services, the certificate status information service systems have top priority.

### 5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures

The Business Continuity Plan of the *Trust Service Provider* has an action plan in place in case the provider private keys compromise. The action plan reveals the circumstances of the compromise besides the revocation of the provider public key and the *Certificate* accompanying, arranges the notification of all concerned parties, takes the necessary steps against the recurrence of the compromise and, if necessary, provides new key to the service unit and the compromise affected end users. The *Trust Service Provider* immediately ceases to use that particular key in case of certification unit key compromise.

In case another certificate authority also issued *Certificate* for the given certification unit - by law, contract or agreement between CAs based - and over or cross certified this certification unit of the *Trust Service Provider*, the *Trust Service Provider* promptly informs that other Certification Authority for that given key compromise and initiates the certificate revocation belonging to the key in question. In case of the key compromise of the intermediate CA issuing *Certificates* for the public administration this means the notification of the KGYHSZ.

The *Trust Service Provider* publishes a notice about the provider public key revocation according to the section 1.3.1

### 5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster

The tasks to be performed in case of service failure due to natural or other disaster are defined in the *Trust Service Provider's* business continuity plan.

In the event of disaster, the regulations come into force, the damage control and the restoration of the services begins.

The secondary services site is placed so far away from the primary site that a probable disaster cannot reach both locations simultaneously.

The *Trust Service Provider* is obliged to notify the affected users as quickly as possible in the event of the disaster.

After the restoration of the services, the *Trust Service Provider* restores its devices damaged during the disaster and the original service security level as quickly as possible

## 5.8 CA or RA Termination

In the event of the planned termination of the service, the *Trust Service Provider* notifies the end users and the National Media and Infocommunications Authority at least 60 days prior to the

termination of the service.

### **The Certification Service and Certificate Status Service Termination**

At the same time with the notification about the service termination, the *Trust Service Provider* shuts down the following services:

- registration,
- *Certificate* creation,
- *Certificate* issuance,
- *Certificate* renewal,
- *Certificate* modification
- re-key.

The *Trust Service Provider* at least 20 days before the planned termination, but at least 14 days after the notification of the *Clients* :

- revokes all valid enduser *Certificates*;
- stop processing the revocation and suspension requests;
- terminates the regular issuance of the *Certificate Revocation Lists*;
- issues a closing *Certificate Revocation List*.

At the same time of the termination, the *Trust Service Provider* shuts down the following services:

- *Certificate* publishing,
- *Certificate* revocation status publishing,
- OCSP service.
- technical support.
- information provision.

Before a planned termination, the *Trust Service Provider* engages in negotiations about the taking over of its services with other Trust Service Provider whose rating is identical to its own. Under section 9.3 , it will hand over its records, including confidential user data, to such a Trust Service Provider or to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority come what may, along with its other services, depending on the outcome of the negotiations or terminates without handover.

The *Trust Service Provider* takes measures concerning the revocation of provider *Certificates* (and destroying private keys) during the 60 day period – depending on the outcome of the negotiations.

The *Trust Service Provider* informs the National Media and Infocommunications Authority about the final outcome of the negotiations. The *Trust Service Provider* is to inform its *Clients* by electronic mail, and *Relying Parties* by means of a publication on its website.

Pursuant to section 2.1., the *Trust Service Provider* will publish an announcement 5 days before its "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" and "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" *Certificate* is revoked.

Upon termination the service, the *Trust Service Provider* produces a full scope backup of its data contained in its IT system, protected by a qualified *Time Stamp*.

The *Trust Service Provider* provides for authorised *Relying Parties* the possibility to interpret the data appearing in its revoked and suspended *Certificates* records if necessary.

In order to make the handing over of its data to another Trust Service Provider possible, the *Trust Service Provider* places data on media and in a format which the new Trust Service Provider can receive or provides the new Trust Service Provider with the opportunity to process data in the original format, and hands over the appropriate tools, documentation and know-how for this.

## 6 Technical Security Controls

The *Trust Service Provider* uses systems consisting of reliable, and safety technically assessed equipment for the provision of its services. The *Trust Service Provider* manages the provider cryptographic private keys during their whole life-cycle within a *Hardware Security Module* that has appropriate Certification.

Both the *Trust Service Provider* and the system supplier and execution contractors have significant experience with deployment of PKI based systems and trust services and they use internationally recognized technology.

The *Trust Service Provider* continuously monitors the capacity needs, and with setting the trends it estimates the expected future capacity demands. It can arrange if needed an extension of the limited capacity, thereby providing the necessary processing and continuous availability of storage capacities.

### 6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

The *Trust Service Provider* makes sure that the generation and management of all the private keys generated by it – for the *Subjects*, for itself and for some of its departments (for example *Certificate Repository*, *Registration Authority*) – is secure and complies with the regulatory requirements in force and with industry standards.

#### 6.1.1 Key Pair Generation

The *Trust Service Provider* uses key generation algorithms for the key-pair generation, which comply with the requirements set out in the following normatives:

- ETSI TS 119 312 [21];
- the current National Media and Infocommunications Authority algorithmic regulation issued pursuant to the authorization of the year 2015. Act CCXXII [8] 92. § (1) b) .



The *Trust Service Provider* in case of the generation of a key pair of its own ensures:

- The generation of the private key of the provider shall be carried out in a protected environment (see section 5.1 ), with at least two trusted role holder (see section 5.2.1) authorized person simultaneously, excluding the presence of other unauthorized persons.
- The creation of the provider private key is carried out in a device, that:
  - meets the requirements of ISO/IEC 19790 [25] , or
  - meets the requirements of FIPS 140-2 [33] level 3 or higher, or
  - meets the requirements of CEN 419 221-5 [22], or
  - is a reliable system that is evaluated in accordance with MSZ/ISO/IEC 15408 [24] or equal security criteria valued to level 4 or higher guarantee level. The assessment shall be based on a security system design or on safety appropriations meeting the requirements of this document.
- The production of provider private key is performed based on a key generation script.
- For the generation of the provider root certification unit private key, an independent auditor is present. The independent auditor certifies that the key generation occurred according to the script.

In case of generating the infrastructure keys used in its own IT systems, the *Trust Service Provider* ensures that:

- the generation of the *Trust Service Provider's* infrastructure key is carried out in a physically protected environment (see section 5.1) by an authorized person in a role of trust (see section 5.2.1), excluding the presence of other unauthorized persons;
- the key generation fully complies with the instructions in the device user documentation.

In case of generating the key pair for the *Subjects*, the *Trust Service Provider* ensures that:

- The creation of the keys is carried out in a protected environment with exclusively trusted role holder persons present.
- The *Trust Service Provider* never generates keypairs for software based enduser *Certificates*.
- The *Trust Service Provider* ensures that the generated key pair is compliant with the requirements defined in Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 , and the private key is not one of a known weak key pair.

In case of an *Applicant* generated key pair:

- the production of keys shall be done in a properly secure environment that is under the supervision of the *Applicant*;
- the *Applicant* shall ensure the proper protection of the generated private key;

- the *Trust Service Provider* shall ensure that the generated key pair is compliant with the requirements defined in Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6, and the public key is not one of a known weak key pair.

In case of provider root and intermediate *Certificate* creation the *Trust Service Provider* shall make a key generation record demonstrating that the process has been conducted in accordance with the predetermined workflow that ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the generated keys. The record shall be signed by:

- in case of the generation of the provider root certification unit private key the trusted officer of the *Trust Service Provider* responsible for key management and as a witness a trusted person independent from the operation of the *Trust Service Provider* (eg. notary, auditor) who verifies that the record corresponds to the performed process;
- in case of the generation of the provider intermediate certification unit private key the trusted officer of the *Trust Service Provider* responsible for key management who verifies that the record corresponds to the performed process.

### 6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

If the *Trust Service Provider* generated the *Subject's* private key, then the following requirements are met:

When the *Certificate* is issued for software based keys in all cases the *Client* generates the private key, so it does not have to be delivered to the *Client*.

### 6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

When the key pair is generated by the *Applicant*, the following provisions shall be complied with:

- the public key shall be sent to the *Trust Service Provider* in a manner that it can be unambiguously assigned to the *Applicant*;
- the *Certificate Application* process shall prove that the *Applicant* really owns the private key corresponding to the public key.

When the end user keys generated by the *Applicant*, the *Applicant* sends the *Trust Service Provider* a PKCS#10 formatted *Certificate Application* which he or she certifies with the private key belonging to the public key to be indicated on the *Certificate*. The PKCS#10 formatted *Certificate Application* contains the public key generated by the *Applicant* and the *Subject* data to be indicated on the *Certificate*, so both requirements are met.

The *Trust Service Provider* issues the provider *Certificates* needed for his trust services himself and generates the provider key pairs himself also, so there is not necessary to deliver the public keys. In case of the provider *Certificate* issued by another service provider – for example KGYHSZ –, the *Trust Service Provider* sends to the issuer a PKCS#10 formatted *Certificate Application*, which is certified with the private key belonging to the public key to be indicated on the *Certificate*.

#### 6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

The *Trust Service Provider* discloses the status information related to the provider Certificates for the Relying Parties by the following methods:

- The *Trust Service Provider* publishes the full provider certificate hierarchy containing every root and intermediate provider certificate from which every current provider Certificate is downloadable (see at the Provider certificates point at the <https://e-szigno.hu/en/pki-services/ca-certificates.html> url ).
- The denomination of the root and intermediate certification units and the *Root Certificates'* hash is in the 1.3.1 section of the *Certification Practice Statement*.
- The Certificates of the intermediate certification units are published on the certified Hungarian provider list [37] maintained and published by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority within the framework of the European common regulations [36]. The list contains every provider certificate (even the expired and revoked ones).
- For the online certificate status response signer responders the *Trust Service Provider* – according to the best international practice – issues *Certificates* with very short validity periods, thus eliminating the necessity of checking the revocation status of the *Certificates*. The current status of the *Certificates* is continuously available at the webpage of the *Trust Service Provider* at the <https://e-szigno.hu/en/pki-services/ca-certificates.html> address.

The *Trust Service Provider* discloses for the *Relying Parties* the status information related to the *Certificate* of the certification units operated by it, and of the units that take part in the online certificate status service by the following methods:

- The status information related to the *Certificate* of the root certification units is available on the webpage of the *Trust Service Provider*.
- The status change information of the intermediate (not root) certification units' certificates is disclosed on the *Certificate Revocation Lists*, on its webpage and within the confines of the online certificate status response service.
- For the responders signing the online certificate status responses the *Trust Service Provider* – according to the best international practices – issues a *Certificate* with very short validity period to eliminate the necessity of checking the *Certificate* revocation status. The *Trust Service Provider* guarantees that in case of key compromise or other problem no new *Certificate* will be issued for the old private key signing the OCSP responses . The *Trust Service Provider* issues the OCSP response *Certificates* for new, secure private keys.

Regarding the disclosure methods of the status information, also see Section 4.10.

### 6.1.5 Key Sizes

The *Trust Service Provider* uses cryptographic algorithms and minimum key sizes, which comply with the requirements set out in the following norms:

- ETSI TS 119 312 [21];
- the current National Media and Infocommunications Authority algorithmic regulation issued pursuant to the authorization of the year 2015. Act CCXXII [8] 92. § (1) b) .

