

Secure Signature Creation Devices (SSCDs)

...from different approaches

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Requirements for SSCDs

Annex III of the e-Signature Directive, in plain words:

1. SSCDs must ensure that the signature creation data:

(a) is secret and unique;

(b) the signature is protected vs. forgery;

(c) is reliably protected, only the signatory can use it.

- 2. SSCDs must not
 - alter the data to be signed;
 - prevent the data to be signed from being presented to the signatory.

Very high level requirements. More or less common sense.



SSCD as a crypto token



- Stores the private key of the signatory
- Capable of authenticating the signatory
- Outputs a signature if the signatory is authenticated only
- Private key or auth data cannot be retrieved from it
- Small and simple enough to be secure
- Usually it is a piece of hardware



Conformity assessment of SSCDs

- A device is considered an SSCD if its conformity had been assessed by a designated body.
- Lower level criteria for assessment:
 - Common Criteria, SSCD PP, EAL4+
 - other criteria based on FIPS 140-X or ITSEC
 - or anything that fulfills the criteria in Annex III of the Directive
- An SSCD assessed in one Member State is to be recognized in all other Member States



Different approaches to SSCDs

- Personal devices (e.g. smart card, USB token)
- Solutions based on a central server
- Solutions for mass creation of signatures
- Solutions based on mobile phones

etc...

Let's take a look at some examples!



Smart card

- Standardized device ③
- People can relate to cards (as they use credit cards)
- Can be personalized ③
- Needs a card reader 🙁
- Driver problems, lack of support on various platforms
 S
- CSPs have little or no bargaining power vs card manufacturers ⁽³⁾







USB token

- A personal crypto token, just like a smart card
- No card reader required ☺
- It is harder for people to relate to it ⊗
- PIN pad readers cannot be used → they are less secure ⊗ (?)
- Can be combined with a USB drive ☺/☺
- Same driver problems as smart cards ⊗⊗⊗





Hardware Security Module (HSM)

- Personalized HSM storing the private key of one signatory
 - mass signing, great performance ③
 - expensive $\otimes \rightarrow$ for large organizations only
- Multiple signatories have their keys in an HSM of a central server
 - □ I do not own my private key ☺
 - how do I authenticate to the HSM???
- Not accepted in every member state ⊗



Pure software SSCD, without hardware?

- Why not? ③ It works everywhere! ③③
- It is possible to backup the private key ☺/☺
- My experience: a natural person CANNOT take care of a software based private key ⁽³⁾
- Questionable degree of security ⊗⊗
- Can be a viable solution for large organizations who can protect a software key ©©
- Why the signatory cannot choose the solution that fits her the best?





Mass signing with multiple smart cards

- Sometimes, in some legal environments...
 - mass signing is needed
 - qualified signatures are required
 - an HSM cannot be used as an SSCD
- Solution: A device containing multiple SSCD smart cards is used for mass creation of signature Such a device is:
 - such a device should not exist \mathfrak{S}
 - \square a circumvention of legislation \otimes \otimes
 - \square a logical response to bad regulation \otimes \otimes





Mobile phones (1)

A mobile phone can be viewed as a personal device. How can we sign using mobile phones?

- SIM card as an SSCD
 - $\hfill\square$ depends on the telco operator $\ensuremath{\mathfrak{S}}$
 - \Box depends on the phone \otimes
- Additional hardware SSCD connected to the phone
 - heavily depends on the phone $\mathfrak{S}\mathfrak{S}$
 - at least the same driver & compatibility issues as hardware SSCDs in PCs ^(B)



Mobile phones (2)

- Software on the mobile phone, so the mobile phone becomes the SSCD
 - \square depends on the phone \otimes
 - is it really secure? ⊗⊗
 - \square phones change a lot, hard to evaluate $\otimes \otimes$
- Server-based solution, phone as authentication
 - does not depend on client platforms ©©
 - □ I do not have my private key in my pocket ☺
 - □ can a rouge telco operator sign on my behalf? ☺



Myths, fairy tales, urban legends (1)

- A QES must be extremely secure!
- No, it is equivalent with handwritten signatures; a handwritten signature is not secure at all
- □ it should be usable; otherwise it shall never be used
- mass signing: a way of saving money
- QES is so important that it must be strictly separated from everything else!
 - □ the same card/PIN cannot be used for anything else?
 - this is unrealistic, and makes signatures unusable



- The signatory must view and accept the document before signing it!
- this does not happen with handwritten signatures in over 90% of the cases



Myths, fairy tales, urban legends (2)

- A PIN must be provided for each QES created!
 - what about mass signing?
- An SSCD MUST establish a secure cypto channel...
 - with what? with the human signatory???
 - with the application? (rules out most applications)
 - with the driver? (what's the point in that?)
- Security assessment provides additional security
 - evaluation takes LONG, costs a lot of money
 - PC software are complex, there: assessed product = product with known vulnerabilities
 - SSCDs are more simple; is their case different?



Myths, fairy tales, urban legends (3)

- Smart card readers with PIN pads are more secure
 - □ PIN pad reader \leftarrow → crypto channel
 - The document must be hashed on the SSCD for security
 - does not protect the signatory at all
 - but: it may prevent the signatory from using encryption
 - It is more secure to authenticate the signatory using biometry
- CEN SSCD PP is a common ground for SSCDs
 - it focuses on crypto tokens only
 - it has many-many different interpretations
 - in encourages circumvention and 'evaluation tweaking'



Conclusions & Recommendations

- e-Signing should be simple, otherwise users will not accept it. Signing is not the purpose of existence, people have other things to do.
- Mass creation of e-signatures (or e-seals) is a requirement from the market.
- Natural persons cannot relate to software keys, they can handle a hardware device much better.
- SSCD PP is suits personal crypto tokens the most. It is often blocking innovation and is often circumvented.
- The current regulation or current situation with SSCDs is one of the obstacles blocking the market.
- Relax the requirements, make the technology usable!



Thank you very much! 🙂