The *Certification Authority* uses at least 2048 bit RSA keys or at least 256 bit ECC keys in every currently active root and intermediate provider *Certificate* and even in the *Certificates* of the *Time-Stamping Units* and the OCSP responders.

The *Certification Authority* issues the enduser *Certificates* only for at least 2048 bit RSA keys or at least 256 bit ECC keys.

From 2021-01-01 the *Certification Authority* issues the *Codesigning Certificates* only for at least 3072 bit RSA keys or at least 256 bit ECC keys.

### 6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

The *Trust Service Provider* generates the keys according to the description of the section 6.1.1.

#### Verification of Compliance of Parameters

The compliance of the key generation parameters is verified by the system from two points of view:

- checking the conformity of the random number generation used for the parameters (whether the generation is sufficiently statistically random),
- checking the fulfilment of the requirements for parameters.

Every *Hardware Security Module* used in the system is able to statistically test the uniformity and independence of the bit sequence it generated. The modules enable the invocation of the tests through a standard interface.

### 6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)

The *Trust Service Provider* root certification unit private key may only be used for the following purposes:

- issuance of the self-signed *Certificate* of the root certification unit itself ,
- to sign the intermediate certification units' *Certificates*,
- to sign the OCSP responder *Certificate*,
- to sign CRLs.

The private key of the *Trust Service Provider's* intermediate certification units – as well as the private key issued to the intermediate certification unit of other organizations – can only be used for the following purposes:

- to sign the intermediate certification units' *Certificates*,
- to sign the end user *Certificate*,
- to sign the *Time-Stamping Unit Certificate*,
- to sign the OCSP responder Certificate,
- to sign CRLs.

The *Trust Service Provider* includes the Key Usage extensions in the end-user certificates that define the scope of the Certificate usage and in the X.509v3 [31] compatible applications technically restrict the usage of the Certificates. The requirements set out for the value of the field are in Section 7.1.2.

The seal private key may only be used for electronic seal creation by the *creator of the electronic seal*, any other uses of the key are specifically prohibited.

The private keys of the OSCP Responders may only be used for the certification of the OCSP Responses.

## 6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures the secure management of the private keys held by it and prevents the private key disclosure, copy, deletion, modification and unauthorized usage. The *Trust Service Provider* may only preserve the private keys as long as the provision of the service definitely requires.

The *Trust Service Provider* stores and uses the Root CA private keys physically isolated from normal operations such that only designated trusted personnel have access to the keys for use.

The *Trust Service Provider* private keys used for the certification organization *Certificate* issuance are stored at a physically secure location, in a secure *Hardware Security Module*.

The *Trust Service Provider* deletes the signing private keys stored on the *Hardware Security Modules* which are out of order in as defined in the device's manual so that it is practically impossible to restore the keys.

The *Trust Service Provider* the *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Devices* used to create *Certificates* issued according to *Certificate Policies* requiring the use of a *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device* stores at a physically secure location, with special attention in order to prevent the illegal use of private keys after the on-board key generation until handing over to the *Subject*.

In case of *Certificates* issued according to *Certificate Policies* not requiring the use of a *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device* the *Trust Service Provider* does not issue private keys to the *Subject* beforehand, eliminating the need to ensure the preservation of the end-user private keys.

### 6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

The systems of the *Trust Service Provider* issuing *Certificate*, signing OCSP responses and CRL lists stores the private keys in such secure hardware devices that are compliant with the following:

- the requirements of ISO/IEC 19790 [25], or
- the requirements of FIPS 140-2 [33] level 3 or higher, or
- the requirements of CEN 14167-2 [35] task force agreement, or
- the requirements of CEN 419 221-5 [22], or
- they are such reliable systems that are evaluated at a guarantee level 4 or higher according to MSZ/ISO/IEC 15408 [24] or an equivalent security criteria system. The assessment either shall be based on the appropriate security system plan that meets the requirements of the present document, or on security appropriations.

The *Trust Service Provider* stores the provider private keys outside of the *Hardware Security Module* only in encrypted form. Only those algorithms and key parameters are used for encoding which fits to the actual algorithmic decision of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority that was issued according to the year 2015. Act CCXXII [8] 92. § (1) b) and that are expected to be able to withstand the cryptographic attacks during the entire lifetime of the keys.

The *Trust Service Provider* provider private keys are stored in a physically secure site even in an encrypted form, in the safe of the *Data Centre*, where they are only accessible to authorized people.

In case of the weakening of cryptographic algorithms and key parameters, the *Trust Service Provider* destroys the coded keys or recodes them again using algorithm and key parameters that ensure higher protection.

### 6.2.2 Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control

The *Trust Service Provider* implements the "n out of m" at the activation of the private key related key management functions. The parameters are determined so that the simultaneous presence of at least two; trusted role holder employees is needed for the critical operations carried out with its provider private keys.

### 6.2.3 Private Key Escrow

The *Trust Service Provider* copied its root CA keys in encrypted form into a CD. The CD is stored in a bank tresor in a closed envelop.

The *Trust Service Provider* does not escrow its own provider private keys other than the root keys. The *Trust Service Provider* does not provide for the end-user seal private keys any escrow service, under no circumstance does it store their copy, multiple usage, except for a private key generated on a *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device*, stored on a *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device* until its hand over to the *Applicant*.

#### 6.2.4 Private Key Backup

The *Trust Service Provider* makes security copies of its provider private keys, before putting the provider private key into service as described in section 6.2.1. in a protected environment, in the simultaneous presence of at least two people holding trusted roles, with the exclusion of other people. During the backup, the private key leaves the module in an encrypted form, and this encrypted key can be loaded into another module. Both the backup and the restore can only be performed by protection mechanisms described in section 6.2.2..

The *Trust Service Provider* stores the backup copy in duplicate, and at least one copy of those is stored at a different place from the service provider location.

The same strict security standards are applied to the management and preservation of backups as for the operation of the production system.

The *Trust Service Provider* does not make any copy of the end-user seal private keys.

#### 6.2.5 Private Key Archival

The *Trust Service Provider* does not archive its private keys and the end-user seal private keys.

#### 6.2.6 Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module

All of the provider private keys of the *Trust Service Provider* are created in a *Hardware Security Module* that meets the requirements.

The private keys do not exist in an open form outside of the *Hardware Security Module*.

The *Trust Service Provider* only exports the private key from the *Hardware Security Module* for the purpose of making a secure copy.

The export and loading of the provider private keys is performed according to section 6.2.2.

#### 6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

The *Trust Service Provider* keeps its private keys used for service provision in *Hardware Security Modules* according to section 6.2.1.

Private keys are stored and used in the *Hardware Security Module* as specified in the certification of the device with full compliance with the related operating instructions.

#### 6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key

The *Trust Service Provider* keeps its provider private keys in a secure *Hardware Security Module* and complies with its user guide and the requirements outlined in the certification documents. The *Hardware Security Module* can only be activated by the corresponding operator cards and the private keys within the *Hardware Security Module* can not be used before activating the module. The *Trust Service Provider* keeps the operator cards in a safe environment and those cards can be only reached by entitled employees of the *Trust Service Provider*.

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures that signatures can only be created with the private key of the root unit certificate in case of commands issued directly by the trust official duly authorized to do so.

In case of the end-user private keys generated by the *Trust Service Provider* it ensures that the private keys and the private key activation data are generated and managed in a properly secure way that excludes the possibility of the unauthorized usage of the private key.

In case of *Applicant* generated private key the protection of the private key is the *Applicant's* full responsibility.

### 6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key

#### Provider Private Keys

The private key used by the *Trust Service Provider*, and managed by the cryptographic devices becomes deactivated if (in a regular or irregular way) the device is removed from active status. This can happen in the following cases:

- the user deactivates the key,
- the power supply of the device is interrupted (switched off or power supply problem),
- the device enters an error state.

The private key deactivated like this can not be used until the module is in active state again.

#### End-User Private Keys

The proper usage of the software based private keys is the responsibility of the *Applicant*.

### 6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key

#### Provider Private Keys

The discarded, expired or compromised *Trust Service Provider's* private keys are destroyed in a way that makes further use of the private keys impossible.

The *Trust Service Provider* destroys the provider private keys stored in the secure *Hardware Security Module* of the certification organization according to the procedures, requirements defined in the user guide and in the certification documents of the used *Hardware Security Module*, in the simultaneous presence of two *Trust Service Provider* employees (an infrastructure administrator and a security officer) with the exclusion of other persons.

The *Trust Service Provider* destroys each backup copy of the private key in a documented way in such a way that its restoration and usage becomes impossible.

#### End-User Private Keys

In case of *Certificate Policies* not requiring the use of a *Cryptographic Hardware Device* the proper destruction of the private keys is the responsibility of the *Applicant*.

The discarded seal private keys of the end-users are recommended to be destroyed.



### 6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

According to the requirements of Section 6.2.1 every provider private key of the *Trust Service Provider* is stored in a cryptographic module that

- has a certificate according to ISO/IEC 19790 [25], or
- has a certificate according to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 [33], or
- has an at least EAL-4 level Common Criteria [34] based certificate attesting compliance with the requirements of the CEN 14167-2 [35] workshop agreement, or
- has an at least EAL-4 level Common Criteria [34] based certificate attesting compliance with the requirements of the CEN 419 221-5 [22], or
- has a certificate issued for this purpose by an independent certification body eligible for evaluating electronic signature products, registered by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority, or in a member state of the European Union

## 6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

### 6.3.1 Public Key Archival

The *Trust Service Provider* archives every *Certificate* its certification organization issued for ten years after the end of the validity period or until until the completion of the incurred dispute related to the *Certificate* (or to the electronic seal based on the *Certificate* ).

For the same time period, the *Trust Service Provider* preserves devices, with which the content of the *Certificate* can be established.

### 6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

#### The Keys and Certificates of the Root Certification Units

The validity period of the *Trust Service Provider* root certification unit certificates and the private keys belonging to them shall not exceed the amount of time until which the used cryptographic algorithms can be used safely according to the algorithmic decision of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority.

The validity period of the *Trust Service Provider* root certification unit certificates and the private keys:

- the key of the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA" root certification unit was valid until 2017-04-06;
- the key of the "e-Szigno OCSP CA" root certification unit was valid until 2017-04-26;
- the key of the "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" root certification unit is valid until 2029-12-30.
- the key of the "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" root certification unit is valid until 2042-08-22;

### The Keys and Certificates of the Intermediate Certification Units

The validity period of the *Trust Service Provider* intermediate certification unit certificates and the private keys belonging to them:

- shall not exceed the amount of time until which the used cryptographic algorithms can be used safely according to the algorithmic decision of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority;
- shall not exceed the validity period of the issuer root or intermediate provider *Certificate* that issued the intermediate provider *Certificate*.

The intermediate (not root) certification unit keys of the *Trust Service Provider* are valid until the expiration time of the *Certificates* belonging to them.

### End-User Certificates

The validity period of the end user *Certificates* issued by the *Trust Service Provider*

- is maximum
  - 39 months from issuance in case of *Codesigning Certificates*,
  - 10 years from issuance in case of other *Certificates*;
- shall not exceed the amount of time until which the used cryptographic algorithms can be used safely according to the algorithmic decision of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority;
- shall not exceed the expiration date of the provider *Certificate* that issued the *Certificate*.

During the Certificate renewal the *Trust Service Provider* may issue the new *Certificate* for the same end-user private key.

### Certificates of the Time-Stamping Units

The *Trust Service Provider* may issue special time stamping service provider *Certificates* based on the request of Time Stamping Service Providers.

The validity period of the *Certificates* of the *Time-Stamping Units* issued by the *Trust Service Provider*

- in case of *Certificate* issued for a qualified Time Stamp Provider at most 12 years from issuance;
- in case of *Certificate* issued for a non qualified Time Stamp Provider at most 135 months from issuance;
- shall not exceed the end of the implemented cryptographic algorithms and key parameters' validity period;
- shall not exceed the expiration date of the provider *Certificate* that issued the *Certificate*.

### Life-Cycle of the Time-Stamping Keys

The following requirements are met for the private keys used for *Time Stamp* certification:

- The Time Stamping Service Provider specifies the end of the validity period of the private keys used in the *Time-Stamping Units* at the Certificate request;
- the end of the key usage period shall not be a later time than the end of the *Certificate* validity period;
- the end of the validity period is not a later date than the end of the implemented cryptographic algorithms and key parameters' validity period;
- the validity period of the *Time-Stamping Units*' is given by setting the "PrivateKeyUsagePeriod" value of the *Certificate* (see section 7.1.2.);

### Certificates of the OCSP Responders

The validity period of the *Certificates* of the OCSP Responders issued by the *Trust Service Provider*

- shall not exceed the deadline until which the used cryptographic algorithms can be used safely according to the algorithmic decision of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority;
- shall not exceed the expiration date of the provider *Certificate* that issued the *Certificate*.

For the signers of the online certificate status responses the *Trust Service Provider* – compliant with the best international practice – issues the *Certificate* with extremely short period of validity thereby eliminating the need for the revocation status verification of the OCSP *Certificate*. The validity period of the OCSP Responder *Certificates* is 24 hours in case of *Website Authentication Certificate* and 10 minutes in case of any other type of *Certificates*.

The *Trust Service Provider* automatically renews the *Certificate* before its expiry for the same key pair.

In case of key compromise, or any other problems there won't be any further *Certificate* issued for the old private key. The *Trust Service Provider* issues OCSP Responder *Certificates* for a new, secure private key.

Both the service provider and the end-user key validity period is affected, if the National Media and Infocommunications Authority issues a new algorithm decree, according to which the used cryptographic algorithm or key parameter is not secure to the end of the planned usage period.

If this happens, the *Trust Service Provider* revokes the related *Certificates*.

## 6.4 Activation Data

### 6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation

The *Trust Service Provider's* private keys are protected in accordance with the procedures, requirements defined in the used *Hardware Security Module* user guide and the certification documents.

In case of password based activation data usage, the passwords are sufficiently complex in order to ensure the required level of protection.

The *Trust Service Provider* never generates software based private keys for the end user *Certificates*.

The creation and installation of the activation data of the *Applicant* created private keys is the duty of the *Applicant*.

#### 6.4.2 Activation Data Protection

The employees of the *Trust Service Provider* manage the private key activation devices and the activation data securely, protect them using technical and organizational measures and passwords are stored in encrypted form only.

The protection of the activation data of the private keys created by the *Applicant*, is the duty and responsibility of the *Applicant*.

#### 6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data

No stipulation.

### 6.5 Computer Security Controls

#### 6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

During the configuration and operation of its IT system of the *Trust Service Provider* ensures the compliance with the following requirements:

- the user identity is verified with two-factor authentication controls by using VPN certificates stored on the card before granting access to the system or the application;
- roles are assigned to users and it ensures that all users only have permissions appropriate for his or her roles;
- a log entry is created for every transaction, and the log entries are archived;
- for the security-critical processes it is ensured that the internal network domains of the *Trust Service Provider* are sufficiently protected from unauthorized access;
- proper procedures are implemented to ensure service recovery after loss of key or system failure.

#### 6.5.2 Computer Security Rating

Microsec highlights the importance of *Client* experience. In order to maintain a high level of services, the *Trust Service Provider* has been operating a quality control system compliant with the ISO 9001 standard since January 23, 2002. Compliance with the standard has been verified by Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance.

Microsec assigns high priority to the security of the systems it operates, and has therefore been operating an information security management system that is compliant with ISO/IEC 27001

(formerly known as BS 7799) in its main areas of activity since May 19, 2003. Compliance with the standard has been verified by Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance.

The scope of both the quality control system and the information security management system cover the trust services provided by Microsec.

Microsec has two level risk assessment which covers beyond the information technology risks the whole organization including also the business risks. The risk assessment is updated at least yearly. Based on the results of the risk assessment the *Trust Service Provider*

- sets up new measures to eliminate the vulnerabilities, or/and
- accepts the identified residual risks by stating the reason of the decision.

## 6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls

### 6.6.1 System Development Controls

The *Trust Service Provider* only uses applications and devices in its production IT system that are:

- commercial boxed software, designed and developed by a documented design methodology, or;
- custom hardware and software solutions developed by the *Trust Service Provider* itself during which design structured development methods and controlled development environment were used, or;
- custom hardware and software solutions developed by a reliable party for the *Trust Service Provider* during which design structured development methods and controlled development environment were used, or;
- open source software which comply with the security requirements and their adequacy is ensured by software verification and structured development and life-cycle management.

Procurement of IT tools is performed in a way that excludes changes to the hardware and software components using reliable, regularly qualified suppliers.

The hardware and software components applied for the provision of services are not used for other purposes by the *Trust Service Provider*.

The *Trust Service Provider* prevents the malicious software from entering into the devices used for certification services with appropriate security measures.

The hardware and software components are checked regularly for malicious software prior the first usage, and subsequently.

The *Trust Service Provider* acts with the same carefulness in case of program update purchases as at the acquisition of the first version.

The *Trust Service Provider* employs reliable, adequately trained staff over the course of installing software and hardware.

The *Trust Service Provider* only installs softwares to its service provider IT equipment necessary for the purpose of service provision.

The *Trust Service Provider* has a version control system where every change of the IT system is documented.

The *Trust Service Provider* operates automatic monitoring system to record all unauthorized changes, which records all changes in every file and in case of changes in the monitored files it generates a log entry or sends an alert to the system operators.

### 6.6.2 Security Management Controls

The *Trust Service Provider* implements processes for documenting, operating, verifying, monitoring and maintaining the systems used in the service including their modification and further development. The version control system detects any kind of unauthorized changes, data entry that affects the system, the firewall, the routers, programs and other components used in the service. Installing the program used in the service the *Trust Service Provider* ensures that the program to be installed is the proper version and that it is free from any unauthorized modification. The *Trust Service Provider* regularly checks the integrity of the software in its system used in the service.

Each *Hardware Security Module* applied by the *Trust Service Provider* has been verified, tested and evaluated. The *Trust Service Provider* verifies the integrity of the modules:

- following the acquisition of the devices during the takeover,
- immediately before the first usage,
- regularly during operation.

The *Trust Service Provider* deletes the provider keys from the *Hardware Security Modules* permanently or temporarily withdrawn from use.

The *Trust Service Provider* stores the unused *Hardware Security Modules* at a physically protected location.

### 6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls

The *Trust Service Provider* ensures the protection of the used *Hardware Security Modules* during their whole life cycle.

During the operation of the IT equipment and systems used for the provision of the services, the *Trust Service Provider* takes into account the security aspects related to the life cycle of the equipment, according to which:

- it uses properly certified *Hardware Security Modules* in its systems;
- ensure, upon receipt of the *Hardware Security Modules*, that the quality control ensures that that the protection of the *Hardware Security Modules* against tampering was ensured during transportation;
- it stores the *Hardware Security Modules* in a safe place, and ensure the protection of the *Hardware Security Modules* against tampering during storage;

- continuously complies with the requirements set out in the *Hardware Security Module's* security target, instructions for use and certification report during operation;
- deletes the private keys stored in their decommissioned *Hardware Security Modules* in such a way that it becomes practically impossible to restore the keys;
- handle and dispose of decommissioned *Hardware Security Modules* in accordance with the requirements of its security target, instructions for use and certification report.

## 6.7 Network Security Controls

The *Trust Service Provider* keeps its IT system configuration under strict control, and it documents every change including the smallest modification, development, software update too. The *Trust Service Provider* implements proper procedures for the detection of any hardware or software change, system installation, and maintenance occurred on the IT system. The *Trust Service Provider* checks the authenticity and integrity of every software component at their first loading.

The *Trust Service Provider* applies proper network security measures for example:

- divides its IT system into well separated security zones;
- separates dedicated network for administration of IT systems and the *Trust Service Provider's* operational network;
- separates the production systems for the TSP services from systems used in development and testing;
- establishes communication between distinct trustworthy systems only through trusted channels that are logically distinct from other communication channels and provide assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure;
- operates the IT systems used for the live operational network in secure network zones;
- restricts access and communications between zones to those necessary for the operation of the service;
- disables the not used protocols and user accounts;
- disables unused network ports and services ;
- only runs network applications unconditionally necessary for the proper operation of the IT system .
- reviews the established rule set on a regular basis.

The *Trust Service Provider* undergoes or performs a vulnerability scan on public and private IP addresses:

- within one week of receiving a request from the CA/Browser Forum;

- after any system or network changes that the CA determines are significant;
- at least every three (3) months.

The *Trust Service Provider* checks the compliance of the local network components (e.g. routers) configuration with the requirements specified by the *Trust Service Provider* at least every three months.

The *Trust Service Provider* orders a penetration test from an external independent expert who has the necessary skills, tools, proficiency and code of ethics to provide a reliable report yearly and in case of a significant change in the IT network.

## 6.8 Time-stamping

For the protection of the integrity of the log files and other electronic files to be archived the *Trust Service Provider* uses qualified electronic *Time Stamps* issued by the e-Szignó Certificate Authority.

# 7 Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles

## 7.1 Certificate Profile

The end-user *Certificates* issued by the *Trust Service Provider* and all the provider's root and intermediate *Certificates* which are in the *Certificate Chain* used to issue the *Certificates* comply with the following recommendations and requirements:

- ITU X.509 Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks [31]
- IETF RFC 5280 [28]
- IETF RFC 6818 [29]
- ETSI EN 319 412-1 [17]
- ETSI EN 319 412-3 [19]

### 7.1.1 Version Number(s)

The provider certification unit (root and intermediate) *Certificates* used by the *Trust Service Provider* and the end-user *Certificates* issued by the *Trust Service Provider* are "v3" *Certificates* according to the X.509 specification [31].

The *Certificates* have the following basic fields:

- Version  
The *Certificate* complies with "v3" *Certificates* according to the X.509 specification, so the value "2" is in this field. [28]



- **Serial Number**  
The unique identifier generated by the *Certificate* issuer certification unit.  
In case of the end-user *Certificates* the "Serial Number" field contains a random number with at least 8 byte entropy.
- **Algorithm Identifier**  
The identifier (OID) of the cryptographic algorithm set used for the creation of the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate*.  
The *Certification Authority* uses the following cryptographic algorithm:
  - "sha256WithRSAEncryption" (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
  - "ecdsa-with-SHA256" (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
- **Signature**  
Electronic seal made by the *Certification Authority* certifying the *Certificate*, that has been created with an Algorithm set defined in the "Algorithm Identifier" field.
- **Issuer**  
The unique name of the *Certificate* issuer *Certification Unit* according to the X.501 name format.
- **Valid From & Valid To**  
The beginning and the end of the validity period of the *Certificate*. The time is recorded according to UTC and compliant with IETF RFC 5280 encoding.
- **Subject**  
The unique name of the *Subject* according to the X.501 name format. Always filled out.
- **Subject Public Key Algorithm Identifier**  
  
The *Trust Service Provider* supports the RSA and the ECC algorithms in the end-user *Certificates*.  
The value to be included in this field:
  - "rsaEncryption" (1.2.840.113549.1.1.1)
  - "ecPublicKey" (1.2.840.10045.2.1)
- **Subject Public Key Value**  
The public key of the *Subject*.
- **Issuer Unique Identifier**  
Not filled out.
- **Subject Unique Identifier**  
Not filled out.

### 7.1.2 Certificate Extensions

the *Trust Service Provider* only uses the following certificate extensions according to the X.509 specification [31]:

### Certificate of the Root Certification Unit

- Certificate Policies – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.32  
This field is not indicated.
- Authority Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.35  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the provider key used for the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate*.  
The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the provider public key.  
In case of the self-signed root certification unit certificate the value is identical with the value of the *Subject* key identifier field.
- Subject Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.14  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the *Subject* public key. The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the public key.  
Always filled in.
- Subject Alternative Names – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.17  
  
It is filled in according to section 3.1.1.
- Basic Constraints – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.19  
The specification whether the *Certificate* has been issued to a certification unit.  
The extension is required and its value is: CA = "TRUE".  
The "pathLenConstraint" field is not present in the root *Certificate*.
- Key Usage – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.15  
The scope definition of the approved key usage.  
The used values are:
  - "keyCertSign",
  - "cRLSign".
- Extended Key Usage – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.37  
The further scope definition of the approved key usage. It is not present.

The above fields are always filled out. There is no any more *Certificate* extension.

### Certificate of the Intermediate Certification Unit

- Certificate Policies – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.32

This field may limit the *Certificate Policies* which can be used in the *Enduser Certificate*.

The intermediate CAs below this CA may issue only that type of *Enduser Certificates* which fit to at least one of the *Certificate Policies* listed here.

It is always filled.

In case of *Certificates* issued to the intermediate certification units of the *Trust Service Provider*, the "anyPolicy" Identifier may be present in this field.

The reference to the related *Certification Practice Statement* can be given in this field. In case of certification unit *Certificates* issued to other *Certification Authority*, only that identifier can be in this field, which relates to a *Certificate Policy* which complies to the *Certificate Policy* implemented by the issuer *Certification Authority*, and there can be no "anyPolicy" Identifier.

- Authority Key Identifier – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.35

The 40 character long unique identifier of the provider key used for the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate*.

It is always filled.

The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the provider public key.

- Subject Key Identifier – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.14

The 40 character long unique identifier of the *Subject* public key.

The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the public key.

It is always filled.

- Subject Alternative Names – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.17

It is filled in according to section 3.1.1.

- Basic Constraints – critical

OID: 2.5.29.19

The specification whether the *Certificate* has been issued to a certification unit.

The extension is required and its value is: CA = "TRUE".

The "pathLenConstraint" is not present in the *Certificate*.

- Key Usage – critical

OID: 2.5.29.15

The scope definition of the approved key usage.

The field contains the following values:

- "keyCertSign",
- "cRLSign".

- Extended Key Usage – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.37

The further scope definition of the approved key usage.

The Intermediate Certification Unit *Certificates* issued after 2019-01-01 contains at least one "Extended Key Usage" value as detailed below:

The Intermediate Certification Unit *Certificates* for issuing *Certificates* for the creation of qualified electronic electronic seals:

- Document Signing (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12)
- Secure E-mail (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
- OCSP Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9)

The Intermediate Certification Unit *Certificates* for issuing *Codesigning Certificates*:

- Code Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3)
- OCSP Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9)

- CRL Distribution Points – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.31

The field contains the CRL accessibility through http and/or ldap protocol. It is always filled.

- Authority Information Access – not critical

OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1

The definition of the other services related to the usage of the *Certificate* provided by the *Trust Service Provider*.

Mandatory, and the field contains the following data:

- For the purpose of the fast and reliable verification of the current *Certificate* revocation status, the *Trust Service Provider* provides online certificate status service. The availability of this service is indicated here.
- To facilitate the certificate chain building the *Trust Service Provider* gives the access path through http or ldap protocol of the *Certificate* of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit.

The above fields are always filled out. There is not any more *Certificate* extensions.

### End-User Certificate

- *Certificate* Policies – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.32

This field contains the denomination of the valid certification policy (see Section 1.2.1) at the time of the *Certificate* issuance and other information on the other uses of the *Certificate*.

In case of end-user certificates, the *Trust Service Provider* fills in this field in all cases by providing the following data:

- the identifier of the *Certificate Policy* (OID according to section 1.2.1);

- the availability of the *Certification Practice Statement*;
- the textual warning in English and Hungarian from which it can be established that it is a II. or III. certification class certificate, namely personal appearance did or did not happen at the registration, the Subject of the *Certificate* is a natural person, and the private key belonging to the *Certificate* is protected by a cryptographic hardware device.
- The identifier specified by ETSI EN 319 411-1 [16] the policy which the *Certificate* complies with. as follows:
  - \* in case of DVCP *Certificate* OID 0.4.0.2042.1.6,
  - \* in case of OVCP *Certificate* OID 0.4.0.2042.1.7,
  - \* in case of IVCP *Certificate* OID 0.4.0.2042.1.8.
- In case of *Codesigning Certificate* Certificate Policy defined by the CA/Browser Forum:
  - \* OID 2.23.140.1.4.1.

The end-user *Certificates* that do not contain the "Certificate Policies" field shall be considered test certificates. The test *Certificate* can only be used for testing purposes, and they shall be declined in case of real transactions.

The reference to the related Certification Practice Statement may be given in this field.

- Authority Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.35  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the provider key used for the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate*.  
It is always filled in.  
The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the provider public key.
- Subject Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.14  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the *Subject* public key. The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the public key.  
It is always filled in.
- Subject Alternative Names – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.17  
See section: 3.1.1.
- Basic Constraints – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.19  
The specification whether the *Certificate* has been issued to a certification unit.  
The default value of the extension is: CA = "FALSE", so this field is not present in the end-user *Certificates*.  
The "pathLenConstraint" field is not present in the end-user *Certificates*.

- Key Usage – critical

OID: 2.5.29.15

The scope definition of the approved key usage.

In end-user *Certificates* the value is exclusively set to the following:

- "digitalSignature";
- "nonRepudiation".

When the *Certificate* is issued for code signing purposes only the following value is set: "digitalSignature"

- "digitalSignature".

- Extended Key Usage – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.37

The further scope definition of the approved key usage.

In the non-qualified signing end user *Certificates* the set values are:

- "Document Signing (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12)"
- "emailProtection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)"

If the *Certificate* is issued for Code Signing purposes the set values are:

- "codeSigning (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3)"
- "softwarePublishing (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.22)"

- CRL Distribution Points – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.31

The field contains the CRL availability relevant to the Certificate through http and/or ldap protocol. The CRL availability related to the *Certificate* is present here (url).

- Authority Information Access – not critical

OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1

The definition of the other services related to the usage of the *Certificate* provided by the *Trust Service Provider*.

In case of end-user certificate certificates the field contains the following data:

- For the purpose of the fast and reliable verification of the current *Certificate* revocation status, the *Trust Service Provider* provides online certificate status service. The availability of this service is indicated here.
- To facilitate the certificate chain building the *Trust Service Provider* gives the access path through http protocol of the *Certificate* of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit.

The *Trust Service Provider* may give in this field the data of more than one service and *Certificate* of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit.

- Qualified *Certificate* Statements – not critical  
OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.3  
The field is intended for the indication of statements related to the qualified *Certificates*, but it has a field, that can be used in case of a non-qualified *Certificate* too.  
  
The QCType field may be filled according to the usage purpose. It is indicated in the field that the *Certificate* was issued for sealing purposes (the value of the field is 'id-etsi-qct-eseal').

The above fields are always filled out according to the given rules.

Other certificate extensions will not be filled out.

### **Certificate of the Time-Stamping Unit**

- Certificate Policies – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.32  
This field contains the identifier of the valid certification policy (see section 1.2.1.) at the time of the *Time-Stamping Unit Certificate* issuance and usage, and other information on the other uses of the *Certificate*.  
  
Filling in is mandatory for this field, and it shall not be critical.  
  
The reference to the related *Certification Practice Statement* can be given in this field.
- Authority Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.35  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the provider key used for the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate*.  
  
The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the provider public key.
- Subject Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.14  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the *Time-Stamping Unit* public key. The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the public key.
- Subject Alternative Names – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.17  
The central email address of the *Time-Stamping Service Provider* can be in this field in the *Certificate* of the *Time-Stamping Unit*.
- Basic Constraints – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.19  
The specification whether the *Certificate* has been issued to a certification unit.  
  
The default value of the extension is: CA = "FALSE", so this field is not present in the *Certificate* issued for the *Time-Stamping Unit*.  
  
The "pathLenConstraint" field is not present in the *Certificate* issued for the *Time-Stamping Unit*.

- Key Usage – critical

OID: 2.5.29.15

The scope definition of the approved key usage.

In the *Certificates* issued to the *Time-Stamping Unit* only the following values are present:

"nonRepudiation",

"digitalSignature".

- Private Key Usage Period – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.16

Determination of the permitted private key usage period.

In the *Certificates* issued to the *Time-Stamping Unit* the *Certification Authority* restricts the private key usage time by setting the "notBefore" and "notAfter" values.

- Extended Key Usage – critical

OID: 2.5.29.37

The further scope definition of the approved key usage. In the *Certificates* issued to the *Time-Stamping Unit* only the following values are present:

"timeStamping (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8)".

- CRL Distribution Points – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.31

The field contains the CRL availability through http and/or ldap protocol. Mandatory to fill.

- Authority Information Access – not critical

OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 The definition of the other services related to the usage of the time-stamping unit *Certificate* provided by *Certification Authority*.

Mandatory, and the field contains the following data

- For the purpose of the fast and reliable verification of the current *Certificate* revocation status, the *Certification Authority* provides online certificate status service. The availability of this service is indicated here.
- To facilitate the certificate chain building the *Certification Authority* gives the access path through http protocol of the *Certificate* of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit.

The above fields are always filled out according to the given rules. There are no any more *Certificate* extensions.

### Certificate issued for OCSP Responder

- Certificate Policies – not critical

OID: 2.5.29.32

This field contains the identifier of the valid certification policy (see section 1.2.1.) at the time of the OCSP Responder *Certificate* issuance and usage, and other information on the other uses of the *Certificate*.

Filling in is mandatory for this field, and it shall not be critical.

The reference to the related *Certification Practice Statement* can be given in this field.



- Authority Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.35  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the provider key used for the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate*.  
The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the provider public key.  
Always filled in.
- Subject Key Identifier – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.14  
The 40 character long unique identifier of the OCSP Responder public key.  
The field value: the SHA-1 hash of the public key.  
Always filled in.
- Subject Alternative Names – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.17  
It is never filled out.
- Basic Constraints – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.19  
The specification whether the *Certificate* has been issued to a certification unit.  
The default value of the extension is: CA = "FALSE", so this field is not present in the *Certificate* issued for the OCSP Responder.  
The "pathLenConstraint" field is not present in the *Certificate* issued for the OCSP Responder.
- Key Usage – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.15  
The scope definition of the approved key usage.  
In the *Certificates* issued to the OCSP Responder only the following values are present:  
"nonRepudiation",  
"digitalSignature".
- Private Key Usage Period – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.16  
Determination of the permitted private key usage period.  
  
It is not filled out.
- Extended Key Usage – critical  
OID: 2.5.29.37  
The further scope definition of the approved key usage. In the *Certificates* issued to the OCSP Responder only the following values are present:  
"OCSP Signing (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9)".
- CRL Distribution Points – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.31

The field is not included in the *Certificate* because revocation is not needed due to the short *Certificate* life.

- nocheck

OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9.5

Indication that the *Trust Service Provider* doesn't offer revocation service for the *Certificate*, so the revocation status shall not be checked. It is always filled in.

- Authority Information Access – not critical

OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1 The definition of the other services related to the usage of the time-stamping unit *Certificate* provided by *Certification Authority*.

Mandatory, and the field contains the following data:

- To facilitate the certificate chain building the *Certification Authority* gives the access path through http protocol of the *Certificate* of the *Certificate* issuer certification unit.

The above fields are always filled out according to the given rules. There are no any more *Certificate* extensions.

### 7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

The denomination of the cryptographic algorithm that has been used to certify the *Certificate*. The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the *Certification Authority* for sealing the end-user *Certificates*:

- "sha256WithRSAEncryption" (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
- "ecdsa-with-SHA256" (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)

### 7.1.4 Name Forms

The *Trust Service Provider* uses a distinguished name – composed of attributes defined in the standards IETF RFC 5280 [28], ETSI EN 319 412-2 [18], ETSI EN 319 412-3 [19] and ETSI EN 319 412-4 [20] – for the Subject identification in the *Certificates* issued based on this *Certification Practice Statement*.

The *Certificate* contains the globally unique identifier of the *Subject* (OID), filled out as defined in Section 3.1.1.

The value in the "Issuer DN" field of the *Certificate* is identical to the value in the "Subject DN" field of the issuer *Certificate*.

### 7.1.5 Name Constraints

The *Trust Service Provider* does not use name constraints with the use of the "nameConstraints" field.

### 7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier

The *Trust Service Provider* includes the not critical (*Certificate Policy*) extension in the *Certificates* according to the requirements of the Section 7.1.2..

### 7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

No stipulation.

### 7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

The *Trust Service Provider* can put short information related to the *Certificate* usage into the *Certificate Policy* extension Policy Qualifier field. The field contains the on-line availability of the *Certification Practice Statement* (URI).

### 7.1.9 Processing Semantics for Critical Certificate Policy Extension

No stipulation.

## 7.2 CRL Profile

### 7.2.1 Version Number(s)

The *Certification Authority* issues version "v2" certificate *Certificate Revocation Lists* according to the IETF RFC 5280 [28] specification.

### 7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions

The *Certificate Revocation Lists* issued by the *Certification Authority* shall compulsorily include the following fields:

- Version  
The value of the field is compulsorily "1".
- Signature Algorithm Identifier  
The identifier (OID) of the cryptographic algorithm set used for creating the electronic seal certifying the *Certificate Revocation List*. The name and ID of the cryptographic algorithm sets used by the *Trust Service Provider*:
  - "sha256WithRSAEncryption" (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
  - "ecdsa-with-SHA256" (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
- Signature  
The electronic seal of *Certification Authority* certifying the *Certificate Revocation List*. The given certification unit certifies the *Certificate Revocation List* with its key used for signing the *Certificates*.
- Issuer  
The unique identifier of the *Certificate Revocation List* issuer certification unit.
- This Update (thisUpdate)  
The date of the entry into force of the *Certificate Revocation List*. Value according to UTC with encoding according to IETF RFC 5280 [28]. In case of the *Certificate Revocation Lists* issued by the *Certification Authority* this is the same as the issuance time.

- Next Update (nextUpdate)  
The issuance time of the next *Certificate Revocation List* (see Section 4.10.). Value according to UTC with encoding according to IETF RFC 5280 [28].
- Revoked *Certificates*  
The list of the suspended or revoked *Certificates* with the serial number of the *Certificate* and with the suspension or revocation time.

The *Certificate Revocation List* extensions to be filled in by *Certification Authority* as mandatory:

- CRL number – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.20  
The consecutive serial numbers of the *Certificate Revocation Lists* are in this field.

This extension may be used by the *Certification Authority*:

- expiredCertsOnCRL – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.60  
The *Certification Authority* indicates with a standard notation according to the X.509 specification that it does not remove the expired *Certificates* from the CRL. (See Section 4.10.)

The *Certificate Revocation List* entry extensions that may be used by the *Certification Authority*:

- Reason Code – not critical  
OID: 2.5.29.21  
The reason of the revocation is in this field.  
In case of suspended certificates, it is a mandatory field, its value is: "certificateHold (6)".
- Invalidity Date – not critical  
The time when the private key became compromised can be in this field.  
The *Certification Authority* need not fill this field.
- Hold Instruction – not critical  
The management of the suspended certificate can be in this field.  
The *Certification Authority* need not fill this field.

The *Certification Authority* is not obliged to fill out the extensions.

### 7.3 OCSP Profile

The *Trust Service Provider* operates an online certificate status service according to the IETF RFC 6960 [30] standard.

The OCSP responses issued by *Certification Authority* contain the following fields:

- Algorithm identifier (signatureAlgorithm )  
The identifier of the cryptographic algorithm used for signing the OCSP response (OID).  
The *Trust Service Provider* supports the following cryptographic algorithms:

- "sha256WithRSAEncryption" (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11)
- "ecdsa-with-SHA256" (1.2.840.10045.4.3.2)
- (Signature)  
The digital signature of the *Trust Service Provider*.
- Identifier of the Responder (responderID)  
The unique identifier of the OCSP Responder which issues the OCSP Response.
- This Update (thisUpdate)  
The date of the entry into force of the OCSP Response. Value according to UTC with encoding according to IETF RFC 5280 [28].
- Next Update (nextUpdate)  
The latest issuance time of the next OCSP Response. Value according to UTC with encoding according to IETF RFC 5280 [28]. Optional.
- Certificate Status Response (SingleResponse)  
The field contains the ID of the *Certificate* (CertID) and the revocation status of the *Certificate* (CertStatus).  
  
The *Trust Service Provider* issues positive OCSP response according to the requirements of the CABF BR. The Response contains the "good" value only if the *Certificate* is included in the *Certificate Repository* of the *Trust Service Provider* and its revocation status is not suspended or revoked.

### 7.3.1 Version Number(s)

The *Trust Service Provider* supports the online certificate status requests and responses conforming to the "v1" version according to the standard IETF RFC 6960 [30]. The default value of the (Version) field is "v1", so this field is not included in the OCSP response.

### 7.3.2 OCSP Extensions

The *Trust Service Provider* may optionally include the following OCSP extension:

- ArchiveCutoff – not critical  
The *Certification Authority* may indicate with a standard notation according to the IETF RFC 6960 [30] specification that it retain revocation information beyond the *Certificate's* expiration. (See Section 4.10.)

The *Trust Service Provider* may include the following OCSP registration extension:

- Reason Code – not critical  
The reason of the revocation is in this field.  
  
In case of suspended certificates it is a mandatory field, its value shall be: "certificateHold (6)".

## 8 Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

The *Trust Service Provider* has its operation periodically examined by independent external auditor. During the audit it is examined that the operation of the *Trust Service Provider* complies with the following normative documents:

- REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC [1];
- ETSI EN 319 401 V2.2.1 (2018-04); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers [15]
- ETSI EN 319 411-1 V1.2.2 (2018-04); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements [16]

The result of the screening is a confidential document accessible only to authorized persons.

The conformity certificate issued in accordance with the conformity assessment report is published on the webpage of the *Trust Service Provider*.

The *Trust Service Provider* applies verified and certified elements (electronic signature production IT system elements) in connection with the service.

The *Trust Service Provider* has rated every one of the system elements used for providing the services into security classes on the basis of its risk assessment system. The *Trust Service Provider* keeps records about these system elements and the security ratings associated with them in the scope of its risk management system.

In addition to the external audit, the *Trust Service Provider* also has its proprietary internal auditing system, which regularly examines compliance with previous audits, and takes the necessary steps in case of deviations.

The *Trust Service Provider* has an ISO 9001 standard compliant quality management system since 2002, moreover an ISO 27001 (formerly BS 7799) compliant information security management system since 2003, which are continuously audited and reviewed by an external auditing organisation. (see section: 1.3.1.)

### 8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment

The *Trust Service Provider* has the conformance assessment carried out annually on its IT system performing the provision of the services .

In case of a provider *Certificate* issued to a certification unit operated by another organization, the operation of the external certification unit is audited annually.

### 8.2 Identity/Qualifications of Assessor

The *Trust Service Provider* performs the internal audits with the help of its employees who hold the independent system auditor role.

The eIDAS and ETSI conformity assessment is performed by an organization, which has a qualifying mandate issued by the national accreditation organization of an EU Member State.

### 8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity

External audit is performed by a person who:

- is independent from the owners, management and operations of the examined *Trust Service Provider*;
- is independent from the examined organization, namely neither himself or herself nor his or her immediate relatives have any employment or business relationship with the *Trust Service Provider*.
- remuneration is not dependent on the findings of the activities carried out during the audit.

### 8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment

The review covers the following areas:

- compliance with the legislation currently in force;
- compliance with technical standards;
- compliance with the Certification Policy and the *Certification Practice Statement*;
- adequacy of the employed processes;
- documentation;
- physical security;
- adequacy of the personnel;
- IT security;
- compliance with the data protection rules.

If the *Trust Service Provider* issued a subordinate *Certificate* for the certification unit of another organization then the listed areas are examined at these external organizations as well.

### 8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

The independent auditor summarizes the result of the screening in a detailed screening report that covers the tested system components, processes, and contains the evidence used in the screening and the auditor statements. The discrepancies revealed during the examination and the deadlines set for correcting them are recorded in a separate chapter of the report.

The independent auditor may record based on their severity the differences and discrepancies revealed during the examination:

- modification suggestions to be optionally taken into consideration;
- derogations to be averted mandatorily.

## 8.6 Communication of Results

The *Trust Service Provider* publishes the summary report of the assessment on its web page on the following url:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/eidas/>

The *Trust Service Provider* doesn't publish the details of the findings, they are treated as confidential information.

## 9 Other Business and Legal Matters

### 9.1 Fees

The *Trust Service Provider* publishes fees and prices on its webpage, and makes them available for reading in printed form at its customer service.

The *Trust Service Provider* may unilaterally change the price list. The *Trust Service Provider* publishes any modification to the price list 30 days before it comes into force. The changes favorable for the *Client* may come into force with shorter deadline than 30 days. Modifications will not affect the price of services paid in advance.

Provisions associated with the payment and refunding of fees are contained in the service agreement and its annexes – the General Terms and Conditions in particular.

#### 9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

See section: 9.1.

#### 9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees

The *Trust Service Provider* grants free of charge on-line access to its *Certificate Repository* for the *Relying Parties*.

#### 9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

The *Trust Service Provider* provides free of charge on-line CRL and OCSP service for the *Relying Parties* on the status of all end-user and intermediate *Certificates* it issued.

#### 9.1.4 Fees for Other Services

See section: 9.1.

#### 9.1.5 Refund Policy

See section: 9.1.



## 9.2 Financial Responsibility

In order to facilitate trust the *Trust Service Provider* complies with the financial and liability requirements below.

### 9.2.1 Insurance Coverage

The *Trust Service Provider* has sufficient financial resources for its responsibilities related to the provision of services and for providing the costs related to its termination.

### 9.2.2 Other Assets

No stipulation.

### 9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-entities

- The *Trust Service Provider* has liability insurance to ensure reliability.
- The liability insurance covers the following damages caused by the *Trust Service Provider* in connection with the provision of services:
  - damages caused by the breach of the service agreement to the trust service *Clients*;
  - damages caused out of contract to the trust service *Clients* or third parties;
  - damages caused to the National Media and Infocommunications Authority by the *Trust Service Provider* terminating the provision of the trust service;
  - under the eIDAS Regulation [1] 17. article (4) e) point, the legal costs of conformity assessment bodies to perform a conformity assessment by the request of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority if it enforces the costs as legal costs.
- The liability insurance policy shall cover at least for 3.000.000 Hungarian forints. Coincidental damages occurred for the same reason constitute a single insurance event.
- The liability insurance provides coverage for the full damage of the aggrieved party – up to the liability limit – arising in context of the harmful behaviour of the *Trust Service Provider* regardless of whether the damage was caused by breach of contract or outside the contract.
- If the valid claim of several entitled parties related to an insurance event exceeds the liability limit defined for an insurance event in the liability insurance, then the compensation of the claims takes place in the proportion of the liability limit to the total sum of the claims.

## 9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information

The *Trust Service Provider* manages clients' data according to legal regulations. The *Trust Service Provider* has a data processing regulation (see section 9.4), which addresses the processing of personal data in particular.

By applying for a *Certificate*, and signing the service agreement, *Clients* consent to the *Trust Service Provider* retaining and processing their personal data (in a manner that complies with the

data processing regulations). Such consent applies to the forwarding of information specified by law and entered in records to third parties in case the *Trust Service Provider's* services go offline; moreover to forwarding such information to the *Trust Service Provider's* subcontractors – solely for the purpose of performing tasks associated with providing the service.

*Applicants* shall make a declaration as to their consent to the disclosure of a *Certificate* on the certificate application form that is linked to the service agreement.

The *Trust Service Provider* uses clients' data solely in connection with the provision of its services. The *Trust Service Provider* discloses *Subjects'* data appearing in a *Certificate* together with the *Certificate* in case a *Applicant* consents to this. The *Trust Service Provider* stores their data that are not entered in a *Certificate* in a secured manner, for the purpose of providing evidence about the *Subjects'* organisational identity, and that of its miscellaneous data provision related obligations. The *Trust Service Provider* retains data of which it becomes aware in accordance with statutory requirements, and for the stipulated period of time. In the course of retaining data, the *Trust Service Provider* sees to the intactness, confidentiality, and secure storage of information. It only permits accessing information to individuals whose tasks justify this.

The *Trust Service Provider* provides for the confidentiality and intactness of information that is not public during the forwarding of *Clients'* data.

### 9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

The *Trust Service Provider* treats as confidential:

- all *Client* data, with the exception of those that qualify as information not considered confidential in section 9.3.2;
- besides the *Client* data:
  - private keys and activation codes,
  - certificate applications and Service Contracts,
  - transaction related data and log data,
  - non-public regulations,
  - all data whose public disclosure would have an adverse effect on the security of the service.

### 9.3.2 Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information

The *Trust Service Provider* considers all data public that can be obtained from a public source, or to the disclosure of which the *Subscriber* gave its consent in writing beforehand.

In case the *Applicant* grants consent, the *Trust Service Provider* treats all of the data it indicates in a *Certificate* as non-confidential information. Such data appear in the *Certificate* application form linked to the service agreement in a clearly marked way.

The *Trust Service Provider* manages the revocation and suspension status of the end-user and intermediate provider *Certificates* as public information and makes it available without restriction to the *Relying Parties* by publishing a *Certificate Revocation List* (CRL) and by providing on-line Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) service. The disclosed information contains the serial number

of the Certificate, the time of the revocation and optionally the reason for revocation. For more information, see section 7.2. and 7.3.

### 9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

The *Trust Service Provider* is responsible for the protection of the confidential data it manages.

The *Trust Service Provider* obliges its employees, subcontractors, affiliated partners to protect all confidential data by signing declaration of confidentiality or by contract.

The *Trust Service Provider* processes confidential information it comes to possess according to the provisions of Act CXII of 2011. on the Right to Freedom Of Information, and only discloses it to persons/organizations in the following case:

- **Information provision for authorities**

For the purpose of investigating or preventing acts of crime committed using the trusted services it provides, as well as in the case of national security related interests, the *Trust Service Provider* – if the statutory criteria applicable to data requests are met – discloses the related identity information and the information verified by the *Trust Service Provider* according to the section (1) of the Eüt. [8] 90. § to investigating authorities and national security services free of charge.

The *Trust Service Provider* records the fact of data transfers, but does not inform involved clients about it.

- **Provision of information in the scope of litigation**

In the course of litigation and non-litigious actions under common law, the *Trust Service Provider* may hand over – in case their being affected is certified – *Subject* identity information and the information verified by the *Trust Service Provider*, to an adverse party or its representative, as well as it may disclose them to the inquiring court.

The *Trust Service Provider* records the fact of data transfers and informs impacted clients about it.

- **Disclosure upon owner's request**

Upon a *Client's* personal request to do so or on the basis of its authorisation granted officially, in writing, the *Trust Service Provider* reveals confidential user information pertaining to the *Client* to third parties.

- **Miscellaneous circumstances resulting in the disclosure of information**

Upon termination of its activity the *Trust Service Provider* is bound to hand over its records subject to the access obligations together with confidential user data to the trusted service provider that takes it over according to section (6) of 88. § Eüt. [8].

## 9.4 Privacy of Personal Information

The *Trust Service Provider* takes care of the protection of the personal data it manages, the operation and regulations of the *Trust Service Provider* comply with the requirements of the Act CXII of 2011. on the Right to Freedom Of Information [6] and the 2016/679 EU General Data Protection Regulation [2].

The *Trust Service Provider*:

- preserves,
- upon expiry of the obligation to retain – unless the *Client* otherwise indicates – deletes from the client database

the registered personal data and information on the *Client* in accordance with the legal requirements.

The *Trust Service Provider* stores identification data, data about the *Subject* appearing in the *Certificate*, data about the *Subscriber* associated with contact details and data connected to the provision of the service in its records.

The *Trust Service Provider* hands over *Client* data to third parties solely in cases where this is stipulated by a legal regulation or if the *Client* has granted its consent to this in writing.

### 9.4.1 Privacy Plan

The *Trust Service Provider* has a Privacy Policy and a Privacy Notice document, which contain detailed regulations for the handling of personal data.

The Privacy Policy is published on the webpage of the e-Szignó Certificate Authority on the following URL:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/all-documents.html>

The Privacy Notice is published on the webpage of the e-Szignó Certificate Authority on the following URL:

<https://e-szigno.hu/en/privacynotice.html>

### 9.4.2 Information Treated as Private

The *Trust Service Provider* protects all personal data related to the data subject or containing conclusions on the data subject that cannot be accessed publicly from the Certificate or other public data source.

### 9.4.3 Information Not Deemed Private

The *Trust Service Provider* may disclose the data of the *Subjects* indicated in the *Certificate* based on the written consent of the *Applicant*.

The *Trust Service Provider* may indicate the unique provider identifier assigned to the *Subject* in the *Certificate*.

#### 9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect Private Information

The *Trust Service Provider* stores securely and protects the personal data related to the *Certificate* issuance and not indicated in the *Certificate*. The data is protected by appropriate measures in particular against unauthorized access, alteration, and against disclosure.

#### 9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

The *Trust Service Provider* only discloses personal data indicated in the *Certificates* with the written consent of the *Client*.

#### 9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

In cases defined in the relevant legislation the *Trust Service Provider* may disclose the stored personal data about the *Client* without notifying the *Client*.

#### 9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

No stipulation.

### 9.5 Intellectual Property Rights

During its business operation, the *Trust Service Provider* shall not harm any intellectual property rights of a third person.

The owner of the private and public key issued by the *Trust Service Provider* to clients is the *Subscriber* and the full user is the *Applicant* regardless of the physical media that contains and protects the keys.

The owner of the *Certificate* issued by the *Trust Service Provider* to its clients is the *Trust Service Provider* and its full user is the *Applicant*.

The *Trust Service Provider* may publish, reproduce, revoke and manage the issued end-user *Certificates*, with the public key contained in them in the manner described in the terms and conditions.

The certificate revocation status information is the property of the *Trust Service Provider* which is disclosed as defined in sections 7.2. and 7.3.

The unique provider identifier issued to the *Clients* by the *Trust Service Provider* is the property of the *Trust Service Provider* which

is disclosed as a part of the *Certificate* by the *Trust Service Provider* in the *Certificate Repository*.

The named *Subject* and the *Client* is entitled to the use of the identification in the certificate (which identifies the *Certificate* subject).

The present *Certification Practice Statement* is the exclusive property of the *Trust Service Provider*. The *Clients* and other *Relying Parties* are only entitled to use the document according to the requirements of the present *Certification Practice Statement* and any other use for commercial or other purposes is strictly prohibited.

The present *Certification Practice Statement* may be freely distributed in unchanged form, in full length and with the indication of origin.

The rules of the application of the software provided for the use of the service by the *Trust Service Provider* is accessible in the description of the software and it is included in the user's guide referenced in the description.

## 9.6 Representations and Warranties

### 9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties

#### Certification Authority's Responsibility

The responsibility of the *Trust Service Provider* is in the *Certification Practice Statement*, the related *Certificate Policies*, and the service agreement with the *Client* and its attachments.

- The *Trust Service Provider* assumes responsibility for compliance with the procedures described in *Certificate Policies* it supports;
- The *Trust Service Provider* assumes responsibility as its own for the damages caused during the provision of the service by its subcontractors;
- The *Trust Service Provider* is liable under the rules of liability for breach of contract in the Civil Code of the Republic of Hungary [7] in relation to the *Clients* which are in a contractual relationship with it.
- The *Trust Service Provider* is liable under the rules of causing damage outside of contract in the Civil Code of the Republic of Hungary [7] in relation to third parties (such as the *Relying Party*) that are not in a contractual relationship with it.
- The *Trust Service Provider* will pay compensation for damages with the limitations specified in its regulations, and the service contracts concluded with Clients for proven damages that occur in the scope of its responsibility (see the section Limitation of Liability 9.8.).
- If the valid claim of several entitled parties related to an insurance event exceeds the amount defined for an insurance event in the liability insurance for the damages, then the compensation of the claims takes place in a relative ratio to the amount determined in the liability contract.

The *Trust Service Provider* is not responsible:

- for the *Subject* activities related to the private key;
- for the *Subject* activities related to the *Electronic Seal Creation Device*;
- for the certificate verification and usage activities of the *Relying Parties*;
- for the regulations issued by the *Relying Parties* or others.

### **Certification Authority Obligations**

The *Trust Service Provider's* basic obligations is that it shall provide the services in line with the *Certificate Policy*, this *Certification Practice Statement* and other regulations in the public domain, the contractual terms and conditions, furthermore corporate and security related internal regulations. These basic obligations are as follows:

- to establish the legal, regulatory, material, contractual, etc. framework appropriate for the service;
- to provide high standard and secure services in accordance with the applicable regulations;
- to continuously operate and audit organisations associated with the services (certification body, customer service etc.);
- to abide by the procedures prescribed in the regulations, and to avoid or eliminate any potentially occurring incorrect operation;
- to ensure the Services to every applicant who accepts the terms and conditions specified in the regulations;
- to maintain public and proprietary records, as well as to make them continuously available to anybody over the internet.

### **Certification Organization Obligations**

The certification organization has the task of setting up and operating the certification units (see section: 1.3.1), as well as units necessary for the online certificate status service, to take care of the certificate repository and revocation status related information to manage and make available smart cards, moreover to manage regulations.

The *Trust Service Provider's* internal, operative regulations specify how a certification organization shall be operated. Certification Authority's certificates issued by certification units are managed (for registration staff members, on-call duty staff, etc.) in accordance with the stipulations of operative regulations. This statement only includes stipulations in connection with the public provider and end-user certificates.

Tasks to be performed in the scope of managing regulations:

- the specification, approval, and maintenance of certificate types that are used;
- preparing the public regulations of the services and internal (not public) stipulations, their reconciliation with legal regulations and internal (not public) regulations, furthermore carrying out any updates;
- the recording of observations associated with regulations applicable to the services, and to evaluate recommendations.

The e-Szignó Certificate Authority is responsible:

- for the authenticity and accuracy of the *Certificates* it issued;

- for the regulations it has issued, and for their the conformity and compliance with statutory regulations;
- for the compliance of the key pairs it generated, and for the relationship between the private-public key and the *Certificate*;
- for the relationship of the *Electronic Seal Creation Device* activation code and the keys uploaded to the device;
- in general for the compliance with its obligations.

### 9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties

The customer service has the task of representing the *Trust Service Provider* at end-users in connection with the services. It performs the following tasks in the scope thereof:

- participates in selling the services;
- performs the registration of *Subjects*;
- receives requests pertaining to various certificate operations (suspension, revocation, reinstatement, certificate replacement);
- receives and handles data modification related filings;
- participates in revocation status publication;
- offers information provision activity to *Clients* and *Relying Parties* in connection with its activities associated with the services provided by the *Trust Service Provider*;

The *Registration Authority* is responsible:

- for establishing the personal identity of the person authorized to represent the *Applicants*;
- for the genuineness of recorded registration data;
- for providing information to those using the services as to the contents and availability of the *Certificate Policy* and the *Certification Practice Statement*, as well as the terms and conditions of using the service prior to concluding the service agreement;
- in general to fully comply with its obligations.

### 9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties

#### **Subscriber Responsibility**

The responsibility of the *Subscriber* is set by the service agreement and its attachments (including the terms and conditions).



### **Subscriber Obligations**

The responsibility of the *Subscriber* is to act in accordance with the contractual terms and regulations of the *Trust Service Provider* while using the service including requesting and applying the *Certificates* and private keys.

The obligations of the *Subscriber* are determined by this *Certification Practice Statement*, the service agreement and the standard policy conditions and other documents forming an integral part with it, as well as the relevant *Certificate Policys*.

When the *Subscriber* is informed about any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the private key associated with the public key included in a *Certificate* belonging to the *Subscriber*, the *Subscriber* is obliged to

- promptly report this fact to the *Trust Service Provider*,
- promptly request the revocation or suspension of the *Certificate*,
- promptly cease using the *Certificate* and its associated private key.

### **Subscriber Rights**

- *Subscribers* have the right to use the services in accordance with this *Certification Practice Statement*.
- *Subscribers* are entitled to specify which *Subjects* should be allowed to receive certificates, in writing, and *Subscribers* have the right to request the suspension and revocation of such certificates.
- *Subscribers* have the right to request the suspension and revocation of certificates.
- *Subscribers* are entitled to appoint *Organizational Administrators*.

### **Applicant Responsibility**

The *Applicant* is responsible for:

- the authentication, accuracy and validity of the data provided during registration;
- the verification of the data indicated in the *Certificate*;
- to provide immediate information on the changes of its data;
- using its *Electronic Seal Creation Device*, private key and *Certificate* according the regulations;
- the secure management of its private key and activation code;
- for the immediate notification and for full information of the *Trust Service Provider* in cases of dispute;
- to generally comply with its obligations.

***Applicant obligations***

The *Applicant* shall:

- read carefully this *Certification Practice Statement* before using the service;
- completely provide the data required by the *Trust Service Provider* necessary for using the service, and to provide truthful data;
- if the *Applicant* becomes aware of the fact that the necessary data supplied for using the service – especially data indicated in the certificate – have changed, it is obliged to immediately:
  - notify the *Trust Service Provider* in writing,
  - request the suspension or revocation of the *Certificate* and
  - terminate the usage of the *Certificate*;
- if the *Applicant* becomes aware of the fact that the subject's *Certificate* has been revoked, or that the issuing CA has been compromised, he shall immediately terminate the usage of the private key belonging to the *Certificate*;
- use the service solely for the purposes allowed or not proscribed by legal regulations, according to the cited regulations and documents;
- ensure that no unauthorized individuals have access to data and tools (passwords, secret codes, signature-creation devices) necessary for using the service;
- notify the *Trust Service Provider* in writing and without delay in case a legal dispute starts in connection with
  - any of the electronic seal or the *Certificates* associated with the service;
- cooperate with the *Trust Service Provider* in order to validate the data necessary for issuing certificates, and to do everything they can to allow the soonest possible completion of such verification;
- the *Applicant* shall answer to the requests of the *Trust Service Provider* within the period of time determined by the *Trust Service Provider* in case of key compromise or the suspicion of illegal use arises;
- acknowledge that the *Subscribers* entitled to request the revocation and/or suspension of the *Certificate*;
- acknowledge that the *Trust Service Provider* issues *Certificates* in the manner specified in the *Certification Practice Statement*, upon the completion of the validation steps described therein;
- acknowledge that the *Trust Service Provider* only displays data that are corresponding to reality in issued *Certificates*. Accordingly, the *Trust Service Provider* validates data to be entered in *Certificates* according to the *Certification Practice Statement*;

- acknowledge that the *Trust Service Provider* revokes the issued *Certificate* in case it becomes aware that the data indicated in the *Certificate* do not correspond to the reality or the private key is not in the sole possession or usage of the *Applicant* and in this case, the *Applicant* is bound to terminate the usage of the *Certificate*;
- acknowledge that the *Trust Service Provider* has the right to suspend and revoke *Certificates* if the *Subscriber* fails to pay the fees of the services by the deadline;
- acknowledge that the *Trust Service Provider* has the right to suspend and revoke *Certificate* if the *Subscriber* violates the service agreement or the *Trust Service Provider* becomes aware that the *Certificate* was used for an illegal activity.

### **Applicant Rights**

- *Applicants* have the right to apply for *Certificates* in accordance with the *Certification Practice Statement*.
- In case this is allowed by the applicable *Certificate Policy*, *Applicants* are entitled to request the suspension and the revocation of their *Certificates*, according to this *Certification Practice Statement*.

#### **9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties**

The *Relying Parties* decide based on their discretion and/or their policies about the way of accepting and using the *Certificate* . During the verification of the validity for keeping the security level guaranteed by the *Trust Service Provider* it is necessary for the *Relying Party* to act with caution, so it is particularly recommended to:

- comply with the requirements, regulations defined in the present *Certificate Policy* and the corresponding *Certification Practice Statement*;
- use reliable IT environment and applications;
- verify the revocation status of the *Certificate* based on the current CRL or OCSP response;
- take into consideration every restriction in relation to the *Certificate* usage which is included in the *Certificate*, in the the *Certification Practice Statement* and in the corresponding *Certificate Policy*.

#### **9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants**

No stipulation.

## 9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties

The *Trust Service Provider* excludes its liability if:

- the *Applicants* do not follow the requirements related to the management of the private key;
- it is unable to provide information or fulfil communication obligations due to the problems of the Internet, or part of it;
- the damage comes from a vulnerability or error of the cryptographic algorithms accepted by the National Media and Infocommunications Authority algorithmic decree.

## 9.8 Limitations of Liability

- The *Trust Service Provider* is not responsible for damages that arise from the *Relying Party* failing to proceed as recommended according to effective legal regulations and the *Trust Service Provider's* regulations in the course of validating and using certificates, moreover its failing to proceed as may be expected in the situation.
- The *Trust Service Provider* shall only be liable for contractual and non-contractual damages connected to its services in relation to third parties with respect to provable damages that occur solely on account of the chargeable violation of its obligations.
- The *Trust Service Provider* is not liable for damages that result from its inability to tend to its information provision and other communication related obligations due to the operational malfunction of the Internet or one of its components because of some kind of external incident beyond its control.
- If The *Trust Service Provider* engages data comparison with an authentic database before the issuance of the *Subject's Certificate*, it relays on the data received from the authentic database. The *Trust Service Provider* will not assume any liability for damages arising out of the inaccuracy of information provided by such authentic databases.
- The *Trust Service Provider* assumes liability solely for providing the services in accordance with the provisions of this *Certification Practice Statement*, as well as the documents to which reference is cited herein (Certification Policies, standards, recommendations), moreover with its proprietary internal regulations.

## Administrative Processes

The *Trust Service Provider* logs its activities, protects the intactness and authenticity of log entries, moreover retains (archives) log data over the long term in the interest of allowing for the establishing, documenting, and evidencing of financial accountability, its proprietary liability related to damage it causes, as well as that of damage compensation due to it for damage it suffers.

## **Financial Liability**

The *Trust Service Provider* has liability insurance according to the legal regulations required in order to ensure reliability.

### **Limitation of Financial Liability**

The *Trust Service Provider* does not limit the highest level of the obligation undertaken at the same time. The *Trust Service Provider* limits its compensation obligation related to its services, the rate of this limitation is:

- related to Certificates belonging to the III. certification unit, 100.000,-HUF per insurance incident;
- related to Certificates belonging to the II. certification unit, 100.000,-HUF. per insurance incident;

If the valid claim of several entitled parties related to an insurance event exceeds the amount defined for an insurance event in the liability insurance for the damages, then the compensation of the claims takes place in a relative ratio to the amount determined in the liability contract.

## **9.9 Indemnities**

### **9.9.1 Indemnification by the *Trust Service Provider***

The detailed rules of the indemnities of the *Trust Service Provider* are specified in this regulation (see section: 9.8. ), the service agreement and the contracts concluded with the *Clients*.

### **9.9.2 Indemnification by Subscribers**

The *Subscriber* and the Subject are liable for damages to the *Trust Service Provider* for the loss or damage caused by non-compliance with their obligations and the relevant recommendations.

### **9.9.3 Indemnification by Relying Parties**

See section: 9.8.

## **9.10 Term and Termination**

### **9.10.1 Term**

The effective date of the specific *Certification Practice Statement* is specified on the cover of the document.

### 9.10.2 Termination

The *Certification Practice Statement* is valid without a time limit until withdrawal or the issuance of the newer version of the *Certification Practice Statement*.

Section 9. of the *Certification Practice Statement* shall remain effective even after the termination of the *Certification Practice Statement*'s effect (regardless of the manner in which effectiveness is terminated) in connection with any and all *Certificates* which the *Trust Service Provider* will have issued while the *Certification Practice Statement* was effective.

### 9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival

In case of the withdrawal of the *Certification Practice Statement* the *Trust Service Provider* publishes the detailed rules of the withdrawal and the rights and obligations persisting after withdrawal on its webpage.

The *Trust Service Provider* guarantees that in case of a the *Certification Practice Statement* withdrawal, requirements for the protection of the confidential data remain in effect.

## 9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants

The *Trust Service Provider* maintains a customer service in order to contact with its *Clients*.

The *Clients* may make their legal declarations to the *Trust Service Provider* solely in writing, and in executed form. Executing in representation of an organisation shall only be valid together with certification of such right of representation.

Issued *Certificates* may also be suspended by sending an SMS. Notifications of other nature may also be given in writing, in the form of electronic mail or fax.

The e-Szignó Certificate Authority informs its *Clients* by means of publication on its webpage or in electronic mail.

## 9.12 Amendments

The *Trust Service Provider* reserves the right to change the *Certification Practice Statement* in a controlled way in case of the change of normative rules, security requirements, market conditions or other circumstances.

### 9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment

The *Trust Service Provider* only discloses those of its procedures in its public domain regulations whose knowledge does not jeopardize the security of the services. The *Trust Service Provider* has a number of internal security and other regulations, as well as operative level stipulations which it treats in confidence (this certificate practice statement mentions several such). The procedures described in section 8.4. audit these documents as well.

A team responsible for maintaining regulations and documentation operates within the *Trust Service Provider*'s organization. This team collects change requests, carries out modifications, and meets any internal and external information provision related obligations. The statement is approved by the director of the e-Szignó Certificate Authority.

The team produces internal, non-public working copies of the regulations as it collects changes, and these undergo internal review before being published. The *Trust Service Provider* strives to only issue new regulations at the least frequent intervals possible.

The *Trust Service Provider* reviews the *Certification Practice Statement* annually or in case of exceptional request for change with priority and performs the necessary changes. The document will receive a new version number even after the smallest change and by taking into account the time required by the endorsement process, the planned date of coming into effect will be determined too.

The accepted document will be published on the webpage of the *Trust Service Provider*.

### 9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period

The *Trust Service Provider* notifies the *Relying Parties* of new document version issuances as described in Section 9.12.1..

### 9.12.3 Circumstances Under Which OID Must Be Changed

The *Trust Service Provider* issues a new version number in case of even the smallest change to the *Certification Practice Statement*, which is part of the document identifier (OID), so any change to the document will result in an OID change, namely two documents – entered into force – with different content cannot have the same OID.

## 9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions

The *Trust Service Provider* aims for the peaceful and negotiated settlement of the disputes arising from its operation. The settlement follows the principle of gradual approach.

The *Trust Service Provider* and the *Client* mutually agree that in the case of any disputed issue or complaint arising whatsoever, they will attempt amicable consultation through negotiation before taking the dispute to legal channels. The initiating party will be obliged to notify every other affected party promptly and to inform them fully concerning all of the case's implications.

The *Client* in case of a deputation is entitled to appeal to the Arbitration Board of Budapest before incidental judicial proceedings.

Questions, objections, and complaints related to the activity of the *Trust Service Provider* or the use of issued *Certificates* shall be addressed to the customer care centre office in written form. The *Trust Service Provider* notifies submitting parties at the address they specify about having received a submission and the time required for investigation, within 3 business days calculated as of receiving a submission. The *Trust Service Provider* is obliged to issue a written response to the submitter within the specified time limit. The *Trust Service Provider* may request the provision of information required for giving a response from the submitter. The *Trust Service Provider* investigates complaints within 30 days, and notifies submitters about the results thereof.

Should a submitter find the response inadequate or if the dispute which had arisen can not be settled based on it without getting the *Trust Service Provider* involved, the submitter may initiate consultation with the *Trust Service Provider* and the *Relying Parties*. All participants of such consultation shall be given written notice regarding the date of consultation 10 business days

in advance thereof; and the submission, the *Trust Service Provider's* response, as well as any documents containing other required information shall be sent to them in writing.

Should consultation fail to achieve a result within 30 business days calculated as of a complaint being submitted, the submitter may file a lawsuit with respect to the issue. The *Relying Parties* shall subject themselves to the sole jurisdiction of the II. and III. District Court of Budapest and/or that of the Municipal Court of Budapest.

## 9.14 Governing Law

The *Trust Service Provider* at all times operates in accordance with the Hungarian legislation in force. The Hungarian law is the proper law of the *Trust Service Provider* contracts, regulations, and their execution, and they are to be construed by the Hungarian law.

## 9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

The applicable regulations:

- REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 of the EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC [1];
- (Hungarian) Act CXII of 2011 on the Right to Freedom Of Information [6];
- (Hungarian) Act V of 2013. on the Civil Code. [7].
- (Hungarian) Act CCXXII of 2015 on electronic administration and the general rules of trust services [8];
- (Hungarian) Ministry of Interior Decree 24/2016. (VI. 30.) on the requirements for trust service providers and their services [9];
- (Hungarian) Ministry of Interior Decree 25/2016. (VI. 30.) on the administrative service fees paid to the trust service supervisory body and on fee rates [10];
- (Hungarian) Government Decree 470/2017. (XII. 28.) on the announcement according to trust services and on the content of registers maintained by the trust service supervisory body [12];
- (Hungarian) Government Decree 137/2016. (VI. 13.) on the requirements for the use of electronic signatures and seals related to the provision of electronic administration services [11];

## 9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions

### 9.16.1 Entire Agreement

No stipulation.



**9.16.2 Assignment**

The providers operating according to this *Certification Practice Statement* may only assign their rights and obligations to a third party with the prior written consent of *Trust Service Provider*.

**9.16.3 Severability**

Should some of the provisions of the present *Certification Practice Statement* become invalid for any reason, the remaining provisions will remain in effect unchanged.

**9.16.4 Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of Rights)**

The *Trust Service Provider* is entitled to claim payment for damages and attorney fees for reimbursement of the damages, losses, expenses caused by its partners. If in a particular case the *Trust Service Provider* does not exercise its claim for damages that does not mean that in similar cases in the future or in case of violation of other provisions of the present *Certification Practice Statement*, it would waive the enforcement of claims for damages.

**9.16.5 Force Majeure**

The *Trust Service Provider* is not responsible for the defective or delayed performance of the requirements set out in the *Certificate Policy* and the *Certification Practice Statement* if the reason for failure or delay was a condition that is outside the control of the *Trust Service Provider*.

**9.17 Other Provisions**

No stipulation.

## A Interpretation of the short policy names

For the simpler handling of the *Certificate Policies* the *Trust Service Provider* defines a five characters long short name (identifier) for each *Certificate Policy*, where each character is meaningful and defines some basic features of the given policy according to the following rules:

- First character [?....]
  - M: qualified *Certificate Certificate Policy*
  - H: non-qualified, III. certificate class *Certificate Certificate Policy*
  - K: non-qualified, II. certificate class *Certificate Certificate Policy*
  - A: non-qualified, automatic issuance *Certificate Certificate Policy*
- Second character [.?...]
  - A: Signing purpose *Certificate Certificate Policy*
  - B: Seal creation purpose *Certificate Certificate Policy*
  - W: *Website Authentication Certificate Certificate Policy*
  - K: *Codesigning Certificate Certificate Policy*
  - E: Other purpose *Certificate Certificate Policy*
- Third character [..?..]
  - T: *Certificate* issued to a natural person *Certificate Policy*
  - J: *Certificate* issued to a legal person *Certificate Policy*
  - x: no stipulation, can be issued to any type of *Subject*
- Fourth character [...?..]
  - B: *Certificate* issued on *Qualified Electronic Seal Creation Device Certificate Policy*
  - H: *Certificate* issued on *Cryptographic Hardware Device Certificate Policy*
  - S: *Certificate* issued by software *Certificate Policy*
  - x: no stipulation, it can be issued on any platforms
- Fifth character [....?]
  - A: pseudonymous *Certificate Certificate Policy*
  - N: pseudonym excluding *Certificate Certificate Policy*

## B REFERENCES

- [1] Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC .
- [2] REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) .
- [3] (Hungarian) Act LXVI of 1992 on the registration of citizens' personal data and address .
- [4] (Hungarian) Act XXXV of 2001 on Electronic Signatures (repealed from 1st July 2016.) .
- [5] (Hungarian) Act II of 2007 on the entry and residence of persons enjoying the right of free movement and residence .
- [6] (Hungarian) Act CXII of 2011 on the Right to Freedom Of Information .
- [7] (Hungarian) Act V of 2013. on the Civil Code .
- [8] (Hungarian) Act CCXXII of 2015 on the general rules of electronic administration and trust services .
- [9] (Hungarian) Ministry of Interior Decree 24/2016. (VI. 30.) on the requirements for trust service providers and their services .
- [10] (Hungarian) Ministry of Interior Decree 25/2016. (VI. 30.) on the administrative service fees paid to the trust service supervisory body and on fee rates .
- [11] (Hungarian) Government Decree 137/2016. (VI. 13.) on the requirements for the use of electronic signatures and stamps related to the provision of electronic administration services .
- [12] (Hungarian) Government Decree 470/2017. (XII. 28.) on the announcement according to trust services and on the content of registers maintained by the trust service supervisory body .
- [13] (Hungarian) Government Decree 132/2020. (IV. 17.) on the Different Application of Certain Legislation Related to Electronic Identification Conditions, Enforcement and Media Service Fees in the Event of an Emergency .
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- [16] ETSI EN 319 411-1 V1.2.2 (2018-04); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements.
- [17] ETSI EN 319 412-1 V1.1.1 (2016-02); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 1: Overview and common data structures.
- [18] ETSI EN 319 412-2 V2.1.1 (2016-02); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 2: Certificate profile for certificates issued to natural persons;.
- [19] ETSI EN 319 412-3 V1.1.1 (2016-02); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 3: Certificate profile for certificates issued to legal persons.
- [20] ETSI EN 319 412-4 V1.1.1 (2016-02); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Certificate Profiles; Part 4: Certificate profile for web site certificates.
- [21] ETSI TS 119 312 V1.3.1 (2019-02); Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Cryptographic Suites.
- [22] CEN 419 221-5; Protection Profiles for TSP Cryptographic Modules - Part 5: Cryptographic Module for Trust Services.
- [23] ISO 3166-1:2013, Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions – Part 1: Country codes.
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- [25] ISO/IEC 19790:2012: Information technology – Security techniques – Security requirements for cryptographic modules.
- [26] IETF RFC 3647: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, November 2003.
- [27] IETF RFC 4043: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Permanent Identifier, May 2005.
- [28] IETF RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, May 2008.
- [29] IETF RFC 6818: Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, January 2013.
- [30] IETF RFC 6960: X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure - Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), June 2013.
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- [37] Magyarország (Hungary): Trusted List ([http://www.nmhh.hu/tl/pub/HU\\_TL.pdf](http://www.nmhh.hu/tl/pub/HU_TL.pdf)).
- [38] e-Szignó Certification Authority - eIDAS conform Non-Qualified Certificate for Electronic Seal Certificate Policies.
- [39] e-Szignó Certification Authority - Qualified Signing Certificate Policies .
- [40] e-Szignó Certification Authority - General Terms and Conditions. .